The construction of military-grade bases in three artificial islands (Subi, Fiery Cross and Mischief Reefs), posting of troops with missile defense capability in four others (Cuarteron, Gaven, Hughes, and Johnson South Reefs), conduct of regular naval and coast guard patrols, and use of paramilitary fishing units in the South China Sea are clear indications that China’s maritime campaign has fully developed a new form of warfare to achieve its political objectives. Some observers argue that this type of engagement –hybrid warfare– emanated from Mao Zedong’s revolutionary strategy of protracted war, but now applied in the maritime domain.
There is no single definition of hybrid warfare. Some broadly refer to it as a kind of warfare that is beneath the level of conventional warfare and above the limit of unconventional warfare. One security expert defines it as “the simultaneous and adaptive employment of a fused mix of conventional weapons, irregular tactics, terrorism and criminal behavior in the battlespace to obtain political objectives.” Hybrid warfare commences long after the start, continues during, and ends before the conclusion of the political warfare. In some instances, conventional warfare is used in short duration so calibrated as to avoid a full blown conflict. China’s employment of this kind of warfare, both on land and at sea, is evident in many cases.
After Mao’s takeover of the mainland, and while aiding the North Koreans in early 1950s, the Chinese embarked on annexing Tibet to bolster its western border defense. China extensively used information campaigns before, during and after the assault of its 20,000 regulars resulting in the killing of 5,700 poorly trained Tibetan troops. China also infiltrated the major religious groups to sow dissension, thus, making the country too disorganized to resist. This eventually led to Tibet’s occupation and transformation into a political system dictated by the invaders. The campaign demonstrated China’s superior military power and willingness to fight while depriving the targeted nation the ability to fight back.
Following the conclusion of the Korean War and wanting to export its new revolutionary framework, China supported the insurgencies in Vietnam (against the French, and later the Americans) and Thailand (aiding the Communist Party of Thailand to prevent Thailand’s support to US forces based there during the Vietnam War). China’s assistance came in the form of ideological training, financial support, propaganda and military hardware.
The communist leaders in Laos, Cambodia, Malaysia and the Philippines also received some assistance to undermine their government and way of life, to further Mao’s ideology.
When the US forces withdrew from Vietnam in 1975, the communists took control of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. They formed a regional federation that had a Soviet inclination. Cambodia, however, resisted Vietnam’s attempt to dominate the alliance because of some border disputes. Alarmed by the Soviet’s growing influence in its two southern neighbors, China saw this crack between Vietnam and Cambodia and exploited the situation. China engaged Vietnam militarily in the late 1970s in land and at sea, and supported Cambodia in fomenting insurgency within Vietnam’s territory. In 1991, Vietnam’s counterinsurgency war against Cambodia ended in success, and thereafter, both countries normalized their diplomatic ties.
One recent case of China’s employment of hybrid warfare is in Bhutan in 2017. Both claimed by Bhutan and China, the Doklam Plateau is included in Bhutan’s map. The small territory also lies along India’s Himalayas border and is considered a strategic chokepoint. The Chinese used legal rhetoric to make it appear that Doklam Plateau is within Chinese territory. They eventually crossed the border and destroyed the Bhutan army bunkers there, and started constructing roads escorted by regular PLA troops. This prompted India to deploy army units to block the road construction and crossed the Chinese border. This led to a two-month standoff. India’s entry to the scene was in its capacity as unofficial security ally of Bhutan. After a negotiation, both India and China later withdrew their troops in the area. This case illustrated China’s testing the security relations between India and Bhutan using methods short of a shooting war.
China’s maritime application of hybrid warfare in Senkaku Islands is worth mentioning to compare its use in South China Sea. With conflicting arguments on the ownership of the islands, Taiwanese and Chinese fishing vessels have entered the EEZ waters since 2006 and some even have had collisions with Japanese Coast Guard vessels. A few years later, some Taiwanese and Hongkong activists, on separate occasions, escorted by Chinese Coast Guard approached within territorial seas of the main island to assert sovereignty. In response, Japanese activists also sailed to the islands without government permission and succeeded in planting a Japanese flag in one of the islands.
In 2012, there were numerous maritime and aerial incursions. Both sporadic and frequent incursions came about only in early 1970s when scientific surveys revealed the existence of energy resources in the area. To escalate the situation, China implemented in 2013 an Air Defense Identification Zone around the islands. Apart from mobilizing its paramilitary, civilian, military and infrastructure, China has sustained its information campaign in print, broadcast media, and in cyberspace to create perceptions favorable to its political goal. Japan, in turn, strengthened its relations with the US that declared the Senkakus under the coverage of the existing US-Japan Defense Treaty.
The South China Sea is where China completely achieved the aim of hybrid warfare. Before 2013, China’s seven detachments in various features in the Spratlys were no different from other claimants’ troop installations. It upgraded 3 detachments into modern, military-grade bases and strengthened the others to take effective control of the internal portions of the sea.
To placate the surrounding and claimant nations, China established a maritime rescue center in Fiery Cross Reef and permanently stationed search and rescue vessels in Subi Reef. Its Mischief Reef airfield can accommodate jet fighters, light bombers and transports. The development of these military installations came about without any physical resistance from the claimant states. Those attempting to improve their detachments faced China’s formidable paramilitary fishing fleet with its coast guard and naval units nearby to render support upon request.
For example, when the Philippines continued the repair of its airstrip in Pagasa Island in April 2019, some 600 Chinese fishing boats encircled the island to prevent the delivery of construction materials and supplies. The Chinese also prevented Philippine supply ships to re-provision Filipino soldiers stationed in Ayungin Shoal three years earlier. In 2013, the Chinese also established full control of the Scarborough Shoal, a rich fishing ground of the Philippines located north of the Spratlys and west of Luzon Island, and well within the Philippine EEZ.
By all indications the Chinese decided to control the South China Sea when their energy and food resources became insufficient to sustain their economic objectives including the realization of their Belt and Road Initiative. This creeping invasion happened while they engaged, politically and economically, the littoral states whose leaders fail to foresee the implications of China’s seemingly benign intentions.
The Chinese actions in the above conflict situations reflect all or some of Mao’s strategic principles in pursuing a protracted war. Ross Babbage identified these principles as: establishing clear goals, making ambit claims, designing a compelling narrative, asserting inevitable victory, correlating contending forces, generating a “sea” of supporters, engaging in intense political warfare, fostering international friendship, seizing initiative, exploiting political weaknesses, tightening party discipline, dominating the media, avoiding frontal operations, striking empty spaces, observing strategic patience, and employing the 3 primary phases of protracted war (strategic defensive, strategic stalemate, and strategic offensive). Some of these principles are variations of Mahan’s and Corbett’s maritime strategies. Interestingly, it is only in the South China Sea campaign that the Chinese applied all these principles in their hybrid warfare operations.
While it appears that Chinese control over the South China Sea is “rock solid” to the extent that it can continuously disregard an international arbitral court ruling in 2016, some strategists view that China’s sea control is only limited to peacetime. It could use its military might to disrupt the flow of trade estimated at 3 trillion US dollars annually. But it would be temporary. China could lose trading partners and may not be able to effectively parry the collective action of the affected nations. The multilateral naval exercises by some littoral states, the freedom of navigation operations including aerial surveillance patrols of the US Navy, and the plan of other advanced navies to show their flags in the South China Sea appear to irritate China.
From military standpoint, under conventional warfare scenario, the geographical distance of China’s artificial island installations from their major supply base in Hainan, 500 miles away, presents both logistical and operational challenges. With some reports that China cannot station its advanced tactical fighters in Mischief Reef due to maintenance and operational problems, its air superiority would be unsustainable. Static targets such as those island bases are easy to neutralize by missile attacks or special warfare operations. Likewise, the surrounding chokepoints located in the littoral states that are beyond China’s influence could greatly reduce China’s ability to maneuver in certain sea areas.
China’s hybrid warfare operations in South China Sea have attracted the attention of the world community. How the United Nations could compel the member states to abide by the rule of law and to behave within the well-established norms of conduct would be a great challenge. Reducing if not removing the tension in that vital waterway would certainly benefit all.