A Chinese embassy official once told a Philippine diplomat, “Why don’t you get closer to a friendly neighbour rather than a distant cousin?” Of course he was referring to the relationship between the Philippines and China vis a vis the former and the United States. On another occasion a US official, on the same topic similarly quipped, “Yes, you cannot choose your neighbours but you can choose your friends.” Two superpowers contending for the preferred attention of a smaller but a very important state.

What the Constitution Says. The 1987 Constitution provides direct guidance on how the country shall conduct its foreign policy: “The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In its relations with other states the paramount consideration shall be national sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest and the right to self-determination.” Our nation is free to choose who, in what manner and when to engage any state. The national interest is the paramount consideration.

In 1848, British PM Lord Palmerston declared, “We have no eternal allies, and we have-not perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.” History shows many applications of this principle as long-time friends or allies become protagonists and former enemies become friends and partners.

Although not defined in the Constitution, sovereignty is understood as the absolute control and exclusive jurisdiction by a nation-state over its territory and internal affairs.

Relatedly, while the Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, this clause refers to offensive wars or wars of aggression and not defensive war since the power to wage a defensive war is the very essence of sovereignty. And the defense of the state is a primordial obligation of the government and of the people. Self defense is an inherent right of nations.

Furthermore, the Constitution says that the State is obliged to “protect the nation’s marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone” in conformity with international law and the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

What the Supreme Court Said. During the deliberation of the 2014 PH-US Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), the Supreme Court expounded that

“the President of the Philippines, as the sole repository of executive power, is the guardian of the Philippine archipelago, including all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all other territories over which the  Philippines has sovereignty and jurisdiction. These territories consist of its terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial domains; including its territorial sea, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas; and the waters around, between, and connecting, the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions.”

The necessity of forging alliances with friendly nations was cited in Saguisag versus Exec Sec. Ochoa and the Supreme Court described the President’s task as:

“It is the president’s prerogative to do whatever is legal and necessary for Philippine defense interests…and this duty of defending the country is unceasing, even in times when there is no state of lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion…It would therefore be remiss for the President and repugnant to the…Constitution to do nothing when the call of the moment requires increasing the military’s defensive capabilities, which could include forging alliances with states that hold a common interest with the Philippines or bringing an international suit against an offending state.”

As established, the President “is the Commander-in-Chief in times of peace and war and includes the power to wage war successfully but also the power and responsibility to prepare for the eventuality of war…, in cooperation with Congress.”

PH Defense Cooperation: the MDT and the VFA. The Philippines has some 38 defense cooperation agreements with other countries aimed to preserve peaceful relations, to advance the national interests overseas and enhance the country’s defense capabilities. As the only treaty ally of the Philippines, the defense partnership with the US is the most advanced as manifested in the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951 (MDT), the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) of 1998 and the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) of 2014.

Similar to the PH-US MDT, the US mutual defense and security agreements with both Japan and South Korea provide that “an armed attack against either party would be dangerous to its own peace and security, and declares that each party would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes.”

The VFA is a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and is the key enabler of the MDT. No sending state would be inclined to send its troops on foreign soil on a cooperative mission without clear rules and guidelines on the rights and privileges of the visiting troops. Under international law, a SOFA differs from military occupation. The United States has more than 120 SOFAs with various countries.

Only two countries have a Visiting Forces Agreement with the Philippines: the US and Australia. The SOFA with Australia was ratified by the Philippine Senate in July 2012, with only one dissenter and it was described by Malacanang as enhancing our national and regional security. Australia is a defense ally of the United States under the ANZUS and Five Eyes defense agreements.

It should be noted that while the Constitution prohibits the establishment of foreign troops, facilities or bases on Philippine soil, this is not an absolute prohibition. Three conditions must be met first to allow them: (1) that the terms are contained in a treaty concurred by the Senate; (2)  If Congress requires, it is ratified by a majority of votes cast in a national referendum; and (3) that the agreement is recognized by the sending state as a treaty. The VFA with the US was ratified by the Philippine Senate in May 1999. A “VFA-2” or the counterpart agreement was also approved.

Separate convictions by Philippine courts for grave criminal offenses of two US military personnel, LCpls. Daniel Smith (2006) and Joseph Scott Pemberton (2014) and who consequently served their jail sentences in the Philippines, and later released or pardoned, are considered proof that the VFA works.

THE RELEVANCE OF DEFENSE ALLIANCES. Alliances and defense partnerships between nations with common interests are forged for reasons of security. It provides a sense of assurance and promotes trust among the signatories. Shared intelligence provides early warning of an impending threat. Shared resources also lower the cost of defense spending. Alliances deter aggression.

When the threat of the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, it was thought that NATO would also be dissolved. Yet NATO members decided to continue maintaining it, with some saying that it was more than a military alliance, a “community of values” that transcends any specific threat. NATO was considered a source of stability for its “valuable organizational and cooperative experience that serves as an insurance policy against future threats.”

There are three levels of defense relationships: (1) treaty ally; (2) defense partner; and (3) friend. A treaty ally obliges each party to defend and come to the aid of the other in case of aggression. Partners and friends do not have that obligation to send troops or defend the other but may agree to provide support to maintain and develop defense capabilities. Australia, Japan, and South Korea are defense partners of the Philippines; while Malaysia and Indonesia are friends.

Some defense relationships became problematic. Pakistan is still linked to the US by the 1954 Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement but has moved closer to China while the US has moved to Pakistan’s rival, India. The MDT between the US and Taiwan was terminated in 1980 since recognition has shifted to the People’s Republic of China and yet recent action of the 7^th Fleet in the Taiwan Strait, huge arms sales, and visits of top officials to Taipei provide an assurance of support to Taiwan in case of a Chinese invasion.

There may be issues and complaints about alliances, such as: “free riding” with big allies like the US, essentially making them pay for a smaller country’s defense, and in so doing, the smaller country could use their resources on social welfare or economic projects instead. In contrast, Secretary of National Defense Delfin Lorenzana recommends that the PH increase its defense budget to at least 2% of its GDP from 0.95%. However, for decades the PH defense budget has not appreciably increased. Nevertheless, in recent years, a program for the modernization of the AFP has been undertaken.

Some advantages of alliances:

1. Alliances prevent wars – it drives up the cost of aggression and deters states from using violence to settle disputes. Allies are less at risk of attack than those without them. Would North Korea be restrained to invade South Korea if there is no defense treaty between the ROK and the US?
2. Alliances control rivals – using a network of bases and control of chokepoints, rivals are denied freedom of movement. Is defense cooperation with China desirable? What are the costs? Allowing access to PLAN ships and PLAAF aircraft in PH ports or bases would certainly expand the PLA’s geographic reach, facilitate logistics, and advance the security interest of China in the South China Sea. How about the Philippines’ security interest of resisting their illegal activities e.g., artificial island construction that are now military bases –within the PH EEZ– and their excessive territorial claims using the Nine Dash-Line declaration? Undoubtedly, US Freedom of Navigation (FONOPS) patrols deter more aggressive behaviour of the PLA in the South China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, and the Sea of Japan.
3. Alliances control allies – a dominant partner is usually concerned with being entrapped by a smaller partner who might be tempted to go it alone when it perceives a quick victory in a short war. Throwback to the late 60s: what could have happened if the Philippines, an ally of the US, decided to invade Sabah which is controlled by Malaysia that has a defense pact called the Five Powers Agreement with the Commonwealth nations of UK, Australia, New Zealand and Singapore?
4. Alliances enable balancing – when bigger regional states attempt to disrupt the status quo, smaller states will balance against it in an effort to retain their independence. The Taiwan Relations Act requires the US to supply arms to Taiwan, and optionally intervene in the event of a Chinese invasion.

The US-PH MDT states that an armed attack on either of the parties “would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common dangers in accordance with its own constitutional processes.” The treaty may be invoked in the event of an armed attack in the metropolitan territory, island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific Ocean and its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific. During the Senate ratification hearings of the PH-US VFA in 1998, the PH Senate demanded and received the assurance of the US, that the Kalayaan Island Group in the South China Sea is covered by the MDT.

Is the Philippines a target for a Chinese nuclear attack because of the presence of nuclear weapons in the designated EDCA bases in the Philippines as claimed by a retired PH military general? The stationing of nuclear weapons is banned under the PH Constitution. The Presidential Commission on the Visiting Forces (PCVFA) is tasked to enforce compliance with PH laws by the US visiting forces.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY (NSS) Lines of Action. The Philippine Council for Foreign Relations or PCFR was invited to contribute in the development of the NSS that was endorsed by President Rodrigo Duterte and published in 2018.

Four Strategic Lines of Action related to National Defense stand out in the NSS:

1. Safeguarding and preserving national sovereignty and territorial integrity;
2. Ensuring maritime and airspace security;
3. Providing a strong infrastructure for cybersecurity; and
4. Strengthening international relations.

In order to safeguard and preserve national sovereignty and territorial integrity, NSS prescribed  the modernization of the deterrent and self-defense capabilities of our ground, naval, littoral and air forces. Additionally, NSS cited the need to provide the support to bilateral, regional, and global mechanisms that promote peace and security, the rule of law, and the peaceful resolution of disputes.

Ensuring maritime and airspace security requires acquiring equipment to provide nationwide 24/7 domain awareness and effectively managing and controlling our air and maritime spaces.

The NSS also provides the strengthening of alliances and strategic partnerships, as well as developing new security or cooperation agreements. Significantly, it recognizes that the Philippines’s inability to thwart the threats from cyberspace could imperil the country’s vital interest, critical infrastructure and installations, institutions, and patrimony of country and people.

The NSS cites the necessity of passing relevant national security legislation and support to bilateral, regional as well as global mechanisms that promote the rule of law and peaceful resolution of disputes.

The acquisition of equipment to provide 24/7 nationwide maritime domain and airspace awareness and control, strengthening alliances and strategic partnerships as well as developing new security or cooperation arrangements are imperatives. Since the US bases were closed in 1992, early warning systems, air and maritime, have degraded. A foreign submarine may be lurking in Manila Bay or within territorial waters and remain undetected. Only when these foreign vessels choose to announce themselves is their presence known.

The arrival of the US Scan Eagle drone early this year and the acquisition of new frigates are significant steps in enhancing domain awareness. What you cannot see, you cannot engage or even file a diplomatic protest about; what you cannot engage, you cannot defeat.

Significantly, the NSS took cognizance that the county’s inability to defend itself from cyber-attacks could imperil the country’s vital interests, critical infrastructure, and institutions. (e.g., foreign interference in elections). A few months ago Facebook struck down 155 questionable accounts, consisting 11 pages within which contents were described to be interfering in Philippine politics and promoting certain politicians perceived to be friendly to China. The questionable accounts were traced to Fujian.

WHAT THE NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY SAYS. The National Security Policy states that the dispute over the West Philippine Sea (WPS) remains to be the foremost security challenge to Philippine sovereignty and territorial integrity. China has refused to recognize the Arbitral ruling that states China has no historical rights to the resources based on their nine dash-line claim. The Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling reaffirmed the Philippine Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and continental shelf claims.

Hundreds of Chinese vessels not necessarily engaged in fishing are part of their maritime militia that loiter and coerce Filipino fishing vessels at will even in waters within the PH EEZ. In February 2020, PLAN fire-control radars lit a PH Navy ship on patrol in the WPS; in plain language “tinutukan tayo.” Our resupply vessels to Ayungin detachment are under the coercive shadow of Chinese militia or CG vessels most of the time.

Notably, the NSP recognizes that a continuing security presence of the US in the Asia Pacific is a stabilizing force. In order to circumvent the “armed attack” condition that will cause a US response if the PH invokes the Treaty, China has employed “unrestricted warfare” or “gray zone tactics.” These include information warfare, diverse cyber and espionage operations, economic and trade warfare, the use of hundreds of para-military or militia vessels to coerce Filipino vessels and intimidate naval presence and coast guard patrols in the West Philippine Sea.

The Three Warfares contained in PLA’s Political Work Guidelines are employed: (1) public opinion warfare; (2) psychological warfare; and (3) legal warfare. The extensive use of paramilitary forces operating below the threshold of what might invite a forceful US response has provided China strategic advantage, and gained them territory.

“Watch out,” a former Vietnamese ambassador told PH officials a few years ago, “You should not easily believe what the Chinese are saying, instead watch what they are doing. We know them. We have been fighting them for a thousand years.” Such a profound advice for a small military-strapped nation just learning to deal with a bullying neighbour.

According to the World Bank, the PH defense budget in 2019 was 0.95% of GDP. From 1958 to 2018 the average was $1.93 Billion. A significant increase of 35% from the 2015 budget started in 2016. The national policy is to allocate at least 2% of GDP for defense. However, the projected decrease of 8% in GDP growth in 2021 as a result of the Covid pandemic caused a pushback in the schedule of some defense acquisitions. Within ASEAN countries, the AFP has the second lowest defense budget as a percentage of GDP.

The five-month long battle in Marawi City, Mindanao in 2017 was the most intense battle the AFP had ever fought in recent history. It showcased the bravery, ingenuity, and resilience of the Filipino soldier. It also provided valuable lessons. Capability gaps were revealed. Foreign military assistance and support in capability development such as training, new equipment and systems augmented the inadequate defense due to the limited AFP modernization budget.

CONCLUSION. The Philippines while still developing a credible defense capability “that is a source of national pride” needs not just friends and partners but an ally committed not only  come to its defense in case of an armed attack but also to help develop its capabilities to resist the gray zone tactics of China. A vital role played by the MDT is deterrence from more aggressive actions by China inside our EEZ and the contested areas. The DND and the Armed Forces of the Philippines must learn to strengthen itself and adapt fast to the asymmetrical and hybrid warfare techniques being used to further China’s national objectives.

The MDT will benefit from a review that will take into account hybrid warfare and unrestricted warfare threats as opposed to conventional armed attacks.

The Philippines should seek to enhance defence partnerships and strengthen alliances with states who share the values of democracy, the rule of law and peaceful cooperation.

In 1945, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill said in his memoir:

“The only thing worse than fighting with allies is fighting without them.”

 

About the Author:

LtGen Edilberto P Adan AFP (Ret) retired as Southern Command Chief in Mindanao after 34 years in the AFP, and was appointed Executive Director of the Presidential Commission on the Visiting Forces Agreement for seven years. He also served as Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy. He is a graduate of PMA and the US Army War College, and holds an MBA from AIM He is a fellow of the Institute of Corporate Directors. Currently, he is a Trustee of the Philippine Council for Foreign Relations (PCFR) where he heads its Cluster on National Security. He is Chairman of the Advocates for National Interest (ANI), and served as Chairman and President of the Association of Generals and Flag Officers (AGFO). He was an Independent Director of several financial institutions.