INTRODUCTION

The word technology is a compound of two Greek roots, tekhne for craft, and logia for learning. Technology then is the practical application of knowledge expressed through the use of a crafted device. This book focuses on 6 technologies in 3 broad categories: Weapon, Tool, and Platform. A weapon is to damage a target; a tool is to assist in using a weapon; and a platform is to deliver a weapon. Naval warfare was transformed through mine, torpedo, and radio in the Russo-Japanese War; submarine and aircraft in WW I; and radar in WW II.

1. USE, DOCTRINE, INNOVATION.

In the 1805 Battle of Trafalgar, British and Franco-Spanish fought with wooden wind-propelled battleships, and fired shells of 40 lbs out to 400 yards. In the 1905 Battle of Tsushima, Japan and Russia fought with steel armor plated ships of coal-fired triple expansion steam engines, and fired shells of 850 lbs out to 10K yards. Technologies included torpedoes, radio, mines, and submarines. In the 1916 Battle of Jutland, British and German navies fought with twice the size of battleships and shells at Tsushima. WW I had submarines, radio, and aircraft. Battleships –the platform in 1805, 1905, 1914, 1939– were taken over by submarines and aircraft carriers. WW II had radar and guided weapons. Long-range hits were by aircraft from navy carriers.12

The Test of Combat. Combat alone decides a technology’s utility. The goal is combat advantage. Information technology enabled the U.S. Navy’s victory in the Battle of Midway despite Japanese superiority in numbers, weapons, and platforms. Night optics gave Japanese tactical victories in darkness at Solomon Islands (1942-1945) despite the advanced U.S. radar.

The Role of Innovation. The difference between the 104-gun first rate ship of the HMS Victory of 1805 and HMS Dreadnought of 1905 is a clear example of technological progress. If the capital ship represents a synthesis of many technologies, then one can argue that behind the technological progress that produced this synthesis, there was profound innovation. The greatest power of new technology comes from innovative use.

The Role of Doctrine. The process of integrating new technology begins with a better bow. Naval designers and architects will agree. It is also selecting the proper target, determining the best circumstances of use, bending the bow itself, and then comes ascertaining. Radar was originally envisioned as a collision warning devise but became a way to trigger anti-aircraft rounds in proximity of a target. Results are best measured in combat. Then base the doctrine on results, and innovation follows.

The Lights that Failed. For navies, the ultimate criterion is whether the weapon, tool, or platform effectively advances the task of securing power at sea and contributes to victory. The searchlight had specific combat use, one that navies believed would be decisive, and a tool that navies invested research and funds to improve. In combat, it turned out to be a weakness.

Choices and Constraints. New technologies can be easily shoved aside as they make significant demands on limited assets, and hard to justify when benefits are impossible to quantify in peacetime. Navies are conservative organizations that embrace innovation, not closed-minded monolithic organizations. The best navies constantly seek an edge against opponents and are wary if their foes have an edge.

2. MINES: The Neglected Weapon.

Mines are the oldest naval technology that did not mature until the Russo-Japanese War in 1904–1905 when upgrades in triggers and explosives met the need for area-specific sea denial operations –denying the enemy use of the sea. WW I (1914-1918) saw the importance of mines as a crucial naval weapon system. In the 20th century, mines  played a major role in the 3 major naval wars fought during 1905-1945. Yet, navies were still wary. The 21st century saw more effective and low-cost mines.

The Technology Described, Early Use, Expectations. Mines have a short shelf life and are dangerous to maintain due to spontaneous explosion during handling. 19^th century navies saw mines as the weapon of the weak. To them, mines were just coastal defense weapons. In the 1866 Triple Alliance South American War, Paraguay sank Brazil’s Rio de Janeiro with floating mines. The 1870 Franco-Prussian War, 1877 Russo-Turkish War, and 1898 Spanish-American War also used mines.

Discovery: The Russo-Japanese War. To overthrow Russia in China and Korea, Japan secured sea lanes in Asia by attacking the Russian fleet anchored near Port Arthur with torpedo boats to halt reinforcements from the Baltic. Russia used 1891 spherical mines with more explosives, better handling, and anchored at a set depth with a detonator and 140 lbs of pyroxylin. Russia used M1898 by 1905. Japan used spherical mines with 50 lbs of shimose, and pioneered offensive mines.

Countermeasures. Reinforced ships acted as mine exploders by sailing ahead of more valuable vessels. Germans did this in both world wars; the U.S. in Vietnam. Countermining detonates explosives in a minefield, hoping mines will explode. The Kite streams off the towing cable to set the cable’s depth. Sweeps are deployed from the stern to cut the mooring cable and bring mines to surface. Japan cleared Kerr Bay with torpedo boats and grapples. Russia used steam tugs to tow a grappling hook.

Revised Expectations. The Russo-Japanese War was scrutinized for lessons on mine warfare. The 1907 Hague Convention banned unanchored mines unless with disarming mechanisms; anchored mines that remain harmful when broken loose from moorings; and forbade mining commercial vessels. Japan, U.S., Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Britain accepted. Germany, France, and Turkey accepted with conditions. Russia refused. Britain voted to ban mines. Germany and Russia vetoed.

Evolution: World War I. German and British losses in WW I were due to mine warfare. In 1915, submarines became the new mine delivery system. Navies could attack in difficult places. 1917 saw mines used against submarines with low success. Minesweepers became so important that Battleships now escorted sweepers. In 1918, U.S. minelaying barrier at Scapa Flow blocked entrants to the Atlantic. 1 submarine per 10,000 mines sunk.

Countermeasures, Continued. Two methods to cut moored mine lines: (1) Russo-Japanese War technique used a sweeping wire between two ships; and (2) Ronarc’h technique streamed 2 wires in a V from the stern of a single sweeper using Kites. Britain favored 2-sweepers, which destroyed 30K mines. France, Italy, and U.S. favored 1-sweepers. In 1916, serrated wire was the best upgrade in minesweeping. British Paravane, a towed explosive antisubmarine device was better for vessels in mined waters.

Exploitation: World War II. Between WW I and WW II, advances in mine technology included sophisticated trigger mechanisms activated by water pressure, sound, or magnetic fields, instead of contact. The creation of a new delivery system (aircraft) expanded the range of mine warfare. Italy sunk the Austro-Hungarian dreadnought Viribus Unitis with hand-delivered mines at end-WW I. Refined delivery used motorized 2-man submersible sleds. Germans and British copied this in WW II.

British found 2 German magnetic mines that failed to self-destruct, and were disarmed by degaussing –changing a vessel’s magnetic polarity. They shared this with the U.S., which began making mines. U.S. Navy built an underwater mine demolition and countermeasure school in April 1941. Britain made a magnetic sweep, an insulated wire with a magnetic field to explode mines. German countermeasures were clocks, delaying activation of mines up to 6 days; by war’s end, up to 200 days.

Case Study: Mining the Normandy Invasion. In June 1944, German mines sunk or damaged Allied ships but losses were immaterial since Oyster mines were in storage to be used en masse once Allied landing location is known. When the Oysters were laid, invaders were already ashore. No Oysters at invasion was an intelligence failure. Taking 5 days to get the Oysters at sea was a planning failure. Upon recovery of an Oyster, Allies found it will not detonate if a ship’s speed is below 4 knots.

The Technology Postwar and Today. There were low-tech delivery systems for mines which became the most effective weapon to less powerful navies and nonstate entities. In 1941, Italian swimmers riding a motorized mine damaged a pair of enemy battleships in Alexandria. What sunk Brazilian Rio de Janeiro in 1866 is the same mine that hit Argentine Santissima Trinidad in 1975 and Sri Lankan Edithara in 1995. By 2019, U.S. Navy believed Iranians planted mines on a Japanese tanker.

What This Tells Us. Mine warfare’s basic characteristics are still valid in the 21^st century: (1) Navies do not prioritize mine warfare as it is simple and not costly; (2) Mines are effective under the right conditions; (3) Mine warfare has been a core naval weapon system for 12 decades; its use and nature remain. Mines were less interesting to navies, except Russian and German. Most ironic was Germany’s delay in laying Oysters in Normandy beach because their tiny torpedo boats were dueling Allied armadas.

3. TORPEDOES: The Long Arc.

A torpedo is a self-propelled underwater explosive device launched from a platform such as a ship, submarine, or aircraft and explodes upon contact with or in close proximity to its target. When self-propelled torpedoes first appeared, they were called automobile torpedoes or fish torpedoes. The mine waited for its target or was carried to it. The torpedo had its own motor. It was ADM David Farragut who said at Mobile Bay, “Damn the torpedoes. Full speed ahead!”

Introduction: Technology Described, Expectations, Early Use. English engineer Robert Whitehead produced in 1866 the first automotive torpedo designed to operate underwater. It had 2 advantages: (1) can strike beneath the waterline, increasing chances of fatal damage; and (2) can be hard to see and avoid. The Austrian navy ordered the Whitehead torpedo in 1868; British in 1871; French in 1872; Italians and Germans in 1873; Russians and Ottomans in 1876; while the U.S. made its own.

Whitehead designed the weapon to be launched from submerged tubes. But navies tested above-water launches as this allowed a torpedo to be fitted without ship redesign. Britain equipped corvette Shah in 1876. By 1880, torpedoes were common in capital ships and cruisers. The 1876 Lightning, a 32.5-ton boat with a single above-water tube and 2 reloads, became the template for torpedo boat designs. Britain, Japan, Austria, Italy, and Germany had torpedo carriers.

A new type of warship was needed to hunt down and destroy torpedo boats before they got too close to  battleships. This led to the Destroyer, the first naval vessel to use turbine propulsion and later fuel oil. The Destroyer’s larger size than the torpedo boat had the advantages of heavier firepower, and could escort a fleet over longer distances in all-weather conditions. It played a major role in the Russo-Japanese War.

Most significant is the device to keep the torpedo on course. This was called the internal gyroscope. It was invented by Austrian Ludwig Obry in 1895. The gyroscope would sense the torpedo’s horizontal movements and realign using steerable vanes. Whitehead adopted it to his torpedo. In 1902, Russia and Japan adopted long range torpedo attacks up to 3,000 meters at low torpedo speeds of 11-15 knots, taking 6 minutes to hit, giving targets time to evade the torpedo.

Discovery: The Russo-Japanese War (8-Feb-1904 – 5-Sep 1905) began with 10 Japanese destroyers attacking Russian warships anchored near Port Arthur, Manchuria. The attack took the Russians by surprise but the results were not devastating; 2 Japanese destroyers collided, several boats fell out of formation, and got lost. Attacking from a 400-1,500-meter range, only 3 of 20 torpedoes hit Russian ships –2 battleships and 1 armored cruiser. Corbett called this the first great naval torpedo attack.

In June 1904, Japanese torpedo boats attacked Russian fleet again. The Japanese released torpedo boats until evening, but a fully alert enemy made it difficult. The 3 attacks against the rear of the Russian fleet failed again. Japanese torpedo boats then made 8 attacks with 67 torpedoes. All missed, while Russian defense damaged 5 Japanese torpedo boats.

The Japanese torpedoed Russians again in August 1904 in the Battle of Yellow Sea as Russians were retreating to Vladivostok. ADM Togo ordered 18 destroyers and 29 torpedo boats to attack. They launched 74 torpedoes but missed all targets at the cost of 1 destroyer disabled and a torpedoed torpedo boat, hit likely by one of their own. Russians turned off their searchlights and sailed under a moonless night. Japanese had coordination problems, and some could not even locate a target.

After 141 torpedoes missed, Japan questioned the efficacy of long-range attacks on moving targets. Thus, the next torpedo action occurred against Battleship Sevastopol, under repair for hitting a mine. In December 1904, Japan launched 124 torpedoes on the stationary Sevastopol. They scored 1 hit and 3 near-misses, but lost 2 torpedo boats and damaged many ships, proving a well-defended enemy is not an easy prey.

In the May 1905 Battle of Tsushima, 2 torpedo divisions were dispatched to sink the smoldering Russian flagship, Suvorov, commanded by ADM Rozhestvensky. 21 destroyers and 32 torpedo boats fired at straggling Russian ships. In this 2-day battle, over 30 Russian ships sunk. But in this show of Japanese torpedo force, 4 divisions failed to find the enemy at all, while 9 of 13 huge Russian warships survived torpedo strikes.

Revised Expectations. The analysis of the Russo-Japanese War produced no consensus on the effectiveness of the torpedo. It did not perform well in short or long-range attacks on moving targets; only on stationary targets. But no navy cast it aside.

Evolution: World War I. The decade leading to WW I saw a jump in range, speed, and warhead weight. The breakthrough was the “Heater” Torpedo of 1904. A refinement in 1905 introduced water. Torpedo effectivity increased, but gave a visible wake. Surface warfare showed big guns could hit long range, and warship torpedoes were effective on anchored short-range targets. Mine warfare became critical naval technology. Submarines launched torpedoes at close range in ambush.

Evolution: Between World Wars. Torpedo technology increased in range and power using pure oxygen, developing torpedoes purposely-built for aerial drop, and increasing lethality with new detonators. Britain canceled pure oxygen and chose oxygen-enriched air as a booster for performance. Japan, unaware Britain shelved pure oxygen, began work in 1928. By 1933, Type 93 oxygen-propelled torpedo went into service.

The airborne torpedo could be dropped from a height of 50 ft at a speed of 80 knots, hit the water, dive a preset depth, and run straight to target. At the start of WW II, big navies developed aerial torpedoes. Japan tested this in 1922 and realized the need for a specially designed weapon –Type 91 – which appeared in 1931 and became the best in its class in WW II. Type 91 could be dropped from a height of 330 ft at a speed of 100 knots.

The U.S. Navy took to war in 1941 the Mk 13, sacrificing speed for range and a heavier warhead. In a prewar practice, Mk 13 had a 90% failure. In the May 1942 Battle of the Coral Sea, Yorktown’s torpedo bomber squadron used Mk 13 and Mod I. Both were erratic. In mid-1943 Mk13 yielded a 69% failure. But by 1944, with the help of California Institute of Technology, torpedoes could be dropped from a height of 800 ft at a speed of 300 knots. Platform and mission magnified torpedo power.

Then came the development of a magnetic exploder for torpedo use. The torpedoes were designed to detonate as it passed under the target’s hull, avoiding anti-torpedo protection, tearing up vulnerable bottom plates, and breaking the ship’s back. Despite enhanced lethality, the British shelved magnetic exploders for submarine torpedoes putting a premium on aerial torpedo light warheads to explode under the target’s soft bottom rather than against its well-protected sides.

Exploitation: War II. British, Germans, and Americans met detonator problems with the magnetic exploders. When attacking degaussed hulls, the exploder required the torpedo to be within 2-3 ft of the hull to activate. German T5 Zaunkönig was designed to home on propellers of convoy escorts. The submarines could blast through the escorts with acoustic torpedoes then ravage enemy ships. Allies responded with towed noisemakers to distract and neutralize the T5.

In late 1941, U.S. honed its acoustic homing torpedoes. Mark 24 (Fido), designed as an air droppable anti-submarine weapon, was short, light, and ran circular patterns at a depth of 125 ft at 12 knots for 15 minutes, homing on submarines within detection range of 1,500 yards. It sunk 2 submarines and damaged 1 for every 10 torpedoes dropped. Air-dropped or surface-launched torpedo was a war-winning weapon if paired with a submarine.7

The Technology Postwar and Today. Torpedoes had a long development arc in the 150 years of use. Its best platform is still a submarine and its best target is still a ship. Faulty torpedoes plagued Argentine attacks in the 1982 Falklands War. When the British nuclear submarine Conqueror attacked Argentine cruiser General Belgrano, Britain used WW II straight running battle-tested torpedoes than the modern Tigerfish guided-weapons. 7

What This Tells Us. The combination of the right platform and target transforms a technology of marginal application into a war-winning weapon. While Japan succeeded with Type 93, U.S. and Germany failed. Japan’s navy applied revolutionary enhancements to technology in pursuit of a tactical dead end. Type 93 was superb but designed for a different battle. The U.S. torpedo was substandard but collaboration with academic, industrial, and military sources made Mark 24 effective.

4. RADIO: The Mixed Blessing.

Introduction: Technology Described, Expectations, Early Use. Marconi invented wireless radio in 1896. It raised hopes of communications at sea, augmenting telegraph network lines and undersea cables. Italy tested the radio in 1897 and installed it in 1898; French tested radio onboard in 1900; Britain in 1901; U.S. and Germany bought  Slaby-Arco in 1903, having the longest range of 74 miles; Austro-Hungarians bought a Siemens-Braun; and Russia bought Slaby-Arco in 1904. Japan made its own.

Discovery: The Russo-Japanese War. Russian and Japanese navies used radio extensively in the war. VADM Kamimura Hikonojō discovered it was difficult to transmit information and accurately determine the enemy’s location in relation to his. Japanese also discovered their radio network could only carry so much traffic, or none at all, when swamped by transmissions from VADM Zinovy Rozhestvensky’s fleet, who later chose radio silence, but it only delayed his eventual detection.

Evolution: To World War I. German equipment generally bested British equipment in range and clarity. Early German submarine radio sets could reach 300 miles vs the British of 60 miles. In 1914: French navy radio sets were the major form of communication ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore; Italian navy had 250 shipborne sets and introduced Marconi voice telephony; Austria-Hungarian navy had 55 German shipborne sets. Russia had a sophisticated radio used in the Russo-Japanese War.

Exploitation: World War I. German VADM Reinhard Scheer used a combination of low-powered radio and flags with a maneuver communicated by radio and flag. VADM Scheer could order his entire battle fleet to reverse course from rear ship to front ship –a difficult maneuver successfully executed 3 times during the Battle of Jutland via radio. By 1917, German submarine radio reached 2K miles. British ADM John Jellicoe relied on the shortest-ranged signaling method: flags, searchlights, radio.

Countermeasures: (1) navies jammed enemy traffic with their own transmissions; (2) radio Direction Finding (DF) used enemy transmissions to locate the ship transmitting; (3) interception of enemy transmissions led to cryptanalysis –the breaking of enemy codes and vast transmissions; (4) access to enemy communications traffic analysis, and checking origin and pattern of transmissions to deduce enemy location and intentions.

Evolution: Between World Wars. At end-WW I, U.S. Navy equipped subchasers with voice telephony using 5 medium frequencies; introduced Very High Frequency (VHF) in 1929 and the TBS, dubbed “Talk Between Ships,” in 1938. Airborne radio DF aided navigation while U.S. Navy carriers developed radio homing beacons to guide aircraft back to deck. Sea-based aircrafts carried shortwave radios and antennas, extending sightings several miles from the parent carrier.

Exploitation: World War II. The British-U.S. attack on the Enigma cipher is famous. Lesser known is the high-frequency direction finding (HF/DF), which provided a shore-based capability to locate submarines, and a precise shipborne capability to run them down. Britain devised the QD monitoring system called “Headache” to intercept German VHF voice transmissions. Matched with radar, QD erased German edge in night combat. 7

The Technology Postwar and Today. If the Germans had a generation of operators raised on video games, the outcome of their Fritz-X armor piercing bomb, and the radio-controlled, aircraft-launched, rocket-propelled cruise missile Henschel HS293, may have been much different. Cellphones are highly developed radiotelephones; Wi-Fis are just short-ranged radio communications networks –the modern TBS.

What This Tells Us. Better communications offered benefits such as conservation of forces, improved scouting, and coordination of strategic movements over long distances. But In the Russo-Japanese War, radio transmissions alerted ships to the enemy’s presence and provided useful intel. Sheer volume of communications can slow and overwhelm decision-making processes over radio. When systems fail, they open avenues of attack through insertion of false information via cyber.

5. RADAR: Magic Goes to Sea.

Technology Described, and Early Use. Radar is the acronym for radio detection and ranging. A radar transmits electro-magnetic waves and receives tiny portions of those waves reflecting distant objects. The radar calculates an object’s range by measuring the time it takes for the wave to reach the object and return. As radar evolved, it could determine with more precision the object’s bearing and height. Radar had wavelength and frequency; pulse frequency rate; power output.

Differences in Development by Nation.

• Its strategic outlook was offensive, but its military commanders perceived radar as providing defensive capability, which made it seem less useful in advancing their offensive agenda. Germany squandered its early lead in radar technology by focusing more on purely technical aspects instead of how else it could be used. Early experience with magnetrons revealed they had fluctuating frequencies. Rather than solve the problem, they focused on precise but less lethal microwave transmitters.
• Great Britain. British saw the value of radar as a defensive aid. Aircraft reflecting radio waves meant a possibility of detecting aircraft at great distances. Churchill said British achievement was operational efficiency than novelty of equipment. British navy’s first T79X air-search radar came in 1936. The T282 was the first fire control set in 1938, and specialized in short-range anti-aircraft gunnery. Anti-aircraft cruiser Curlew was supplied with T79Z in 1939. Battleship Nelson with the T284 in 1940.
• United States. S. Naval Research Laboratory took interest in the radar in 1931 after radio navigation generated data from passing aircraft. Priority was low so a primitive radar was produced in December 1934. In 1937, the first radar test aboard destroyer USS Leary detected an aircraft 20 miles out, enticing U.S. Navy to pursue radar. This led to the prototype Model XAF radar on Battleship USS New York in 1939, enabling air and surface target detection, and tracking projectile flight.
• In 1935, the SFR developed a 16 cm continuous wave obstacle detection device for the new Normandie liner. It did not spark any interest in the navy even after detecting a ship 5 miles out. French focused instead on land-based electromagnetic air defense barrier system. In 1939, Britain shared its progress in radar. This led the French navy to make a pulsed metric air surveillance system (DEM). Battleship Richelieu received the first operational DEM in May 1941.
• Radar-facilitated British naval victory at Cape Matapan in March 1941 shook Italian complacency, but by then it was too late. Italy’s failure to realize a workable radar before the war was due to underfunding, poor options when exploring how to deploy the technology, and inadequate intelligence as Germany did not share with its ally Italy any of its advances in shipborne radar until April 1941. Italy deployed radar after Spring 1942.
• Japan saw the benefit of detecting aircraft and ships using reflected radio waves in 1936. Upon inspecting German radar installations in early 1941, Japan’s navy learned of the pulsed radar, then produced a land-based air-search radar by end-1941. Type 21, the first shipborne air-search radar, mounted on Battleship Ise in May 1942, detected aircraft 55 km out, and warships 20 km out. But admirals valued radar only after the Battle of Midway, a fatal mistake.

Expectations.  Germans expected the British would attempt to detect their radar, thus used it with extreme caution. This concern affected radar development, Germans putting greater emphasis on passive detection devises instead. British and Americans accepted the possibility of interception to get the benefit of detection. This approach made sense in 1943 tactical situations. Allies were after finding than avoiding the enemy.

Discovery: World War II. Inexperience, ignorance of Japanese attack methods, and lack of IFF (identification Friend or Foe) returns blunted U.S. during early 1942 carrier raids in Marshall Islands, Southwest Pacific, and Rabaul. Lessons learned are the need for practice; coherent DF; better radios; better radar fire control; and IFF. U.S. and British navies identified lessons needed to be learned, and found ways to get answers, while Germans preferred passive learning systems.

Evolution: World War II. It took 2 years for U.S. radar-assisted DF and fleet air defense to become a fluid system. In the Battle of the Philippine Sea, radar tracked 4 Japanese air strikes 60 miles out. 33 attempts gave 85% success, with no ships lost. DF gave carriers reliability to defeat air strikes, enabling U.S. carriers to decimate Japan’s land and sea-based airpower. It took a year for U.S. to master surface search radar (SG) to beat Japan in night combat. Of 85 attacks pre-1942, Allies hit 42%; Axis hit 43%. Of 68 attacks post-1942, Allies hit 72%, Axis, 15%.

Case Study: Technological Integration Off the Normandy Beaches. British light forces intercepted German intruders. But when frigate flagship HMS Lawford sunk, defensive plans suffered. Whereas, in USS Frankford’s first action on 6 June, she detected German S-boats at 13.6K yards out, plotted movements to 8K yards, and opened fire at 4.5K yards. British and German destroyers were no match to U.S. SG radar.

Exploitation: World War II. German warships, torpedo boats, minesweepers, submarines, and aircraft did not carry a search radar until April 1944. They relied on land stations to locate the enemy. Seaborn radar Seetakt was designed for fire control and target ranging, not air or sea search. There was never a motive to make a shipborne radar. Germans preferred radar detectors as they were easy to make. When submarines received radar, passive radar detectors and hydrophones were used instead.

Allies exploited radar-fuzed shells, a small radar unit in a shell that detonates when the shell is near the enemy aircraft. The Allies also gave importance to anti-aircraft artillery by radar. In 1939, effectiveness of anti-aircraft fire ranged from thousands of rounds per bird in daylight, to tens of thousands at night.

Countermeasures. Jamming blinds the enemy’s radar. Spoofing uses a transponder to generate false echoes to register phony attack formation. While the enemy is focused on intercepting bogus information, attackers are flying low and may strike at will. Japanese aircraft were disguised with bogus IFF responses to penetrate Allied aircraft carrier forces. Philippines in October 1944, saw Japan rule the skies using young kamikaze pilots.

Radar and countermeasures had the greatest impact. German submarines deployed decoy floats and balloons to distract Allied radars, but these had only limited effects because they were rather tuned to metric radar wavelengths. More successful were radar-absorbent coatings that they put on submarine snorkels, a “stealth” technology, making snorkels invisible to Allied radar.

The Technology Postwar and Today. Postwar radar increased in power and precision. Navies combined radar with high-performance guided missiles to counter enemy jets. Soviets produced shipboard antiship missiles in 1957.  Antiship missile threat became the focus of both the passive –maneuvering, chaff, electronic countermeasures (ECM), and active responses –guns and missiles, the passive proving more effective.

What This Tells Us. The British centralized approach of pushing development via government committee proved more fruitful than the German approach of agency competition with no communication nor collaboration. Limited German resources were directed to land-based air defense, with the navy adapting air force devices. Limited Japanese resources were squandered by army vs navy silos, and lack of cooperation with scientists. Italian and Japanese navies came too late to value the radar.

6. SUBMARINES: The Mission Matters.

The Technology Described, Early Development. The first engine-propelled submarine used in combat was the semi-submersible Russian Keta that almost attacked a Japanese destroyer in 1905. The first torpedo attack was in December 1912 in the First Balkan War where Greek Delfin missed Ottoman cruiser Mejidieh. In 1914, the best submarines were the British E and German U-19. E’s range exceeded U.S. Navy’s Holland-C. MAN 2-stroke diesel engine was the best German diesel sub.

Expectations. In 1914, navies agreed that submarines had 3 basic missions: attrition, coastal defense, and fleet cooperation. Attrition consisted of patrol missions to find and destroy enemy warships. Coastal defense consisted of patrolling friendly ports to deter enemy incursions. Fleet cooperation was difficult, with battleships streaming at 15 knots and 20 knots in action. The most modern submarines could make 16 knots on the surface but less than 10 knots submerged, and for only a brief time.

Discovery: World War I. As of August 1914, these nations had submarines: Great Britain, 76; France, 50; U.S. 32; Germany, 27; Russia, 22; Italy, 18; Japan, 13; and Austria-Hungary, 5. German and British submarines torpedoed each other’s warships. The only active weapon in WW I was the depth charge, which was hardly more successful in sinking U-boats than gunfire or ramming, and far less successful than mines. The first submarine sunk by a depth charge was German U-68 in March 1916.

Evolution: World War I. Unrestricted submarine warfare triggered U.S. declaration of war, which suggests that submarines caused Germany’s defeat. Submarines violated international norms and enraged the neutrals. Germany proved inept in addressing the problem, and provides an example of why considering military issues but excluding non-military concerns in the use of new technology is dangerous.

Countermeasures. ADM John Jellicoe first proposed a droppable antisubmarine mine in December 1914, but were put in ships only in January 1916. German C15 standard depth charge was fragile with a 50% dud rate. French Guiraud depth charge detonated hydrostatically but was delicate and unstable. American Mk I – Mk IV depth charges were produced in 1916. Overall, depth charges were ineffective in WW I and only 5% successful in WW II. Tools to locate submarines underwater were the sonar in 1927 and the hydrophone in 1935.

Exploitation: World War II. Navies embraced submarines as a weapon of war, and its roles were coastal defense, antiwarship patrol, fleet cooperation, commerce warfare, mine warfare, and special operations. France, Britain, Japan and U.S. made missions against enemy warships a primary function of submarines, but were also building types for trade war in disregard of treaty obligations. Germany switched from their WW I “lurk-and-shoot” to “wolf pack” approach of attack.

Evolution: German Super Submarines. In WW I and WW II, Allies managed with an influx of technology and resources; Japan, with less technology and fewer resources failed. In 1934, Germans responded to the growing superiority of Allied anti-submarine technology by developing one that could travel underwater a long distance at high speeds, run down a convoy, attack and escape without surfacing. But the finished boats fell short.

The Technology Postwar and Today. Britain integrated a wide range of technologies in a system that neutralized submarine technology like escort convoys. Once U.S. fixed their defective torpedoes, the destruction of Japan’s merchant marine quickly began. Germany’s response to Allied countermeasures were new sensors, stealth, air independent submarines –impressive but too late. In the next war into the future, submarines will do missions simultaneously, with unimaginable lethality.

What This Tells Us. The most effective way to deal with submarines is to mitigate their impact, rather than a direct attack. It was not about better sensors or weapons; it was organizing merchantmen into escorted convoys. New ASW technologies proved capable of managing German submarine threats in 1917-18. But from start to finish, submarines remained hard to detect, and harder to kill.

7. AIRCRAFT: Vision and Competition.

The Technology Described, Early Development. Naval aviation, blended with the right weapons and tools, proved more versatile than any other platform in naval warfare history. The Wright brothers achieved the first powered heavier-than-air flight in December 1903. In 1910, U.S. Navy launched an airplane from cruiser Birmingham; France set up an army air service; and British navy developed seaplanes. In 1911, planes trialed air dropping torpedoes. In 1912, machine guns were aloft.

Expectations. In 1912, CAPT Irving Chambers, the first head of U.S. Navy aviation, considered the primary function of aircraft as scouting, and ancillary tasks were locating and destroying mines, submarines, airships, cooperating with submarines and torpedo boats, and bombing enemy bases. In 1914, LT Richard Saufley USN, added the roles of attacking ships at sea and directing naval gunfire. But machines capable of these duties did not exist.

Discovery: World War I. By 1918, 6 general missions evolved: (!) Scouting and Patrol; (2) Gunnery Spotting; (3) Attacking Ships from the air; (4) Striking from the Sea; (5) Anti-Submarine Warfare; and (6) Air Defense. Despite all technological advances, aerial reconnaissance was unreliable. Using aircraft to direct gunfire was problematic. Warships proved difficult to hit. The most versatile form of air attack was one delivered from ships, exploiting mobility to strike targets outside the range of land-based aircraft. Only 5 ships were sunk out of thousands that sailed in convoys with air escorts due to German U-boat threats. Zeppelins made the British take fighter planes to sea, making air defense an important mission for sea-based aircraft.

Infrastructure Needs. The infrastructure required to maintain just a dozen airplanes in service was considerable. To begin to explore the combat potential of aircraft, navies had to make a significant investment in men and resources.

Countermeasures. Navies had quick-firing guns of up to 4-inch caliber to deal with enemy torpedo boats. Guns provided some defense to discourage aircraft attacks, but aircraft would become the best defense against aircraft.

Evolution: Between World Wars. The lesson that failed to emerge from 1914-18 was navies had special needs, and aviators required special skills to be effective over water. This was eclipsed by the need for better aircraft, which became more of a platform of land than of sea, creating problems for naval aviation 20 years into the future. First, it created a perception of naval air being unnecessary; and second, the serious effects for lack of sea-based aircraft and training upon entering WW II.

Exploitation: World War II. Reconnaissance aircraft powers were magnified when fitted with radar, radio, radio navigation devices –Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) and DF. In the June 1944 Battle of the Philippine Sea, U.S. carriers with radar defeated enemy air strikes at a distance. With air mobility, carriers struck enemy fleets in bases. Defense against aircraft was airborne interception guided by radar and controlled by radio.

The Technology Postwar and Today. Technique, technology, and geopolitics merged to keep the carrier relevant. The technique of an angled flight deck enabled landing jets to overshoot without crashing into parked jets. The steam catapult hurled jets off flight decks at high speeds, and mirror landing systems allowed jets to land on deck. Helicopters were armed to sink submarines. Carriers became the arbiter of sea power.

What This Tells Us. An anonymous author’s vision in a 1913 Naval Review article that believed every warship should have its own self-contained aviation component was right after all, even though his vision took more than a century to realize. Navies will still require wings, but those wings may be of a new type such as unmanned drones flying from new platforms than costly large sea carriers. Air power at sea will remain paramount as antisubmarine warfare is still a major task of naval aviation.

CONCLUSION

The Genesis of Naval Technology. A navy’s core function is to win wars and the role of any technology is to advance that function. Its role in situations short of war as a means to project power and intimidate is even more influential. Navies that lost the battle to retain their own aerial resources after WW I were hampered throughout the interwar years amidst the rapid advances in aviation and in acquiring special skills to operate aircraft at sea. They began WW II critically handicapped.

Use It or Lose It. In 1905, Japanese torpedoes missed in long-range attacks against moving targets then concluded it was not the best way to use the weapon. Torpedoes made submarines weapons of war, and turned aircraft into ship-killers. Mines sank a third of Russian and Japanese warships. German navy focused on acoustic devices disclosing user location, and took passive hydrophones to  places unknown to U.S. and Britain.

Need and Use. There was a power of combination such as submarines and aircraft, radar and acoustic torpedoes, radio and radar. Radar-assisted torpedo shells could explode near the target. Radio and radar increased the power of aircraft in WW II. Navies used both tools as anti-aircraft defense.

Principles of Success. Broad principles that govern the successful development, introduction, and use of naval technology: (1) Expectations do not determine best use; (2) Users have valuable input; (3) Needs influence use; and (4) New technologies bring new vulnerabilities.

What This Tells Us.  Navies would do well to keep broad horizons in looking out for disruptive technologies. In the end, it is not about machines and tools. It is about the men and women who use them and the way they are used. Technology is not the weapon, tool, or platform. It is the application of knowledge expressed through the use of weapons, tools, and platforms.

RECOMMENDATION

This book titled, Innovating Victory – Naval Technology in Three Wars, authored by Vincent P. O’Hara and Leonard R. Heinz, and published by USNI, is well worth the read! This book examines how the world’s major navies developed and used in combat 6 different technologies: 2 weapons (mines and torpedoes); 2 tools (radio and radar); and 2 platforms (submarine and aircraft). The historical events of 3 wars and the case studies open your mind to step back and imagine how the mere absence or presence of these technological feats, particularly when paired perfectly, could portend to be a matter of loss or victory in war. Combat is technology’s acid test. Only in war can technologies be truly tested for effectivity.