The continuing harassment of China Coast Guard (CCG) reached an unprecedented level in late March 2024 when three (3) Filipino troops on a replenishment mission were wounded after CCG cutters 21555 and 21551 attacked by water cannons the civilian wooden-hulled supply boat Unaizah May 4 carrying passengers and supplies intended for the Philippine stranded ship BRP Sierra Madre in Ayungin Shoal (Second Thomas shoal).
The incident irritated President Ferdinand Marcos Jr who said that “Filipinos will not be cowed into silence, submission, or subservience.” He then signed Executive Order No. 57 strengthening the nation’s maritime security and maritime domain awareness to effectively protect our maritime zones and vigorously seek options to prevent repetition or escalation of unwanted actions in the West Philippine Sea (WPS) and other areas where the country exercises sovereign rights.
President Marcos’ resolve to address the country’s maritime issues did not escape other nations’ attention including the US whose President invited President Marcos to attend a trilateral meeting with the U.S. and Japan on April 12, 2024. The summit discussed the conduct of joint patrols in Indo-Pacific waters in 2025, reaffirmed the commitment of the 3 countries to international law in South China Sea (SCS), and made initial plans to launch a new economic corridor in the Philippines as part of G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure Investment involving projects on clean energy, ports and agriculture. The meeting sends a clear response to China’s “adventurism” in the SCS.
Under the UN Charter conflicts between states and non- state actors must be resolved peacefully within the ambit of international law. Some analysts advance that contemporary conflicts are classified as state, hybrid, and non-state.
State conflicts involve the employment of large-scale military force and advanced technologies across the five-dimensional battle space to prevail over an adversary. Their probability of occurrence is the lowest among the three but the consequence is the highest in terms of human, physical, and financial costs.
Hybrid conflicts, on the other hand, combines conventional and irregular forces and employs asymmetric systems to “create ambiguity, seize the initiative, and paralyze the opponent.” Their probability of happening is higher than state conflicts but the consequence is lower.
Non-state conflicts utilize small units and networks to undermine governments and gain control of the population. Compared with state and hybrid conflicts, non-state conflicts occur more frequently but with a less devastating outcome.
China’s maritime campaign in South China Sea including the West Philippine Sea is a form of a hybrid conflict. This campaign started in 1974 when China seized full control of the Paracels situated in the northern portion of South China Sea, equidistant from Vietnam’s eastern coastline and China’s Hainan province, and some 700 miles west of Zambales. In 1978 China engaged the Vietnamese navy in the Spratlys resulting in dozens of fatalities. It then established permanent presence in several features in the Spratlys that are far beyond China’s maritime zones: Fiery Cross Reef, Subi Reef, Mischief Reef, 1st Thomas Shoal, Gaven Reef, Johnson Reef South, Ladd Reef, Len Dao Reef, and Cuarteron Reef. Fiery Cross, Mischief and Subi reefs have been reclaimed as artificial islands and fortified to accommodate PLA Navy’s air and surface assets as well as militia boats.
To put up a semblance of legitimacy in the entire Spratlys, China established two administrative districts, covering nearly 90% of the South China Sea, under the local government in Sansha located in Woody Island and within the authority of China’s Hainan Province. Sansha’s Nansha district based in Fiery Cross Reef covers the Spratly Islands; while the Xisha district collocated in Sansha handles the Paracels, the Macclesfield Bank and the Scarborough Shoal. China has devised a four-pronged strategy to protect its maritime gains in the SCS: totally ignore the 2016 Arbitral Ruling, permanently occupy its island bases and features, regularly patrol Spratly waters employing its 3 seagoing forces, and wear off the other claimants through persistent dissemination of false and threatening narratives.
Among the claimant countries in the SCS, the Philippines has been a victim of incessant harassment. Of late is an incident in Bajo de Masinloc on April 30, 2024 when China’s CCG-3105 and CCG-5303 cutters supported by several China Maritime Militia (CMM) boats water-cannoned and rammed BRP Datu Bankaw (MMOV-3004) causing damages on the Philippine supply boat’s radio communications and electrical systems. A nearby Philippine Coast Guard ship BRP Bagacay (MRRV-4410) was also hit and sustained damages on its railings and other main deck temporary structures. As expected, China issued a false narration of the incident.
The Philippine government has time and again reacted passively. Some quarters are alarmed with this pacifist stance but few asked if we have the national will to fight in case the hybrid war escalates into a state conflict. While the probability of state conflict remains low, the Philippines may have to undertake preparations to confront the challenge, with alliance or partnership support, or on its own.
The national will to fight, as defined by a think tank, is the “determination of national government to conduct sustained military and other operations for some objective even when the expectation of success decreases or the need for significant political, economic, and military sacrifices increases.” The responsibility to initiate, continue, and end the engagement in war is the “national” government. The political decisions to press on with operations during a conflict refer to the “will.” Such decisions set aside the personal issue of bravery and are based on thorough deliberations on three vital components: resource, economic, and moral. The “fight” pertains to the employment of military force and other aspects of national power in accordance with a strategic plan. This would include non-kinetic activities like diplomatic initiatives, economic pressures, and informational efforts.
The same policy institute cites that the national will to fight has 4 centers of gravity: government, population, military, and international community. In arriving at the decision to engage, there are 7 factors to consider: government type, social cohesion, economic resilience, national identity, stakes/interests, popular support, and conflict duration. These factors depend on 4 relevant conditions that do not change abruptly: civil-military relations, military capabilities, economic leverage, and allies/partners. The 4 enablers that strengthen or weaken the national will to fight include economic pressures, engagement with international community, messaging/indoctrination, and casualties.
Of the 4 centers of gravity of the national will to fight the military takes the largest slice in resource allocation due to its complex systems of human and physical resources that are used to engage an adversary. The military capability (fighting power) of a nation consists of 3 components.
The first is the conceptual component that refers to the principles of war, warfighting doctrines and thinking processes. The second is leadership in the organizational, operational and people dimensions.
And the third is physical that comprise of manpower, equipment, readiness, and sustainability. Given the country’s population trend, manpower requirements could easily be filled up. On equipment, a balanced sourcing between foreign and domestic maybe considered. The nation’s shipbuilding and ship repair industries could be tapped to design, construct, and maintain ships for maritime operations. The readiness of the forces and their sustainability are functions of manpower and equipment.
The conceptual and leadership components are predominantly qualitative; while the physical component is basically quantitative. Technology pervades all components.
The sum of the national will to fight and the nation’s military capability is called military effectiveness, the ability to produce favorable military outcomes. This effectiveness is complemented by the type of government, culture, civil-military relations, and human capital.
Democratic political institutions cultivate superior leadership and initiative in the battlefield and democratic states win more battles than non-democratic states.
Culture implies that the norms and values of the society and military organizational structure are important in winning battles.
The relations between the civilian and military leaders are vital in making sure that military ethos, like discipline, esprit d’ corps, and meritocracy, are observed and respected by the civilian leaders who must maintain their oversight functions.
On human capital, some studies found that better educated soldiers are more receptive to training, more proficient at operating and maintaining sophisticated equipment and platforms, and more capable in executing tactical maneuvers in the battlefield. As Vietnamese Army General Vō Nguyên Giap once quipped: “In war there are two factors: human beings and weapons. Ultimately, though, human beings are the decisive factor. Human beings! Human Beings!”
A survey group in March found that “77% of Filipino adults are willing to fight for the country in case of external conflict.” But the society’s elite, media, peasants, and other advocacy groups are silent. So are the top officials in government and Congress. On the other hand, the country’s armed forces joined a Maritime Cooperative Activity with 3 other nations and participated in the annual bilateral exercises with an ally. These maritime engagements demonstrate a collective commitment to strengthen regional cooperation in support of freedom of navigation in the Indo-Pacific waterways.
The national will to fight requires high level political discussions, multilateral exercises, and tactical training. There is a need to craft a comprehensive plan that includes threat assessment, contingency plans, war gaming, doctrines update, and strategic guidance on intelligence, force planning, potential operations, international engagements, and messaging. This whole-of-nation plan must clarify the roles, responsibilities, priorities and tasks of every government agency and the civil society to address the diplomatic, informational, economic, and military efforts of the national command authorities.