Early Days of Mischief. It was during the years 1888-1904 in Owenton, Kentucky that Willis Augustus Lee Jr. was nicknamed “Mose.” His father, Judge Lee Sr, was the circuit judge who tried civil and criminal cases. His mom, Susan, died of a heart attack in 1913. His elder brother, Clarence also died at an early age. His father had a “Live and Let Live” attitude toward gambling and bootlegging in Owenton. It also manifested in the loose rein on his children –Lucy, Roberta, Alice, and Mose–and helps explain why Mose was allowed to play pranks. Mose was mischievous, and when he pulled a prank, it involved some cleverness. Judge Lee Sr. had an excellent shot and passed along this skill to Mose who became an excellent shooter, and anything he aimed at, he hit. Mose’s interest in guns remained with him all his life.
Mose and his friend, Roy Holbrook, decided to make a bomb one day. They took gunpowder out of shotgun shells and put it under a tin can. They then ran a trail of powder from the can as a fuse and lit the other end of it. When nothing happened, Mose went to investigate but when he got close, the bomb exploded on his face. His physician saved his eyesight and no scar remained on his face. But his eyesight was damaged and he had to wear thick glasses for the rest of his life.
He applied at the Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland. Judge Lee Sr.’s political connections got Mose the appointment to Annapolis through Congressman South Trimble. At age 16, without having finished high school, he entered the Naval Academy. Many doubted he would last in a rigidly disciplined academy. The strict rules were tough but Lee stuck it out.
U.S. Naval Academy (USNA) Years. From the 4th of July 1904 to June 1908, Lee attended USNA. On the day Lee entered the campus on Independence Day, his civilian life ended. During 3 1/2 of his 4 years at the Naval Academy, Lee roomed with Midshipman Edmund R Norton, who marveled at Lee’s ability to get by with little studying. Norton studied hard and stood 2ND in the 201-man Class of 1908. Although Lee had a great mind, only two things mattered to him: rifle shooting and freehand drawing. Midshipman John Earle was amazed at Lee’s intense concentration. Lee would read a lesson assignment once and retain everything. Earle wrote, “He never seemed to be in the least burdened by our studies, as were so many of us. On walking into Lee’s room, one seldom found him at his books. He was particularly good at math, the hardest subject, and spent hours trying to show his classmates how simple math really was.” Lee was nicknamed “Wah Lee,” Chink, and Ching, as almost everyone is named. That nickname sticks with you forever.
Willis Lee’s and Walter Heiberg’s marksmanship skills immediately showed in the shooting galleries in Annapolis and became the long subject of conversations in the Wardrooms of the fleets. By end-June 1907, USNA awarded the gold medal for general excellence in target practice to Willis Lee. Lee and Heiberg (bronze medalist) began summer training and were assigned to the USS Nevada. While Nevada was in New London, Connecticut, Lee received orders to report to the USNA Rifle Team in Annapolis. He was detached from Nevada on 12-July-1908 to join a marksmanship competition. What Lee accomplished in one day was overwhelming. He won Individual national championships in both rifle and pistol, the only American to win both categories the same year. In the Individual rifle category, Lee performed rapid fire at 200 and 300 yards, and slow fire at 600 and 1,000 yards.
Lee won over his competitor, 318 vs 316. With the pistol, Lee shot slow fire, timed fire, and rapid-fire at ranges between 15-75 yards. He beat his competitor by 1 point. Classmate Thomas C. Kinkaid spoke with Lee after the triumphs at Camp Perry. Lee finished the rifle match early, so he joined the pistol matches “just to kill time.” Midshipman Lee was excellent at marksmanship, but he could not see the target clearly. What he saw was an image the size of a postage stamp. William “Poco” Smith observed that Lee aimed at the postage stamp and hit the bull’s eye. John Earle, an USNA Rifle Team member, said Lee never looked flustered. He shot birds just as fast as he could pull the trigger.
One of Lee’s lifelong traits was his sense of modesty. During Lee’s first-class year, weekly inspections were standard. Midshipmen wore full-dress uniforms with medals. Lee did not comply. He told Lee if he did not show up with medals next week, he would be put on report. Lee showed up at formation, his chest covered with medals that it was hard to see his jacket.
Lee habitually failed the regular eye exams. In May 1908, Lee’s poor eyesight was finally found out at USNA. The Bureau of Medicine and Surgery reported a physical examination of Midshipman Lee revealed he had defective vision, a potentially disqualifying condition. His right eye was tested 11/20 and his left eye 10/20. But the Navy Surgeon General recommended he “be allowed to graduate with his class, subject to re-examination in 2 years” to establish physical fitness for service. The Secretary of the Navy concurred. Lee graduated on 5-June-1908. Of 201 graduates, Lee was 106TH yet was among the 4 youngest. The level of attrition was considerable. In the USNA Class of 1908, 82 students (41%) did not make it to graduation.
Junior Officer, 1908-1918. Pre-1910 USNA graduates were required to serve for 2 years as “Passed Midshipmen.” But starting in 1910, the year Lee would finish serving his 2 years, midshipmen become Ensigns upon graduation from USNA. Post-USNA, Lee moved to an old sailing ship, the Severn. He also practiced with the USNA Rifle Team. Lee spent July & August with the rifle team at Camp Perry, Ohio. On 2-October-1908, Lee reported to battleship Idaho. On 1-June-1910, Lee asked to compete for a spot on the U.S. Rifle Team for an international rifle tournament in Bisley, England. The Bureau of Navigation turned him down.
British battleship Dreadnought entered in 1906, setting a new standard for battleships with a battery of big guns. Whereas, Idaho was built on the cheap. Congress previously provided each class to have the best armor, armament, and speed. But for the Idaho and Mississippi in 1905, Congress restricted tonnage, making the ships less capable than their predecessors. Naval historian Malcolm Muir wrote “the sister ships proved a perfect example of false economy in defense spending. They were of such limited endurance and so slow that they hampered the performance of the whole fleet.”
In November 1908, Passed Midshipman Lee was assigned to engineering duty. By May 1909, his Idaho tenure ended, and he returned to USNA Rifle Team and Severn. The New England Military Rifle competition was held at Wakefield, Massachusetts In July 1909. Andrew Denney won the revolver reentry match at 25 yards; Lee won the timed-fire revolver match at 50 yards. Lee spent a brief period onboard Independence, a former warship. Later, Lee joined the cruiser New Orleans which was being refitted at Mare Island for China service. She was a protected cruiser, with armor above her machinery space.
The USNA Rifle Team received overtures from an agent seeking recruits to overthrow China’s Manchu government. Inducements included amounts big enough to resign from the Navy. The offer included the right to chop off as many Chinese heads as they desired, which was totally unappealing to Lee.
Lee and Denney were part of the cruiser’s crew when New Orleans was recommissioned on 15-November. By 25-April-1910, the ship ventured from California to the Pacific and arrived at Yokohama, Japan. She then patrolled the far eastern waters. It was Lee’s first in-person exposure to China. Lee and Denney then got their article published in the first 1910 issue of the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. The topic was revolver shooting, a 6-page primer with hand-drawn diagrams. One tip was “Acquire accuracy before you try for speed.” Lee signed with a Chinese character. It was their first and last article.
On 6-June-1910, Lee was commissioned as an Ensign. Lee and Denney embarked on the New Orleans for Hankow, China, near current-day Wuhan, where they joined the next ship, Helena, on 26-May-1910. Helena was 251 ft with a shallow 9 ft draft to navigate China’s rivers. Her main armaments were four 4-inch guns. The purpose of the collection of ships in the area was to protect U.S. interests in the Far East. The locus was known as the “China Station,” although the ships operated often in the Philippines. In 1911, Lee contracted cholera and was hospitalized ashore, but recovered in a short time.
Marine 2LT Adolph Miller, who joined Helena in 1911, was a year behind Ensigns Lee and Denney at USNA, but did not graduate. Once Miller became part of the crew, Helena ventured in April 1911 from Shanghai to Hankow because of rumors of a revolution between the Manchu government in Shanghai and the rest of China. The revolt broke out in October in Hankow, where the ship was in port. A company of Marines and 2 divisions of sailors went ashore from the Helena. Miller was ashore for 5 months as an intelligence officer, while Lee commanded a division of sailors. During that time, Miller kept a day-by-day record of the revolution. Miller and Ensign Lee compiled a report for the Office of Naval Intelligence.
In June-December 1913, the New Hampshire joined other ships of the Atlantic Fleet in patrolling the Gulf of Mexico. Relations were strained between the U.S. and Mexico. The situation became complicated upon the delivery of weapons to President Victoriano Huerta, who had taken over Mexico a year before the coup. President Woodrow Wilson ordered a landing force ashore in Veracruz to seize the weapons from the Customs. By 21-April-1914, landing parties were ashore. Sailors and Marines crawled onto the land with orders to occupy Customs, the railroad terminal, and communications offices. RADM Frank “Friday” Fletcher directed the sailors and Marines to occupy beyond the port area, which was too much for the locals, so they attacked the U.S. forces, devolving into urban warfare.
CAPT Edwin Anderson of New Hampshire disembarked the 2nd Seaman Regiment that marched toward the Mexican Naval Academy. They came under fire from the locals. The U.S. ships offshore bombarded the academy. Ensign Lee became part of this hostile mix. Mexican snipers were now his target. They were hardly visible, poking out a rifle barrel or a pistol. Getting the targets to show themselves required risk. Lee baited them. He sat on a curb in the open with a borrowed rifle across his knees. Navy men use the angle of the sun by day. The Mexican snipers were now silhouetted against a bright sky to shoot him. Big mistake. Lee drew a bead on the snipers at 800 yards, pulled the trigger, and watched each one fall into the street below.
In July, the New Hampshire moved to the Norfolk Navy Yard. Ensign Lee renewed his request to be examined by a statutory board for promotion, and he passed. In August 1914, WWI broke out in Europe. On 29-September-1914, Lee was commissioned LT Junior Grade retroactively as of 6-June-1913.
After serving on the New Hampshire another year while the U.S. was neutral during the European war in progress, LTJG Lee was detached on 3-December-1915. LTJG Lee reported to the Union Tool Company, a foundry in West Chicago, Illinois where he served as Naval Inspector of Ordnance. It was his first shore assignment, 7 1/2 years after graduation from USNA. His role was as a quality control observer. He inspected control appliances for turret motors that were long-lead-time equipment for battleships of the Tennessee class. Inspections took him to Minnesota, Michigan, Indiana, and Iowa. Factories in the Midwest were making their contribution to the construction and arming of ships that would operate on oceans far away.
The U.S. being at war beginning 6-April-1917, the Bureau of Navigation advised Lee on 19-February-1918 of his promotion to Lieutenant retroactive to 29-August-1916. Another letter on 19-April-1918 from the Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels notified Lee of a temporary appointment to LT CDR retroactive to 1-January-1918 – when he was still wearing his LTJG uniform.
World War I and Aftermath, 1917-1920. In July 1917, while Bullseye Lee was still trying to get promoted to Lieutenant, he was transferred to another shore billet. The U.S. had entered WWI 3 months earlier and still needed ordnance inspectors. But LT CDR Lee preferred to serve on board a warship to support the Allied war effort in Europe. On 7-October-1918, LT CDR Lee requested he be assigned to sea duty in European waters. His request was granted. Lee proceeded to New York, caught a ship to Queenstown, Ireland then to Brest, France where he reported onboard destroyer O’Brien on 20-November-1918. However, he arrived too late to take part in WWI combat. The hostilities had ended 9 days earlier. He remained at the naval port office in Rotterdam until 9-June-1919. A dispatch to his Kentucky home directed Lee to join the U.S. Rifle Team in Caldwell, New Jersey in July 1919. But he had something else to attend to. Lee and Miss Mabelle Elspeth Allen, daughter of John and Margaret Allen, were married on 14-July-1919. She was 24 and he was 31. Mabelle met Lee in Chicago for the ceremony. Mabelle went back to Rock Island, Illinois to live with her family since the newlyweds had no time for a honeymoon.
In September 1919, LT CDR Lee returned to shipboard duty for 9 months as Executive Officer of submarine Bushnell. It was likely that Lee was assigned to the sub to broaden his naval experience by including some contact with submarines, and to “stash” him somewhere safe before going abroad to the 1920 Olympic Games with the U.S. Rifle Team. With his typical curiosity, Lee learned as much as he could and how submarines worked. He rode the submarine, and experienced going down during dives. Lee’s assignment on Bushnell ended in June 1920.
WWI prevented the holding Olympic Games. For participation in the U.S. Rifle Team at Quantico, 17 men were selected –one civilian and 16 officers and enlisted men of the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps. They were off to Belgium aboard the armored cruiser Frederick for a competition. Lee participated in 14 events, including 7 in one day. As a member of a 5-man team, he captured most of the Gold medals. LT CDR Lee and CDR Carl T Osburn, U.S. Rifle Team Captain, reported to the Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels on the results of their rifle competition. They received congratulations and a picture with SECNAV Daniels. Lee was now poised for his first battleship command.
Destroyer Skipper, 1920-1928. On 28-September-1920, Lee took over his first command, the destroyer Fairfax. On 1-June-1921, LT CDR Lee became the Commanding Officer of USS William B Preston, which ended on 29-July-1924 when he was detached at Chefoo, China. It was a tour of duty he surely enjoyed. He boarded the USS Argonne on 8-November to serve at the New York Navy Yard in Brooklyn. In September 1926, Lee was promoted to the rank of CDR, 18 years after leaving Annapolis. He passed the promotion examinations with high marks, particularly in international law, strategy, and tactics. Lee became Executive Officer of the target repair ship Antares, home-ported in Norfolk, Virginia. He reported to the ship on 27-November-1926, then took command of the 4-piper Lardner on 7-October-1927 at Norfolk until 16-June-1928. At the end of his tour, LT Dashiell L Madeira witnessed Lee’s ship-handling prowess. Lee’s destroyer days were over.
Commander, 1928-1936. CDR Willis A. Lee was a student in the senior course of the 1928-29 academic year at the Naval War College, which prepared naval officers for naval war. The preponderance of Navy flag officers who made substantial contributions during WWII were Naval War College graduates. After the shooting competitions, CDR Lee reported on 22 September for duty at the Navy Department in Washington. It was the 1st of 3 tours he performed in the Fleet Training Division on the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations. The work of the division was to assess the effectiveness of the performance of ships in their ability to perform wartime missions.
One route to promotion in the Navy between the world wars was being a member of the “Gun Club.” Although CDR Lee did not have a postgraduate degree in ordnance, he had great knowledge in depth. Some dubbed him a “scientist in uniform.” His exceptional ability was in applying theory to reality. A new skipper, CAPT William J Giles, took command of the flagship USS Pennsylvania. Lee became Executive Officer and Navigator, but relinquished the latter in a month. As second in command, CDR Lee was responsible for the internal operation of the ship: cleanliness, discipline, and administration. He went about the high-power job low-key. Lee had applied essentially no sanctions and achieved the desired result easily.
ADM Luke McNamee sent a letter to the Chief of Naval Operations, “During Lee’s current tour of sea duty as navigator and as Executive Officer of the USS Pennsylvania, CDR Lee USN, has been of material assistance to battleship gunnery progress, particularly in subjects as anti-aircraft machine gun defense, ballistics, and the photographic analysis of anti-aircraft bursts…” CDR Lee’s assignment on Pennsylvania ended on 7-June-1933, and he reported on 29-June-1933 for his 2nd tour of duty in the Navy Department in Washington. He was again assigned to Fleet Training Division to revise the gunnery and tactical instructions. CDR Lee went to Rockland, Maine to observe trials held by the Board of Inspection and Survey on the USS Ranger, the first U.S. aircraft carrier built from the keel up for naval war. Lee was to observe interior control mechanisms and practices for lessons learned to be applied to the coming Yorktown class.
In 1936, RADM Manley H Simons wrote, ”I know of no officer in the Navy that I would prefer to have served with me more than CDR Lee. He possesses zeal, ability, knowledge, and initiative that is far above average. He has displayed exceptional knowledge of both theoretical and practical Ordnance in connection with his present duty.” On 26-August-1936, Lee was promoted to CAPT retroactive to 1-July-1936. Finally, he would now be at sea, where he had always wanted to be.
Cruiser Service, 1936-1939. CAPT Willis Lee was ready for his major command. For surface officers, the desired commands were battleships, heavy cruisers, and light cruisers –in that order. Having received his 4th stripe, Lee became one of the Navy’s most junior captains. In 1936, the Bureau of Navigation slated him for the Omaha-class light cruiser USS Concord. Although CAPT Lee’s ship was commissioned in 1923, it was already obsolescent in armament. Her anti-aircraft protection was nonexistent. EO CDR Eugene Oates summoned LTJG Evan “Deacon” Yancey to meet Lee at the railroad station. Yancey was from Owen County and had known Lee since grade school.
On 6-October-1936, CAPT Willis Lee relieved CAPT William T Smith. Morale in the Concord under CAPT Lee’s command was high. The enlisted men were top-notch since the labor situation during the Depression enabled the Navy to be choosy. The Navy was comprised of a small, elite professional group of men, and most officers were from the Naval Academy.
On 23-October-1936, Concord was the flagship of RADM Walter N Vernou, simultaneously Commander for the Cruisers Battle force and Cruiser Division 3. RADM Vernou was a stickler for punctilious compliance with Navy regulations and customs. Lee was practically the antithesis of Vernou. In professional matters, Lee did care and sought excellence. But he was casual about appearances, and that included his navy uniform. When naval aviator LT William “Andy” Anderson embarked on the cruiser scouting squadron to report to CAPT Lee on the bridge, Lee replied with an informal “Okay” instead of “Very well,” the proper naval response. Vernou did not hear him and Lee got away with it. But in the instance of Vernou giving an order to the Concord’s helmsman where Lee was conning the ship, he countermanded the order. CAPT Lee turned to RADM Vernou and said, “I’m the commanding officer of this ship. I give orders to the helm. Please leave the bridge.”
One day when LTJG Marcus W Williamson, a junior aviator, had the watch in port. Lee called him to the captain’s cabin and asked him to bring along bombing data records. When Williamson arrived, he walked in and saw the skipper had a blackboard set up filled with bombing data and sketches of airplane bombing approaches at various altitudes. Math formulas filled the chalkboard. CAPT Lee asked LTJG Williamson whether the approaches he had drawn were feasible. LTJG Yancey stood deck watch on the bridge, and many times heard CAPT Lee express that the U.S. would have to fight Japan, and he scanned every open foot of deck on the Concord to determine whether he could install additional light AA guns.
On 12-June-1937, the crew gathered on the fantail. RADM Vernou presented CAPT Lee with the Light Cruiser Unit Trophy for General Excellence in Athletics. In 1935, the Concord’s unheralded team staged an upset to win the Battle Force championship and went on to win the U.S. Fleet competition.
On 22-June-1937, RADM Julius C Townsend relieved Vernou and the flagship shifted to USS Trenton. CAPT Lee took over as acting commander of Cruiser Division 3 for the next few months. LT Harold Krick was Lee’s flag lieutenant when Lee was acting division commander. LT CDR William F Jennings reported to the cruiser division staff as flag secretary. Thus began a personal and professional association with Lee that continued for 7 years. The Concord was a happy ship under CAPT Lee. When Lee left, the new skipper CAPT Earle C “Dutch” Metz was as nervous as Lee was calm and serene. Metz was likable and a fine officer, but he lacked the control that CAPT Lee displayed on the bridge and throughout the ship by his unruffled, taciturn demeanor. He was an old shoe in sloppy uniform but he got results. CAPT Lee’s command of Cruiser Division 3 ended on 7-September-1937 when RADM Harold “Betty” Stark became Commander.
Ensigns Richard Bradley and Fitzhugh Palmer were two new contributions to the Concord from USNA’36. Years later, both expressed gratitude at having been sent first to the cruiser. It was standard practice for newly commissioned academy ensigns to report to the fleet’s battleships, carriers, or heavy cruisers that allowed them to get their first experiences as naval officers without too much pressure or responsibility. With fewer officers in the light cruiser, both of them got their upbringing in the hands of capable officers who were serious about professional performance and yet pleasant to be with.
Before the end of 1937, LT CDR Charles Wellborn Jr became navigator after having served in the Bureau of Ordnance and as Commanding Officer of destroyer Perry. Wellborn said of Lee: “He could carry in his mind the decimal figures for sines and cosines to any degree you wanted to give. He could multiply these decimals by some other number mentally and come out with the linear measures of sines and cosines.” To Wellborn, Lee was a human computer, using his capability beyond the classroom, spending little time in academic pursuits.
CAPT Lee’s concern was finding the means for his facility with numbers to be applied in naval operations. Lee used 2 superimposed compass roses that he carried in his pocket. The gadget was known as an “is-was” and was more commonly used by submariners to calculate attack courses. The device enabled Lee to come up with the two legs of the relative motion triangle: the range and bearing from the guide at the Concord’s present station and at the new station to which she would proceed. He figured the 3rd leg in his head and then was able to supply the required course and speed. He had memorized the trigonometric functions of all possible angles of a triangle and then did the necessary calculations mentally. He was tolerant of people who didn’t have his ability, and they had to do the computations on paper to check his solutions. His estimates were almost always right within a degree or two.
On 30-July-1938, CAPT Willis Lee ended his nearly 22-month tour in command of Concord but he remained onboard as Operations Officer on ADM Stark’s staff. CAPT Earle C Metz of USNA’10 became the new skipper of Concord. Since Stark had white hair and seven staff members, they were soon nicknamed for the movie characters of Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs. The new commanding officer of Concord had a tough act to follow, and a resulting fall in morale was inevitable.
On 30-December-1938 in New York, ADM Stark and his staff shifted to Honolulu, one of Brooklyn’s sisters. The commissioning skipper was CAPT Oscar Smith who was sworn in with Lee at USNA in 1904. LT CDR Frederick Entwistle, Honolulu’s gunnery officer noted CAPT Lee’s interest in the new 6-inch guns. LT CDR Entwistle recalled Lee as quiet and unassuming but not an introvert, and devoid of pomposity.
Staff Gunnery Officer Wellborn scheduled the various ships for target practice and sent in administrative reports on the results. The international political situation had dictated the operation be geared more to potential wartime requirements.
On 24-May-1939, CAPT Lee left cruiser Honolulu to report to the Navy Department in Washington to prepare the U.S. Navy for the war that he and many others expected to come.
The Washington Years: Preparing for Battle, 1939-1942. War clouds were swirling throughout Europe when ADM Harold R Stark became the Chief of Naval Operations on 1-August-1939. Stark wrote that CAPT Lee’s men were devoted to Lee. Those words may just have been Lee’s highest accolade of all.
One weakness of the Mark 14 sight was that its predicted lead angles relied on a manual range estimate by an operator. In fast combat situations, operators could neglect to change the range setting as planes approached, throwing off their aim. Radar could not only “see” but could also update the range automatically, making the entire system always accurate. The Navy purchased 85,000 Mark 14 gunsights to control the multitude of light AA guns in the fleet.
One of the best-kept secrets of the prewar months was the development of shipboard radar. CAPT Lee saw the radar’s potential. He recognized the value of getting it installed aboard as many ships to perform the functions of searching for targets and controlling gunfire against those targets.
On 13-May-1941, CAPT Lee chaired a conference in his office to discuss the installation of radar antennas and sets onboard various ships of the fleet, beginning with battleships, heavy cruisers, and light cruisers. CAPT Lee recommended to the Bureau of Navigation to establish a class at the Naval Research Laboratory in Washington to train men to operate various types of radar. The candidates for training were to include radiomen, fire control men, and electrician’s mates.
At 0200 on a September morning in 1941, CDR Nealy A Chapin, Fleet Training Duty Officer, gave a pleased Mabelle Lee the news that her husband had been selected for Rear Admiral. It wasn’t that much of a surprise as CAPT Lee had been serving in an admiral’s billet in the months since ADM Herbert Leary left, and the CNO had the utmost confidence in him.
On 7-December-1941, the Japanese struck Pearl Harbor and the nation was at war. CAPT Lee put Jimmy Holloway as Head of Fleet Training’s gunnery section in charge of allocating .50-caliber ammunition, which was in short supply. The half-million rounds on hand weren’t enough for more than a few days of fighting. One reason for the scarcity was that the U.S. had been providing the bullets to the British through the Lend-Lease program, which was America’s means of keeping the British afloat during the period before the U.S. got into the war itself.
ADM Ernest J King who had been serving as Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, moved to Washington to be Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet. On 30-December-1941, CAPT Lee reported to ADM King’s staff for temporary additional duty as Assistant Chief of Staff for Readiness. The division’s function was to make the fleet ready for combat. On 8-January-1942, ADM Stark administered the oath of office as CAPT Lee was promoted to the temporary rank of Rear Admiral, retroactive to 4-November-1941. RADM Lee could now provide the fleet with more weapons.
As Head of Readiness Division, RADM Lee was responsible for seeing that weapons and ammunition were procured and delivered to the ships to meet all operational requirements. RADM Lee and LT CDR Percival “Pete” McDowell of USNA’23 concocted a letter to BuOrd and BuShips, saying they wanted at least one radar installed on every combatant ship. Per RADM Lee, “If you can’t produce them in the U.S., buy British.”
Getting weapons onto ships was a prime consideration. A letter drafted by LT CDR Mcdowell went up the chain of command, got the requisite approval from the Secretary of the Navy, and was implemented. Thereafter, whenever a combatant went into a shipyard, light anti-aircraft guns were added everywhere there was room. For some of the ships, topside equipment was removed to make way for the AA guns. The biggest and most impressive of the new gunnery ships were 35,000-ton fast battleships of the North Carolina and South Dakota classes. A war was on, and RADM Lee wanted to go to sea, ADM King approved RADM Lee for command of a battleship division. Lee was officially detached from Washington duty on 10-August-1942. RADM Willis Augustus Lee Jr,. 54 years old, was on his way to rejoin the fleet he loved so well.
Battleship Division Commander, August-October 1942. The recently promoted RADM Willis Lee would be heading to the South Pacific in August 1942. The tentacles of the Japanese octopus had expanded farther and farther to ensnare new conquests. But then, codebreakers working in a basement room in the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard divined Japanese intentions from intercepted radio messages. That intel work put U.S. warships into position for the Battle of the Coral Sea in May. The victory of the Battle of Midway was also due to good intel work. The intel also revealed that Japan’s intention in Guadalcanal was to build an airstrip that would provide them a wide radius for air attacks. Japanese began laying out the airstrip on July 6.
On August 7, the Navy sent the 1ST Marine Division assault team ashore Guadalcanal. The Marines captured the airstrip and renamed it Henderson Field. On 8-9 August, a Japanese cruiser commanded by VADM Gunichi Mikawa sank 4 heavy cruisers: Astoria, Vicennes, Quincy, and the Australian Canberra. The U.S. guns inflicted hits on the enemy heavy cruisers: Chokai, Aoba, and Kinugasa. U.S. submarine S 44 torpedoed and sank heavy cruiser Kako on August 10. On August 19, a Japanese convoy of9 destroyers delivered a thousand army troops to the island. The commander of the infantry regiment was COL Kiyonao Ichiki, whose mission was to recapture Henderson Field. The Marines killed COL Ichiki and hundreds of his men, but even more troops were poured into Guadalcanal. RADM Willis Lee was now headed to Guadalcanal, designated to take the first division of the new 27-knot fast battleships to the Pacific.
RADM Lee had risen to Commander, Battleship Division 6. President Roosevelt directed SECNAV Frank Knox to put together a group of 9 senior admirals, whose task was to pick the 40 most competent of the Navy’s 120 active-duty flag officers. Surprisingly, neither Nimitz nor Spruance made the cut. RADM Lee received 5 votes. Historian Richard Frank lauded RADM Lee as the star of the surface officers as clearly one of the finest officers of that generation. SECNAV Knox turned over the results of the votes to President Roosevelt on March 9.
South Dakota served as RADM Lee’s flagship. She was the lead ship in a new class of fast battleships, shorter and better armored than North Carolina and Washington. She carried a main battery of 9 16-inch/45-caliber guns. Her secondary battery has only 16 rather than 20 5-inch/38-caliber dual-purpose guns for use against both air and surface targets.
For his flag lieutenant, RADM Lee wanted someone who could aid him in the substance of tactical challenges ahead, not one who would take care of his personal chores. Thus the intervention by CDR Bill Jennings who had gone to the Bureau of Naval Personnel to find an officer with postgraduate education in ordnance and fire control. LT Ray Thompson fit those specifications and was immediately available. Ensign Paul Backus remembered LT Thompson as a hotshot in the weapons field. He finished 5TH of 432 in the USNA Class of 1933. RADM Lee also sought out LT Chad Knowlton as the ship’s Electronic Maintenance Officer. He did the repairs on all of the ship’s radars and Lee sought him out for information on their capabilities. Lee wanted to pass on his knowledge of the intersection of radar and gunnery by pooling what he knew with inputs from others. LT CDR Richard D Zern became the Flag Secretary and proved to be a wise choice. Signalman Henry C Price as watch supervisor, hand-delivered messages to RADM Lee. LT Albert T. Church was Radar Officer and acting Communications Officer. Ensign Robert Gooding served as the Radar Material Officer. In the 1970s, he became VADM Gooding and served as Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command. Two years later, Gunnery Officer LT Lloyd M. Mustin joined RADM Lee’s staff. Washington remained Lee’s favorite flagship.
On October 8, Japanese seaplane Nisshin and destroyers headed toward Guadalcanal. They were attacked by SBD dive-bombers and TBF Avengers of the Cactus Air Force. The Navy sent in ships to stave off Nisshin’s return. These were RADM Normal Scott’s Task Group 64.2, RADM George Murray’s Task Force 17, and RADM Willis Lee’s Task Group 17.8. In addition to Lee’s flagship Washington, was a light cruiser and 2 destroyers. That day, RADM Kelly Turner set out from Noumea in 7 ships to deliver an Army Infantry Regiment and ground detachment of the 1ST Marine Air Wing. On October 11, seaplanes Nisshin and Chitose, set out with cruisers and destroyers to bombard Guadalcanal’s Lunga Airfield after midnight. ADM Ghormley dispatched the 3 Task Forces and directed RADM Lee’s group to protect RADM Kelly Turner’s convoy. This was a rare and successful surface action. This victorious night action on October 11- 12 was called the Battle of Cape Esperance.
On October 18, ADM Nimitz tasked ADM Halsey to take Command of the South Pacific Area and South Pacific Forces. The morale of the South Pacific Theatre shot skyward. But there was at least one skeptic. ADM Halsey visited Washington and RADM Lee pointed out the SB radar screen to ADM Halsey. All ADM Halsey said was “I’ve heard of that.” RADM Lee had no expression on his face but LT Al Church wrote years later, “I’m not trying to detract from the great leader Halsey was, but this was just an incident where my confidence was so fully in Lee and somewhat shaken in ADM Halsey.” It showed how really exceptional Lee was in grasping and mastering new technology.
Task Force 64 was now under RADM Lee’s command, deployed to the waters of Guadalcanal known as “torpedo junction” for the submarine peril. With Washington at dusk on October 17 were cruisers San Francisco, Helena, and Chester. They were directed to patrol off Guadalcanal’s southern coast as ADM Yamamoto’s plan was to capture Henderson Field.
On 20-October-1942, the 3 cruisers along with 6 destroyers split off to bombard Japanese positions near Cape Esperance. That night, a Japanese submarine I-176 hit Chester with a torpedo ramming into her number 1 engine room after tearing a large hole in the skin of the ship. The attack killed 11 crewmen and injured 12. It damaged the ship to the extent that she needed significant repair work, and headed stateside for repairs. Chester’s Signal Officer, Ensign Guilliaem Aertsen III was transferred to Lee’s staff as Aide and Flag Lieutenant. Aertsen was a Harvard graduate commissioned as a junior officer by the V-7 program. But his skills and experiences onboard Chester were useful. Aertsen and Lee meshed so well that he remained with Lee throughout the war. He was like a son to RADM Lee.
RADM Lee’s Washington was 130 miles south of Guadalcanal. Lee’s Task Force 64 composed of battleships, cruisers, and destroyers positioned itself between the islands of Rennell and San Cristobal, out of range of Japanese carrier planes, but also not in a position to support the carrier task forces. The Hornet sunk on October 27, hit by Japanese destroyers and deadly torpedo attacks. The lesson this provides is the need for anti-aircraft protection for the carriers and its surface ships. That pairing became the template for U.S. carrier operations throughout the remainder of the Pacific War.
Night Action off Savo Island, November 1942. LT CDR Layton recalled that ADM Nimitz had high regard for RADM Lee as a war-fighter, which explains why Lee remained in the war zone for nearly 3 years without relief so he could command the battle line when appropriate. Nimitz said: “Now we’ll see a real fighter show those Japs how we can fight.” Layton said it was obvious that Nimitz felt far more confidence that Lee would “do the job” on the Japanese than he had of the others.
RADM Lee’s Washington did not have a radar on the bridge, just one in the CIC room. It would mean having to walk back and forth between the bridge and CIC so he stood and watched the battle from
outside the ship instead. Projectiles from the Kirishima flew over but did not hit his ship, but at least one of Washington’s 16-inch salvos struck Kirishima. South Dakota was hit critically by Kirishima, Atago, and Takao. At 02:32, Washington unleashed her 5-inch guns fatally on the already-wounded destroyer Ayanami. The Uranami polished her with a torpedo and sunk Ayanami. At 2338, VADM Lee directed his two remaining destroyers to leave the formation since they were no longer capable of offensive action.
Washington’s fire control radars tracked a large target which proved to be the Japanese flagship Kirishima. But VADM Lee held off firing for a while until the smoke cleared because it might be the South Dakota. At midnight, Washington opened up on Kirishima with her main battery at the range of 8400 yards, a close encounter of naval behemoths firing. Washington unleashed 75 radar-controlled 16-inch rounds at Kirishima. Of the 75, 20 struck home. Rounds from the 5-inch guns made 18 hits. Within 7 minutes, Kirishima was out of the fight. Kirishima’s rudder was jammed, some of the hits were below the ship’s waterline, acting like a torpedo that let water into her hull. She was uncontrollable and fires raged topside. The damage inflicted on Kirishima was so extensive that she sank at around 0320, 11 miles west of Savo Island. Washington was now fighting alone. From that point onward, Washington effectively constituted the entirety of the U.S. Fighting force. Neither the destroyers nor the South Dakota was capable of combatting the enemy. Washington sailed south to protect South Dakota. As Washington was steaming away, VADM Lee was imperturbable. Yet he had just fought the biggest battle of his life. He explained to the surviving crew that their margin of superiority was due almost entirely to their possession of radar. The Japanese did not have any radar.
That night, Task Force 64 had prevented the bombardment of Henderson Field and the landing of enemy troops and supplies on Guadalcanal. Watchful Waiting, December 1942-October 1943. For years, RADM Lee focused his efforts on improving anti-aircraft gunnery. Lee was interested in the variable-time (VT) fuze, a part of a projectile for a 5-inch/38-caliber shipboard gun. The fuze would send out a radio signal, sense the nearness of an enemy aircraft, and receive a response that would explode the warhead. It only had to come near an aircraft to detonate. His interest resulted in a large increase in orders for the VT fuze and its general issue to combatant ships in the Pacific. LTJG Van Allen explained that RADM Lee’s influence was responsible for the highly successful use of the radio-proximity fuze in anti-aircraft defense of the Pacific Fleet. Years later, by then a renowned scientist, Van Allen recalled that Lee immediately focused on the importance of the VT fuze that eliminates “range error” of the old mechanical-time fuze, making it 5-10 times more effective.
Central Pacific Campaign, Autumn 1943-Summer 1944. After Guatemala, RADM Lee’s battleships got back into combat in the autumn of 1943 while supporting the invasion of the Gilbert Islands. This was the start of the island-hopping campaign that would eventually lead to Japan. The battleships were to be valued not so much for their big guns, but for their smaller ones. They would provide anti-aircraft protection while operating as part of carrier task groups. This validated Lee’s push in the pre-war period to get as many anti-aircraft guns to sea battleships.
RADM Lee got a rare opportunity to exercise tactical command on 8-December 1943. The operation was an air-sea attack on the island of Nauru, northeast of the Solomons. It was well defended by the Japanese that U.S. forces bypassed than invaded. It did, however, provide an opportunity for all 6 fast battleships to participate as a unit and test their abilities at shore bombardment. The ships were North Carolina, Washington, South Dakota, Indiana, Massachusetts, and Alabama. At 0700, at RADM Lee’s signal transmitted by flags, all ships unleashed 9-gun salvos toward the coast. 54 16-inch projectiles were in the air simultaneously. The opening range was 30,000 yards. The ships moved closer during 40 minutes of firing, bringing the destroyers firing position. The U.S. ships had fired 810 16-inch projectiles and 3,400 5-inchers. The carriers Bunker Hill and Monterey strafed and bombed the island too.
On 30-January-1944, a day before the invasion of Kwajalein Atoll, RADM Lee commanded Task Unit 58.13 during a bombardment of the southern atoll. His command comprised Washington, Massachusetts, and Indiana, which were accompanied by a division of destroyers. The battleships launched Kingfisher floatplanes though Lee’s report said these aircrafts did not have sufficient endurance to observe the entire operation. Lee recommended carrier planes be used in future missions. The battleships fired 1029 rounds of 16-inch projectiles and 8,215 rounds of 5-inch projectiles. Lee’s assessment: “The bombardment appeared to be most effective and undoubtedly inflicted heavy damage on enemy personnel and installations.” As in the Gilberts, RADM Lee was designated to command the battle line if enemy ships contest the invasion.
Of all the actions that RADM Lee took during WWII, his decision not to engage the Japanese surface fleet in the Marianas remains the most controversial and the one for which he has been criticized. When the time came to take on the Japanese heavies, Lee expected that he could do so in a situation that provided him a battle line with a clear tactical advantage, an element missing off Saipan. It would be amiss again in Leyte Gulf.
Battle of Leyte Gulf, Summer-Autumn 1944. RADM Lee, onboard Washington, was designated commander of Task Group 34 and had tactical command. Among Lee’s duties was serving as the assistant commander of the 3RD Fleet, able to step in and direct the fleet when needed. However, when ADM Halsey and his men could have greatly benefited, they did not listen to Lee. It was a huge blunder on the part of ADM Halsey and staff to ignore Lee’s warning that VADM Takeo Kurita’s ships were on their way to San Bernardino Strait. Halsey blundered twice, the first was in sending all the battleships north when the enemy was south; the second was in turning back and sending all his ships south when the enemy had headed north. Had even just 2 of Lee’s ships pursued VADM Kurita’s ships, the likelihood would be that Lee would have sunk Ise and Hyuga. Kinkaid asked Halsey plainly “Where is Lee? Send Lee.” Nimitz directed his war plans officer RADM Forrest Sherman to ask Halsey, “Where is Task Force 34?” ADM Ernest King was angry that Halsey had not let Lee’s ships guard San Bernardino Strait. A few years later RADM Kinkaid said, “The net result of all this is that 6 strongest battleships in the world, except Yamato and Musashi, steamed 300 miles north and 300 miles south during ‘the greatest naval battle of WWII’ and the largest engagement ever fought on the high seas -and did not fire a single shot. I can well imagine the feelings of my Naval Academy classmate, Lee.”
On 21-November-1944, RADM Lee disembarked his favorite flagship, Washington, at the lagoon of Ulithi Atoll. He first embarked on the ship in September 1942 after the South Dakota scraped a gash in her hull at Tongatabu. RADM Lee had been on board Washington for the Guadalcanal campaign, Gilbert Islands, Marshall Islands, the collision with the Indiana, Marianas, and the frustration at Leyte Gulf. Lee and his Battleships Pacific Fleet staff transferred back to South Dakota.
Closing in on Japan, November 1944 – June 1945. The operation to capture Kerama Retto in the Ryukyus was to acquire a support base and anchorage for U.S. Navy ships. In preparation, ADM Spruance designated RADM Lee as Commander of Task Force 59. It was classified as a heavy striking force as it went out from Ulithi for 2 days of maneuvers, prior to the invasion of the Philippines. The difference was the enemy was considerably diminished in size and power by 1945. But Yamato survived the Battle of Leyte Gulf and was a threat.
Scholar Malcolm Muir wrote that only one fast carrier was lost to air attack while under fast battleship protection: the Princeton at Leyte Gulf. Some ships were not conceived for air attacks when they were designed. The Japanese may have had to turn to kamikazes when their pilots met such effective anti-aircraft fire from U.S. ships escorting carriers making it hard to carry out their air raid missions.
Task Group 59.7, commanded by VADM Lee, comprised 8 fast battleships, Spruance’ flagship Indianapolis, destroyers, and destroyer minesweepers. Air attacks and bombardments of southern Okinawa were a diversion to deceive the enemy on where the real landings would happen. VADM Lee’s 4 divisions of battleships opened up at 0930 on 24-March-1945 at a range of 22,000 yards and proceeded to bombard the southern coast. The 8 battleships released 1,375 16-inch projectiles. Missouri and Wisconsin fired their main battery guns for the first time. Floatplanes were over the island as spotters. The carriers maintained aerial assaults and continued support as the soldiers and Marines went ashore on the western side of the island.
Ever since Lee’s victory at Guadalcanal in November 1942, VADM Lee had remained at sea much of the time to command the battle line in surface engagements. The remaining target was the 72,000-ton Yamato, which was sunk on April 7 together with 9 other warships by U.S. carrier aircrafts before the kamikazes reached Okinawa to perform a suicide attack.
From April 1 to June 22, 1945, the U.S. Army divisions and Marines attacked the Shuri Castle line. U.S. battleships, cruisers, and destroyers approached under cover of darkness to support the offensive. VADM Lee’s Task Group 58.7 comprising South Dakota, North Carolina, and Washington also arrived in darkness. North Carolina commenced shelling at 0647. South Dakota followed at 0853 with her 16-inch guns and 5-inchers at 11:16. South Dakota’s Kingfisher planes were overhead to direct firing at preplanned targets. Carrier planes joined in the onslaught. South Dakota launched 227 16-inch projectiles and 114 rounds of 5-inchers. Carriers launched 1,000 aircrafts a day to strike at LT GEN Mitsuru Ushijima’s HQ on Okinawa. But the kamikazes got worse. 36 U.S. ships sunk and 5,000 sailors died.
ADM Nimitz, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas moved his HQ from Pearl Harbor to Guam to put him closer to the scene of combat. This gave him the opportunity for face-to-face conversations with VADM Lee on operational issues. Lee and Mustin were impressed by Nimitz’ acceptance of observations made by those who had experienced actual combat. Nimitz wanted to learn more about kamikaze attacks. The intellectual Nimitz finished 7TH of 114 in USNA Class of 1905.
VADM Lee discussed with ADM Nimitz that a combat information center (CIC) onboard any ship should include the gunnery department. CIC provided information necessary for the effective use of the ship’s armaments and should have a direct link in the organizational structure. The Navy Department experimented with augmenting an operations department, merging gunnery and radar CIC systems in a few ships. Post-war, the change was made permanent in U.S. Navy ships.
VADM Lee’s WWII combat service was over, having started in the summer of 1942. The kamikaze was the primary threat in invading Japan’s home islands. Lee had been selected to find counter-measures to foil the kamikaze attacks. Lee was considered the best analytical man in the Navy. The conviction by the Navy’s leaders that he was the best man to take on Japan’s fleet. Thus Lee had not been east of Hawaii since that summer of 1942. On 16-June-1945, Lee turned over Battleship Squadron 2 to RADM John F Shafroth, a Division Commander under him, and also from USNA Class of 1908.
War’s End, June-August 1945. On 18-June-1945, a PT boat came alongside the dark gray hull of South Dakota, and RADM Lee took leave of a battleship for the last time in his life. He took along with him a few of his staff. The boat headed for Samar Island, where a Navy plane would fly them to the U.S. East Coast. On 2-July-1945, VADM Lee was designated as Commander of Task Force 69, re-designated as Composite Task Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet. VADM Lee’s initial flagship for Task Force 69 was the radar picket destroyer Dennis J Buckley. Its role was to provide advance warning of incoming enemy air raids. On August 11, she was replaced with Wyoming as Lee’s flagship.
VADM Lee’s group gave COMMO Arleigh Burke the go-ahead to send the color-burst projectiles to the fleet. It was an innovation adopted as anti-aircraft projectiles that produced different-colored bursts when they exploded. Previously, all flak bursts were black, so if more than one ship was firing at a plane, there was no way to distinguish the bursts. In surface gunnery against ships, different colors of dyes were used in projectiles.
Following the dropping of 2 atomic bombs on Nagasaki and Hiroshima, Japan surrendered. VADM Lee had not gotten back to his battleships. WWI and WWII finished without him. The naval career he so single-mindedly dedicated his life to suddenly seemed to have no future. Lee was unprepared and depressed. His task force had not found a solution to the kamikaze menace. And now it no longer mattered. For what good use would a battleship commander be now that the war is over? Lee’s deep-set grief in not being able to correct the blunders of ADM Halsey in the Battle of Leyte Gulf greatly contributed to his early death, a high price to pay to be part of the greatest battle at sea.
VADM Lee boarded a boat to his office on Great Diamond Island. Moments later, Lee began choking. He slumped over on his seat in the cockpit, and the boat crew rushed in to help. Lee tried to speak but could not. The boat headed for the nearest ships of Lee’s task force destroyers. Within 20 seconds, doctors from the Goodrich and Henry Tucker boarded the boat but found Lee already dead of coronary thrombosis. It had only been 7-8 minutes since the boat had left the landing dock. The man who spent many years in command of big ships died in a small boat. The best Battleship Commander died not in battle but in peace.
RECOMMENDATION:
The book “Battleship Commander –The Life of Vice Admiral Willis A Lee Jr.” by Paul Stillwell and published by USNI is such a joy to read. The author clearly presents how VADM Lee’s marksmanship, advanced mathematical skills, cleverness, and wit in his childhood years later benefitted the U.S. Navy in wartime Pacific. This book would be a perfect reference for future navy commanders as it reveals how Lee could generate a cohesive and happy crew. Lee was very much appreciated by ADM Nimitz for his brilliant mind, and his ability to transfer theory into practice, but most of all for his humility and non-pompous nature.
VADM Lee sought ideas to find the nexus between radar and gunnery systems, and to optimize the placement of weaponry in all ships. His quest created an operations department, merging gunnery and radar communications systems in every ship, as recommended by VADM Lee. He ensured that all crew were well-trained in gunnery by holding drills. The battleship crews became so good with their light and heavy guns that the Japanese had to resort to Kamikaze pilots because of the difficulties they faced. In addition, having carrier planes became a template for all U.S. carriers after the war, as recommended by VADM Lee. The tactical group that experimented on remedies to fight the Kamikazes became the Operational Test and Evaluation Force in 1959. That command, growing from the seeds planted by VADM Willis Lee in 1945, exists as a vital part of the U.S. Navy. There was a reason why ADM Chester Nimitz singled out VADM Willis Lee. He considered VADM Lee the best battleship commander among the rest.
