INTRODUCTION. Coordinating the tasks of running a ship at the Age of Sail was complex, and sea battles threatened the lives of all on board, which required strict discipline to survive. The sea is a hazardous place, and death awaits. Every detail of shipboard life revolves around absolute obedience. The navy captain’s power was indeed immense. To stoop and receive orders from a civilian was utterly frustrating for the Petty Despots. Although willing to accept civilian authority, naval officers valued their independence, dignity, but above all, honor.

CHAPTER 1. “To Be Obeyed, It Is Necessary to be Esteemed.” American Revolution at Sea, 1775-1783.

The Revolutionary War gave a grand example of how not to run a navy. George Washington’s force provided a nudge for Congress to get on with creating an official navy. But opponents found it insane to challenge the Royal Navy. Although outnumbered, Washington’s tiny fleet inflicted damages on Britain. Washington was a commander of the Continental Army, and later, Washington’s ships were a Continental Navy.

Once the 1775 Congress voted for a navy, it planned to build 13 frigates to be put to sea in 3 months. The 13 frigates took over a year to finish. Congress had 9 more vessels plus 74 gunships to build. They never came about. Congress proved sorely deficient in the eyes of the navy. Unable to mount an engagement with the Royal Navy, the continental ships were used as coastal defense, and State navies decided to act on their own.

When states appealed for naval assistance, a Continental Navy was sent. Congress would warn the Continental Navy not to upset the State’s Navy Captain as he is used to being in command. As the guardian, the crew obeyed for utter trust in his wisdom and care. John Paul Jones said, “in order to be OBEYED, it is necessary to be ESTEEMED.” The navy got the civilian control concept, but had little esteem for Congress.

Mistrust for Congress led many naval officers to act with more autonomy. But these were the Navy Captains who channeled their navy zeal mindset in the right direction, possessed the courage and daring to overcome the odds against the Royal Navy, and make big contributions to the war effort. The Navy Captains that could not make a shift in mindset to ignore their low esteem for Congress faced problems.

Congress then promoted Commodore Esek Hopkins as Commander in Chief of the Fleet of the United Colonies. Hopkins was an inept merchant marine who did not follow naval orders and instead raided a scantly guarded British fort in the Bahamas. On his return, he did not fire a single shot on the frigate Glasgow, despite their 7:1 ratio against Britain. Hopkins was dismissed from the navy the next year without a court martial.

Congress then began granting early Captain commissions without considering seniority. At the senior Captains’ mission-completion, only one made it to the list: John Paul Jones, who should have been #5 but was at #18. The list had little to do with past achievement. Congress could not explain what it had done to the senior Navy Captains. The new captains had no experience. By October 1777, Britain captured Philadelphia.

Congress made it even worse for the navy. It created 2 navy boards with vague mandates. Washington wrote to the 1st and 2nd Navy Board to promptly submerge 2 ships, Effingham and Washington, to keep them away from British use. Francis Hopkinson (1st Navy Board) fulfilled the command. Then was questioned by John Barry (2nd Navy Board) as the sinking was neither approved by the Marine Committee nor Congress.

In the early 1780s, privateer Thomas Truxtun anchored his Constellation next to CAPT John Paul Jones’ Ariel. Truxtun refused to lower his pennant, a blatant disrespect. Jones wrote to Truxtun, “It is not me you have offended. You have offended the United States of America.” Learning from Jones, Truxtun became a defender of the U.S. Navy’s honor later in life.6

CHAPTER 2. “To This Great National Object.” The Creation of the United States Navy, 1783-1797.

Although the infant U.S. was free, it was far from secure. With an empty treasury and no navy, its commercial shipping became a target to the notorious Barbary Corsairs, consisting of the Ottoman Empire (Algiers, Tunis, Tripoli) and Morocco. Piracy weakened maritime economies of Britain’s rivals.

Algiers seized James Cathart’s Maria and CAPT Richard O’Brien’s Dauphin in 1785. Both crews were put into slavery for over 11 years. Washington, Jefferson, and Hamilton struggled to find a solution. But the remaining Continental navy ships after the Revolution were given away or sold, leaving their seas with no defense protection. Lesson: U.S. must pay the cost of safeguarding commerce to safeguard its commercial ships.

The dissolution of the Continental Navy after the Revolution invited attacks on American shipping, but it also gave the new nation a chance to correct the errors of the Revolutionary War regarding maritime forces. The new navy should have a more stable oversight, and a more direct chain of command. George Washington and John Adams ensured the new navy’s survival.

The hope for a new navy rested with the 1787 Constitution in Philadelphia. Antifederalists were against the Constitution for fear of contraction of State power; Southerners feared a navy may give maritime power to New England states; antifederalists said a navy is expensive, requires high taxes, and will draw states into Europe’s wars; the navy opposes civilian power, therefore was pointless to have one since the Atlantic Ocean was a perfect barrier against invasion.

With such short-sighted arguments, the Federalists won. Federalist Alexander Hamilton saw the navy as indispensable in protecting American commerce and obtaining respect from Europe. Major opposition to the creation of a new Navy almost entirely came from the Jeffersonian-Republican Antifederalists.

Jefferson believed there was a need to combat rampant piracy in the Mediterranean, the same piracy that held over a dozen Americans enslaved in Algiers for over a decade. By 1793, the number of enslaved Americans skyrocketed. The impact on American shipping was catastrophic. It finally forced Congress to take decisive action. It passed the Naval Act of 1794, creating the U.S. Navy. To be built immediately were 6 frigates.

CAPT John Barry was requested to aid in the selection of the first navy captains. Selecting naval officers is different from selecting army officers. Conventional wisdom holds that a competent army officer brings his skills and expertise with him to command his troops. Hiring a navy officer is not easy. Not many have the combination of status as a gentleman, diplomat, and deep skills in seamanship based on experience at sea.

A sailing vessel was one of the most complex technologies of its day. The first 6 Navy Captains by seniority were John Barry, Samuel Nicholson, Silas Talbot, Joshua Barney, Richard Dale, and Thomas Truxtun. Truxton had the least experience but did the most to establish the Navy’s reputation and prepare for the future. Barney refused to be classified as less senior to Talbot since he was already a Captain. James Sever replaced Barney.

The new Navy almost disappeared when a Treaty with the Regency of Algiers was ratified by the Senate in March 1796, eliminating the need for a navy. Relations with France soured when the U.S., having no war funds nor a navy, declared itself neutral in the British war against France. The Treaty of Amity and Commerce signed by U.S. and France during the revolution, stated they would each come to the rescue in future wars.

Instead, a new Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation was signed between America and Britain. In retaliation, the French Revolutionaries authorized privateers to seize American ships, which they could do so with impunity as the U.S. government was unable to protect its merchant fleet.

Only 3 frigates were to be completed –in Philadelphia, Boston, and Baltimore for CAPTs Barry, Nicholson, and Truxtun. The tight-fisted Congress had always opposed a new navy, and Washington found no reason to keep Dale, Talbot, and Sever on payroll. They were released from the Navy. Captains Barry, Nicholson, and Truxtun were made superintendents of their ships, including constructing, equipping, and manning.

Then came the retirement of Secretary of War Henry Knox. He did such a fine job that his successors could not measure up. The tenure of Timothy Pickering was uneventful, followed by James McHenry, who had an easy-going personality ill-suited for to face senior foreign naval officers and diplomats with steel egos. Alexander Hamilton became de facto Secretary of War.

Civilians took subscriptions to build warships. Washington, Knox, and Hamilton saw this as militant since the owners would dictate their use. But the subscribers allowed government to use their ships. They only exerted influence on the selection of the Captain. A subscription warship was a sign of lack. To manage an Army and Navy was too much for Adams. For the incompetence of his Secretary of War, a Navy Department was needed.

CHAPTER 3. “To Rid Our Navy of Such Men.” Benjamin Stoddert and Creation of the Navy Dept, 1798-1801.

Adams found it daunting searching for a Secretary of the Navy. George Cabot was the first choice but he declined. He did counsel that whoever is chosen must hold deep knowledge of maritime affairs. The post was accepted by merchant Benjamin Stoddert of George Town, a captain in the Continental Army; and Secretary for Congressional Board of War. Stoddert urged captains to induce unworthy officers to resign from the navy.

In February 1799, French frigate L’Insurgent surrendered to CAPT Truxtun. The battle was a remarkable victory for the infant U.S. Navy. The Constellation lost only 1 sailor vs. 70 French sailors. No repercussions were brought to LT Andrew Sterrett for having Nelson Harvey killed for cowardice aboard the Constellation. Naval regulations impose a court-martial, but in the heat of battle, the Navy Captain’s authority is absolute.

When Truxtun voiced out his opinion of government policy, he crossed the line between civilian and military. This identified Truxtun with the radical wing of Adam’s Federalist Party, which broke with Adams and clamored for a declaration of war. Alexander Hamilton, the leader of the radical Federalists, openly challenged the president’s desire to avoid war. With talk of war, CAPTs Dale, Talbot, and Sever were called back in 1798.

Talbot outranked Truxtun. But Truxtun regarded himself superior. “The avarice of rank in the infancy of our service is the devil,” SECNAV Stoddert said to Hamilton after losing his best officer, Truxtun. Adams and Stoddert enticed him back into the Navy by convincing Washington to invite Truxtun to Mount Vernon. Washington urged him to reconsider since the nation was at war. Truxtun had one request, not to serve under Talbot.

SECNAV Stoddert worked lead roles in the Department of War, Department of the Navy; and liaised between his officer corps and Congress, especially in appealing for the navy to receive better pay. With such a workload, Stoddert was annoyed when his captains looked to him for their orders that he felt they could have easily done using their own authority. Stoddert told Truxtun to act with full authority. Stoddert would regret this.

Truxtun indeed acted like the CIC and made major mistakes, one of which was to set sail Captain Alexander’s vessel opposite to Stoddert’s instruction. The vessel was to relieve Talbot (Truxtun’s nemesis) at Cape Francois, and its seamen whose enlistments had expired. Stoddert had to search for another ship to get Talbot. Stoddert was horrified and reprimanded Truxtun, but realized it was his fault for granting him full authority.

President Adams sought a peaceful solution to the U.S. differences with France. He succeeded in 1800. Both countries signed a new treaty ending the undeclared conflict with finality. For the remainder of his life, Adams regarded this peaceful resolution of hostilities as one of his greatest legacies. But having infuriated the radical wing of his own party, John Adams lost to Thomas Jefferson in the 1800 elections.

President Jefferson’s backers were the most hostile to the creation of the Navy. Jefferson retained fewer captains than Stoddert did. The Navy Captains released from the Navy received nothing. Those that were removed from service did not get paid, or were receiving wages a family could not live on. The Jefferson government would not send out a 74-gun ship for 20 years, and of the 13 frigates retained, 7 were simply stored.

SECNAV Stoddert encouraged bad behaviors by calling for zeal, but ignoring the defiant zealots. The good naval officers chose their subordinates, determined strategy, and enjoyed near-total autonomy over their crew. SECNAV Robert Smith succeeded Stoddert in the Navy Department. He inherited a zealously determined corps to combat the enemy. He also got officers who judged their civilian superiors as enemies.

CHAPTER 4. “To Make An Impression of Our National Character.” Navy in the Tripolitan War, 1801-1807.

        The crop of junior officers sent to the Mediterranean were “men of spirit and enterprise” that Stoddert had so eagerly sought. When they found themselves unable to wage war against the enemy, they soon turned their weapons on one another. With personal honor at stake, no man could refuse a challenge and hope to preserve reputation in the officers corps.

CAPT Alexander Murray proposed amending the naval regulations to stipulate penalties, including revocation of commission, for anyone who participated in or failed to prevent a duel. Even Stephen Decatur, a man who would eventually die in a duel, issued standing orders after he became captain in 1804 that all disputes among his subordinates had to be referred to him for arbitration before resorting to the field of honor.

The Navy Department accepted this as a frustrating but unavoidable fact of the officer corps. After all, the kind of naval officers that Stoddert and Robert Smith sought –men of zeal, courage, and aggressiveness– were most prone to engage in duels. Adding alcohol to their own sense of honor, mixed with tight quarters and boredom, could indeed be deadly.

CAPT Edward Preble wanted to bring down Tripoli. But his plans for an assault suffered a setback. CAPT William Bainbridge had lost schooner Retaliation in the French Quasi War, and now frigate Philadelphia was grounded on rocky shores. Facing either surrender or blowing up the ship with all on board, Bainbridge chose the former. In 1803, Tripolitans sailed Philadelphia triumphantly into the harbor.

In the spring of 1801, Jefferson planned to send a small squadron to the Mediterranean to assess the situation. To lead the fact-finding mission, he turned to CAPT Thomas Truxtun of the Constellation. Jefferson soon found Truxtun was both an asset and a headache. He was the most successful captain to emerge from the Quasi War, and recognized as the most effective mentor to young officers. But he had a hot temper.

When Truxtun discovered his mission was only intelligence gathering while providing his seamen with experience, he declined the command. CAPT Richard Dale took the mission, commanded the squadron, and set sail in the summer of 1801. Upon his return a year later, Dale brought news that Tripoli had declared war on the U.S., and that Sterrett and the men of Enterprise had fought a battle with a Tripolitan cruiser. Dale then blockaded the port of Tripoli.

Federalists pounced on Jefferson for sending the Navy with inadequate authority to engage the enemy. Alexander Hamilton, his mortal enemy, led the charge, firing off 18 articles in the New York Evening Post. Jefferson quickly planned to send a more powerful squadron to Tripoli, with the power to wage war. He sought Congress to authorize taking enemy vessels, blockades, and acquire peaceful terms. Congress approved.

Robert Smith declined the post for Secretary of the Navy, but later agreed to take it at the behest of his brother, Samuel, who was offered the job earlier but also declined. Walking in the shadow of his brother, Robert suffered unfair reviews but in truth he had ample exposure to government and the sea, and served in Maryland’s House and Senate. His law practice focused on admiralty and maritime cases.

Robert Smith went on to become one of the most significant Secretaries of the Navy. As SECNAV, Smith proved to be an extremely capable administrator but never had free control of his department. Jefferson took keen interest in naval affairs; every major decision on naval commands, strategy, and deployments bore his personal approval. Jefferson and Smith had an excellent working relationship, and were of one mind.

CAPT Richard Valentine Morris made his mission to the Mediterranean a yachting convoy with wife, son, and servant, infuriating the president. In 1803, CAPT Edward Preble replaced CAPT Morris. Preble did not fear British officers nor cower to enter a British vessel. He had the fighting spirit Jefferson sought in a commander, and was highly respected by his crew.

In 1804, LT Stephen Decatur led his men into the Harbor aboard Intrepid to set fire to Philadelphia’s magazine, lighting up the city. Decatur was promoted to CAPT before senior LTs who had captured vessels before he did. LT Andrew Sterrett captured a Tripolitan ship in 1801. He decided to resign. Smith decided to award Sterrett a ceremonial Congressional sword for capturing an enemy vessel, and for gallant conduct.

In 1805, Smith asked CAPTs Stephen Decatur, Samuel Barron, James Barron, Edward Preble, and William Bainbridge to counsel him on whether CAPT Truxtun threatened to resign from the service or decline the mission to the Mediterranean. The unanimous decision was the former, because as his letter stated, he would rather resign “from the service.”

CAPT John Rogers was in command in the Mediterranean.  Preble was junior to Rodgers but was chief of the squadron. This murky chain of command was Smith’s doing resulting in a clash of 2 officers’ sense of honor. CAPT Preble flew the pennant on the Constitution. It was an insult to Rogers who had seniority. But they put their animosity aside and turned to Morocco which dispatched 2 ships to prey on U.S. merchant ships.

There was a pending duel between CAPTs John Rogers and Samuel Barron. SECNAV Smith ordered Barron to give all his attention to the gunboat building, and remain where the boats are being built. Smith gave Rogers a similar directive, making it impossible for both to meet. John Stricker spoke to Barron and Rogers and found they could be convinced not to duel.

Two Navy Captains agreeing their honor could be defended without resorting to arms in a long-standing dispute was a precedent. But by showing their willingness to duel unless certain that only by settling their differences would their honor remain intact, they proved that naval officers were in no way weak or contemptible, for a young nation still trying to prove itself. By 1806, U.S. Mediterranean interests were secure.

CHAPTER 5. “A Government Rigorously Frugal and Simple.” Navy and Jeffersonian Republicans, 1805-1812.

Jefferson and Madison were justly criticized for the unprepared state of the U.S. Navy for the War of 1812, but they labored under a host of tremendous political and fiscal constraints. Jefferson also made it certain that Army and Navy officers would imbibe the “correct” Republican principles.

 Jefferson was “for a government rigorously frugal and simple, applying all savings to the discharge of the national debt” and he knew the need for national defense, despite what his hysterical Federalist critics claimed. But he did not believe in a large and permanent military. He would rely on internal militia until an invasion occurred. The Navy was to be defense-oriented, protecting coasts and harbors from British invasion by sea.

Officers on land and at sea were filled with Alexander Hamilton’s Federalists. Jefferson feared the majority of officers were strongly anti-democratic. Jefferson’s first order was to republicanize the highest echelons of the military. Jefferson and Secretary of War Henry Dearborn reduced the Army to purge blatant Federalist officers and those unfit to continue. His vision was for an Army West Point academy, but none for the Navy.

Jefferson and the Smith brothers would use the Peace Establishment Act of 1801 to shape the existing set of navy officers. The Navy was reduced by 300. Congress passed an act in the ending days of Adams’ regime with considerable input from Stoddert hoping that reducing the Navy in a measured way would prevent Jefferson from gutting it. The Smith brothers realized many meritorious navy officers were cut from service.

The Peace Establishment Act was “the true foundation of the fully professional naval officer corps that the U.S. developed between 1801 and 1812.” It had an apolitical character in the selection process compared to the Army selection process. Samuel Smith said, “I have attended much to character, nothing to the political caste.” However, Navy officers were drawn from merchant shipping and coasts, which were mainly Federalists.

While the reduction of the Navy was the most far-reaching naval policy of the Jefferson administration, the gunboat program was the most infamous. Jefferson’s plan was to put the frigates in drydock and transition the Navy to a more economical strategy. His fear recalls the Danish Navy that refused to be part of the Anglo-French war. Britain sent a squadron to Copenhagen in 1801 and destroyed the entire Danish Navy.

The worst civil-military tensions during Jefferson’s time were from navy officers who objected to their low pay under Robert Smith’s tenure. David Porter proposed a committee of naval officers to approve expenditures, rather than a civilian secretary. His proposal was approved years later as the Board of Navy Commissioners. In 1846, the Navy settled in Porter’s favor, 3 years after his death. He exposed the real poverty of navy life.

In 1805, Smith pressed Congress to authorize to construct 12 of the 74-gun ships. Commodore Preble and CAPT Bainbridge fought to acquire 74s but Congress overwhelmingly rejected. In 1808, a group of naval officers on half-pay until they were needed, sent a very desperate plea to Congress, asking for money for rations, pensions for widows as Army wives received, and better pay. The Republican-controlled Congress declined.

The rejection particularly rankled CAPT Isaac Hull. Years later, still seething at how the Congress had treated the naval officers, Hull told David Daggett (a friend in the Senate), “I wonder how men of feeling could bear such treatment, when the world will and must acknowledge what they have asked was asked respectfully, and ought to have been granted.”

By June 1807, Commodore John Rodgers was to be relieved from the Mediterranean. SECNAV Smith dispatched the Chesapeake, commanded by Commodore Barron. When the British found out that 4 British deserters were onboard, VADM George Cranfield Berkeley ordered to stop the Chesapeake and search its crew, a shocking order given at peace time.

In June 1807, British CAPT Salusbury Humphreys of the 54-gun ship Leopard came aboard to seize the 4 deserters. Commodore James Barron declared his crew was purely American. Humphrey gave a warning shot, but Barron ignored it, so Leopard unleashed a broadside on Chesapeake. It was utter chaos, and most unacceptable as they fired back only once. No one knew their battle station, nor how to fire the guns.

Humphreys boarded, and Barron offered his ship but Humphreys declined as his orders were purely to seize the deserters. The British captain offered aid that Barron ignored. Casualties were 3 deaths, 16 wounded, and the ship limped back to Norfolk. Barron was charged for failing to have his ship ready for action; failing to take an attack seriously; failing to encourage his men to fight; and failing to attempt to defeat the Leopard.7

The composition of the court was obviously not a fair hearing. The senior officer was Rodgers, Barron’s old nemesis; and Decatur, who would assume command of the Chesapeake, had decided that Commodore James Barron acted shamefully. Although there was a shortage of navy officers, Smith and Jefferson decided Barron was guilty of gross negligence.

Jefferson’s response to the attack on the Chesapeake was controversial. He spoke of avoiding war, yet he blocked merchant trade. It was a blow to the British and French economies. Internally, the embargo hurt New England and revived the sagging Federalist Party. The Embargo Act of 1807 tainted the final year of Jefferson’s tenure. He believed it was the last card against Britain’s assault on American sovereignty.

In 1808, Jefferson stepped down from the presidency. The office went to his Secretary of State, James Madison. Robert Smith became Madison’s Secretary of State, a stepping stone to the presidency. Paul Hamilton, former governor of South Carolina would oversee the Navy. He had absolutely no maritime skills. Hamilton became an alcoholic as he lacked the maritime administrative ability to do an honorably good job.

In June 1810, LT John Trippe sailed Vixen to New Orleans to replace a few unseaworthy gunboats. Thinking Vixen was a French ship, a British ship fired on her. No men were killed, but Vixen was badly hit. Trippe ordered his men to action but was stopped by a British rowing towards her with a letter of apology. Hamilton had Trippe called back to be punished for the damages to Vixen without fighting back. By spring 1811, Commodore John Rodgers aboard President broadsided British ship, Little Belt.

In 1812, the U.S. Navy had ample opportunity to prove their fighting spirit. The Navy’s popularity soared after a series of single-ship victories. The difficulties of war set the groundwork for improved naval administration. The war with Britain exposed the shortcomings of the gunboat program. The unpreparedness for war on land and at sea were laid on the feet of Jefferson and Madison, yet it was they who fought much for the Navy.

The Peace Establishment Act formed a more professional naval officer corps than before. The gunboat program, although misguided, highlighted a strong sense of subordination to civilian control among the officer corps. Robert Smith and Paul Hamilton continued Stoddert’s way of selecting officers who were bold and courageous to defend their nation’s honor. These traits brought both victories and headaches for the Navy.

CHAPTER 6. “The Precious Gem of Our National Glory.” Navy and the War of 1812.

Fourteen-year-old Samuel Leech, a British prisoner of the frigate United States, witnessed euphoria at the capture of the Macedonian by CAPT Stephen Decatur aboard United States; defeat of the Guerriere by LT Charles Morris aboard frigate Constitution; and the capture of British Java by CAPT William Bainbridge aboard Constitution. These victories over the Royal Navy gave the U.S. Navy fame and finally paved the way for Congressional support in the aftermath of the War of 1812.

The war on land went badly but the naval victories bolstered U.S. public morale, and infuriated the British who were used to triumphs at sea. But U.S. leaders overlooked strategic realities. The Royal Navy’s numeric superiority to U.S. was staggering. Single-ship victories risked a huge chunk of U.S. naval forces against a completely disposable British ship. Paul Hamilton had essentially neglected the maritime element of war.

Madison extracted Paul Hamilton. Hamilton’s leadership during wartime was inept with no maritime skills. Madison was of no help either. Hamilton promoted LT Charles Morris 2 levels up unnecessarily for the Guerriere capture. In 1813, William Jones replaced Paul Hamilton as Head of the Navy Department. Jones brought clear strategic thinking, and changed how the U.S. Navy operated, putting away the “Honor at all costs” mentality.

William Jones’ new naval strategy was radical. No longer would officers be enforced to hazard everything in the pursuit of national honor. The purpose of sending out the Navy against Britain was not for glory. Jones sought to damage British commerce to affect their economy and force concessions on impressment and neutral rights.

The character of the U.S. Navy no longer required chivalry. Jones based his tactical change on simple math. Britain could replace its ships; U.S. could not. U.S. vessels should cruise individually, and target merchant ships to force Britain to pull valuable ships away from the blockade.  Jones ordered captains to avoid fights, and aim to destroy British commerce to show insurers the Royal Navy is weak in shielding its merchant ships.

Congress increased the Army slightly; and before declaring war, voted against increasing the Navy. Naval officers assigned to protect citizens from British coastal raids depended on themselves to inspire -or beg- civilians to rally to their own defense. The people of Baltimore rallied around John Rodgers, and the British failed in their attack. Elsewhere, British raids landed on U.S. coasts at will, burning the capital in August 1814.

CAPT John Paul Jones resigned in the spring of 1814. During Jones’ tenure, it proved impossible to stop British coastal raids, no thanks to Congress. The Navy was undersupplied and under-manned. Yet the Navy had 2 major victories, one with CAPT Oliver Perry in the 1813 Battle of Lake Erie, 9 U.S. ships captured 6 British ships; and with Commandant Thomas Macdonough in the 1814 Battle of Lake Champlain, 14 U.S. ships captured 16 British ships. Macdonough was promoted to CAPT.

        John Paul Jones’ demand for a less aggressive strategy was a dramatic shift in navy strategy. All this time, the Navy sought officers with ambition, zeal and even recklessness to cover for the deficiency in the navy force. Their zealous mindset showed at the outset of the War of 1812 as navy captains sailed with one goal: to find and defeat a Royal Navy vessel. CAPT Jones’ new strategy now called for a dramatic shift in navy culture.

        In the final months of the war, the Navy emerged from the conflict with unprecedented popularity and therefore, support from Congress. Civilian and military leaders turned from combating British ships to building an administrative apparatus for a newly expanded service. The Secretary of the Navy’s role became an issue of contention. A division of responsibility between civilian and military leadership emerged.

CHAPTER 7. “A Radical Change of System.” Navy Board and Professionalism, 1815-1824.

In November 1814, SECNAV William Jones wanted out of Washington for financial reasons that demanded immediate attention. Madison offered the SECNAV post to Commodore John Rodgers, but for all the perks of the top navy job, he declined. Rodgers wanted to be a commissioned officer for life rather than a politician with an uncertain tenure. Rodgers accepted the Senior Officer post of the Navy Board.

As soon as the War of 1812 began, the Algiers declared war. Algeria was banking on the British to crush the U.S. Fleet, a big miscalculation. Madison had a larger and more powerful Navy than Jefferson had in the Tripolitan War against the Algiers. In 1815, the second Barbary War took place. CAPT William Bainbridge was commander of the U.S. squadron to Algiers.

Benjamin Crowninshield Jr accepted the post of SECNAV In 1815, with hesitancy. He had extensive knowledge of maritime affairs. But he was more of a theoretical writer of the philosophical type, and was indecisive and directionless. He did not have his father’s business-mindedness and love of the sea. So in the first few months, he waffled, and caused trouble early.

Crowninshield tapped Commodore William Bainbridge to lead the expedition to Algeria to avenge the Philadelphia. But in May 1815, Commodore Decatur convinced Crowninshield to send him earlier while Bainbridge was still fitting out his 74-gun ship Independence, and would follow 6 weeks later. Until 1815, Congress declined to authorize the rank of admiral and continued to do so until the Civil War. The corps contented themselves with Commodore, a courtesy title.

Commodore Decatur did not want to be second to Commodore Bainbridge. Decatur paid high bounties to get men to sign up as his crew. He negotiated at the mouth of a cannon and imposed terms on Algiers at will. Algiers released its U.S. prisoners without ransom, paid compensation for U.S. property it seized, abandoned extraction of tribute, and he resolved the Tunis and Tripoli conflicts. Nothing was left for Bainbridge.

There was much rejoicing on Decatur’s return. But Crowninshield’s decision that let Decatur write his own orders poisoned the relationship between Decatur and Bainbridge. It set the stage among senior officers that naval oversight shifted from SECNAV to the officer corps. It would show its horns when the Board of Navy Commissioners was created in 1815.

The first Board of Navy Commissioners were Commodores John Rodgers, Isaac Hull, David Porter, and Stephen Decatur. Since they saw themselves as co-equal to the SECNAV, Decatur and John Shaw suggested the SECNAV be part of the Navy Board, serving as presiding officer, putting him on equal footing with the officer corps. Crowninshield negated.

The final bill passed by Congress explicitly stated “nothing in this act shall be construed to take from the Secretary of the Navy his control of the naval forces of the United States.” The Board of Navy Commissioners was attached to the office of SECNAV, and was under his superintendence.

Crowninshield worked hard to build healthy relationships with the Navy Commissioners. In March 1817, he assured the Navy Board he was not stepping down, and held no grudges for the Navy Board’s desire to receive the same information as the SECNAV receives.

When Crowninshield’s tenure ended in November 1818, James Monroe offered the SECNAV post again to Commodore John Rodgers, which he again declined. The Navy Board yielded sufficient power over naval affairs to satisfy his desire for influence. His decision to reject Monroe’s offer shows the officer corps believed it had a voice in the Navy Department.

Crowninshield was the last NAVSEC with maritime experience. He was succeeded by NAVSECs with legal and juridical expertise. Politics instead of maritime experience would increase the influence of senior navy officers, but having no maritime background resulted in many early blunders. Smith Thompson, who succeeded Crowninshield in 1819 as SECNAV, had no maritime experience. It was the Navy Commissioners who made his duties lighter and bearable.8

Then in March 1820, Commodore James Barron shot and killed Commodore Stephen Decatur in a duel. The root of the duel was Barron’s court-martial. Barron traveled to London to support his family, but found the place detestable, the people insufferable, and lived on a limited income with most of it sent to his family. Commodores Rodgers and Porter tried to dissuade Decatur and called the duel foolish, but failed.

Decatur learned that no one of equal social standing was willing to help him in the field of honor, until William Bainbridge re-entered his life after refusing to speak to him for 5 years after his sly Mediterranean victory. He agreed to act as Decatur’s second at the duel. It put a fog of suspicion around Bainbridge ever since. Barron aimed to hit Decatur’s hip but the bullet sliced through his groin and vital organs, and he died a painful death.

Barron’s career turned around dramatically at Decatur’s death. Decatur did not grant him a hearing. Within months of the duel, Barron appeared before a court of inquiry. SECNAV Smith Thompson granted Barron command of the Philadelphia Navy Yard in 1824, and the Gasport Navy Yard in Virginia in 1825. Barron retired in 1938 as 2nd highest ranking naval officer.

The Navy Commissioners had limited success in advancing their objectives with Congress, as their main role was the primary source of information and advice on naval appropriations. SECNAV Thompson took a decidedly secondary role in practice. At the head of the naval officer corps were seasoned bureaucrats, and the management of naval affairs was heavily entrusted to the officers themselves.

While civilian supremacy was now firmly entrenched, managing naval affairs without the expertise of naval officers was impossible due to the complexity of naval science. The officer corps succeeded in keeping a sphere of authority and did so without subverting civilian control. Professionalism helped them achieve this, guided by strong assertions of the Navy Department’s authority from the Secretary of the Navy.

CONCLUSION. By November 1824, Commodore David Porter sailed for the 3rd time to the West Indies. Porter found the Spaniards too friendly but had little interest in checking the rampant piracy he was sent to quash. Porter pursued pirates up to the shore, but was denied permission to pursue on land. America then endorsed President Andrew Jackson’s decision to enter Spain’s territory in Florida to pursue Seminole Indians, and pressed Spain to surrender Florida to the U.S.8

The situation required any Commodore to have diplomacy skills, which Porter did not have. Porter exerted force over the pirates, and was in no mood to exercise diplomacy. When LT Charles Platt went to Fajardo City, he was jailed. Porter gathered 200 armed men and swarmed Fajardo. Porter demanded an apology and if not received, he would burn the whole city to the ground. Spain apologized.

Commodore Porter had zeal and aimed at destruction of the enemy. SECNAVs Stoddert and Smith would have praised Porter for defending the nation’s honor. But times had changed. SECNAV Samuel Southhard found Porter insubordinate. Porter learned the relationship between the Navy Department and the officer corps was different from when he was first assigned to Constellation as a young LT. He resigned in 1826, trapped between an old culture he could not transcend, and a new navy culture he had not learned fast enough to accept.

The War of 1812 was a draw, caused by repeated violations of U.S. naval rights, but victories over the Royal Navy and Andrew Jackson’s defeat of the British invasion to gain a critical port in New Orleans in 1815 showed the U.S. Navy had power. The old navy culture was still in continuity as navy officers cared about their honor in deep and profound ways. They would still lash out if disrespected, and butt heads with the SECNAV.

Naval protest resignations ceased by 1815. Severe limits were imposed on Navy Captains who displayed hostility toward government. By 1820, a clearer division of responsibility enhanced civil-naval harmony. Both President and SECNAV decided on ship movements and naval strategy. Navy Commissioners handled ship design, construction, outfitting, selection, and training.

The first 5 SECNAVs and the first generation of naval officers who served under them, bequeathed an officer corps that was fiercely committed to the nation’s honor, and put duty and commitment to civilian supremacy. It produced an officer corps that subordinated personal aims for the good of the Navy. Along with victories over French, Tripolitan, and British, this ranks among the U.S. Navy’s greatest contributions to their country.

Many SECNAVS pushed for a naval academy, but it was SECNAV Samuel Southard who put the establishment of a naval academy as a priority. The U.S. Naval Academy would later be founded by George Bancroft in October 1845.

RECOMMENDATION. This book titled Commanding Petty Despots, authored by Thomas Sheppard, and published by USNI in Annapolis, Maryland is about the founding of the U.S. Navy as well as the history of naval culture. With honor being the most important virtue to every single U.S. Naval Officer, it is likewise an honor to recommend this book to enthusiasts of American naval history and its culture.