Introduction. France had fallen under the incessant firepower of the German blitzkrieg in 1940. The reasons for the sudden defeat of France are due to leadership failure at both military and political levels. The French army was poorly led and equipped with inferior arms and equipment. And to prevent the Axis powers from taking control of the French Marine Nationale’s ships, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill ordered the seizure, neutralization, and destruction of all French Navy assets within reach. The fate of Marine Nationale was sealed from that day forward, and years post World War II. The Royal Navy turned on France without warning, at its moment of great distress, inflicting a devastating assault that severely damaged most of her ships at port, including battleships Bretagne and Dunkerque, wounding and killing about 2,000 French sailors and officers.
French President and Acting Brigadier General Charles De Gaulle instructed Vice Admiral Émile Muselier to continue building up the movement’s devastated navy. The challenge of that task would be considerable in manpower and funding to build a new navy. Most French sailors outside of France’s metropolitan and colonial ports were corralled in British detention camps while their vessels were impounded by the Royal Navy. The British offered to facilitate the return to France of those who wished to follow the famed Maréchal Philippe Pétain into proclaimed neutrality rather than rallying the unknown de Gaulle. Those who wished to fight the Axis, senior would be provided the option of joining the king’s armed forces than the Forces Françaises Libres (Free French Forces) (FFL).
The awkward stance of the British in the critical months that followed Operation Catapult drove both de Gaulle and Muselier to maintain a guarded attitude in their dealings with British authorities. They had to balance implied reliance on a hesitant ally, yet proclaim autonomy for the FFL. This modus describes Free French navy relations with the Allied powers.
The Free French Forces (FFL) are remembered through the feats of army soldiers who resisted German General Erwin Rommel’s tanks at Bir Hakeim in 1942 and followed Free French Général Philippe Leclerc as he raced to Paris in 1944. Sailors wearing Croix de Lorraine, the symbol in July 1940 of the Free French movement, made earlier contributions. Forces Navales Françaises Libres (FNFL), the French Navy, provided de Gaulle the ways and means to rally political support in the colonial empire, making early military contributions to the Allied cause.
In the summer of 1940, Brig General de Gaulle and Vice Admiral Muselier focused their first efforts on securing support from Great Britain in the wake of Operation Catapult. The debilitated French Navy slowly grew in size and effectiveness, achieving notable success in the two years that led to the Anglo-American landings in French North Africa and the German invasion of France’s Free Zone, after which the U.S. helped much in rebuilding the shattered French Navy.
The assistance of Great Britain to Muselier’s navy at the dawn of the Free French movement was critical to the rise of all of Free French Forces. It shaped relations between France and its allies in the remainder during and post-war. The Royal Navy continued providing resources to foster the FNFL into a small, effective French navy, but the sidelined Vichy navy atrophied.
Building a Free French Fleet. British Prime Minister Churchill needed a French ally to keep the country’s fleet and its colonies out of Axis hands. The unprecedented situation resulting from the presence of a militant de Gaulle in Great Britain versus a legitimate Vichy regime led by Maréchal Philippe Pétain left British leaders facing a serious French political problem that seemed impossible to resolve. On the fateful day of 10-July-1940, French senators and deputies met in the small town of Vichy, in the free zone left unoccupied by the Axis.
The politicians ratified the armistice of 22-June-1940, and agreed to make the unelected Maréchal Pétain the Head of State, combining executive and legislative powers. De Gaulle opposed the armistice between Maréchal Pétain and the Nazis, which ultimately led to Nazi occupation of France. Brig Général de Gaulle sought to achieve a “transfer of sovereignty” from the vanquished Vichy regime, and this ambition needed legitimacy, internally in France and externally with Allied leaders.
In July 1940, De Gaulle appointed Vice Admiral Muselier as commander of the Free French Naval Forces (FNFL) and the Free French Air Force. To restore and reestablish France as a great power after the hostilities, de Gaulle ordered the French citizenry to continue fighting and that French military forces make a significant contribution to the liberation of the homeland. It was clear to de Gaulle his campaign could not be left to the Allies, despite the Allies portraying benevolence. France wished to stand with the victors at war’s end. De Gaulle needed to make a major contribution to the defeat of the Axis.
De Gaulle was largely to blame for the toxicity between him and Muselier for his haughtiness, self-aggrandizement, and cruel attacks on Maréchal Pétain —who was much loved by the military and majority of the French people, about 90% overall.
At the time of the first armistice, as the French were preparing to repulse a German invasion, the British were undermining Free French recruitment through offers to join Great Britain’s armed forces with higher pay and promises of British citizenship. However, relocating FFL recruits to French camps where the living conditions were worse than the British camps, clearly did not help France’s cause.
The Royal Navy wanted to set sail under the White Ensign of many French vessels detained in British ports, manned by either British crew or other European navies that sought refuge in Great Britain. As de Gaulle’s supporter, Churchill was very generous to de Gaulle yet simultaneously so ruthless in requiring the use of Marine Nationale ships for British purposes.
By the end of 1940, the Royal Navy gave up on the idea of arming French ships and realized that Forces Navales Françaises Libres (FNFL) sailors were the best source of manpower to put French ships back to service. This turnaround was a victory for Muselier no matter how small, as de Gaulle set out to formalize the Anglo–Free French political relationship.
In April 1941, Muselier agreed that FNFL crew could take over new warships under construction in British shipyards instead of recommissioning existing French vessels. This started with newly acquired 6 Fairmile wooden motor launches and 6 Flower-class corvettes. The new launches and corvettes of the Royal Navy were facilitated by the U.S. Lend-Lease Act on 11-March-1941. U.S. President Roosevelt did not extend the Lend-Lease to the Free French Forces because he considered Vichy the legitimate regime. However, the Royal Navy gained access to new vessels in North America. The vessels required manning by experienced British crew, leaving more British ships for manning by Allied crew. Unfortunately, efforts to bring older Marine Nationale ships into service were abandoned.
Just days before the Japanese Axis bombed Pearl Harbor on 7-December-1941, Roosevelt had reaffirmed its commitment to the principle of “mutual non-intervention” with Vichy forces based in the Western Hemisphere. The U.S. recognized the Pétain regime over that of de Gaulle.
Free French Naval Forces killed and missing rose to 567 by the summer of 1943, when the FNFL was formally merged with the Vichy navy. They showed the commitment of Muselier’s decapitated navy to the Allied cause in 1940 and 1941, a time when Great Britain and its colonies stood almost alone against the Axis. Despite FNFL’s limited size, it met the 1940 goals of de Gaulle. FNFL consisted of 5,700 sailors, navy riflemen, and aviators at end-1942; 40 ships, small crafts and submarines totaling 26,212 tons or 3.5% of September 1939’s tonnage.
Free French ships and submarines made a direct contribution to the Allied war effort, in both blood and equipment with increasing effectiveness. Muselier’s ships were the first to actively join the fight against the Axis in the immediate aftermath of the 7-August-1940 accord, right when de Gaulle was anxious to build legitimacy with the Allied party.
The provision of British-built units to the Free French represented a valuable return on investment for Great Britain, which sought to deploy every sea-ready ship. Muselier appreciated the serviceability and range of the new ships which were better than old French ships with doubtful sea-readiness.
The good relations among naval leaders could not assuage the personal tensions persisting between General de Gaulle and Vice Admiral Muselier, leading to Muselier’s exit in the spring of 1942. Discord between the two was more about politics than military, which eventually reached a breaking point between the older leftist radical Muselier, and the younger over-bearing conservative de Gaulle. This was bound to happen. Muselier’s aggravation took root on the first day of work under de Gaulle.
They never agreed on the fundamental nature of the Free French movement. The sailor had a political naiveté compared with the shrewd instincts of the soldier. Muselier envisioned a an apolitical Free French movement, a military legion fighting alongside Allies until a legitimate government is restored to a liberated France. De Gaulle saw FFL’s political nature, instituting units of an independent state within a larger military alliance.
Muselier expressed utmost annoyance at de Gaulle’s non-support of his plans to obtain a navy-to-navy agreement with the First Sea Lord on 5-July-1940, denying him the opportunity to shape the higher-level 7-August-1940 accord. Muselier presented earlier the potential to make FNFL a naval foreign legion rather than a fleet serving Free French interests, without having consulted de Gaulle, and his counterpart Admiral Dudley Pound not consulting with Churchill either. It might have been for the best that none of the proposed plans were confirmed.
Negotiations became the purview of a very narrow circle of de Gaulle advisers, whom Muselier was not part of despite his seniority in rank. It was revealed, the Admiral was not formally appointed as deputy to the acting Brigadier General.
But Muselier had played a critical role in the early years of the budding Free French movement, implementing his own vision by putting to sea the most effective means in the most efficient way. The sheer will he exemplified in the dark days that followed the Armistice and Operation Catapult, assembling a small but capable fleet proved essential to de Gaulle’s rise during the war years and the eventual rebuilding of France’s sea power post-war. Muselier’s chosen replacement –Rear Admiral Philippe Auboyneau– had the same attributes, in pursuit of similar policies as Muselier’s.
Philippe Auboyneau was one of the most senior naval officers to join FNFL. He commanded Le Triomphant, the first French destroyer. Promoted to captain in 1941, he assumed responsibility for all FNFL forces sailing in the Pacific until his urgent recall to Great Britain due to Muselier’s resignation, which entailed a promotion to rear admiral. Politically savvy and agreeable to compromise with Allies, Rear Admiral Auboyneau proved more effective with de Gaulle and the British, yet retained Muselier’s plans for French sea power.
Army-Centric France. In a letter to General Henri Giraud in November 1942, in an attempt to rally him to the Allied side, U.S. Diplomat Robert Murphy confirmed the U.S. would extend the Lend-Lease Act for requisitions from the U.S. to enable the French Army to participate in the Allied cause. Vichy Brigadier General Charles Mast included logistics, artillery, fighter-bombers, and transport to make the battle corps more flexible and autonomous, although focused purely on land operations.
Such “army centricity” in the days leading up to the Allied landings was to be expected given the composition of the dissident group behind the Mast Plan. It only had one naval officer at Cherchell. The Vichy navy was viewed as a potent force, but some expected the fleet’s destruction within a month.
German troops crossed into France’s free zone in response to North African landings and the Axis pounced on Vichy’s last unoccupied base, intent on seizing French ships and submarines intact. Taken by surprise, soldiers were incapable of repulsing the Wehrmacht assault. The French naval crew failed to raise steam in time to escape by sea. Ship commanders ordered the scuttling of all vessels at berth. Nearly 48,800 tons of capital ships, destroyers, and submarines went down, counting 90 vessels or 33% of naval strength. French sea power sunk to its lowest point.
Rearming for war amidst internal French rivalry. A bitter rivalry continued to permeate the ranks of the divided Marine Nationale in 1943, a reflection of the larger national fracture. FNFL officers set up recruiting stations outside shipyard gates where ships of the Forces Maritimes d’Afrique (FMA) were being refitted. Over 100 crewmembers from Richelieu shifted to smaller destroyers and corvettes under Croix de Lorraine. Still, work continued to bring warship Richelieu back into the fight.
A figure of compromise, Vice Admiral André Lemonnier exercised influence on Marine Nationale’s wartime rearmament and operations and its postwar struggles, remaining at the helm until August 1950. He entered École Navale in 1913, ranking first in class and graduating in time to see service during the Great War, in the Dardanelles campaign, and a tour with a naval gun battery in Macedonia. Lemonnier displayed excellent skills at sea and rare political instincts during the interwar period. He commanded submarines and surface vessels of all types, and was first in class at the École de Guerre (War College). As the youngest captain in WWII, he lead gunships into Belgium.
General de Gaulle endorsed the former Vichy Vice Admiral Lemonnier in his memoirs: “Absorbed by the technique which is its life and passion, which kept its recent ordeals from deterring it, [our Navy] reconstituted itself while taking an active share in operations. Vice Admiral Lemonnier, appointed in July 1943 as chief of the Navy’s general staff, brought to this feat of reorganization remarkable ability and a tenacious will, disguised beneath a misleadingly modest manner.”
A modest manner and tenacious will would prove key qualities for a leader seeking to unify two factions so far apart: the Free French sailors and the Forces Maritimes d’Afrique (FMA). With a conciliatory vein, Vice Admiral Lemonnier saw the two entities would continue to exist, albeit in an uncomfortable divide of geography and missions.
The Allied prevalence in capital ships grew exponentially over the Axis navies. However, the FNFL noticed the Allies “were mainly interested in building up those parts of the French fleet that complemented those of the Allies.”
While arming and modernizing whatever can float and fight after the fusion of the Free French Navy with the Vichy Navy in August 1943, Lemonnier submitted in September 1943 a vision for a postwar navy. He proposed a fleet that could defend the métropole and the empire independent of Allies, capable of operating worldwide, pairing an aircraft carrier and a battleship with escort cruisers, destroyers, long-range attack submarines, and replenishment ships, modeling the U.S. in the Pacific.
Vice Admiral Lemonnier submitted further requisitions in February 1944 requesting an aircraft carrier. These were promptly dismissed: “The Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) decided it would not be beneficial to the war effort to make further assignments of vessels to the French in the near future.” Lemonnier lamented in a letter to Fénard in 1944: “We have ships but we do not have a fleet in the sense that we no longer possess a main battle force, the vital backbone of any fleet.”
Vice Admiral Lemonnier’s plans of acquiring the means to assemble an aircraft carrier–centric battle corps became the focus for the remainder of the war. This capacity allow the Marine Nationale to influence Allied strategy in the closing months of the war and in planning under uncertain peace post-war. France could envision sitting with the victors at the war’s end but would be alone and on its own after the war.
The Alliance was unlikely to continue its support after the Axis surrender. Tensions grew among Washington, London, and Moscow about the next international order. France was shattered economically and divided politically. Reconciling the demands for civilian reconstruction and developing the armed forces as a continental powerhouse would be a struggle.
End of an alliance, rebuilding alone. Three years to the day after her entrance in New York Harbor, battleship Richelieu made a triumphal arrival in Toulon on 11-February-1946. The moment was charged with conflicting emotions for the French sailors and citizenry. Vice Admiral Lemonnier, chief of the Naval General Staff, presented Richelieu with a prized commendation, the Croix de Guerre for performing exemplary service at war.
Richelieu then traveled to the Indian Ocean for service with the Royal Navy’s Eastern Fleet tasked with blocking Imperial Japanese Navy ships based in Singapore and striking enemy shore positions in Burma and the Dutch East Indies. And, following the surrender of Japan in September 1945, Richelieu escorted troopships dispatched to Indochina to regain control over the colony, later providing fire support to French forces ashore during the first skirmishes with Vietnamese guerillas.
The crew of Richelieu was proud of their wartime accomplishments. But the hostilities left the ship’s company bitterly divided between sailors who had remained loyal to General Pétain to the very end, those who had joined General de Gaulle into dissidence, and those who had followed Vichy Admiral Darlan when he switched allegiance to the Allies. Such tensions fragmented the French navy, army, and air forces.
France’s largest warship Richelieu distinguished herself in all assigned tasks, but these were of secondary interest during the final two years of the war. By the time she sailed home, the threat to the British Isles had mostly passed with the largest German ships isolated in Norway. Assignment to the Eastern Fleet confined the battleship to the periphery of Japan’s conquests. Richelieu could not dream of liberating France, while it was confined to subordinate roles under the British command. This was a far cry from Lemonnier’s vision of a battleship, aircraft carrier, and escort formation.
The Alliance itself was coming to an end. The U.S. and Great Britain hoped to terminate the huge wartime commitments to rebuild and support the armed forces of their allies. Rebuilding the Richelieu would now suffer uncertainty.
Nearly half of the 1939 merchant fleet vanished, with 1,328,858 tons lost to enemy action and accidents, and over 1,500 mariners dead in a watery grave on the high seas. Heavy losses of men, ships, and submarines in the aftermath of the armistice sustained the legitimacy of a politically divided France.
Marine Nationale could have boasted of a meaningful contribution to the Allied cause in the last two years of the war and to France’s restoration as a self-governed and united country. But French admirals did not receive the laurels of victory bequeathed onto army generals because their vessels were relegated to secondary roles serving the Allied strategy rather than the French national interest. And yet this was made possible with U.S. support. in refurbishing and modernizing the French ships, training, and transferring new assets to the fleet. But at war’s end so did the essential support to the French navy.
The end of the war left France’s navy with a large fleet of questionable value. Many ships were obsolete or too expensive to modernize. The mix of French, British, American designs, plus German and Italian reparations would challenge French builders. The naval force grew haphazardly under Allied priorities, none of the French desires, and became a mixed bag of “naval dust” in Lemmonier’s view. He faced a huge challenge in forging a naval ship capable of defending the national interest.
Planning to rebuild alone. Assembling 400 ships and submarines in September 1945, the French fleet had a respectable figure given the grave losses suffered in 1939. Marine Nationale ranked 4th in size behind U.S., Great Britain, and Soviet Union navies, the same rank held at the outset of World War II (behind U.S., UK, and Japan) but with more hulls. Total tonnage was less than 50% of the fleet 6 years earlier (350K vs 745K tons), far behind the U.S. in mounting a large, autonomous naval operation at a great distance from home ports.
The only ships capable of operating in blue-water missions in the near future were Richelieu, 4 cruisers and 4 heavy destroyers/light cruisers refitted in the U.S., and a dozen modern escort vessels leased from the U.S. and Great Britain. Submarines transferred to the French Navy by Great Britain and those refitted in Philadelphia Navy Yard were nearly obsolete.
In the last two years of the war, the accomplishments of the French Navy were largely unseen. The army seemed to bear a larger responsibility under the armistice and had lost the respect built over centuries of European battlefield warfare. Thus, in 1940-1942, Generals de Gaulle and Pétain used their navy fleets to sustain the political legitimacy of its forces. Post Operation Torch, French soldiers from across the empire fought and died in Tunisia, Italy, France, Germany, and Indochina and were often in the news. But naval war at sea received not much coverage.
By 1945, de Gaulle was known colloquially as Le Général and army leaders became household names to the French, unlike the senior admirals of the navy who were lesser-known. Among the French admirals, the most well-known during World War II were the collaborationist Jean Francois Darlan, and the rebellious Émile Muselier, while the highly intellectual André Lemonnier remained a bland figurehead even while in command.
Despite the purification begun by the Gaullists after the 1943 fusion, the navy remained populated by former Vichysts since not enough experienced crew could be found in the Free French Navy. Former Vichy naval officers were reaching flag rank. These officers had to communicate the high importance of French sea power and to place vast investments to rebuild a modern fleet.
These uncertain situations left Vice Admiral Lemonnier in a difficult position to uphold the interest of Marine Nationale and plan a credible fleet for the future. The navy had done well in combat given the challenges they faced, but relations of a large majority of naval officers to Vichy like Admiral Jean Francois Darlan until he was assassinated in December 1942. Vichy Admiral Darlan earlier had Muselier assassinated but failed.
The end of wartime alliance and damages inflicted on France’s shore installations left it incapable to acquire ships or submarines, and unable to construct its own. Geopolitical uncertainty on the future of war resulted in planners being unable to spot an enemy and delineate the means to fight at sea in an atomic era. As De Gaulle focused to restore France’s grandeur, Lemonnier had to scale down his blue-water fleet plans.
Budget constraints inhibited shaping the future naval fleet, leaving to the Ministry of Finance what kind of navy France could afford. Pétain and de Gaulle showed the political value of the fleet. Troubles in Indochina demonstrated the benefits of ships with aircraft operating from the sea in fighting insurgencies. Russia ensured building up forces on land and sea for control and deterrence. A new association among the Western powers ensued, with potential for naval cooperation and fleet growth.
French admirals now viewed collaborations guardedly. Wartime experience —the FNFL veterans who dealt with the British and the FMA who dealt with the CCS— revealed support from Allies was based on their own interests, largely at the French Navy’s expense. Lemonnier continued leveraging U.S. support which was helpful to develop Aéronavale, though political leaders almost surrendered France’s naval autonomy in adopting the “Defense of the Rhine” policy.
These CCS defined the limited extent of support it could provide to General Giraud and the navy in mid-1943. Ships would not be transferred to the French wholesale. Existing ships were to be refitted in Allied yards as space opened up. The U.S. and Great Britain were to supply ships and submarines and provide repair and consumables to French bases in Africa. FMA Commanders were grateful, but they too noticed the provisions were narrowly focused on wartime requirements, exploiting French naval assets and crew to augment Allied fighting power at sea, with no intention of rebuilding the French Navy ships.
The defense of the Rhine. The moment of greatest danger to Vice Admiral Lemonnier came in the fall of 1948. Minister of National Defense Paul Ramadier proclaimed the primacy of the “defense of the Rhine,” sacrificing naval growth to build up the army and air force focused on France’s greatest vulnerability as a continental power –its land border. This shift stood in stark contrast to the symbolism of French sea and air power launched just a few years earlier.
The Superior Council of the Navy decided that conversion to a carrier would take as much time and money as building an entirely new vessel, and would provide a limited carrying capability—40 aircrafts ready for operations with 14 more slung from the hangar deck head—which would be obsolete when the ship is launched. Minister Jacquinot endorsed in September 1945 Lemmonier’s push to complete Jean Bart as a battleship.
Rear Admiral Pierre Barjot, a veteran of Aéronavale, stated: “It was surprising in 1945 to see the Naval General Staff supporting the cause of the battleship against that of the aircraft carrier. This attitude, which dominated the discussions in September 1945, clearly reveals that despite the experience of the war, the mythology surrounding the big guns continues to rule our naval thinking.” The German threat had receded behind the belligerent Soviet Union. Western fears grew as a result of Moscow’s imposing behavior on friendly regimes.
Minister of Defense Ramadier put the defense of the Rhine as the apex of France’s interest. This required expansion of heavily mechanized land forces in Europe and the development of an air force focused on close air defense for the army. The role of the navy would thus be reduced to maintaining light escort forces and shore infrastructures in Africa. To Lemonnier and fellow admirals, it was 1943 all over again, with the Allies assisting in rebuilding the French navy yet restraining it to subordinate secondary missions, but this time by the French.
Returning to a strategy of alliance. World War II paradoxes reappeared when France resumed a strategy of alliance in 1948. France joined NATO and gained access to the wealth of resources the U.S. made available through the Mutual Defence Assistance Program (MDAP) at a time when the French government put rearmament on an equal basis with civilian reconstruction. This presented Marine Nationale with a chance for quicker regeneration. Admirals Lemonnier, Battet, and Lambert quickly leveraged any available U.S. and French resources.
However, the Soviet threat on the Alliance’s eastern border drove the U.S. to demand continental Allies to build a credible air-land force for deployment on the central front. U.S. Secretary of State Acheson stated that failure would lead to the rearmament of West Germany, France’s former foe. The January 1951 French rearmament bill and continued U.S. support through MDAP provided Marine Nationale and French naval industries increasing capacities, but a blue-water fleet was now uncertain.
Building a blue-water fleet under clashing visions. Allied material and monetary assistance to generate the means to build ships, submarines, and shore infrastructure came at a frenzied pace. France had suffered defeat in Indochina, and the Algerian struggle was turning desperate, but the French Navy performed well in both conflicts and became a respected voice in allied naval and national defense circles.
Two documents shaped naval regeneration: (1) 1952 Statut Naval, which set the path for a credible blue-water surface fleet, and (2) 1955 Plan Bleu which sought to elaborate a longer-term vision of a mature navy upholding France’s grandeur under the complexity of the Cold War, and being ready to fight in the nuclear era. As MDAP ended in 1956, blue-water plans paused.
The challenge of clashing naval visions. The U.S. Embassy in Paris relayed to French authorities an aide-mémoire providing consolidated feedback of agencies “with a view to increasing the effectiveness of the present Franco-American efforts to strengthen the combat effectiveness of the French military establishment of carrier planes.” The section on naval matters gave low priority to construction in France, and purchasing patrol aircrafts from Great Britain, recommending production of minesweepers, landing crafts, and destroyers instead.
This view drew a piercing response from Chief Naval Architect Louis-Lazare Kahn. He said the French plan would satisfy national and alliance requirements. He also said the increasing production of minesweepers in France would impact the construction of new fleet destroyers, and completion of the cruiser De Grasse. He decried the proposal that an American minesweeper design be adopted by French shipyards for NATO standardization because construction of a “superior” French model had already begun while the British were still designing.
In the 1950s, the Military Assistance Advisory Group advised France to put plans on hold for the construction of 6 new Narval-class submersibles and build surface ships instead. The U.S. was doubtful of French ambitions in building a modern submarine fleet because NATO war plans for France did not call for a large submarine beyond coastal patrol; and French shipyards were too weak to construct submersibles to postwar level (extreme depths, faster speeds, autonomous, quieter.)
Vessels of the Aréthuse class based in Mers el-Kébir and Bizerte would guard against Soviet submarines seeking to threaten strategic lines of communications between North Africa and the métropole. The small size, short endurance, and narrow specialization of the Aréthuse class proved to be a liability. But the experimentation work required for the launch of Aréthuse class led to the design of the larger Daphné class.
Rear Admiral Henri Nomy only referred to nuclear power as a means of propulsion for ships and submarines in Plan Bleu, but a study in October 1955 pressed for development and deployment of French nuclear weapons at sea: “A navy that will renounce the atomic bomb would be out of the game, even for secondary missions in war and would have no value as an ally. It is the same as constabulary forces maintained by Portugal and Thailand. The navy’s future is tightly bound with government policy regarding nuclear weapons.”
Going nuclear. As Le Redoutable set out for the Norwegian Sea where her missiles can reach the Soviet Union, Marine Nationale joined a navy club (U.S., Soviet Union, and U.K.) that maintains their nuclear assets in the depths of the sea.
The lead vessel, Le Redoutable, was joined by Le Terrible, Le Foudroyant, L’Indomptable, Le Tonnant, and L’Inflexible, deployed in different patrol areas for redundancy and credibility to France’s nuclear deterrence. Commissioned in 1970, the Île Longue naval complex offered a homeport for the SSBN class, which continues until today to house 4 Le Triomphant SSBNs that succeeded Redoutables in the late 1990s.
The Redoutable proved an amazing achievement done in great haste based on de Gaulle’s decision to complement France’s nuclear deterrent with ballistic missile-carrying submarines built by France alone. Standing up to FOST (Force Océanique Stratégique) came at a huge cost. Growing tensions between the French and Anglo-Americans in the 1960s meant France would bear the cost of the submarines and missiles.
FOST meant huge investments in the navy, and dedicating many resources to ballistic submarines alone could gravely affect the execution of the Plan bleu de 1955. Rear Admiral Nomy’s vision of an expeditionary fleet of an aircraft carrier–centric group, with smaller surface combatants and attack submarines. Plan bleu could not reconcile with de Gaulle’s drive for SSBNs.
The atomic era impacted the allocation of funds to the French Navy. Bases needed to go underground to survive a nuclear exchange. While new technologies extended the autonomy of naval forces, the first decade of the Cold War showed blue-water fleets still required a worldwide network of infrastructure to be able to conduct independent operations.
Dawn of a new republic, end of allied assistance. The world’s first nuclear-powered submarine was the first vessel ever to reach the North Pole. The USS Nautilus demonstrated the capability of a nuclear submarine to roam undetected for extended periods, and able to bring nuclear-armed might right up to an opponent’s shores. De Gaulle noted that any nation deploying such capability had powerful leverage.
Bases and shore infrastructure. All Western fleets went through retrenchment after 1945, then rapid expansion as the Cold War set in. The experience of Marine Nationale was unique given the wreckage that blocked ports and naval bases. Wartime had ruined its network of bases and infrastructure. German and Allied bombing brought devastation. Key bases of Toulon, Brest, and Cherbourg were destroyed.
The emergence of the Soviet threat in Europe resulted in increased defense budgets, yet funds allocated to naval bases fell short for Rue Royal planners who sought 6 billion FF in 1949 but only received 3.16 billion. The bizarre navy budget continued into the early 1950s. In January 1959, de Gaulle assumed the presidency of the Fifth Republic for a 7-year mandate. He assigned the French Navy to deploy nuclear weapons at sea in support of the national strategy of “deterrence of the strong by the weak.” As quickly as Rear Admiral Nomy had to abandon maintaining network bases in the 1950s, his successor, Vice Admiral Georges Cabanier, eyed building French sea power.
Nuclear deterrence in submarines. After de Gaulle took power in June 1958, he recalled Vice Admiral Cabanier to Paris and made him commander of the navy when Rear Admiral Henri Nomy retired in 1960. It was Nomy’s initiative that the 2 aircraft carriers, Clemenceau and Foch, and helicopter–carrier Jeanne d’Arc were built. Nomy knew battleships had come to an end.
Vice Admiral Cabanier’s background fit squarely within de Gaulle’s agenda. He was a Gaullist and proven sailor with a solid track record, had experience working with the Americans, and had a submariner background that would greatly assist in discussions with the U.S. in the future.
French admirals were uncertain about the future of nuclear propulsion. In the early 1950s, a concerted effort was underway to grow the submarine arm, and debate arose whether future plans should focus on nuclear or conventional propulsion. Nomy and Lemonnier promoted the former while Pierre Barjot and Paul Ortoli promoted the latter. The decision was to develop one nuclear-powered submarine for the navy while maintaining the construction of diesel-electric platforms.
In what became known as France’s nuclear strategy, “the deterrence of the strong by the weak,” the weaker power did not need deterrence comparable to that of the stronger enemy. It only needed the capacity to inflict greater damage than the opponent was willing to endure in comparison to the gains the latter sought to obtain by force. France could not compete with the superpowers but it could assemble an instrument of sufficient size to act as asymmetric or proportional deterrence.
50 Dassault Mirage IV two-seater jet bombers were delivered in 1963-1967, and 12 in 1964. Since the French industry had not had the maturity needed to produce a jet engine of high performance required of supersonic planes, the decision to seek engines from American Pratt & Whitney to be built under license in France was made. U.S. allowed jet engine technology transfer, knowing Mirage IV could be an atomic-bomb delivery vehicle.
The decision to detonate their first atomic bomb and acquire Mirage IV strategic bombers would operationalize France’s Strike Force. De Gaulle laid out his vision in November 1959: “The defense of France must be French. What ensues is that we must, obviously, develop in the coming years a force which can act on our behalf, a force de frappe capable of deployment at any time and anywhere. At the heart of this force will be atomic armament. And, since potential opponents will eventually be able to destroy France from anywhere in the world, our force must be capable of reaching anywhere in the world.”
By 1961, the French Navy did not yet have a serviceable submarine nuclear-propulsion plant, an advanced navigation system for extended underwater cruising and accurate ballistic targeting, a working submarine-launched missile, nor a nuclear warhead that could fit such a missile. France was unlikely to assemble and operationalize all elements in one platform for another decade unless the U.S. would provide a shortcut if de Gaulle deemed it would restore France to its former grandeur.
But the Marine Nationale was going nuclear, whatever the cost. The sea-going vessels would soon assume a central role in de Gaulle’s vision of a credible and independent strategic deterrent for France. Having launched this massive effort, de Gaulle proclaimed in 1965 the navy’s rise to prominence in the nation’s defense: “The navy now finds itself, no doubt for the first time in history, at the apex of France’s military power. And this will become a little truer every day in the future.”
Conclusion. None of the Admirals —Muselier, Auboyneau, Lemonnier, Nomy, Cabanier— ever accomplished the grandiose visions they set out to achieve. Nevertheless, history shows their incredible agility to work with the compromises forced down upon them by the Allied military leaders and the powerful politicians during the 1940s-1960s. These compromises were called the “least bad” arrangements that the French Navy had to accept. But later, these “least bad” arrangements themselves became the essential force that allowed the proceeding admirals to rebuild its French Naval Fleet and the French Naval Aviation with an uncommon unity of purpose —to attain an independent naval policy with an alliance strategy— in remembrance of the horrendous suffering brought on by World War II and the new beginnings of distrust as the Cold War began in the next decade.
During the Cold War, the French Navy was organized into two squadrons in Brest and Toulon for the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. Post-Cold War, the two squadrons were divided into the Naval Action Force and the Anti-submarine Group.
Recommendation. “The Fall and Rise of French Sea Power” by Hugues Canuel, and published by USNI, Maryland shows the twists and turns year after year that the French naval officers had to maneuver, and comply with the Allies during World War II and at the onset of the Cold War. For countries that have a fledgling navy, this book is an excellent read, to witness how a small devastated navy can still be useful to its allies, and turn into a formidable one with the will to rebuild itself back to its glory days, armed with the humility to seek and maintain long-term alliances throughout the years. Like many small nations that are Army-centric within the Department of Defense, having only one Naval officer, or even none at all, to provide a naval perspective for the Defense Secretary and the nation, this book will open their eyes to the utmost importance of having a strong Navy fleet with combined airpower to address external threats. It is a basic naval strategy worth applying for control and deterrence.
