The principal role of maritime forces is war fighting. This includes searching for, surveillance of, and combat engagement with the adversary’s battle fleet. The aim is to control the sea lines of communications including the chokepoints or deny their use by the enemy in order to achieve the enduring national interests: territorial integrity and political independence. Maritime forces initiate naval battles only when all conceivable conflict avoidance options fail, or when defending the integrity of their units is necessary. These battles though short in duration are intense and destructive, and could lead to full-scale conflict.

An isolated armed skirmish leads to a long period of lull that allows preparation for the next hostility: training, upkeep and updating. However, due to their inherent attributes and the existence of several threats, maritime forces, when directed by command authorities, can assume other roles: constabulary (law enforcement) and benign support (to national development, emergency medical support, search and rescue, etc.).

The escalation of global terrorism, coupled with increased migration and frequent natural disasters, redefined these “other roles” as Maritime Security and Defense Engagement. Maritime Security covers counter-terrorism, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, hydrographic and oceanographic survey, law-enforcement like CIQ and transnational crimes, counter-piracy, counter-illegal drugs, counter-human trafficking, non-combatant evacuation, and other operations to preserve freedom of navigation. Defense Engagement refers to the use of defense resources and activities short of naval combat operations to prevent conflict, build-up confidence with partners, and influence the prevailing and anticipated situation in the maritime domain. This role entails enabling partners to participate in joint exercises, attend training opportunities, avail medical support, engage in maritime patrols and reconnaissance, and enhance interoperability and collaboration. Defense diplomacy –employing Defense Attachés, liaison and exchange officers, and visiting staff officers– is part of the defense engagement role.

For sometime now, the Philippine Navy adopted the capability-based planning approach to beef up its war fighting potential in compliance with the Armed Forces of the Philippines Modernization Law of 1995, as amended. This presupposes that naval forces should be able to fight and prevail over an unspecified threat utilizing existing manpower and modern equipment procured under the modernization program. Acquiring new capabilities, like submarine and anti-submarine, and upgrading existing ones to address unspecified threats is very expensive and requires a wide array of technical personnel and service support facilities; as well as a highly efficient sustainment system.

The acquisition of submarine capability needs further examination because of its complexity. Of the 41 countries with submarines, 9 could operate in South China Sea. Thailand does not possess any submarines, after decommissioning its last submarine in 1951. When it reached the industrialized country status in 2012 Thailand eventually decided to buy 2 Chinese submarines in the future. None of the other 14 countries that removed submarines from their inventory reported any plan to reacquire such capability. Additionally, Malaysia’s submarine purchase payments contributed to its military budget increase by over a third to an average of 2.1% of GDP from 2002 to 2009, compared with 1.5% of GDP after the acquisition. It presently encounters maintenance challenges.

Interestingly, the developing global and regional security landscape convinced some strategic planners to return to threat-based planning method that is somewhat less expensive in that it is highly focused and may not require significant changes in existing capabilities. At external front while the conversion of some features in the Spratlys into military bases continues to irritate the claimant countries, the freedom of navigation principle will encourage more multinational efforts to keep maritime traffic moving in that waterway. There could be a disruption of maritime activities there but it would be temporary. The Philippine Rise poses another challenge. Relatedly on global terrorism, some Israeli analysts observed the downward trend of terroristic activities in the past few years but could not say if there would be a recurrence. A very alarming observation is the threat and use of weapons of mass destruction, particularly chemicals, by the terrorists and even governments. Their recommendations: continuous monitoring of threat groups using intelligence, strengthening border protection, and enhancing cooperation with counterparts in foreign governments and their agencies.

Maritime forces may consider the threat-based planning scheme to address the internal threats. Necessarily, their capability priority list must change and so would their role as well. Maritime security will be at the center stage. The recent counter-terrorism operations in an urban setting in Marawi and in some rural areas, the continuing nationwide counter-drug campaign, and the ongoing marine environment preservation actions in Boracay Island and other coastal areas showcase the different security threats confronting maritime forces. In the Marawi operations, several Philippine Navy aviators flying newly-acquired armed helicopters had qualified as combat pilots for their exceptional feat. Naval and Coast Guard elements achieved absolute control of the waterways in and around Lanao Lake, thereby, containing the hostilities on land by the Army and Marine units.

Are the country’s maritime forces –Navy, Coast Guard, select units of the Army and Air Force, and Maritime Police– “manned and ready” to assume an expanded role to protect our territory and sovereignty?

A snappy salute and Godspeed to the nation’s premier maritime force, Hukbong Dagat ng Pilipinas, on its 120th founding anniversary!