“Great Powers, Grand Strategies: The New Game in the South China Sea,” edited by Anders Corr (U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2018), is a good read because it puts the South China Sea conflict into a global strategic context. In so doing, it looks at the movements of China well within the EEZ of Philippine coasts, a topic dear to my heart, through the optics of all major global powers. This issue has caught the interest and ire of Filipinos all over the world, and this book makes clear why it is an issue well beyond Philippine shores.
The discussion is framed by a definition of Grand Strategy as “a set of plans to achieve a set of important state goals through the utilization of all its resources, including economic, diplomatic, and military means and interactions.” The definition shall be the format and basis of this book review, but not necessarily in the same order.
Military. Since 1997, China’s defense budget grew over 600%, making itself the 2nd largest defense spender in 2016 after the United States. This drives the arms race in the East Asia Region. China’s posture and activities have been unquestionably offensive in the South China Sea (SCS). China disregards and disrespects international law, and “demands” joint development and exploration of the resource-rich islands in the SCS. However, China’s lack of transparency may also be hiding the true technological quality and quantity of their total arsenal.
The top 5 in military expenditure globally (US, China, Russia, India, Japan), the European Union (EU), and ASEAN, together, could have influence in the conflicts in the SCS. At present, the US is still the top defense spender, albeit over-stretched in its resources with a citizenry weary of war. Dr. Corr predicts that unless the US increases defense spending, by 2025, the US and China will be on military parity in the South China Sea, and the US will then not be able to effectively protect friends like the Philippines or Vietnam from China’s predation. China at that point might even take the top spot and could make a preemptive but limited war against the US.
China’s increased defense expenditures are to meet the following goals: (1) solidify standing as a global power; (2) maintain pressure on Taiwan to rejoin the Mainland; (3) develop expeditionary military capabilities; (4) expand control of hydrocarbon resources, fish, sea lines of communication (SLOCs) in the SCS; (5) increase naval power projection, littoral security, and territorial claims; and (6) pressure US military forces in the region to withdraw.
Diplomatic. The strong words of US Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter against China’s massive reclamations in the SCS, serves as a warning that the US would uphold international law to protect freedom of navigation for naval and civilian vessels in the SCS.
The US has a 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty to defend the Philippines. But China has occupied and built massive military infrastructure covering over 200 acres in a span of 18 months on Philippine territories (e.g., on Mischief Reef; Subi Reef, and Fiery Cross Reef, where in April or May they placed surface-to-air missiles and anti-ship cruise missiles) in the SCS, simultaneously accusing the US of being the source of instability in the area. This, while they occupy Scarborough Shoal within the Philippine EEZ as well. Neither the US nor the Philippines have posted permanent vessels to monitor the area, something quite puzzling from the sole perspective of naval defense. However, this scenario makes the US’ resolve to defend the Philippines seem questionable to both the Philippines and China.
The SCS conflict cannot be seen outside the context of Japan and Taiwan. The US has a 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation with Japan where the US is obligated to protect the Senkaku Islands as part of Japan’s territory, but which are also being claimed by Taiwan. The Taiwan Navy regards freedom of navigation of utmost importance.
The 1979 Taiwan Relations Act authorizes the US to sell arms to Taiwan. However, to navigate into the Taiwan Strait, depends upon freedom of navigation in the SCS. And there‘s the rub – the US refuses to recognize the sovereignty claims of China in the SCS.
Resources. China calls its top 3 overseas interests – energy, fishing, and SLOCs. In 2009, China had circulated a map with 9 dashes indicating its sovereign territories in the SCS. Regardless of distance from its coastline, China claimed sovereignty over the Paracels to the west; Scarborough Shoal to the east; Spratlys to the south; and Natunas to the southwest.
The most important resource interests of China in the SCS are the 58 trillion cubic meters of gas and 29 billion tons of oil deposits, totaling 70.78 billion tons in reserves, more than enough to supply China’s needs for 60 years, and making the SCS the 3rd largest reserve in the world, next to Venezuela and Saudi Arabia. Beyond energy resources are the fish catch, which accounts for 12% of the world’s catch, and the corral reefs that account for 30% of the world’s corrals, and habitats for thousands of marine animals. At the bottom of the sea are rare earths, minerals such as metallic ores, and on land are phosphoric and lime mines, all of which are attractive to China and its over-fished seas. By 2013, over-populated China became the world’s highest net oil importer.
By reclaiming the reefs into islands, China had built outposts in the SCS that she may later use to block ships from passing through. China has rammed and capsized big ships as well as fishing vessels of its neighbors, and evicted local fishermen from their traditional fishing coasts.
Tactics. China has been using brinkmanship, an effective form of intimidation, against its less powerful neighbors. It has made repeated verbal assurances that it would work in harmony with its neighbors, which is rather a big mistake for naïve countries to believe in China’s words, rather than in its actions. In the “win-win” arrangement promoted by President Xi to jointly develop the resources to increase GDP of all participants, China demands at least a 50% stake, and the rest of the Claimant countries get a slice of the remainder. More recently it has become a 60% take, but even this is unclear. China could demand more later depending on whether it also tries to charge for any machinery, labor, or expertise it provides. And this is from a country farthest from the disputed islands in the SCS.
When faced with a problem, China prefers bilateral talks and arrangements, but this is rather due to mastered bribery tactics to dominate the weaker country; it is a delaying tactic until China solidifies control of a territory, and in so doing, discourages other countries from following the UNCLOS arbitral path that the Philippines took. The win-win rhetoric is just a ploy, a zero-sum game solely in favor of China.
The US has had more frequent joint exercises with the Philippine troops. The US also passed through the Spratlys to prove that these are legally navigable international waters in opposition to China’s claim of sovereign territory over the Spratly Island Group and the waters surrounding the islands. The US had also flown reconnaissance jets over the SCS, and was able to record the massive military construction being done by China early on. Similar reconnaissance jets in Djibouti, Africa, were subject to Chinese military laser attacks in May, causing damage to U.S. pilots’ eyesight. With the lack of a stronger military response from the US, the Philippines has had to balance between the US and China.
The Root of China’s Aggressive Behavior. China’s incursions into the SCS are predicated on a sense of entitlement, a “false memory syndrome.” It is historically baseless to see themselves not as expansionists but rather “defending their territories” because these islands and reefs were never part of China. Most islands were merely renamed from their original British names to Chinese. Spratly became Nanwei, James Shoal became Zengmu Ansha, etc. In 1974, China attacked and killed 64 Vietnamese marines to capture the Paracels. In 1988, China grabbed Johnson Reef from Vietnam by shelling the Vietnamese ship and machine-gunning 84 Vietnamese marines to their death. After 1988, China employed incrementalism in building new islands in the SCS until the present –all supposedly to eradicate their Century of National Humiliation.
This is one place in the book that is lacking – an analysis of the effects that this supposed Century of Humiliation has had on the conflict. China supposedly recalls its deep shame, but in reality it is another propaganda ploy. I find it quite convoluted for China to use it as their rallying cry when in truth their actions are to completely negate their words, a staged double-talk that China utilizes with absolutely no shame.
Although China vehemently refuses to accept the Arbitral Tribunal findings under UNCLOS because China claims its ancient sovereign rights supercedes the UNCLOS claim, the UN Tribunal judges dismissed China’s argument. The Tribunal found that China “violated the Philippines’ EEZ,” and “inflicted irreparable harm to the marine environment” during its reclamations in the SCS. China then aimed to discredit UNCLOS from then on.
China’s reclamations in the SCS are analogous to the Israeli settlement-building in the West Bank. Other smaller countries submit to do joint exploration with China, even if legal judgment is in their favor, and regardless of China’s flawed sense of righteousness. “The disputes can only be truly resolved “by challenging China’s view of history, and thereby undermining China’s sense of righteousness,” writes famous South China Sea historian Bill Hayton in the volume. Hayton also pushes for States interested in long lasting peace, “to go beyond their stances of neutrality on the territorial questions.” He adds that, “Instead, they need to assert that territorial claims without a foundation in verifiable evidence are not a viable basis for dialogue and conflict resolution.” These are wise words of strength. My Philippines, and the United States, should not cave in to China.
China has had only one country that it skirts around, watching its reactions and non-reactions – the US. And we should remember that the Philippines has in the past, along with Thailand and Singapore, been the US’ strongest ally in Southeast Asia. China is therefore in a tight spot. While China has succeeded in avoiding war with the US through its “salami-slicing” aggression, it has gained deep animosity from neighboring Asian countries, thereby galvanizing nationalistic anti-China sentiments. China obviously did not take its little neighbors (but serious Claimant States) into consideration. The US now finds a gaping hole in China’s Grand Strategy, the patriotic citizens of Southeast Asia, from which it can expand the US’ role as protector of national sovereignties in these Asian countries surrounding the SCS.
China’s neighboring countries are now investing more on defense and joint activities with the US, as a result of China’s continued illegal dredging and militarization of islands in the SCS, despite the UNCLOS arbitral ruling. The inordinately fast pace of China’s military build-up to increase “defense” and control over the SCS is all falsely based on an invented myth that the SCS was once their “lost territory.” But truly, for all of China’s trumpeting about its centuries-old culture, no historian has ever known or heard of China’s lost “Atlantis.” China does have a fake news problem, but also a much bigger fake history problem.
The limelight of this decade is on maritime power. China aims to be in the top 8 navies by 2020; the top 5 by 2030; and the top 3 by 2049. China’s territorial expansion in the SCS is unilateral, in utter disregard of international rulings on the laws of the sea and based instead on a mistaken historical claim of China’s sovereignty over the 3 million square miles of maritime territory in the SCS. China also has absolutely no respect for EEZ rights and continental shelves. Scarborough Shoal is 470nm to China, while only 125nm to Philippines, well within the Philippines’ 200nm EEZ. The same applies to Reed Bank. Yet China sent away a Philippine survey vessel from Reed Bank in 2011; and continued to survey Scarborough Shoal underwater in 2016. China’s diplomatic, economic and military powers have similarly gotten Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand to surrender aspects of their sovereignty; to a lesser degree, Malaysia as well.
China’s new naval stations in seized islands like Cuarteron, Fiery Cross, Gaven, Hughes, Johnson, Mischief and Subi Reefs –China’s 7 occupations in the Spratlys– not only have dramatically increased Chinese warships but also provided China the confidence to challenge anyone who dares to sail or fly over their so-called territory. They often justify these as weather stations, rescue stations or even for environmental study. But in the book, former P-8 flight officer Sean Liedman (Capt., USN, Ret.) makes the important point that these islands experienced the fastest rate of permanent coral loss in human history. Clearly, China’s rhetoric versus actions has a pattern of two-faced dualism that only leads to more distrust. China had stated that only involved Asian countries can interfere during conflicts, alluding to the interference of US and Japan. Yet China sent its submarine all the way to the Indian Ocean and claims to have interests there.
China’s Grand Strategy is to be the Leader of Asia and the world, and to lay the blame for all the instability and conflicts left in its wake mainly to the US presence –from Southeast Asia to South Asia– where smaller country economies are highly dependent on seaborne trade, and therefore, freedom of navigation in international waters. Even India now needs to defend itself with greater vigor against an expansive China, not only in the Indian Ocean, but also in the Himalayas. China’s most important tactical accomplishment is not island-building nor imposing its 9-dash line sovereignty, but rather in bribing officials, splitting factions off formerly strong alliances, buying off countries, and rendering the ASEAN weightless and powerless to impose international rulings, let alone discuss the conflicts in the SCS. Calling it a Grand Strategy is just more wholesome than what it really is: bribery and Illegal island grabbing, inclusive of air, sea and sky.
Economic. The worries do not end in Asia, as China’s claws have now been seen rising up in the Arctic. It has established the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) to challenge the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. In the near future, if China gets its way, there will stand a United Nations of Asia centered in Beijing, with its own security council to decide the fate of the Asian countries. China will institute its own international law with Chinese characteristics, starting with its obstruction of a Code of Conduct in ASEAN. The very country that virtually does not respect peace treaties, even where she is a signatory member, is now taking the helm.
China’s attempts to eliminate US-Japan security alliances and military assistance to Vietnam and Philippines have increased mostly through blatant threats and harassment tactics. And if that didn’t work, through extravagant promises of infrastructure loans in the ballpark of $20 billion which have been offered to Laos, Cambodia, and recently, the Philippines. As a result, the US and Japan have only become more occupied in showing its presence in the SCS more than ever as ASEAN became fragmented. US and Japan contribute to increase maritime capacity building of China’s neighboring countries in the SCS, while Russia helps build military capacity of Vietnam to help deter China’s aggression in the SCS, although Russia failed to hold sway as ASEAN’s balancer in Asia.
Conclusion. The intricacies of China’s (un)diplomatic and military tactics are set out throughout the book, which would be too much for me to itemize just for the sake of comprehensiveness. Let me instead invite you to read, “Great Powers, Grand Strategies”. From the in-depth Introduction to the incisive chapters, the tactical and strategic events and analyses provided by the authors will make it difficult to put this book down. It shows the minutia of how China’s brand of defiance has brought instability in the Asia region. The US will need to respond strongly to compel China to adhere to international law, at least by signing and ratifying UNCLOS, to empower the Claimant States to keep up the fight. And given the lack of collective power projection by the EU, the responsibility for keeping the expansionism of China in check eventually lies with not only the US, but with patriotic citizens in all claimant countries. Unless this takes place, then China’s “Might makes Right” will prevail.
