I cannot forget that final day in 1977 when we in the DND Strategic Studies Group (SSG) headed by then Col Salvador Regalado PAF that was specially created by DND Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile, presented our final proposed draft of the revised PH-US Military Bases Agreement (MBA) when, after the ensuing discussions, we were surprised by the position paper prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs that drastically changed much of what we had prepared, I was the J2 representative on special detail with the DND SSG then.

The conference, held at the ISAFP Conference Room at Camp Aguinaldo, was co-chaired by Secretaries Carlos P Romulo and Juan Ponce Enrile, and ended generally approving the DFA draft to be given to the US side during the annual Mutual Defense Board meeting that week.

With the PH-US Joint Review Panel present, it was going to be a drastic departure from the “business as usual” meetings of the MDB, I thought correctly.

Indeed, it was, and after the meeting we were told that the State Department had requested for a recess in the negotiations so that key members of the US Panel could go back to Washington to consult.

That was also when I really got to know the Chief of Staff AFP, Gen Romeo C Espino, who asked me to be the Secretary of the Military Panel that he headed, with BG Mamerto M Bocanegra, Col Feliciano M Gacis PA and Capt Brillante C Ochoco PN (PNLO Subic) as members. We would later start the mil-to-mil discussions weekly, with the US panel headed by COMNAVPHIL, which HQ had moved from Sangley (which had been transferred to the PN) to Subic Naval Base. During the meetings our panel flew by helicopter from Camp Aguinaldo to the Central Bank building on Roxas Boulevard with the US panel. The Chairman of the Philippine Delegation, the highly respected Amb Eduardo Z Romualdez, then AMBAPHIL Washington DC (and uncle of FL Imelda Marcos) held his Manila office there for the negotiations.

The rest was history. While the Philippine hard-line position was not carried all the way because of PFM’s intervention, it changed a lot in the US bases regime, mainly:

1. The US military bases became Philippine bases, under Philippine flag and a Philippine base commander, following the Thailand model; The areas had collateral boundaries, just like the City of San Francisco within San Francisco County; the gates being jointly manned, with the US facilities as enclaves;
2. The areas occupied by Philippine personnel were under jurisdiction of the Philippine base commander; the US facilities within were under jurisdiction of the US base commander;
3. The mission of John Hay Air Base and all US recreational facilities now included AFP personnel as authorized patrons and users.
4. The idea of “rental” was introduced in addition to what the Military Assistance Program (MAP) covered. This “rental” was actually termed Economic Support Fund (ESF) by the US Government, to cover non-military fund assistance of some USD 200 million annually.

The eventual fate of the bases was sealed, as succeeding events showed, and the US facilities were practically dismantled in haste and troops left after the Pinatubo eruption in 1991. President Joseph Estrada realized his error (in voting against the extension of the bases while serving as Senator) when he became President and the Chinese gambled by seizing territory in the Spratlys.

It was during the mil-to-mil negotiations that I learned that the US did not consider Kalayaan as actionable under the MDT. That China seized the Paracels towards the end of the Vietnam War without touching Pagasa and Philippine-occupied islets, however showed that the MDT was providing a shield of protection nevertheless.

The removal of the bases, of course needed some agreements to cover assistance and training needs, among others, that justify presence of US troops and facilities in order to operationalize the MDT, as the 1986 Constitution now came into play. Enter the EDCA (Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement) and the VFA (Visiting Forces Agreement), which needed Supreme Court decision to be Constitutionally compliant, which was eventually granted.

For more insight on the VFA, EDCA and MDT aspects, one may view various media interviews. One, done by Dr Carlos Tabunda PhD of New Era University with retired LTG Edilberto P Adan, a co-trustee in the PCFR (who was the former Executive Director of the VFA Commission until 2014, on Net 25 TV on 7 Mar 2020) I consider excellent. Those interested to learn more may see the video at https://www.facebook.com/EagleNews/videos/542646059698337/.

VFA Termination?

President Rodrigo Duterte had expressed his scorn of the United States for quite many years, primarily because of his inclusion in the US human rights black list, starting from allegations concerning the supposed “Davao Death Squad” when he was the City Mayor. Upon election, he immediately unleashed his wrath upon US Ambassador Philip Goldberg, turning quite personal due to the latter’s untoward comments during the elections about his human rights record, an obvious faux pas for a diplomat. The ambassador was of course replaced shortly after.

Thereafter, he continued attacking US policies and historical records, highlighting more the negative and purposely or apparently showing little knowledge of the positive. This he did every occasion he had in public, actually stating that “the (useless) alliance with the US would go”.

While the US has immense popularity among the population vis-a-vis the negative impression against China, nevertheless President Duterte enjoys equally immense popularity from the people. He announced early in his term his opinion that our US relationship has no value, and that, while he professes “enemy to no one, friendship to all”, his actions and decisions show a clear pivot to China, starting from his first visit to China upon assumption as President. He had stated a few times his thinking that he would terminate our long-standing defense engagement with the United States. I personally thought it was mere hyperbole.

President Rodrigo Duterte on 23 January shocked many of us with the announcement at a public meeting in Malacaang that he would finally terminate the Visiting Forces Agreement. That was on the eve of the first meeting of the year of the Maritime Forum, traditionally held at the Department of Foreign Affairs.

Of course, many did not believe that it would happen. The following day, at the start of the 153rd Maritime Forum held at the President Elpidio Quirino Hall at DFA, I expressed concern about that previous day’s statement of the President in my Opening Remarks, and the ensuing discussion led to a motion that the Forum should make its feelings publicly known through a Resolution, worded as follows:

“Resolution No. 20-1. Resolved, as it is hereby resolved that the Maritime Forum expresses its concern about the implication of the possible termination of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) as announced by the government, on the national security of the Philippines, and strongly recommends that the government consider the pros and cons prior to deciding its termination, and that if feasible, a detailed review be conducted and negotiated as soon as possible.”

There were remarks on the propriety of such a statement of concern since some of the key participants in the Forum are active government officials, but the great majority held on to the motion, which was approved with some officials abstaining.

Asked as to whether we should provide copies to the media forthwith, I hedged a little with the intention of consulting the key maritime players in the Forum first, something I would later regret due to the public statements of key cabinet officials, including Secretary of Foreign Affairs Teodoro Locsin Jr and Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana (among other officials asked by reporters) expressing the same concern, as reported in media, on the same day. Thus, I knew that my gut feel was correct; that the official family of the President was not ready to accept that drastic path.

Yes, we all surmised incorrectly. but how could those officials now countermand their boss?

The Forum Resolution was again confirmed during the 154th Maritime Forum in Cebu City on February 21, 2020, ten days after the letter of termination was sent to the US Ambassador by Secretary Teodoro Locsin. By that time, many columnists, opinion-makers and other notable individuals have expressed concern about the announced termination of the VFA, including a very carefully worded one by former DFA Secretary Roberto Romulo. Understandably, an announcement was made that the President’s cabinet now stood in support of the termination.

Many American officials, military officers and retired diplomats are disappointed in the turn of events. Asked by newsmen, they stated that the security in the region could be affected by the termination or reduction of the value of Philippine inclusion in the alliance network.

The US Philippines Society (USPHS) is a US private sector initiative organized in 2012 in Washington, DC by veteran diplomats and others who have interest in Philippine affairs, with a vision“ to create a new and timely mechanism for elevating the Philippines’ profile in the United States and a mission “to build on the rich and longstanding historical ties between the two nations and help to bring that unique relationship fully into the 21st century at a junction when U.S. policy interests are increasingly focused on East Asia”.

In mid-February 2020 the USPHS conducted a series of meetings in Manila to discuss the current situation, inviting Philippine officials and other groups, including the Philippine Council for Foreign Relations. There we in PCFR learned that many Americans share similar concerns of losing our special security relationship.

Even Sec Teodoro Locsin Jr somehow telegraphed what I believe is the majority of the officials in government hope will happen when he jokingly stated, “The fat lady has not yet sung!”

Quite often politicians opposed to US presence in the Philippines, including President Duterte, would state that the VFA and the EDCA are not treated in the same way by our two governments. In fact this opinion has been a good selling point for those who oppose. I often provide justification by saying that for the US, the MDT says it all, and for them there is no need for US Senate confirmation of the two Executive Agreements, as they are only deemed to be implementing the MDT. In the PH case, since the Military Bases Agreement (MBA) had lapsed, any foreign military presence in the Philippines would now have to contend with the 1987 Constitution.

It was only during the USPHS meeting that I learned, together with my other colleagues, that the contention of President Duterte and others opposed to US presence under the VFA due to unequal processes is not warranted. In essence, the US is indeed committed to the EDCA and the VFA by force of law.

Here’s the answer to the criticism that the VFA and the EDCA were not considered confirmed by the US Senate. It is actually covered under ARIA 2018 (US Public Law 115-409):

ASIAN REAASURANCE INITIATIVE ACT OF 2018 (PUBLIC LAW 115–409—DEC. 31, 2018)

SEC 202 (d) UNITED STATES-PHILIPPINES ALLIANCE.—The United States Government is committed to the Mutual Defense Treaty between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America, done at Washington August 30, 1951, and all related and subsequent bilateral security agreements and arrangements concluded on or before the date of the enactment of this Act, including the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, done at Manila April 28, 2014. (underscoring mine)

This was explained by Philippine Ambassador to the US Jose Manuel “Babes” Romualdez in response to a question by a participant during the meeting of the USPH Society held at the Manila Peninsula Hotel in Makati on 17 Feb 2020.

Way ahead

Will the 180-day lead time for withdrawal still provide an opportunity for a change of heart by 11 August, 2020? The answer, from various impressions we are getting, seems to be in the negative, particularly as US President Donald Trump, in answer to a question, replied that it was alright, and that the US would save a lot. That makes it virtually impossible to reverse course, as President Duterte would lose face.

Some say the ultimate goal of the President is the termination of the MDT. Even on the VFA alone, Japanese media is already quite concerned. The Australians feel that the security links from Japan to New Zealand would be terribly jeopardized.

The way ahead depends on a very crucial legal issue. Does termination of a treaty such as the MDT and the Agreements in question require Congressional confirmation as the latter did in approving them? Senator Rodolfo G Biazon, one of the strong proponents of the approval of the VFA researched on the Constitutional Commission records, enabling him to turn around one of the strongest oppositors, the late Sen Miriam Defensor Santiago.

The Senate has actually asked the Supreme Court 9 March to require the upper chamber’s concurrence in the termination of treaties, CNN Phil on that day reported:

In their petition for declaratory relief and mandamus, senators urged the high court to “render a decision declaring that the withdrawal from or termination of a treaty or international agreement …requires the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of the Senate.”

The lawmakers also want the court to order the Office of the Executive Secretary to refer the notice of withdrawal from the treaty to the Senate for its concurrence.

Resolution 337 was sponsored by Senate President Vicente Sotto and Senators Panfilo Lacson, Frank Drilon, Juan Miguel Zubiri and Richard Gordon and was adopted on March 2 with a vote of 12-0 and seven abstentions, paving the way for the Senate to file petitions before the high court to clarify the process, which will determine the fate of the VFA. Other petitions from other groups are expected to be filed.

The Forum has done its part, albeit not so expressed in public media. But we should also join other sectors in their suggestion that perhaps now is the time to review the MDT itself, with the intention of introducing amendments that will clarify what situations heretofore not identified should now be covered, due to the fact that many areas of conflict short of shooting war can now be included, such as cyber warfare and “gray zone strategy”, including harassment by use of surrogates and armed militia.

The irony in all this is our focus has been diverted to the NCoVi 19 problem, because a more serious problem has arisen.

So many derogatory remarks have been said concerning the actions by the Interagency Task Force (IATF COVID-19), but can we see that government is caught between the devil and the deep blue sea? We need to “flatten the curve” but we are hurting many, especially the poor. As one of the level headed Viber posts hitting the perceived failings amidst the crisis says. “if you want a better President, PRAY for President Duterte.”

May God bless us all.