



# MARITIME REVIEW

PUBLICATION OF THE MARITIME LEAGUE

Issue No. 22 - 1

JAN - FEB 2022

## PROPOSAL FOR CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION

### Also Inside:

- » Engaging the Enemy in Littoral Waters
- » Taiwan and Philippines
- » HADR by Philippine Navy
- » Planned Maintenance System on MRRVs
- » Engaging the Enemy in Littoral Waters
- » Commanding the Pacific - U.S. Marine Corps Generals of WWII

# POWER WHEN YOU NEED IT.



Whatever your vessel, when it's out in the sea,  
it'll need all the power it can get.  
Propmech can give your ship the muscle it needs  
to achieve its mission. Contact us today!

Propmech Corporation is a leading marine engine provider  
based in the Philippines with a global reach.



PROVEN  
PERFORMANCE

[www.propmech.com](http://www.propmech.com)

MARINE TECHNOLOGY CENTER  
A. Soriano cor., Arzobispo Sts., Intramuros, City of Manila



(02) 5279055 / (02) 5276666



(02) 5279052 / (02) 5279046



## THE MARITIME LEAGUE

**CHAIRMAN EMERITUS**  
Hon. Fidel V Ramos

**HONORARY CHAIRMAN**  
Hon. Arthur P Tugade

**FOUNDING CHAIRMAN**  
Commo Carlos L Agustin AFP (Ret)

**TRUSTEE AND PRESIDENT**  
VAdm Eduardo Ma R Santos AFP (Ret)

**TRUSTEE AND VICE PRESIDENT**  
VAdm Emilio C Marayag Jr AFP (Ret)

**TRUSTEE AND TREASURER**  
RAdm Margarito V Sanchez Jr AFP (Ret)

**TRUSTEE AND AUDITOR**  
Commo Gilbert S Rueras PCG (Ret)

**TRUSTEES**  
Joseph Emilio A Abaya  
Capt Tomas D Bains PN (Ret)  
LTJG Christian R Chua PN (Res)  
Herminio S Esguerra  
Engr Sammuel T Lim  
Adm Ramon C Liwag PCG (Ret)  
Vicky Viray-Mendoza  
Phillip L Ong  
Commo Mariano S Sontillanosa AFP (Ret)  
Alberto H Suansing

**TRUSTEE AND CORPORATE SECRETARY**  
VAdm Edmund C Tan PCG (Ret)

**ASSISTANT BOARD SECRETARY**  
John Paul D Agustin

## THE MARITIME REVIEW

**MANAGING DIRECTOR**  
Commo Mariano S Sontillanosa AFP (Ret)

### EDITORIAL BOARD

**CHAIRMAN**  
VAdm Emilio C Marayag Jr AFP (Ret)

**MEMBERS**  
Capt Tomas D Bains PN (Ret)  
John Paul D Agustin  
LTJG Christian R Chua PN (Res)

**EXECUTIVE EDITOR**  
Vicky Viray-Mendoza

**GRAPHICS AND LAYOUT**  
Mia Lea E Desalisa

The Maritime Review is published bimonthly on behalf of the Maritime League and is supplied to members as a part of their annual membership package. The opinions expressed by the writers do not necessarily reflect those of the Maritime League

📍 Ground Floor, Unit B, Waypoint Bldg,  
No. 4 Bayani Road, AFPOVAI, Taguig City

🌐 [www.maritimeleague.com](http://www.maritimeleague.com)

✉ [marrev@maritimeleague.com](mailto:marrev@maritimeleague.com)

☎ +63 (2) 8961-9392

# Table of Contents

### MARITIME CALENDAR

04 *Maritime Events Calendar*

### FEATURE STORY

06 *A Proposal for Climate Change Adaptation for Archipelagic States*

### HADR

12 *Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief by the Philippine Navy: NAVFORSOL, NAVFOREASTMIN, NAVFLEETMARINE, NAVFORCEN, NAVFORWEST, and SAMBISIG*

### SHIPPING MAINTENANCE

18 *Planned Maintenance System (PMS) on the Propulsion Engines of the 44M MRRV of the PCG*

### MARITIME GEOPOLITICS

24 *Taiwan and Philippines*

### MARITIME HISTORY

29 *Engaging the Enemy in Littoral Waters*

32 *Commanding the Pacific - U.S. Marine Corps Generals of WWII*



18



13



16



29

### ABOUT THE COVER

Typhoon Rai crossed the southern and central Philippines on 16-December-2021, intensifying to category 5 strength just hours before landfall. Locally named "Odette," the storm was one of the strongest recorded on Earth this year and the 6th to reach category 5. This natural-color image was acquired in the early afternoon on December 16 by the Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite (VIIRS) on the Suomi-NPP satellite. At the time of this image, the storm had sustained winds of 240 kilometers (150 miles) per hour, a category 4 super typhoon. News and weather reports indicated the storm first came ashore in Siargao, a popular island for tourism, with sustained winds of 195 kilometers (120 miles) per hour, before crossing over several other islands. About 100,000 people evacuated their homes before Rai "Odette" arrived. An estimated 30 million people live in the central and southern islands of the Philippines. The storm also hit the western side of the Philippines as it started to track northwest. Sustained winds were whipping at 180 kilometers (110 miles) per hour. Forecasters from the U.S. Joint Typhoon Warning Center predicted that the storm would head toward Vietnam and southern China in the coming days. Rai "Odette" is the 15th typhoon to pass through or close to the Philippines this year. The Philippine archipelago typically sees more landfalling storms annually than any other place on Earth. Photo credit: NASA Earth Observatory image by Lauren Dauphin, using VIIRS data from NASA EOSDIS LANCE, GIBS/Worldview, and the Suomi National Polar-orbiting Partnership.

Story by Michael Carlowicz.

# Maritime Events Calendar

## NOVEMBER 2021

- 2 - 3 ASIAN LOGISTICS AND MARITIME CONFERENCE (HONG KONG EXHIBITION CENTER, HONG KONG)
- 2 - 5 EUROPORT 2021 (ROTTERDAM AHOY CONVENTION CENTRE, AHOYWEG, ROTTERDAM, NETHERLANDS)
- 3 - 4 GLOBAL LINER SHIPPING CONFERENCE (VIRTUAL EVENT)
- 8 - 11 ABU DHABI INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM EXHIBITION AND CONFERENCE (ADIPEC 2021) ABU DHABI NATIONAL EXHIBITION CENTER, AL KHALEEJ AL ARABI ST, AL RAWDAH CAPITAL CENTER, ABU DHABI, UAE
- 9 SMART MARITIME NETWORK DUBAI CONFERENCE (CONRAD DUBAI, SHEIKH ZAYED RD, TRADE CENTRE 1, DUBAI, UNITED ARAB EMIRATES)
- 9 - 11 THE MARITIME AUTONOMY AND TECHNOLOGY SHOWCASE (MATS 2021) NATIONAL OCEANOGRAPHY CENTRE, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON, SOUTHAMPTON, UNITED KINGDOM
- 11 CHINA SHIP FINANCE SUMMIT (THE RITZ-CARLTON SHANGHAI PUDONG, SHANGHAI, CHINA)
- 15 - 18 NAVIGATION 2021 - THE EUROPEAN NAVIGATION CONFERENCE (ENC) - VIRTUAL EVENT
- 15 - 18 NAVIGATION 2021 - THE INTERNATIONAL NAVIGATION CONFERENCE (INC) - VIRTUAL EVENT  
MARITIME FORUM #168 - UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES - INSTITUTE FOR MARITIME AFFAIRS AND LAW OF THE SEA (UP - IMLOS)
- 26 **MARITIME FORUM #168**

## DECEMBER 2021

- 12-15 SEATRADE CRUISE GLOBAL (MIAMI, FLORIDA, USA)
- 1 - 3 INTERNATIONAL WORKBOAT SHOW 2021 (MORIAL CONVENTION CENTER, NEW ORLEANS, LA, USA)
- 7 - 8 NATURAL GAS AND LNG DYNAMICS (VIRTUAL EVENT)
- 7 - 10 MARINETEC CHINA 2021 (NEW INTERNATIONAL EXHIBITION CENTRE, SHANGHAI, CHINA)
- 8 TITBIT: MARITIME MICROGRIDS TECHNOLOGIES FOR ELECTRIFICATION OF SHIPS AND SEAPORTS - VIRTUAL EVENT
- 13 - 15 SEATRADE MARITIME MIDDLE EAST (DUBAI EXHIBITION CENTRE, LEHABAB STREET, DUBAI, UNITED ARAB EMIRATES)
- 14 - 15 IMPA LONDON 2021 (QUEEN ELIZABETH II CENTRE, WESTMINSTER, LONDON, UNITED KINGDOM)
- 15 - 17 INMEX SMM INDIA 2021 (NESCO CENTRE HALL, GOREGANON, MUMBAI, MAHARASHTRA, INDIA)
- 28 NEW YEAR CREDIT UNION EDUCATIONAL CRUISE CONFERENCE (ABOARD HOLLAND AMERICA'S MS EURODAM, KEY WEST, USA)

## JANUARY 2022

- TBD **MARITIME FORUM #169 - DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (DFA)**
- 10 - 13 NOR SHIPPING 2022 (NORWAY TRADE FAIRS, MESSEVEIEN 8, LILL ESTROM, NORWAY)
- 22 - 23 28TH MIDDLE EAST PETROLEUM INSIDERS (FOUR SEASONS HOTEL, BAHRAIN BAY, MANAMA, BAHRAIN)
- 24 **MARITIME FORUM #168 - UP-IMLOS**
- 25 - 27 TRANS MIDDLE EAST (THE DIPLOMAT, RADISSON BLU HOTEL, RESIDENCE AND SPA, MANAMA, BAHRAIN)
- 26 SMART MARITIME NETWORK SINGAPORE CONFERENCE (MARINA SQUARE 6, RAFFLES BLVD, SINGAPORE, SINGAPORE)

## FEBRUARY 2022

- TBD **MARITIME FORUM #170 - CEBU PORTS AUTHORITY (CPA)**

## MARCH 2022

- TBD **MARITIME FORUM #171 - MARITIME ACADEMY OF ASIA AND THE PACIFIC (MAAP)**
- 15 - 17 OCEANOLOGY INTERNATIONAL 2022 (EXCEL LONDON, ROYAL VICTORIA DOCK, LONDON, UNITED KINGDOM)
- 16 - 18 ASIA PACIFIC MARITIME 2022 (MARINA BAY SANDS, SINGAPORE, SINGAPORE)
- 21 - 23 DOHA INTERNATIONAL MARITIME DEFENCE EXHIBITION AND CONFERENCE (DIMDEX) - DOHA EXHIBITION AND CONVENTION CENTRE (DECC), DOHA, QATAR
- 24 - 26 INMEX VIETNAM 2022 (SAIGON EXHIBITION AND CONVENTION CENTRE, HO CHI MINH, VIETNAM)

## APRIL 2022

- TBD **MARITIME FORUM #172 - MARITIME INDUSTRY AUTHORITY (MARINA)**
- 20 - 22 SEA JAPAN 2022 (TOKYO BIG SIGHT EXHIBITION CENTRE, KOTO CITY, TOKYO, JAPAN)

## MAY 2022

- TBD **MARITIME FORUM #173 - PHILIPPINE NAVY (PN)**
- 11 - 13 SHIPBUILD INDIA EXPO SUMMIT 2022 (BOMBAY EXHIBITION CENTER, MUMBAI, INDIA)
- 11 - 13 MARITIME TRANSPORT AND SHIPPING INDIA EXPO 2022 (BOMBAY EXHIBITION CENTER, MUMBAI, INDIA)
- 17 - 19 EUROPORT ROMANIA 2022 (ROTTERDAM AHOY, AHOYWEG, ROTTERDAM, NETHERLANDS)



**PANDIMAN PHILIPPINES, INC.**



**SURVEY SPECIALISTS, INC.**

# 24/7

## in continuing pandemic times



### We are where you need us to be, playing our part in the global maritime industry.



#### SERVICES

##### FOR SEAFARERS

- Illness, Injury & Death
- Shipwreck Unemployment Indemnity
- Loss of Personal Effects
- Wage Disputes
- Illegal Dismissal
- Provide Medical Escort Services Worldwide

##### FOR CARGO

- Loss, Shortage, Damage
- Freight & Demurrage Claims

##### FOR VESSEL

- Damage to Fixed & Floating Objects
- Collision Liabilities
- Fines and Disputes
- Lifting of Arrest
- Oil Pollution
- Loss Prevention Surveys



Pandiman Building, General Luna corner Sta. Potenciana Streets, Intramuros, Manila 1002, Philippines



[www.pandiman.com](http://www.pandiman.com)



[mis@pandiman.com](mailto:mis@pandiman.com)  
[mis@pandiman.net](mailto:mis@pandiman.net)



(02) 8527-7831  
(02) 8249-9050 to 59  
(02) 5322-7740 to 55



(02) 8527-2169  
(02) 8527-2171



Certificate No.: 1568  
ISO: 9001:2015

# CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE FOR CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION IN THE INDO-PACIFIC/INDOCHINA-PACIFIC MARITIME REGION 1/

by Alberto A. Encomienda and Peter Flewwelling 2/

## **P**hase 1 (4 years) – A Pacific Ocean marine corridor in central Philippines

**Background.** Phase 1 of the Programme spotlights a Pacific Ocean corridor in central Philippines serves as the initial focus for the wider Indo-Pacific/Indochina-Pacific 3/ maritime region that is critical to global health and security. This large sea area as designated is comprised of interconnected enclosed-semi-enclosed seas sharing characteristic regional features. The Pacific Ocean central corridor in the Philippines constituting the municipal waters and sea areas of the Philippines in the Provinces of Surigao del Norte - Dinagat Islands - Bohol - Leyte - Samar - Sorsogon, are key to this Indo-Pacific /Indochina-Pacific link that also coincides as the hub area of the archipelago severely impacted by global warming, increased intensity of natural disasters, and deficiencies in appropriate levels of nutrition and food security as well as other socio-economic issues. The development and enhancement of capacity and good governance in the Regions and Provinces in this Pacific Ocean central corridor of the Philippines to mitigate the destructive impacts of Climate Change and associated threats to health, livelihood and security shall be through the establishment of a strategic science and technology driven Centre of Excellence in Leyte Province being the soft underbelly of the archipelago, and the heart of the Coral Triangle. This will entail the commitment of all three main branches of the national government, Legislative, Executive, and Judicial, in a whole-of-nation approach principally implemented through Local Government Units (LGU's). This Pacific Ocean marine corridor will be the seed upon which to build the succeeding and expanding Phases 2 and 3 of the overall Programme with the focus on addressing SDG 13 and positively impacting on SDG 14.

Another area of grave concern in regard to the Pacific Ocean marine corridor in the central Philippines wherein the Centre of Excellence addressing adverse impacts of Climate Change can have a critical part, is in regard to anticipated disaster(s) waiting to happen. These are anticipated and not merely potential disasters, on account of its maritime character but in regard to the exercise of the right of archipelagic sealanes transit passage for foreign vessels. The Leyte-Dinagat Island -Surigao sea areas and the Bohol sea are entry and exit points between the Pacific Ocean and the South China Sea. So is the San Bernardino Straits in the Samar-Sorsogon sea area.

The Philippines archipelago has seven such entry/exit points for the exercise of archipelagic sealanes transit passage that carries the same concerns relating to impacts on coastal resources and the environment, and livelihood, that must be given equal attention and due consideration along with pervading adverse effects of Climate Change. In other words, awareness of

adverse effects of such impending disasters must be built-in into the Programme as an adaptation measure, mindful always that archipelagic States with its coastal and small island communities, are most vulnerable to temperature rise and sea level rise. For the same reason as aforesaid, and looking to the Programme Phase 2 whole-of-archipelago expansion an additional adaptation measure can take up from the IMO (International Maritime Organization) to designate the entire Philippines archipelago as a Particularly Sensitive Sea Area (PSSA). The central Philippines marine corridor in the Pacific Ocean is also the northern fringe of the Coral Triangle. In the context of the foregoing real concerns, the Philippines in the late 1990s presented a request to IMO for the establishment of an IMO Regional Office in the country.

**Objective:** To develop mechanisms, processes, procedures to mitigate the negative socio-economic/political impacts resulting from Climate Change in the sea areas of the Provinces of Surigao del Norte-Dinagat Islands-Bohol-Leyte-Samar-Sorsogon though the commitment of the Local Government Units (LGU's) and Regional Development Councils (RDC's) led by Governors and City/Municipal Mayors in this Phase 1 marine corridor in the central Philippines, and develop lessons learned for a Phase 2 archipelago-wide national expansion.

### **Methodology:**

#### **Management:**

A multi-sectoral **Climate Change Advisory Panel (CCAP)** must be established composed of appropriate Senior Officials from the Office of the President, DFA, DILG (with highlighted roles for the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) and PNP Maritime Police), DOST, DENR, DA, DSWD, DoT, and DepED, with representatives from the Regions, Provinces and Cities/Municipalities in the marine corridor to form a Steering Committee for Phase 1 to develop the framework of this phase and the template for Phase 2. The DFA and DA would co-lead the CCAP and Steering Committee.

The CCAP would create a **Programme Management Unit (PMU)** composed of management and technical specialists from Government and Civil Society to serve as the **Secretariat** to design and develop the full comprehensive Programme in its three phases. The Centre of Excellence with the PMU would serve as the catalyst and core of the Centre for the design and delivery of the programme components.

#### **Issues to be addressed for Phase 1:**

- Identification of clear socio-economic impacts of Climate Change:
  - » impact on coastal areas and communities including infrastructure;
  - » impact on upland areas and communities;
  - » impact on food security and nutrition;

- » impact on health and health security;
  - » impact on the environment;
  - » impact on trade and peace/security in coastal communities;
  - » impact on trade, peace/security, and good order in sea passages;
  - » impact on local industries and agri-business centers;
  - » impact on education and capacity for governance;
  - » impact on capacity to address increasing severity of natural disasters;
  - » impact on, and requirements for adjustment of legal/policy structures to address Climate Change; and
  - » Others as may be considered appropriate
- Identification of up-to-date processes to mitigate the above issues through a wide collective forum of government and private sector specialist advisors, would form an operational pillar for the operations of the PMU.
  - Identification of legal ramifications and development of appropriate legal instruments and policy directions under international/regional agreements to address and implement the recommendations for mitigation, would be among early tasks for international legal advisors, and a second pillar of PMU operations.
  - Promoting community awareness through development and dissemination of general training modules and materials for public and adult awareness sessions, and formal training modules for input into the educational system especially National Science High Schools, Agricultural Schools and Fisheries Schools; at the same time creating a focus for merging technical specialists with educational and community organizational advisors.
  - Identification and on-job training of a multi-sectoral professional team of future trainers for the Center of Excellence, working with the PMU, to assess and train ‘rapid response teams’ to be able to assess, organize and carry out initial response to Climate Change challenges, e.g., natural disasters, health epidemics, etc.
  - Mobilization of communities, regional, provincial, city/ municipal and barangay governments, INGO’s and NGO’S, and local industries to become involved and commit to a network whole-of-nation approach and new mitigation practices, would be a challenging assigned task for organizers and trainers and form, with the above two activities, the third pillar of PMU operations.
  - Detailed Programme evaluation for Phase 1 involving independent technical specialists and legal/policy experts to produce clear lessons learned and detailed recommendations for the adjustment of mitigation mechanisms, would be a pre-requisite for the approval and commencement of Phase 2.

**Outputs:**

1. Delivery of Phase 1 objectives and identified issues;
2. Detailed key lessons learned with detailed recommendations, for adjustment updating of Phase 1, and the further Programme development for Phases 2 and 3;
3. Development under the PMU, of a combined national and international team for the formal training program of the Center of Excellence to create regional, provincial and local ‘rapid response teams’ for initial responses to mitigate climate change challenges.
4. Decision for the expansion of the success of Programme Phase

1 towards a Phase 2 nationwide archipelago coverage, with appropriate adjustments/adaptations.

**Financing / Funding Sources:** Key government officials would be solicited to sponsor and champion the Programme, seek national Government funds and financing support from foreign Governments, International Development Banks, Civil Societies, and philanthropists.

**Phase 2 (6 years) – Expansion towards archipelago-wide sea areas, east to west and south to north; the Philippines to be “staging point” for the wider Indo-Pacific/ Indochina-Pacific maritime region**

**Background:** This Phase 2 of the Programme would assemble lessons learned from Phase 1 and will serve to adjust the development of mechanisms, processes and procedures to enlarge the umbrella of commitment to incorporate capacity-building and successful mitigation measures towards a new norm for national governance in the Philippines as an archipelagic State. With the slogan of ‘Climate Change Mitigation - Learning and Adapting for the Philippines archipelagic State,’ Programme Phase 2 will encompass the entire Philippines archipelago as the central political and geographic core for a regional ocean governance in a seamless link of a Large Marine Ecoregion (LME) that is the Indo-Pacific/Indochina-Pacific maritime region.

Parallel to this Phase 1 and Phase 2 Programme expansion within the Philippines is the commencement of outreach programs to partner countries in the Indo-Pacific/Indochina-Pacific sea areas in an UNCLOS Part IX 4/ context and application, that could already include early interaction and collaboration with “other interested States” and relevant international organizations and non-governmental organizations and civil society organizations, in accord with UNCLOS Part IX. This would endeavour to secure commitments of concerned regional countries to put aside straddling irritant issues and collectively address this common regional threat pursuant to the UNCLOS, and thus in essence a more localized regional copy of a “Common Heritage of Mankind.” The organizational/institutional design laid out above could serve as the precursor to a formally constituted “appropriate regional organization” as envisioned and exhorted in the opening paragraph of Article 123, UNCLOS Part IX; an extremely important point for awareness and consideration in the overall Programme development and implementation.

**Objective:** To build on the positive results of Phase 1 and enhanced Climate Change mitigation measures; to expand the national geographic scope of the Programme to include the remainder of the regions, provinces and cities/municipalities of the Philippines for a Phase 2 nationwide coverage on account of the Philippines being an archipelagic nation-State, and through direct participatory involvement of Government and private sector/civil society in a whole-of-nation approach. Concurrently, a parallel outreach program interaction shall already begin and be initiated to prepare and secure commitment from the partner countries of the Indo-Pacific/ Indochina Pacific maritime region for a Programme Phase 3 implementation.

**Methodology:**

**Management:** The Steering Committee/Climate Change Advisory Panel would be enhanced with the addition of key representatives from the expanded Indo-Pacific/Indochina-Pacific maritime region, with appropriate adjustment to the PMU to ensure the capacity to address the larger maritime geographic

region. In addition, successful mechanisms would be further enhanced and explored in the enlarged Indo-Pacific/Indochina-Pacific regional maritime area including possible adaptation or adoption of models such as that used in the Arctic Council and the EU Integrated Maritime Policy (IMP). The Centre of Excellence would commence its formal outreach training of future Climate Change technical, legal and management specialists from this Phase 2 nationwide programme area to form the core 'rapid response teams' and trainers in these new areas of wider Phase 3 regional Indo-Pacific/Indochina-Pacific expansion; they would serve as first responders for the mitigation of climate change challenges, natural disasters, health and security issues and general 'best practice' management training.

**Issues to be addressed for Phase 2:** The issues to be addressed in this Programme Phase 2 nationwide geographic scope would be in three main components:

- The first component for Phase 2 would be an expansion of the tasks in Phase 1 to cover the entire archipelago and building on the successes and lessons learned in all issues addressed in Phase 1, including the steps of review of current mechanisms and capacity, assessment of legal/policy adjustments and implementing mitigation measures. Under this Phase 2 component would be the necessitated expansion of the 'training of trainers' program and 'rapid response teams' in the wider national geographic area at the regional, provincial and municipal levels through internships at the Center of Excellence combined with on-site training and coordination;
- A second component for Phase 2 would be to develop, through central government sources, an outreach program to identify and cultivate official contacts in all key countries of the Indo-Pacific/Indochina-Pacific maritime region. 5/ They would be one conduit to solicit and secure commitment for the wider-scope country partners' involvement through a formal team from the Philippines PMU. The special Philippines PMU team and new contacts working together would assist in setting up PMUs in each of the involved country partners. Additionally, prospective Indo-Pacific/ Indochina-Pacific country partners would be assisted in setting up their respective individual Climate Change Advisory Panel / Steering Committee. An enhanced PMU of technical, legal and management advisors for the wider Indo-Pacific/Indochina-Pacific regional phase with the larger program one Steering Committee would be comprised of the respective Chair of the Climate Change Advisory Panel of each country partner; and
- A third component for Phase 2 would be to conduct economic study with the objective to seek partial or full cost recovery for the operations of the Center of Excellence to support and sustain continuation of the Programme and reduce any costs to the government.

Evaluation of Programme Phase 2 with lessons learned from the final report, to be included in Phase 3 planning.

The development and review of common legal instruments and formal regional agreements conformably to UNCLOS Part IX prescription will be key to the future success of the Programme on account of differences relating to oceanographic/ geographic/ geophysical and marine geological classifications in the Indo-Pacific/ Indochina-Pacific maritime region, that has impacts on overlapping maritime jurisdictions.

### Outputs:

1. The successful expansion of Programme Phase 2 outputs to the entire Philippines in order to secure its position as central and lead for expansion towards the wider Phase 3 Indo-Pacific/ Indochina Pacific maritime region.
2. Official links established for Phase 3 inclusion of Indo-Pacific/ Indochina-Pacific country partners in the wider geographic scope of the Programme, including establishment of Steering Committees in individual country partners.
3. Evaluation and lessons learned to be incorporated in Phase 3 planning; and
4. Selection of PMU for Phase 3 and agreement on Steering Committee which will form the body of a Committee of the Parties (COP) for regular reviews and adjustments to the Programme.
5. Recommendations for partial or full cost-recovery mechanisms to address the ongoing operational costs of the Center of Excellence as the central supporting pillar for regional ocean governance in the Indo-Pacific/Indochina-Pacific maritime region.

**Financing / Funding Sources Confirmed:** Funding sources would hopefully have been identified and secured from the start of Phase 1 and with careful and transparent account of public access to the Programme expenditures, the PMU would hopefully obtain a formal timely commitment from all sources early on or mid-way through Phase 1.

### PHASE 3 (10 Years) – Links to wider country partnerships in the Indo-Pacific /Indochina-Pacific maritime region as UNCLOS Part IX interconnected enclosed /semi-enclosed seas

**Background:** The successful implementation of Programme Phase 1 and Phase 2 would need to be anchored on the establishment in the Philippines of the **Regional Center of Excellence**, building upon the national Center in the Philippines as the geographic and strategic epicenter for the larger maritime region. The national Center in the Philippines would then serve as a stepping-stone for the formation of a **Regional Center** for training and coordination of operations to mitigate the negative impacts of Climate Change serving the wider Indo-Pacific/ Indochina-Pacific maritime region.

Building on the contacts in the Indo-Pacific/Indochina-Pacific maritime region from the national Center in Phase 2, seek support and collaboration to mitigate the impacts of Climate Change in this very important global maritime area to safeguard trade, commerce and socio-economic well-being. The national Center and staff from Phase 2 would reach out to expand the benefits and lessons learned in Phase 1 and Phase 2 to each of the above-noted wider regional contacts.

The **Regional Center** would also be equipped and staffed to serve as a Coordinating PMU for the national PMUs established in each of the member countries in the Indo-Pacific/Indochina-Pacific maritime region, working together in establishing procedures to mitigate the multi-sectoral negative impacts of Climate Change. Country partners as **Committee of the Parties (COP)** shall establish mechanisms toward UNCLOS Part IX implementation with added focus on Climate Change adaptation, and thus serving the collective benefits of all countries in this wider maritime region of socio-economic/political importance. This would be carried through to the totality of the regional



coverage 6/ emphasizing the commonalities and benefits of the Programme and to downplay the straddling socio-economic/political sensitivities and tensions – e.g., promote the ‘together we all win’ cooperation idea as a Phase 3 peacebuilding mantra.

**Objective:** This Phase 3 of the Programme has, as main objectives, the following:

1. To establish an Indo-Pacific/Indochina-Pacific **Regional Center of Excellence**, building upon and expanding on the successes of Phase 1 and Phase 2 national program in the Philippines which is also the regional geographic and strategic maritime center, with capacity and capability to be the catalyst for Indo-Pacific/Indochina-Pacific cooperation and collaboration to mitigate and address a key threat to global survivability – the negative impacts of Climate Change as the immediate threat, and further, as a step towards a critical contribution to overall peace, good order and human security.
2. To develop and maintain a network of National PMU Centers of Excellence, to continue the ongoing scientific/technological initiatives to mitigate these issues towards the future as a global example of ‘What Can Be Done Together To Mitigate Negative Impacts Of Climate Change’ in an expansive regional cooperation undertaking;
3. To formalize the commitment for such Indo-Pacific/Indochina-Pacific regional cooperation and work to establish an intergovernmental regional mechanism for sustainability and building on the national PMU network for the future as envisioned in UNCLOS Part IX at Article 123.

#### **Methodology:**

##### **Management:**

The national **Center of Excellence for Phase 1** and Phase 2 in the Philippines form the core of the coordinating PMU for Phase 3 and extrapolating and applying lessons learned towards the wider Indo-Pacific/Indochina-Pacific maritime region which shares characteristic regional features. For outreach initiatives at Phase 2 towards Indo-Pacific/Indochina-Pacific participating entities, mechanisms must be established for the creation of national PMUs in partner countries, with local staffing and coordinating/ advisory support from the Center.

For respective national PMUs, staff must be directly linked to the Center of Excellence in the Philippines as it evolves into the **Regional Center of Excellence**, for initial training from the Phases 1 and 2 Programme initiatives to mitigate the negative impacts of climate change in this Large Marine Ecoregion (LME) which essentially is mainly a collection of coastal and small island communities. This initial training shall be followed closely by national on-site partner training (Center of Excellence trainers in partnership with training national PMU trainers) in each of the Indo-Pacific/Indochina-Pacific partner countries to enhance the confidence and capacity of each national PMU to expand the Programme in their respective countries.

Seek both legal/policy instruments and practical mechanisms to formalize and sustain the institutional and cooperation agreements in the Indo-Pacific/Indochina-Pacific maritime region as an example of regional cooperation with extra-regional global partners as “other interested States” in consonance UNCLOS Part IX, in this critically important intra-regional geographical area of the world. In this regard, a diplomatic guide charting the outward push for the Philippines at this Phase 3 would firstly be

with member States of the ASEAN since all sea areas around the ASEAN region are interconnected enclosed/semi-enclosed seas as defined under the UNCLOS at Part IX, and interconnected archipelagic waters. Needless to say, the Philippines must commit to spearhead this ASEAN tack and get all ASEAN Member States on board as partner countries. Beyond the ASEAN group of partner countries, principal regional partner countries would be China, Papua-New Guinea, Timor-Leste and Sri-Lanka 7/ noting the opportunity to include ‘other interested States’ per UNCLOS Part IX. The scope of participating States as laid out, additionally with the participation of relevant international agencies and non-governmental/civil society organizations as encouraged under UNCLOS Part IX, gives the Programme a world-wide reach and inclusivity.

**Issues to be addressed for Phase 3:** The issues essentially include all those from Programme Phase 1 and Phase 2, however in a much expanded politically sensitive but globally important marine geographic area to demonstrate the benefits of regional / global cooperation within a rules-based policy context under UNCLOS Part IX. The aim is to contribute to mitigating the negative impacts of Climate Change as a first step to the survivability of the ocean planet, Earth, through ocean governance and adapting Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM) principles and proven practices.

These management issues, among others relevant, and taking up from Phase 1 and Phase 2, are:

1. The establishment of the Coordinating PMU for the overall Programme from the **Regional Center of Excellence** through the provision of technical, legal and management advisors for the wider Indo-Pacific/Indochina-Pacific regional phase, including a Steering Committee to be comprised of the Chairs of each participating entities PMU/Climate Change Advisory Panel;
2. Expansion of the tasks in Phase 1 and Phase 2 to cover the wider geographic area of all partner countries and participating entities, building on the successes and lessons learned from Phase 1 and Phase 2 in all areas, including: i) steps of review of current mechanisms and capacity; ii) introduction of mitigation measures; iii) assessment of legal/policy changes required; and iv) enhancement of the capacity to include and address special needs or vulnerabilities of each partner country in the Indo-Pacific/Indochina-Pacific maritime region;
3. Assist Indo-Pacific/Indochina-Pacific partner countries in setting up respective individual Steering Committees/ Climate Change Advisory Panels, national PMUs, and their rapid response teams;
4. Through central government sources, the Centre must develop an outreach program to identify official contacts and cultivate contact points in all key countries of the Indo-Pacific/Indochina-Pacific maritime region. This action, as noted earlier, is to solicit and secure commitment for their involvement and assistance in setting up PMUs in each of the involved partner countries;
5. Increased ‘training of trainers’ and ‘rapid response teams’ in the wider regional sea area at the intra-regional, national/provincial/municipal levels through internships at the newly evolved **Regional Center of Excellence** combined with on-site training and coordination; and

6. Economic study with the objective to seek cost recovery for operations of the **Regional Center of Excellence** and Indo-Pacific/Indochina-Pacific network of PMUs/formal national institutions to formalize and provide sustainability of the program for future years. Importantly, the legal/policy reviews for each partner country, coupled with the development of a common, agreed legal instrument and formal regional agreements will always be key to the future success and sustainability of this regional cooperation initiative. This is so when noting the political sensitivities in the oceanographic, geographic and geophysical spheres in the Indo-Pacific/Indochina-Pacific maritime region. The commitment of each partner country and success of this Programme will set the tone towards greater cooperation to address this life-threatening concern.

**Outputs:**

1. The formal establishment of the Indo-Pacific/Indochina-Pacific network of national institutes working with the Indo-Pacific/Indochina-Pacific **Regional Center of Excellence** to mitigate the negative impacts of Climate Change through ongoing advances in scientific/technological and practical development initiatives in this Large Marine Ecoregion (LME) for the future.
2. An example of ‘what we can do together’ to address global issues through cooperation if there is a commitment to do so, starting in this, one of the most sensitive intra-regional areas of the world.
3. Sustainability of this Indo-Pacific/Indochina-Pacific regional ocean governance network through financing and funding commitments from partner States, institutes and civil society to preserve life of Planet Earth into the future.

**Financing / Funding Sources Confirmed:** Funding sources would hopefully have been secured from the beginning at Phase 1 and with careful and transparent account of public access to the program expenditures, the formal and timely re-confirmation of financial commitment from all sources would be secured; with appropriate further commitments for sustainability of the Programme at large following proven success of the early national Philippines initiative. Quarterly financial reports must be openly disseminated.

\* \* \*

**The conceptual approach restated/reemphasized**

The proposition involves reconstructing the Philippines as an archipelagic State under the UNCLOS at Part IV (Archipelagic States) and in relation to UNCLOS Part IX (Enclosed or semi-enclosed seas). These related UNCLOS provisions, and thus rules-based, would play into the post-COP26 national commitments as adaptation measures for the Philippines addressing peculiar vulnerabilities as an archipelagic State. Additionally, it is an indigenous NGO/Civil Society contribution to an all of nation approach to mitigate adverse impacts of Climate Change.

This is a Concept Paper on a proposed Programme for Climate Change mitigation in an institutionalized approach with the establishment of a Center of Excellence, to address the permanency in the issues involved i.e., (1) reconstructing the Philippines as an archipelagic State, and (2) Climate Change

mitigation to meet specific concerns in an archipelago setting, affecting sustainability and resilience in regard to health and livelihood, and disaster response. These are intertwined core permanent interests of the Philippines and thus well beyond the year 2050, even granted that the 1.5 degree greenhouse gas emissions cap is attained.

Said another way, the Programme relates to constructing the Philippines as an archipelagic State under the UNCLOS and incorporating UNCLOS ocean governance principles as adaptation framework for a post-COP26 implementation. Following a perceptible drift in the COP26 narrative, these national Climate Change adaptation measures can be projected on a wider maritime regional scale in the setting of what amounts to an archipelagic continent sharing characteristic regional features.

To further explain, the Programme can be a stand-alone proposition as a core national interest of the Philippines archipelagic State. Nevertheless it seeks to incorporate COP26 in a practical adaptation towards further building national resilience against natural disasters, health and livelihood, and protection of the marine environment and biodiversity.

The conceptual broad brushstrokes for the project proposal centered on the establishment of a Center of Excellence for Climate Change Mitigation in the Indo-Pacific/Indochina-Pacific Maritime Region, for a post-COP26 adaptation measures factored into archipelagic State nation-building, are reflected from borrowed quotes hereunder:

- “If the world is not ready to take bold action on climate change, then the world must be ready for the disastrous results of climate change.” Jacinda Ardern, Prime Minister of New Zealand.<sup>8/</sup>
- “If we are really intent to treat the climate as a crisis, it’s really important for the governments, organizations and activists to all come together, to start taking concrete action.” Ridhima Pandey, a 14 year old climate activist from India.<sup>9/</sup>
- “As a global community, we face many challenges in reducing greenhouse gas emissions and adapting to a warming planet, and the challenges of reducing poverty and creating an inclusive sustainable economy are no less daunting. But we know that it is no longer possible to achieve one without the other.” Sonia Mishtar, Special Assistant on Poverty Alleviation and Social Protection to the Prime Minister of Pakistan.<sup>10/</sup>

This indigenous Philippines NGO post-COP26 adaptation proposal was officially submitted to the head of the Climate Change Commission of the Philippines on 13-November-2021.

**End Notes:**

- 1 This initiative has been developed based on current issues and concerns that require urgent and timely action on a wide scale. It has been proposed as a phased programme commencing in the Philippines as the geographic central core of the Indo-Pacific /Indochina-Pacific maritime region and expanding to the wider region. As can be observed, this herein proposition as a regional contribution to help mitigate the adverse effects of Climate Change, is “outside the box” of the 2015 Paris Agreement, and an NGO/Civil Society effort.
- 2 <https://www.balikbalangay.com/>
- 3 The designation and scope of the regional maritime area in regard to this Programme proposition as the Indo-Pacific/

Indochina-Pacific is a melding of traditional geographic references for a more graphic projection of the targeted maritime area coverage. It is devoid of any political/geopolitical connotations and sets aside maritime jurisdictional issues.

#### 4 PART IX ENCLOSED OR SEMI-ENCLOSED SEAS

Article 122: Definition: For the purposes of this Convention, "enclosed or semi-enclosed sea" means a gulf, basin or sea surrounded by two or more States and connected to another sea or the ocean by a narrow outlet or consisting entirely or primarily of the territorial seas and exclusive economic zones of two or more coastal States.

Article 123: Cooperation of States bordering enclosed or semi-enclosed seas:

States bordering an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea should cooperate with each other in the exercise of their rights and in the performance of their duties under this Convention. To this end they shall endeavour, directly or through an appropriate regional organization: (a) to coordinate the management, conservation, exploration and exploitation of the living resources of the sea; (b) to coordinate the implementation of their rights and duties with respect to the protection and preservation of the marine environment; (c) to coordinate their scientific research policies and undertake where appropriate joint programmes of scientific research in the area; (d) to invite, as appropriate, other interested States or international organizations to cooperate with them in furtherance of the provisions of this article.

5 This outreach component can be incorporated into a South/South or North/South UNCTAD agenda for the Philippines, and further formalized under the Climate Vulnerable Forum (CVF).

6 This will include all Member countries signatories to the program, hopefully including ALL of the States of the Indo-Pacific/Indochina-Pacific maritime region.

7 The latter two States are Observer States in the ASEAN Organization. China and India are ASEAN Dialogue Partners.

8 "NZ's APEC host Ardern calls for 'bold' climate action," Manila Bulletin, 11-November-2021 at p. B-5

9 "What governments should learn from the climate activists" by Shanta Rau Barriga, Human Rights Watch, appearing at The Manila Times, 17-November-2021 at p. A-6.

10 "Climate policy is social policy", appearing in the Philippine Daily Inquirer 19-November-2021 at p. A-12.



#### About the Authors:



**Alberto A. Encomienda.** A career Foreign Service Officer of the Republic of the Philippines retired in 2009 with the rank of Chief of Mission, Class I. He served as the country's Ambassador to Greece, Malaysia and Singapore. His career specialization is Oceans Law and Policy with an LL.M degree from the University of London in 1972 and Columbia University in

1978, and advanced academic credits at the Columbia School of International Relations working towards a doctoral degree, also in Oceans Law and Policy. The last decade of his diplomatic career was focused and dedicated to Oceans Policy and Law of the Sea as head of the then Maritime and Ocean Affairs Unit (MOAU) under the Office of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs that also functioned as the Secretariat of the high-level Cabinet Committee on Maritime and Ocean Affairs (CABCOM-MOA). The CABCOM-MOA was later abolished and at the same time the MOAU was upgraded to the Maritime and Ocean Affairs Center (MOAC) with Mr. Encomienda as Secretary-General. The agenda of the CABCOM-MOA and its policy formulation and oversight functions were devolved to MOAC. To give a higher profile and prominence to ocean-related concerns of the country as an archipelagic State, MOAC functions were transferred to the Office of the President. Now designated as the Commission on Maritime and Ocean Affairs (CMOAS) chaired by the Executive Secretary of the Office of the President, Mr. Encomienda headed the CMOAS Secretariat for a year after its establishment. He is presently engaged in NGO Track 1½ work as Executive Director of balikBALANGAY, Inc.




**Peter Flewwelling.** His career commenced with 27 years in the Canadian Government, first as a Navy/Submarine Officer (1966-1977), then involved in the Department of Fisheries and Oceans from Fishery Officer to Acting National Director Regulations and Compliance and National Chief, Surveillance and Enforcement. The latter

period included a stint as Director of Pacific and Caribbean Basin programmes in a Canadian Crown Corporation, International Centre for Ocean Development and retirement from government service in 1991. International initiatives being addressed as Director on retirement included 112 projects in the Indian Ocean, South Pacific and Caribbean Basin in marine ecosystem, fisheries management, environment and gender related affairs. From 1991 to 2013, Mr. Flewwelling has been involved in international development activities in the maritime sector in South America, east Africa/Indian Ocean area, Asia, and Western and Central Pacific with experiences in more than 60 countries on long and short term ocean management, fisheries and coastal State issues. Involvement as a consultant included projects and programmes as Programme Director, Team Leader and Team Member for the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Asian Development bank (ADB), World Bank (WB), Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Norwegian International Development Agency (NORAD), UNESCO, UNDP, AusAID, Municipal Governments, the Western and Central Pacific (Tuna) Commission as Compliance Manager, and IOTC and NAFO as member delegate, to positions such as he addresses today, Fisheries and MCS Advisor to the Ministry of Fisheries Mozambique. These duties included, as well as the positions noted above, the writing and publishing of global reference MCS publications; fisheries management development papers; programme implementation; evaluation and training; leading tsunami recovery activities; and working to establish regional fisheries management organizations.

# HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND DISASTER RELIEF BY THE PHILIPPINE NAVY: NAVFORSOL, NAVFOREASTMIN, NAVFLEETMARINE, NAVFORCEN, NAVFORWEST, AND SAMBISIG

Compiled by Vicky Viray Mendoza

## NAVAL FORCES SOUTHERN LUZON



# NAVAL FORCES EASTERN MINDANAO



# NAVAL FORCES FLEET MARINE



## ROLLING CARGOES ON THE WAY

Sailors of Philippine Navy thru Joint Task Force "Sambisig" facilitated the hauling of assorted relief goods to be given to the victims of typhoon "Odette" in Brgy. Hubang, Dapa, Siargao Island, Surigao del Norte on January 6, 2022.



5<sup>th</sup> CIVIL RELATIONS GROUP, CRSAFP

#AFPyoucanTRUST



# NAVAL FORCES CENTRAL



# NAVFORWEST





## SAMBISIG

# RELIEF AID FOR SURIGAO



Joint Task Force "Sambisig" utilizes a Navy vessel (LS 550) in transporting assorted relief goods to the affected families of typhoon "Odette" in Surigao del Norte on January 4, 2022.



5<sup>TH</sup> CIVIL RELATIONS GROUP, CRSAFP

#JTFsambisig #AFPyoucanTRUST



**COMMODORE**  
Maritime Solutions Inc.

+63[46]4724685  
info@commodore.com.ph  
<http://www.commodors.com.ph>



## BOATS · EQUIPMENT · SERVICES



Quality high performance defence / pilot / patrol / SAR / offshore aluminum workboats from Maritime Partner AS



Custom and ready-made 38' to 100' monohull / catamaran / trimaran FRP interisland ferry boats ranging from 36 to 200 pax.



Routinary dry-docking services & repair; Equipment installation, maintenance repair & restoration services



Turn-key and custom marine materials handling equipment (davits, cranes, winches, etc)



Custom and ready-made FRP cruising / speed / recreation / leisure boats using the latest composite technologies.



Naval Architecture & Marine Engineering using advanced 3D CAD/CAM software tools

# PLANNED MAINTENANCE SYSTEM (PMS) ON THE PROPULSION ENGINES OF THE 44M MRRV OF THE PCG

by Capt Tomas D Bains PN (Ret)



## INTRODUCTION

This article is a detailed overview on how the propulsion system of 44M Multi-Role Response Vessel of the Philippine Coast Guard PMS can be achieved. The existing propulsion system of said ten units 44M MRRV is MTU Model 12V 4000 series M93L which can be maintained effectively using the following step by step PMS procedures:

⊕ Understanding the engine performance curves of the engine speed and power performance limitation as shown in Fig 1.

- 1) Meantime Between Overhaul of 9000 operating hours at 61% average load factor (life span of engine)
- 2) Power Rating Capacity of 2,580 brake horse power at 2,100 rpm.
- 3) Operating temperature of air and water are 25oc
- 4) Speed and power performance limitation
  - i) 100% power load at 10% of the operating time duration
  - ii) 70% power load at 70% of operating time duration
  - iii) Not greater than 10% power load at 20% operating time duration
- 5) Frequent lube oil analysis
- 6) Fuel compatible to the engine


**Table 1**  
**SPEED, POWER, TIME ALLOWABLE AND TACTICAL OPERATION**

Load/Power Rating	Operating Hours Allowed / Patrol Time	Bhp	Speed/ Time Allowable	Average Load Factor
100% Interception/ hot pursuit	10%	2 x 2,580 kw	25 knots for .60 hours only (36 minutes)	.10 x .01 = 0.010
70% Cruising/patrolling	70%	2 x 1,806 kw	17.5 knots for 4.2 hrs.	.70 x .70 = 0.490
<10% Maneuvering/ loitering	20%	2 x 258 kw	2.5 knots for 1.2 hrs.	.10 x .20 = 0.02
Average allowable time and load factor			6 hours	0.52 or 52% not greater than 61%

**Note:**


- 1) Average load factor is the amount of power imposed in the engine and the measure of level of stress absorbed by the engine.
- 2) TBO-Time Between Overhaul is the life span of the MTU Model 12V 4000 M93L series before next major overhaul is conducted which is limited to 9000 hours only at maximum 61% load factor. Exceeding the load factor will diminish or shorten the TBO of the engine, and premature engine failure breakdown will occur.

Figure 1  
Performance Curve of Marine Diesel Engine MTU  
MODEL 12V 4000 M93L SERIES



**Figure 2**

**Diagram of Desired Operating Profile as Recommended by MTU Engine Manufacturer**



**Table 2**

**Fuel Specification to be Complied by the PCG (Recommended by MTU Engine Manufacturer)**

Composition	Limiting Values
1. Total Contamination (Fuel Insoluble Ingredients)	24 Mg/Kg
2. Density at 15 degrees Centigrade	0.820 g/ml
3. API Gravity at 60 degrees Fahrenheit	41 to 33
4. Viscosity at 40 degrees Centigrade	1.5 mm <sup>2</sup> /s
5. Flashpoint	55°C
6. Carbon Residue	.30% by weight
7. Oxide Ash	0.01% by weight
8. Sulfur Content	0.5% by weight
9. Cetane Number	45
10. Cetane Index	42
11. Oxidation Stability	25g/m <sup>3</sup>

**Table 3**

**Predicted Engine Problems thru Spectrometer Oil Analysis**

Indicator	Acceptable Levels	Engine Problem	What to Check
Silicon (Si) and Aluminum (Al)	10 to 30 ppm	Dirt ingestion	Air intake system, oil filter plugging, oil filter cap and breather, valve covers, oil supply
Iron (Fe)	100 to 200 ppm	Wear of cylinder liner, valve and gear train, oil pump, rust in system	Excessive oil consumption, abnormal engine noise, performance problems, oil pressure, abnormal operating temperatures, stuck/broken piston rings
Chromium (CR)	10 to 30 ppm	Piston ring wear	Excessive oil blow-by and oil consumption, oil degradation
Copper (CU)	10 to 50 ppm	Bearings and bushings wear, oil cooler passivating, radiator corrosion	Coolant in engine oil, abnormal noise when operating at near stall speed
Lead (Pb)*	40 to 100 ppm	Bearing corrosion	Extended oil change intervals
Copper (CU) and Lead (Pb)*	10 to 50 ppm	Bearing lining wear	Oil pressure, abnormal engine noise, dirt being ingested in air intake, fuel dilution, extended oil drain intervals
Aluminum (Al)	10 to 30 ppm	Piston and piston thrust bearing wear	Blow-by gases, oil consumption, power loss, abnormal engine noise
Silver and Tin	2 to 5 ppm 10 to 30 ppm	Wear of bearings	Excessive oil consumption, abnormal engine noise, loss in oil pressure
Viscosity Change		Lack of lubrication	Fuel dilution, blow-by gases, oil oxidation, carburetor choke, ignition timing, injectors, injector pump, oil pressure
Water/Anti-freeze		Coolant leak or condensation	Coolant supply, gasket sealed, hose connection, oil filler cap and breather

\* Significant as wear metal, only for engines using unleaded and diesel fuel.

**Table 4**  
**Planned Maintenance System Matrix of 9000 Hours**  
**MTBO**

Item	Interval	Operating hours (%)																	
		1.1-1.5	1.6-2.0	2.1-2.5	2.6-3.0	3.1-3.5	3.6-4.0	4.1-4.5	4.6-5.0	5.1-5.5	5.6-6.0	6.1-6.5	6.6-7.0	7.1-7.5	7.6-8.0	8.1-8.5	8.6-9.0	9.1-9.5	9.6-10.0
Engine																			
Fuel servicing port	1a																		
Fuel servicing port	2a																		
Engine oil filter	2a																		
Engine operation	-	X																	
Centrifugal oil filter	2a	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Oil indicator filter	2a	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Engine mounts	1a		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Fuel filter	2a		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Fuel prefilter	2a		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Intermediate fuel filter	2a		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Visc gear	2a		X		X				X									X	
Turbochargers	2a				X					X								X	
Air filter	2a				X				X									X	
Crankcase breathers	6a								X										X
Crankcase breathers	6a								X										X
Battery charging alternator	9a								X										X
Fuel injectors	9a								X										X
Engine governor	9a								X										X
Combustion chambers	9a								X										X
Preheater / Jacket water heater	18a																		X
Component maintenance	9a								X										X
Turbochargers	18a								X										X
Engine mounts	5a																		X
Rubber stems	6a																		X
Hose lines	6a																		X
Cylinder head	9a																		X
Automatic engine oil filter	8a																		X
Extended component maintenance	18a																		X
HP fuel pump	18a																		X
Turbochargers	18a																		X
Engine mounts	18a																		X
Preheater / Jacket water heater	18a																		X
Turbochargers	24a																		X

\*schedule of spare replacement versus time utilization due to wear and tear

**RECOMMENDATION**

In order to hone the skills of new PCG shipboard personnel, PCG must conduct periodic training sessions through lecture series. Understanding the performance curves limitation, the schedule of spare parts replacement, periodic oil analysis with real time application, and utilization of the recommended quality of fuel can ensure that the meantime between overhaul of 9,000 hours can be fully achieved at 61% load factor by Series Model of Engine MTU 12V 4000 M93L.

**References:**

1. <http://defenseph.net/drp/index.php?topic=1726.0>
2. MTU Engine Model 12V 4000 m93L Series Technical Manual Proposed Circular of Requirements (COR) of 44M MRRV.

**About the Researcher**



CAPT TOMAS D BAINO PN (Ret) served as Naval Architect Consultant with the Project Management Office in Ship Acquisition, Operations and Maintenance from 2017 to 2020 of the Philippine Coast Guard and Department of Transportation. Lecture series has been conducted on said aspect of the Planned

Maintenance System (PMS) of said engine to the PCG that requires periodic training.



**SMOOTHER  
AND  
QUIETER**



**MERCURY**  
GO BOLDLY.™



**DELIVERING  
LEGENDARY  
PERFORMANCE.**



**SOLANDA ENTERPRISES, INC.**

730 Andra cor. Solana & Magallanes Sts., Intramuros, Manila  
Tel (632) 8527-8261; (632) 5328-5351 Fax(632) 8527-1315  
[www.solanda.com](http://www.solanda.com) Email:solanda@solanda.com



# TAIWAN AND THE PHILIPPINES

by Brig. Gen. Manuel P. Oxales AFP (Ret)



Photo Credit: The Diplomatic Envoy, Seton Hall

In the event tensions escalate to a conflict between China and Taiwan, will the Philippines be involved? This may be one of the risk scenarios in 2022.\*

China's President Xi Jinping blamed the U.S. for the tensions between the two world economic and military powers on "Repeated attempts by Taiwan authorities for U.S. support in their independence agenda as well as intentions of some Americans to contain China" in a speech on the 110th anniversary on 10-October-2021 that overthrew China's last imperial Ming dynasty in 1911. He further said, "*reunification must be fulfilled but it must be achieved peacefully*" but warned the Chinese people have a tradition of opposing separatism. By encouraging Taiwan's independence, Xi warned the U.S. "is playing with fire."

Taiwan lady Premier Su Tseng Chang promptly reacted and accused China of "flexing its muscles and stoking tension" when months ago it sent some 60 fighter jets over the Straits of Taiwan into the island's aircraft identification zone. She called on China to stop its "harassments, intrusions and provocations."

While most western countries denounced and condemned China's harassment and provocations, U.S. President Biden was more conciliatory. He said under the 1999 Taiwan Relations Agreement Act, U.S. follows a 'One China' policy that recognizes only China but has unofficial ties with Taiwan, and is obligated to provide arms for the islands' defense. Two years ago, U.S. sold to Taiwan 66 F16CD with upgraded weaponry and avionics costing \$62 billion, thus boosting its air defense to 200 fighter

interceptors. That is puny compared to China's nuclear missiles, long range bombers, and its land and carrier-borne jet fighters.

President Biden reiterated the U.S. position. It would oppose any unilateral move that would alter the status quo in Taiwan. When asked whether U.S. would defend Taiwan if attacked, the U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan said U.S. would "stand up and talk up." **Deliberate ambiguity has characterized U.S. pledge to defend Taiwan.**

**Taiwan then Formosa** meaning beautiful, a name given by passing Portuguese mariners in the 16th century, must have enamored Europeans notably the Dutch and Spaniards who vied for its possession, control, strategic, and commercial importance. It was the Dutch who finally prevailed and added it to its prized and largest colony, the Dutch East Indies, now Indonesia. (The writer visited a sea side resort in Taiwan in the early 1970's and saw islanders with European features. The tour guide said they were descendants of shipwrecked Dutch sailors)

In 1894, Japan, an emergent naval power seeking food and natural resources for its burgeoning population and growing western adopted industries, invaded Korea and fought China. The latter sought peace and ceded Korea, the Laotian peninsula, southeast of Manchuria and Formosa. In the next 45 years, Korea and Formosa became a colony of Japan until her defeat and surrender in 1945.

**Formosa: Japanese Base for the Invasion of the Philippines in WW II.** Military strategy and geopolitical considerations by the protagonists in WW II, Japan and the U.S., had determined the defense of the Philippines and the fate of its people. Formosa, an island about one third of and 200 kms north of Luzon figured prominently in Japan's imperial design towards Southeast Asia, the conquest of the Philippines, then a Commonwealth and a U.S. protectorate, the British-held Malaya (Malaysia), Singapore, Hong Kong, and Dutch East Indies (Indonesia). Formosa was the assembly and staging area for land, air and naval forces for the invasion of the Philippines. The foremost objective was to destroy the U.S. B17 bombers and other aircraft at Clark Air Base, Pampanga; Nichols Field (Villamor Air Base) in Pasay; and naval facilities and fuel tanks in Cavite, two hours away via Japan long-range bombers based in Formosa.

**U.S. Planned to Bomb Formosa.** WW II had already started in Europe on 1-September-1939 with the invasion of Poland by German forces. U.S. had declared itself neutral in the war in Europe. As relations between U.S. and Japan had become strained after Japan had invaded China in 1931 and occupied Manchuria, Washington top military staff began drawing plans for the defense of Philippines. Under OPlan Orange Gen. Douglas MacArthur, Commander of the USAFFE, combined American and Filipino forces, the four-engine B17 bombers based in Clark, Pampanga would attack air and naval fleets in Formosa, and possibly delay Japan's invasion of the Philippines. The defense of the Philippines was already conceded, a delaying action in the face of Japan's numerically superior and well-equipped invasion forces.



But the surprise attack by Japan's Asiatic Fleet on Pearl Harbor, Honolulu, Hawaii at about 8:00am on Sunday, 7-December-1941, a day of rest, religion and recreation for Americans and their families, scuttled MacArthur plans. Japan's objective was to prevent the U.S. Pacific Fleet from interfering with Japan's planned invasion of western colonized countries in Southeast Asia. The attack came while Japan's Ambassador to U.S. was in Washington to present its Fourteen Parts Message, a compilation of replies and counters to U.S. demands. It was at 3:30am Monday, 8-December-1941 in Manila when Clark in Luzon heard the attack on radio. At noontime, Japan attacked and destroyed almost entirely the 40 U.S. B17 bombers on the ground in Clark. Within hours, Japanese warplanes attacked simultaneously Wake Island, Guam, Singapore, Malaya and Hongkong, executing as per plan. In contrast, Clark B17 bombers failed to attack air and naval targets in Formosa. MacArthur's staff in Manila and commanders at Clark were characterized with unpreparedness, mis-assessing the impending threat and miscommunication. Washington failed to read the ruse and treachery in Japan's diplomatic moves. Condescending thinking and racial bias by the Americans on the ability of the Japanese navy commanders to sail their warships from the ports of Japan to Pearl harbor, a distance of 6,000 kms in 12 days undetected gave a false sense of security and sanctuary. Complacency doomed the U.S. naval forces in Pearl Harbor to destruction, death and dishonor. Four battleships were sunk, four damaged and 188 aircrafts destroyed, 2,400 dead American naval and army personnel. Two aircraft carriers at sea trials fortunately escaped the holocaust.

**Bypass Luzon and Invade Formosa.** In the liberation of the Philippines in the 1944 military strategy, geopolitics and U.S. domestic politics would determine the fate of the Philippines, the city of Manila and its 3 million residents. Top military planners in Washington were faced with the problem whether to bypass Luzon occupied by 60,000 Japanese troops or invade not heavily guarded Formosa and make it a base of offensive operations to the islands and mainland of Japan. General MacArthur who had escaped from Corregidor on 12-March-1942 and was now in Australia (Bataan fell on 9-April-1942 and Corregidor on 6-May-1942). The Commander of Allied land forces opposed the plan to bypass Luzon which was favored by Admiral Chester Nimitz, Commander of all naval forces in the Pacific. Both agreed though to invade first southern Mindanao and Leyte to divide in the center an estimated 400,000 Japanese troops occupying the Philippines. President Franklin Roosevelt had to call for the two strong-willed commanders to Honolulu in July 1944 to resolve the issue. Nimitz expounded on the need to save American soldiers, the losses in time, equipment and wasted effort. MacArthur in his flamboyant manner said American honor and prestige were at stake, not taking Luzon was both a "military and political disaster" President Roosevelt, eyeing a fourth term, which he won, sided with MacArthur.

U.S. invasion forces landed in Lingayen Gulf on 9-January-1945, in the vicinity where Japanese forces came ashore in the invasion of the Philippines on 22-December-1941. By this time, Gen. Tomoyuki Yamashita and his 50,000 troops had already left for the Mountain Province, hoping to reach the ports of Ilocos and be evacuated to Formosa. Rear Admiral Sanji Iwabuchi who defied Yamashita with his 20,000 Marines and army soldiers stayed behind in Manila to make the last stand and die for the Emperor. In the Battle for Manila, the city was left in rubbles next only to

Berlin and Warsaw in devastation, with 100,000 Filipino civilians dead. Military pragmatism gave way to egotism and personal glory.

(Yamashita and his beleaguered troops formally surrendered on 3-September in Baguio, in obedience to the Emperor who had accepted on 15-August-1945 the terms of the Potsdam Declaration a week after U.S. dropped an atomic bomb each on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In a reversal of fortunes, Yamashita surrendered to Major General Jonathan Wainwright who, in 9-April-1942 had surrendered to him combat weary and half-starved 80,000 Filipino and American soldiers in the Battle for Bataan after three months of fighting; and to Lt Gen Arthur Percival who had also surrendered, including Singapore and 90,000 British, Australian and Indian soldiers on 15-February-1942 after a week of skirmishes against 30,000 of Yamashita's soldiers. Yamashita would later hang in Los Banos, Laguna a year after). (PVAO records claimed Yamashita and his starving soldiers surrendered to Filipino guerillas in Kiangnan, Ifugao who turned them over to the Americans.)

**Involvements after WW II.** After Japan surrendered **Formosa, it became commonly known as Taiwan.**

This time the bone of contention was the Straits of Taiwan, a waterway which separates the island from southeast of China by a sea about 200 kms wide. After communist North Korea invaded on 25-June-1950, South Korea, a U.S. ally, in a strategic move, U.S. President Truman directed the U.S. 7th Fleet home-based in Hawaii to guard the Straits obviously to prevent Mao Zedong and the Peoples Liberation Army from crossing the waterway and invade Taiwan, the sanctuary of General Chiang Kai Shek, the Koumintang government and his fledging army after their defeat in 1949 in China's decades old civil war. Incidentally China under Chiang was a strong ally of U.S. against Japan in WW II.

Philippines sent to South Korea a total of 7,000 battalion size army soldiers who fought alongside Americans under the United Nations Coalition. Clark in Pampanga and Subic in Zambales were used extensively in the assembly, training, staging, maintenance, logistics and R&R of U.S. military forces involved in the Korean War from 1950-52, and also in the Vietnam war from 1967 until U.S. departure in 1975.

From the foregoing discussions, Formosa, now Taiwan, in WW II figured prominently and significantly as an assembly and staging base of Japan's invasion forces to the Philippines. It was considered by U.S. top brass as an alternate invasion objective in the plan to bypass Luzon. Post-war, U.S. air and naval bases in the Philippines were intensively used in U.S. conflicts with both communists North Korea and North Vietnam. Political and historical ties, military alliance with U.S. and geography inevitably involved the Philippines in U.S. wars in the Pacific.

**Warnings.** While President Xi in his October speech on the 110th anniversary of the overthrow of China's last imperial dynasty was conciliatory it was no so last July when he declared he would 'smash' any formal declaration of independence by Taiwan. President Len-wen of Taiwan warned that threat from China was "growing every day." His Defense Minister Chiu Kuocheng also warned that China could invade Taiwan by 2025 and that continuous intrusions in Taiwan's air spaces was intended to wear down its air defenses He cited increased gray zone tactics like economic coercion, political intimidation, subversion undermine the Taiwanese people. Former Australia Prime Minister Tony Abbot said the present tension between China and Taiwan may

escalate into a sea blockade by China in the Straits of Taiwan. Japanese Prime Minister Abe was quoted as saying an emergency in Taiwan would be an emergency in Japan, hinting a possible expansion of the conflict. The U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin warned that incursions by China's bombers and fighters into Taiwan's aircraft identification zone are rehearsals for an invasion. General Mark Miley, Chairman U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, in his testimony before the U.S. Senate said China is "clearly and unambiguously" developing the capability to invade Taiwan in the future. He would not say, so a window of one or two years perhaps. Retiring Admiral Davidson of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command said China could invade Taiwan in 6 years or by 2027. Incumbent Admiral John Aquilino, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command said China would "clearly invade Taiwan than most people think." Various international publications agree.

There was, however, opposition from Chinese generals on China's seemingly bellicose stance towards Taiwan according to GRAVITAS, an Indian news channel which reported their warnings: China's goal is not reunification with Taiwan but rather national rejuvenation to achieve the dream of a good life for 1.4 billion Chinese people; it is not winning friends and not a single country supports China's declarations; it has helped many countries but wants to take Taiwan by force; not to take advantage of U.S., but to take stock of its weaknesses; and China will be fighting numerous fronts. (China has: only one formal defense treaty with North Korea; a dispute with Japan on Senkaku islands, and border problems with India and Russia)

**Flashpoint, Not West Philippine Sea (WPS) but Taiwan.** China has actual possession of islands, islets, reefs and sea areas on WPS, which are Philippine territories and over which Philippines has sovereign rights and jurisdictions located in the Spratly Group about 130 nautical miles west of Palawan; and the Scarborough Shoal (Patag) about 120 nautical miles east of Zambales. Thus declared President Rodrigo Duterte in his SONA in July 2021. (WPS is the official designation by the government of the eastern part of South China Sea [SCS], west of the Philippines and included in its territory and exclusive economic zone [EEZ]).

China has employed the **cabbage strategy**, seizing control by swarming and surrounding islets and sea areas with layers of Chinese militia vessels to prevent intrusions and outside support, which Chinese militia vessels have been doing to Filipino fishermen at Scarborough Shoal. It was done on a massive scale when some 250 Chinese big fishing boats occupied the sea areas off Julian Felipe islet in the Spratly Group from April to May. In response, the Philippine Coast Guard ships patrolled within a safe distance in a symbolic gesture. In November, Chinese militia ships prevented a Philippine Navy ship from resupplying its personnel occupying a grounded navy vessel off the Ayungin island, 120 miles west of Palawan.

China also has applied the **salami slicing strategy** which is a series of actions, harassments and provocations not constituting a heightened conflict or a *causa belli* to test the response of its intended victim and achieve a higher goal. This is what happened in 1974 on Paracel Islands, south of Vietnam; in 1988 on Fiery Cross and Johnson Reef in the Spratly group west of Palawan which resulted in violent skirmishes with the defending Vietnamese who incurred more than a hundred casualties. China occupied in 1994 Mischief Reef, an island, a Philippine territory west of Palawan on which China has built structures and facilities for a 2,700 kms runway. In 2012, off Scarborough Shoal, west of Zambales,

a Philippine navy warship had a confrontation with a number of Chinese Coast Guard vessels. Brokered by U.S. and mutually agreed to break off, the Philippine Navy ships departed but not the Chinese ships which are still there until today.

China adheres to the doctrine of Sun Tzu, a Chinese military strategist, the forerunner of the Prussian Clausewitz and Napoleon of France, who wrote more than 2,000 years ago that "**The best commander is he who wins battles without fighting.**" It has already actual possession, domination and control over many islands, islets, reefs and sea areas in South China Sea with which it has in disputes with militarily weak states of ASEAN and Taiwan. Hence it would not likely raise the ante, raise to a threshold of conflict to a next level or trigger a "*causa belli*." Thus create a situation where the Philippines will invoke Art IV of the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty, "an armed attack on either Party would be dangerous to its own peace and security and declares each Party would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes." In 2019, U.S. declared SCS is in the Pacific and that "an armed attack on Philippine armed forces, public vessels and aircrafts would trigger paragraph IV." To prevent entry by Philippine vessels into China occupied sea areas its militia ships employ water cannons, blaring signals in addition to radio broadcasts in asserting its "sovereignty" and "authority."

The U.S. is obligated to defend the Philippines **not "automatic or self-effecting"** like that of NATO. It will require a resolution by the U.S. Congress. U.S. senators and congressmen may have known about WPS only when the Philippine government in 2011 referred to it to reinforce its claim before the Hague Arbitral Tribunal. It would be best to assume U.S. will not respond militarily and immediately to uphold Philippine interest on WPS, too far from U.S. homeland.

The horrifying memories of U.S. involvements in Korea, Vietnam, and lately in Afghanistan which resulted in a combined total of more than 150,000 dead and wounded American soldiers, and the shame of defeat and dishonor still haunt the American people.

South Korea has a similar mutual defense treaty with the U.S. with substantially the same provisions as those found in 1951 RP-US MDT. There are no records, however, that U.S. intervened militarily and immediately in behalf of the South Korean government after the following major incidents: the sinking of a South Korean warship, a corvette by a North Korean submarine off its coast in 2010 which resulted in the death of 46 and wounding of 56 South Korean seamen; and in the same year the firing of artillery shells on an island border that separates the two warring neighbors resulting in the wounding of many South Korean soldiers. 37 skirmishes have been recorded.

The U.S. would not likely involve itself militarily nor respond immediately on WPS. But not so with Taiwan where U.S. and China have so much at stake.

**Sino-U.S. Relations.** The **One China policy** is the cornerstone of Sino-U.S. relations. To China it guides its national policy and diplomatic relations with U.S. and other countries as well. It passed in 2004 the Anti-Secession Act, in response to interference of the international community in its internal affairs. It declares that the Taiwan issue has been left unresolved by the civil war, and it is the sacred duty of the Chinese people to reunify with the Taiwanese. China may adopt non-peaceful means if secessionist movements in Taiwan would cause its separation from China.

The U.S. adheres to a One China policy, a diplomatic

acknowledgment that there is only one Chinese government. After it has recognized China in 1979, U.S. has severed formal diplomatic relations with the Taiwan government and maintains only “robust unofficial” ties through trade, commerce, education and culture. It revoked its 1954 defense treaty and replaced it with its 1979 Taiwan Relations Act which opposes non-peaceful means to unify Taiwan with China and obligates U.S. to provide arms but is not committed to defend her. **A strategic ambiguity.**

The U.S. is looked upon as a guarantor of peace in East Asia, a security ally of Taiwan, and protector of the militarily weak ASEAN states. In a landmark declaration in 2019, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo sided with the Philippines which won the 1916 Hague Arbitral Ruling (which China rejected) when he stated, “U.S. rejects China’s claims based on the so called 9-Dash-Line on offshore resources across most of SCS as unlawful under UNCLOS, and its bullying to control them.” He warned “**U.S. will not allow to make the SCS its maritime empire**” effectively supporting the ASEAN states, Taiwan, and their disputes against China.

In a demonstration of might and resolve, U.S. on two occasions last year, two U.S. powerful carrier task forces sailed through SCS on a declared exercise of freedom of navigation (FON) in international waters. These were followed by exercises with the navies of Japan, Australia and India. Much later UK’s newest aircraft carrier escorted by her destroyers and frigates in tandem with U.S. ships sailed the SCS.

In March, newly sworn U.S. President Joe Biden convened the leaders of QUAD –India, Japan, Australia and India to a virtual summit to secure their pledge to counter rising influence of China in the Indo Pacific. Also, Australia, U.S. and U.K. formed a partnership AUS-UK to enable Australia to build a nuclear powered submarines, which is seen by observers as ushering into a strategic alliance.

To China, U.S. policies on and naval movements in the SCS, declared as FON operations, are undisguised provocations and multi-alliances are aimed to strategically encircle China. The bitter memories of China’s colonization and humiliation by European powers from the 1840’s to 1949, Japan’s invasion in 1931, and the occupation of Manchuria until 1945, the end of WW II, are still fresh in the minds of the Chinese people.

**Strategic Importance of Taiwan.** A very significant aspiration of China in the book by Jonathan Holstag: ‘The Coming War in Asia’ is the determination to “recover Taiwan, establish hegemony in Hong Kong, have dominance in the area bordering China, takeover of the islands and reefs in the SCS considered as territories by Japan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan and the Philippines.”

But the “arc of military and political alliances which extends from South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Okinawa, Taiwan, Singapore, Indonesia, Australia and New Zealand poses a strong deterrence to military excursion and adventures by China into the Pacific Ocean and SCS.” (President Fidel V. Ramos is his paper, Strategic Leadership in the Challenge of the Times). The QUAD dialogue formed in 2016 and AUS-UK recently have been added to these alliances.

Taiwan forms an important part of the Island Chain from Kuril and Ryukyu islands (Okinawa), Senkaku (claimed by China but guaranteed protection by U.S.) of the Japanese archipelago down to Luzon, Philippines. To U.S., it represents the first island barrier of its defense of western Pacific. Taiwan to China is crucial to its entry and expansion towards the Pacific of its navy which has already surpassed the U.S. Navy in numbers. It was labelled

an “unsinkable carrier” since WW II, a term to refer to an island from which armed forces can project its power. Its land mass about 400 kms long and 11 kms wide at its narrowest part can provide mobility for its aircraft and other defense equipment and facilities as well. The Straits of between southeastern China and northern Taiwan and the Bashi Channel between southern Taiwan and the Batanes Islands, north of Luzon are important waterways for international shipping. Underneath Bashi Channel are submarine cables for data and telephone international traffic. (A Philippine Marine detachment has occupied Navulis islet in the Batanes group). Hence, possession and control of Taiwan, Straits of Taiwan and the Bashi channel are crucial. Mahan’s doctrine “**who controls the sea lanes controls the island; who controls the island controls the mainland**” is still valid today despite the advent of long range bombers, ICBMS, aircraft carriers, drones and missile firing submarines.

**Ideological Divide.** Taiwan is a bulwark of western type democracy and its capitalistic system is an exemplar of a market driven and export-oriented economy. Its government is elected through popular votes and multi parties exist and are allowed. China is a socialist republic with “Chinese characteristics” and is run by the ruling Communist Party. It follows a socialist economy is a system where there is a predominance of state-owned enterprises within a market driven economy. Public ownership coexists with the various forms of private ownership, a system considered by economists as responsible for the very significant and high growth rate of China’s economy. The ideological divide is seen in the crackdown and imposition of stringent measures on dissent and assembly by the mainland government on Hong Kong residents who pine for their freedoms under British colonial rule which ended in 1997. The Taiwanese government and people can only express their vehement protests in fraternal sympathy.

**Destined to Clash.** Western scholars wrote that the conflict between U.S. and China may fall into the Thucydides Trap, a term popularized by Harvard Professor Graham Allison, that war is inevitable between a rising power and a ruling one. The “rise of power of Athens and the alarm, which it has inspired in Sparta” led to the Peloponnesian War (431-404 BC). Sparta, the reigning power, lost but both suffered heavily and declined in power for decades. Graham in his book cited 16 cases of conflicts between states or group of states from the 15th to 20th century including WW 1 and II up to the 1990’s –12 led to war.

Many historians and writers, however, have questioned the validity of predicting future conflicts on the basis of a battle that occurred 400 years B.C. and wars in the 15th to 20th century. It is Euro-centered interpretation of the causes and prevention of the conflicts –which are complex matters. Using social science methodology and making an analogy of the ancient battle where gun powder and air vessels were not yet in use to predict the outcome of the rivalry of U.S. and China is flawed. The core interests of China and U.S. are poles apart. China wants a ‘place under the sun,’ U.S. wants to maintain its global dominant position. Both China and the U.S. have internal problems. China’s President Xi’s wise counsel said soon after President Donald Trump (2017-2021) occupied White House, “*As long as we maintain communication and treat each other with sincerity we can escape the Thucydides Trap.*”

Four compelling reasons will prevent U.S. and China from going to war over their stakes and interests in Taiwan or the SCS according to an article in the Strategist: It may turn nuclear and

## MARITIME GEOPOLITICS

each side would try to avoid it and likely resort to proxy wars; China plays a long game, lags behind in conventional forces; China has been gaining victories in the soft power global war like the Build and Road Initiatives and both economies are heavily intertwined. More importantly, the top leaders of U.S. and China have their people at heart, and are talking.

**Biden-Xi Virtual November Summit.** The deep differences in Sino-U.S. relations may be viewed from the declarations of President Biden and President Xi during their virtual Summit last 16-November-2021.

Biden said the U.S. would stand up for its interests and values as well those of allies and partners in the Indo Pacific region and uphold U.S. commitments to them; cited the importance of freedom of navigation and overflight; and will protect American workers and economy from China's unfair trade practices. He raised concerns on Beijing's human treatment in Xingiang, Tibet, and Hong Kong, and coerciveness in the SCS. He reiterated the One China policy and guarantees under the Taiwan Relations Act. In a conciliatory gesture, he said, *"It is our responsibility as leaders of U.S. and China that competition between our countries does not veer into conflict whether intended or not."* (Readout of U.S. Summit Declaration)

President Xi wants respect, to be treated as equal in the world stage and asserts its one party political system is at par or better than liberal democracy. Its 'state-centric-one-party-led economic system provides industrial policies, massive subsidies and preferential treatment of state enterprises and private enterprises to make them globally competitive,' thus distorting market forces. As to treatment of its own people and others in territories it governs, China cannot be judged according to the domestic policies of U.S. and calls it interference. Xi considered U.S. declaration that it will oppose any change on the status quo on Taiwan as intimidating and for U.S. to be "more prudent." In sum "China and U.S. should respect each other, coexist in peace and pursue win-win cooperation." (East Asia Forum)

Many analysts and observers said there has been not much breakthrough in the Summit. Both leaders would have to hold more talks on nuclear arms control, hypersonic missiles development, ease the tensions over Taiwan, and coercion in the SCS.

Six years ago in Washington, President Barrack Obama (2009-2017) and President Xi met at a Summit. Obama said, "U.S. and China have structural differences but can manage their disagreements." Both leaders discussed at length the Thucydides Trap. President Xi alarmingly said, **"should major powers time and again make the mistake of strategic miscalculations they might create such traps for themselves."**

In the event of a miscalculation, a misreading of intentions or a misstep leading inevitably to a conflict between U.S. and China over their differences on Taiwan and SCS, **the Philippines will be involved because of existing military alliances with U.S. and geography**, so said former AFP Chief of Staff Retired General Emmanuel Bautista Jr at a forum sponsored by the Stratbase ADR Institute on 25-November-2021.\*\*

\* According to The Economist Intelligence (EIU).

\*\* Forum on Security and Foreign Policy

Outlook 2022. 🚢

**About the Author:**

You may reach the author at [maningoxales@yahoo.com](mailto:maningoxales@yahoo.com)



# iSoftware

iSoftware Systems Technologies, Inc.

<https://issti.com>

+63(2)8874-2006

[info@issti.com](mailto:info@issti.com)

+63(2)8874-1522

## CAD/CAE/CAM Systems for the Naval Architecture, Ship Design & Shipbuilding Industry

Rhinoceros  
design, model, present, analyze, realize...

Orca3D

Simerics  
TECHNOLOGY BY DESIGN

EXPRESSMARINE  
Structural modeling plugin for Rhinoceros

MAXSURF  
Integrated Naval architecture & Ship Construction software

AUTODESK

ShipWeight

MOSES

NavCad

PropExpert

PropCad

SHIPCONSTRUCTOR

SACS

prop elements

# ENGAGING THE ENEMY AT THE LITTORALS: A HISTORY OF COASTAL DEFENSE IN THE PHILIPPINES FROM THE PRE-SPANISH PERIOD TO THE SECOND WORLD WAR.

(Part 1 of a 3-Part article)

by CDR Mark R Condono

*“Coast Defense, in its broadest sense, includes all measures taken to provide protection against any form of attack at or near the shore line as well as within the combat zone immediately in rear thereof.”*

*-US FM 31-10 Basic Field Manual of Coast Defense*

## INTRODUCTION

In October 2019, the Philippine Army activated the Artillery Regiment's 1st Land-Based Missile System Battery and 2nd Multiple Launch Rocket System Battery at Fort Magsaysay in Nueva Ecija. Ten months later in August 2020, the Philippine Navy activated the Coastal Defense Regiment (CDR) of the Philippine Marine Corps at Marine Barracks Rudiardo Brown, Headquarters Philippine Marine Corps, Taguig City. The CDR's functions were designed to protect the country's coast, shores, ships, and amphibious task forces from an invading enemy and to improve support of naval operations.

The aforementioned units were activated in anticipation of the acquisition of India's Brahmos Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles and the arrival of the Republic of Korea's Kooryong K136 Rocket Artillery System for both the Philippine Army and Philippine Marine Corps.

By April 2021, the Philippine Marine Corps unveiled its new warfighting concept—the Archipelagic Coastal Defense as part of an inter-agency—an integrated Joint Operations which also adds to the Philippine Navy's Active Archipelagic Defense Strategy (AADS) all geared toward an External Defense Posture and of the Anti-Access/Area Denial or the A2/AD concept prevalent with the Western Naval Forces.

Most recent is the release of the special allotment order of the 15% initial down payment for the Philippine Navy's Shore-Based Anti-Ship Missile System—the acquisition of the Brahmos AS Cruise Missiles.

These weapons systems would play a pivotal role for the defense and security of the world's second largest archipelago, which has more than 7,600 islands and boasts a total coastline of 36,289 kilometers. The Philippines is no stranger at taking an enemy from the sea that dates back to the ancient period up to the Second World War, and which this paper seeks to explore.

## COASTAL DEFENSE IN PRE-COLONIAL PHILIPPINES

Prior to the Battle of Mactan, there were already antecedents in Pre-Hispanic Philippines of Raiders coming from the Sea as the rulers between Islands fought for control of territory and economics such as the conflict between the Rajanate of Cebu and the Sultanate of Maguindanao.

Another would be the conflict between Rajanates of Manila and Tondo which were at the Country's Center of Gravity. The Battle of Mactan is unique as it is the most well-known first recorded native resistance to a European power.

Coastal Defense Actions were already prevalent in Pre-colonial Philippines in which the maxims of beach defense and anti-landing concepts were already in effect.

## Battle of Mactan: First Coastal Beach Defense Operation (27-April-1521)



*Painting by Carl Frances Morano Diaman shows the Battle of Mactan exhibited at the Lapu-Lapu Shrine in Mactan Island.*

Marking its Quincentennial Anniversary last year, the Battle For Mactan could also be considered as the known First Beach Defense Operation in the Philippines.

### The Commanders:

DATU Lapu-Lapu (Local Chieftain of Cebu) Captain Ferdinand Magellan (Spain) (Expedition Head).

### Strength of Forces:

Datu Lapu-Lapu had amassed strength of about 1, 500 warriors, while Ferdinand Magellan had 5 ships and 270 men.

### On a Bloody Shore:

The Spanish Soldiers under Ferdinand Magellan held the advantage against Lapu-Lapu's force but were defeated for their over-confidence despite their logistical problems. Apart from the 60 Spanish Soldiers, Magellan was accompanied by a local chieftain and his warriors which were never deployed during the battle. Magellan's forces possessed the weaponry and armor but lacked the employment of additional manpower and naval gunfire support both of which ultimately cost them defeat at the hands of Lapu-Lapu.

The Chieftain of Mactan and his forces utilized to their advantage the terrain, and had a good grasp of the vulnerability of the Spanish armor suite hitting them on the bare areas of their body. Additionally, their weighted armor once in the water reduced their mobility. One aspect was Lapu-Lapu's men

consistently followed through their attacks with manoeuvre warfare and armed their spears and crossbows with poisoned arrows as secondary weapons.

Despite superiority and modern technology by invaders of that era, the beach defense maxims were successfully implemented by the local warriors of Mactan, denying the enemy the occupation and seizure of Mactan.

### The Ships of the Armada De Moluccas

On 20-September-1519, the Royal Commission was sent off designating Capitan Fernando De Magallanes to head the Expedition in search of the Spice Islands. Flotillas of five ships were tasked for the expedition, namely:

- The *Trinidad* (Flagship) with Ferdinand Magellan as Captain;
- The *Santiago* under Capitan Juan Rodriguez Serrano;
- The *San Antonio* under Capitan Juan De Cartagena;
- The *Concepcion* under Capitan Gaspar De Quesada; and
- The *Victoria* under Capitan Louis De Mendoza.

Lessons Learned:

**ADVANTAGE OF TERRAIN:** Lapu-Lapu and his men were able to take advantage of the local terrain and the shoreline, the Spaniards with their heavy armor suffered reduced mobility to move in water.

**STRENGTH:** With quite a disparity from the start, the Spaniards assumed that with their advanced technology they would easily defeat Lapu-Lapu's warriors, despite being outnumbered.

**NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT:** The cannon and mortars on Magellan's Ships and the crossbows of the local warrior on board Magellan's ships and Balangays were never utilized against Lapu-Lapu's warriors as they were out of range and the ships were anchored too far away from shore.

**STRATEGY AND TACTICS:** Again with the advantage to terrain, the invaders from the start had already lost in terms of manoeuvre as they were pinned down and engaged in a frontal and pincer manoeuvre of Lapu-Lapu's Forces. One should have a means of escape or extraction point for the soldiers to cut and run, else they get captured or killed. Lapu-Lapu would have seen this particular advantage even before the Spaniards lowered down their boats to get to shore.

### COASTAL DEFENSE IN THE SPANISH PERIOD

During the Spanish occupation of the Philippines, the essence of Commerce Raiding and Coastal Defense were ample be they against foreign or domestic pirates.

These piratical raids had already taken a toll on Spanish prestige and economy at that period. Hence, Operations were planned by as early as 1848 right up to the Philippine Revolution in curbing out the threat of piracy in the archipelago specially in the Southern Waters.

In the narrative below, first covering the Beach Defense against the Chinese Pirate Limahong, were thwarted with the combined Filipino-Spanish Force. In this action, the Chinese Pirates failed in utilizing the essence of intelligence while the Spanish utilized it to the effect that Limahong's forces were tracked early on at its forts and lighthouses, and their movements were reported to the Filipino-Spanish Force.

Second, the Amphibious Assault in Balanguingi Island and the reversed Coastal Defense of the Moro Pirates were again on the maxims of Beach Defense that of Seapower and sound strategy.

Lastly, the raid on the Moro Fortresses at the Rio Grande was also a classic aphorism of warfare, that of Combined arms

from the Spanish Army and Marines in artillery and naval gunfire support.

### The Battle of Don Galo: 29-30 November 1574

53 years after the Battle For Mactan came another Beach Defense Operation in the shores of present day Paranaque City. The Red Sea incident as it was then known was a part of the larger Battle For Manila.

Limahong's Forces first landed in Ilocos Norte and were able to defeat some Spanish Forces. He then sailed towards Manila and landed on Paranaque.



*Captain Juan de Salcedo, Spanish conquistador in the Philippine, dated 7-July-1807. Photo Source: Creative Commons/Wikimedia.org*

Limahong's Forces had the upper hand in manpower with about 6,500 men on board 62 ships while the local force under a Filipino named Galo was around 300 men, later on with the arrival of the Spanish Army Captain Juan De Salcedo of about 300 additional men that defeated the Chinese Corsairs, with Limahong making his way towards Pangasinan.

**Lessons Learned:**

**FAILURE OF INTELLIGENCE:** One facet of beach defense, as with all military actions, is basic intelligence. In this operation, Limahong failed to utilize the various captives he had, as well as to send out a reconnaissance party. He was earlier told that Paranaque had a weak defense or none at all, or again, a victim of over-confidence.

**COMMAND & LEADERSHIP:** The Village Leader, Galo, aptly enabled the Command and Leadership, and rally his townsfolk into depriving the enemy of gaining a foothold to capture their village.

**COMBINED WARFARE:** Another aspect of this operation was Combined Warfare in which the Filipinos and Spaniards were able to integrate into a combined force which was already the practice in various Spanish Coastal Fortifications with Spanish Officers and Filipino militia.

**FAILURE OF NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT:** Limahong, despite having a number of ships, the shallow waters and the range to shore for his artillery made them ineffective.

### The Battle of Balanguingi: 16-22 February 1848

The Battle of Balanguingi Island is similar to the United States Marine Corps landing at Tripoli, Libya with the objective of curbing Piracy in the region. The Balanguingi Island is a stronghold of Moro Pirates prowling that area of Mindanao. The Spanish had had enough of the piracy and decided to take on the pirates at their lair.

The objective was to capture the Island and the four Fortresses thereat. Balanguingi was located between the Province of Basilan and Jolo. A classic Amphibious Assault Operation by the Spanish Forces under Brigadier General Jose

Ruiz De Apodaca and Lieutenant Colonel Arrieta with the overall Command of the Spanish Governor General Narciso Claveria.



Map of Balanguingui Island, 1848. Photo Credit: J. Espejo.



The Amphibious Landing at Balanguingui Island in 1848. By artist Antonio Brugada, 1804-63. Photo credit: Oronoz.com.

The Moro Pirates had the upper strength in manpower, though the Spanish Forces had in support 19 warships along with a sound concept of the assault operation.



Garay warships of the Balanguingui Pirates, by artist Rafael Monleon. Photo credit: James Francis Warren (1985).

The Moro Pirates also maintained a fleet of PROAs (ancient cargo/fishing/warships) and more than 100 artillery pieces. Despite these advantages, the pirates were routed and defeated through strategy, tactics, good artillery, and naval gunfire support.

**Lessons Learned:**

**VITAL USE OF INTELLIGENCE:** The Spaniards made headway of the essence of intelligence by utilizing the locals on the particulars of the Forts to be assaulted, and developments on the fortifications and weapons inventory of the enemy.

**NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT:** The Spanish Assault Force primary use of Naval Gunfire Support was of the essence in this naval operation as shelling contributed to surprise and sowing confusion to the enemy.

**The Rio Grande De Mindanao Operation: Jan-March 1887**

Almost 39 years after the successful amphibious assault of the Island of Balanguingui, a similar operation was launched by Spanish Forces on the Rio Grande De Mindanao in 1887.

Mindanao River as it was formally known was a river encompassing three Provinces –Bukidnon, Cotabato, and Maguindanao. It had seven tributaries. The Operation was part of the larger campaign against the Moros by the Spanish from the beginning of Spanish occupation until the sparks of the Philippine revolution.

The 1887 operation was led by Spanish General Julian Serina along with General Emilio Terrero, Col San Felin, and Col Matos with a force of 3,400 men, 120 Filipino militia known as Disciplinarios under Spanish Major Villabrille.

The objective was neutralizing the Moro Forts on the riverine coast and tributaries of the Rio Grande. The Spaniards employed both naval gunfire and local support. Moro response, on the other hand, were their lantakas and about 60 smaller canoes led by Datu Uto. On 10-March-1887, after 14 days of negotiations with emissaries, Datu Uto signed a Peace Accord along with his family and constituents.

The Moro force was effective in threatening smaller Spanish garrisons, but succumbed to overwhelming force, comprising the Spanish Army and Marines, Artillery Forces, and River Gunboats of the entire Spanish Naval Garrison in the Visayas region that were deployed. Arms coupled with a sound strategy are the lessons learned on this action.



**About the Author:**

*CDR Mark R Condono is Deputy Administrative Officer, Philippine Korean Friendship Center and Museum Curator, PEFTOK Korean War Memorial Hall Museum under the Dept of National Defense-Philippine Veterans Affairs Office. In 2007, he was Research Officer at the Office of the Naval Historian, PN; and Projects Officer at the Maritime Historical Branch of the Fleet-Marine Warfare Center, PN. He earned a BS Architecture at Palawan State University. In 1997, he completed the Basic Naval Reserve Officers Training Course, PN; and is with Bravo Class of 1999, PCG Auxiliary Officer's Indoctrination Course. In 2002, he took the Aerospace Power Course at Air University, USAF. In 2008, he took the Military History Operations Course at U.S. Defense Technical Information Center. He is with Class 26 of the Executive Course on National Security at the National Defense College of the Philippines. He has been published in PAF Review, PAF Perspective, PN Journal, PN Digest, Rough Deck Log, CITEMAR6, USNI Proceedings, Asiaweek, USAF Air & Space Power Journal, and CIMSEC.*

# BOOK REVIEW: COMMANDING THE PACIFIC – U.S. MARINE CORPS GENERALS OF WWII

by Vicky Viray-Mendoza

## INTRODUCTION

Some of the Marine Corps' most difficult assignments were not only excessively costly, but also had questionable strategic value. The Marine Generals' willingness to take on almost any assignment therefore came at a stiff price. They acceded for having little say in the Pacific War strategy, and because they were ready to demonstrate their added value to the military establishment. If the Marines had balked at any of their missions, it would have upset the Navy's confidence in the Marine Corps, and grant the Army a bigger role in the war. As Marines, they did not question orders. They fought with professionalism, persistence, and competence against the strongest Japanese defenses in the Pacific.

Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Commanders decided which Japanese island to attack, it was the Marine Combat Generals who determined the proper tactics, timing, weaponry, planning, organization, alternatives, and training for the actual ground operation. They did amphibious operations that were extraordinarily tough to organize with tactical precision.

The Marine generals selected their officers and staff. The Marine Corps were directly responsible for the performance of their division's missions. However great their contribution, they were still criticized mainly for their large casualties.

Although Marine Corps battle Commanders took some of most horrendous and complicated assignments, they emerged victorious in all of their operations during the U.S. counter-offensive across the Pacific, except in the **Philippines** mainly because the focus was on the fight in Europe to block Hitler's advances. And even after Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, and hours later, the **Philippines**, the grand strategy was still to deploy resources against Germany, and remain on the defensive in the Pacific against Japan.

The Marine Corps' success is a credit not only to their doctrine and culture, but also to the USMC Commandants, who relied on their personal knowledge of the officer corps to appoint the right people for the right posts. These Marine combat generals deserve more attention from historians than they had been given for their roles in garnering victory over Japan. The few who failed were due to the intricate job of planning and executing the complex amphibious assaults.

The names of these WWII Marine Corps Combat Generals – men who led tens of thousands of marines through some of the Pacific War's most ferocious battles have been all but forgotten.

## WAGING WAR IN THE MOST REMOTE PLACES ON EARTH

Japan attacked Pearl Harbor on 7-December-1941 on Sunday at 8:00 in the morning. By March 1942, the Combined Chiefs of Staff split the Pacific into two groups. The Army led the Southwest Pacific Area under Gen. Douglas MacArthur (Australia, New Guinea, Dutch East Indies, and Philippines). The Navy-centric Pacific Ocean Area under Admiral Chester Nimitz was subdivided into the North Pacific Area; Central Pacific Area; and South Pacific

Area. The arrangement allowed Army and Navy forces to focus on defeating Japan. The Marine Corps concentrated almost exclusively on invading Japan's islands via amphibious operations that Marines were trained for.

Japan made it impossible for the U.S. Navy to steam across the Pacific to rescue the **Philippines** and defeat Japan as envisioned in War Plan Orange by crippling the U.S. Fleet at Pearl Harbor. Japan's offensive stunned everyone with their ferocity and rage. Japan struck several Allied positions in the region that by end-May 1942, Japan had taken the **Philippines, Guam, Wake, Malaysia, Singapore, Hong Kong, Burma, and Dutch East Indies**. Japan captured 85,000 British troops in Singapore, and 76,000 Americans and Filipinos in Bataan, Philippines. The Japanese Fleet had sunk dozens of Allied warships. In turn, by the U.S. inevitably provoking the Japanese into a brutal war of attrition, Japan was compelled to fight a war it could not afford economically and militarily.

The **Battle of Guadalcanal** during August 1942–February 1943 forged the 1st Marine Division into a veteran outfit for a cadre of Generals who participated in the "Guadalcanal Campaign" and showed how the Marines had dominated amphibious operations in the Pacific War. In the 186-day battle, 7,000 Marines were killed, and 20,000 wounded; and 24,000 Japanese killed. The **Battle of Tarawa** took place in November 1943. Marine commanders learned important lessons that would be applied to future battles, particularly the need for better inspection, precise and sustained pre-landing bombardment, and more amphibious landing vehicles. Better waterproofed radios would be developed as a result of Marines wading in waist-high waters to reach the beaches through enemy fire by Japanese snipers from the wrecked and abandoned boats in the lagoon. In the 4-day battle, over 1,000 Marines were killed and over 2,000 wounded; and 6,400 Japanese killed. The **Battle of Iwo Jima** took place in February-March 1945. In the 36-day battle, 7,000 Marines were killed, and 20,000 wounded; 21,000 Japanese killed, and 216 captured. The biggest lesson learned from Iwo Jima is that the price of freedom is high. The **Battles of Guam** took place in 1941 (Axis victory) and 1944 (Allied victory). In total, 24,511 Marines were killed, and 68,207 wounded; and over 18,000 Japanese killed. The **Battle of Saipan** took place in June-July in 1944. In the 24-day battle. 3,426 Marines went missing, 10,364 wounded, 4,500 fell ill; 24,000 Japanese killed, and 5,000 suicides. The **Battle of Kwajalein and Roi-Namur** took place in January-February 1944. In the 4-day battle: on **Roi-Namur**, less than 200 Marines were killed, and 500 wounded; over 3,500 Japanese killed, and 200 captured; on **Kwajalein**, 5,000 Japanese soldiers were killed and a handful were captured; the Army's 7th Infantry counted 177 soldiers killed and 1,000 wounded. The **Battle of Peleliu** took place in September-November 1944. In the 71-day battle, 1,460 Marines were killed; 13,600 Japanese were killed, and 400 captured. The **Battle of Okinawa** took place in April-June 1945. In the 82-day battle, the largest death casualties of 100,000 Japanese; 38,000 Allies;



14,200 Marines; and 10,000 Japanese captured. U.S. Army troops landed at Hagushi on the west coast of **Okinawa**. 50,000 men of the 10th Army established a beachhead about 5 miles long, for which naval minesweepers pre-cleared the landing. It was the largest amphibious landing in WWII Pacific.

#### AN ANOMALOUS ORGANIZATION IN SEARCH OF A MISSION



**Lt Colonel Earl "Pete" H. Ellis** was the Marine Intelligence Officer who zeroed in on Japan as the most likely future adversary of the U.S. in War Plan Orange, the Navy's contingency plan for fighting Japan, which called for the U.S. Fleet to steam across the Pacific to rescue the American-held Philippines and defeat its Japanese counterpart in a climactic naval battle. Lt Colonel Ellis recognized that doing so would require someone to seize and hold island bases in the Central Pacific to aid in the Navy's offensive. In the 1921 report "Advanced Base Force Operations in Micronesia," It was Lt. Col. Ellis who advocated that the Marine Corps fill this difficult role. The 13th Marine Corps Commandant, Gen. John Lejeune, endorsed the Ellis' report, thus assigning the USMC its mission: Amphibious Operations.



**Gen. Thomas Holcomb** was the 17th Commandant of the Marine Corps when the U.S. entered WWII in December 1941. He graduated from the Naval War College, Rhode Island. His long-standing friendship with President Franklin Roosevelt and deep commitment to the Marine's amphibious doctrine secured his post. Holcomb had good judgment, common sense, inspired confidence in others, but was cold-blooded. He was plain spoken and referred to Washington DC as a "snake pit of intrigue." He was dedicated, self-disciplined, and self-reliant. Having a 20th century mind, Holcomb rarely removed officers from their posts for cause. His policy was to rotate Marine officers who had been overseas for a year or more to come home and teach the new recruits. He was the right man for the job at the right time. Holcomb announced that women were eligible to serve in the Marine Corps in 13-February-1943, a date celebrated as the anniversary of women in the Marine Corps. There were 17,000 U.S. Marines in 1936, and by the time Holcomb retired in 1944, that number had risen to 300,000. Gen. Holcomb was the first Marine Commandant promoted to full General after retirement.

#### CLOSING IN ON JAPAN

Assailing the Japanese islands required intricate coordination among the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps. In March 1945, Japan's cities and factories were bombed by the Army Air Forces one by one, blocking import of food and materiel. Tired and disinclined to face off with the Japanese, the Marines blasted them out of their caves and tunnels with flame-throwers and bulldozers. The naval **Battle of Midway** fought in 3-7 June, 1942 in the central Pacific Ocean turned the tide of the war in favor of the Allies. In the naval **Battle of Leyte Gulf** fought in October 1944, U.S. carrier aircrafts destroyed 1,046 Japanese planes and warships totaling more than 300,000 tons, effectively eliminating the Japanese surface fleet. Japan conceded defeat but would only submit if their Emperor is guaranteed preservation but the Allies demanded unconditional surrender. In the 1943 campaigns and the first half of 1944, the Allies captured **Solomon Islands, Gilbert Islands, Marshall Islands, and Papuan Peninsula of New Guinea. Iwo Jima and Okinawa** were the goriest. This left Japan holding the islands of the **Philippines, Caroline, Palau, and Marianas**. After the atomic bombing on Hiroshima on 6-August and Nagasaki on

9-August-1945 by the U.S. 509th Army Air force, the Marine Corps changed mission to occupying Japan and eastern China. That day, 70,000 Japanese died in Hiroshima; and 40,000 in Nagasaki.

#### THE U.S. MARINE CORPS COMBAT GENERALS

Marine Combat Generals did not become known like their Army and Navy counterparts. Ironically, the Marine Corps gained considerable renown in battle but their Marine Combat Generals were virtually and historically anonymous. All 16 Marine Combat Generals received multi military honors, stars, and awards for participation and heroism in leading a battle.

16 Generals led U.S. Marine Corps Divisions overseas for a prolonged period. But 3 of the 16 Marine Division Commanders never got an opportunity to command in battle: Generals Charles Barrett, John Marston, and Clayton Vogel. They did not fail in battle. They failed in pre-battle planning, training, coordinating, or for not having an "iron soul" which would put the lives of Marines in jeopardy. A hardness in character is deemed necessary to have the ability to do whatever it takes to win. Physical and mental health status must also be prime to be a good Commanding General.

9 of the 16 Marine Division Commanders were assigned to the Central Pacific: Generals Cates, Geiger, Rupertus, Schmidt, Shepherd, Holland Smith, Julian Smith, Turnage, and Watson. Of the 9 Generals, 2 fought but did not excel in battle: Generals Rupertus and Julian Smith, and were reassigned.

The attrition ended with 7 Marine battle Division Commanders, of which 6 were by combat-hardened veteran Generals personally known to the 18th Marine Corps Commandant Alexander Vandegrift, and remained division commanders until the end of the Pacific War. One other division was led by a rookie, Keller Rockey, who was anticipated to be the least effective Battle Commander, but proved otherwise.



**Lt Gen. Alexander "Vandy" Vandegrift** served in WWI and WWII. He attended the University of Virginia. In 1942, he was promoted to Maj. Gen. and commanded the 1st Marine Division. Vandegrift was the first Marine Officer on active duty to attain a four-star rank for outstanding service. Vandegrift was responsible for picking the Marine Division commanders and assistant commanders, as well as the leaders of the Amphibious Corps. He knew each one personally in great detail, and based on shared experiences while fulfilling pre-war missions as most officers spent time onboard warships commanding Marine detachments. The experiences introduced the Marines to the Navy's way of doing things as well as to the naval officers with whom they would later work with. He fought in the **Solomon Islands, Guadalcanal, Tulagi, and Gavutu** in 1942. Vandegrift became the hero of the **Battle of Guadalcanal**. At the end of the **Battle of Edson's Ridge** of 12-14 September, 1942, Vandegrift used the rotation period to bring the Marines, Col. **Capers James** and Col. **LeRoy Hunt** (a good friend of Vandegrift), home to train and organize new units. The latter never forgave Vandegrift for derailing his career as Commander of 5th Marine Regiment. Vandegrift used the rotation rationale to replace unsatisfactory performers. Vandegrift became Commanding General of 1st Marine Amphibious Corps in July 1943. His selection of Marines created a "Guadalcanal Clique" that dominated the Corps even postwar. From 1944-46, Vandegrift became the 18th Commandant of the Marine Corps. In 1982, the frigate USS *Vandegrift* was named in his honor.



**Lt. Gen. Julian C. Smith** served in WWI and WWII. He graduated from the University of Delaware in 1885. In June 1938, he was Commander of 5th Marines, 1st Marine Brigade at Quantico, Virginia where he remained until his promotion to Brig. General. Julian Smith was ordered to London,

where he served with the Naval Attaché, American Embassy, as a naval observer. Smith returned to the U.S. in August 1941, and reported to Quantico. Upon appointment to Maj. Gen. in October 1942, he became Commanding Officer, Fleet Marine Force Training Schools at New River, North Carolina. In May 1943, Lt. Gen. Julian Smith became Commander of 2nd Marine Division to lead the division in the assault on **Tarawa**. The basic idea was for the Army to take **Makin** while the Marines stormed **Tarawa**. In November 1943, American warships had arrived near **Tarawa**. The Marines moved inland on **Betio Island**, blasting surviving enemy emplacements with grenades, demolition packs and flame-throwers. 76 hours after the invasion, **Betio** was finally declared secure. **Tarawa** served as a very costly classroom experiment that taught Naval and Marine officers what amphibious practices would work, or not. The intellectual Julian Smith lost his footing when communications were cut during the raid. He was reassigned and became Commanding General, Expeditionary Troops, 3rd Fleet in April 1944. By December 1944, he took command of the Department of the Pacific, with headquarters in San Francisco, California. He earned a Doctor of Laws from University of Berkeley in 1945. Lt. Gen. Julian Smith became Commanding General, Marine Corps Recruit Depot, Parris Island until his retirement in 1946. The Julian C. Smith Hall at Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune is named after him.



**Gen. Allen "Hal" Turnage** served in WWI and WWII. He attended the University of North Carolina. In April 1941, He was Director of the Division of Plans and Policies at Headquarters Marine Corps when WWII broke out. In June 1942, he took command of the Base and its Training Center which included

organization and training of two Regimental Combat Teams for the 3rd Marine Division, at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. In September 1943, he became Commander of 3rd Marine Division. He led the Division in the landing on **Bougainville** in 1943, and in the recapture of **Guam** in 1944, and was awarded the Navy Cross and Distinguished Service Medal. Turnage became Director of Personnel at Headquarters Marine Corps in September 1944, and Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps. Turnage had a serene demeanor even under fire and was well-liked by the Marine Corps. However, he lacked the experience of ferocious combat battles that the other Marine battle commanders faced. In May 1946, the University of North Carolina, awarded him the honorary degree of Doctor of Laws. His final assignment was as Commanding General, Pacific Fleet Marine Force. Gen. Turnage retired in January 1948 with 4-stars for heroism in combat.



**Gen. Roy "Jiggs" Geiger** served in WWI and WWII. He graduated from Stetson University, College of Law. In September 1942, Geiger took command of **Cactus Air Force** at Henderson Field, **Guadalcanal**. In November 1943, he returned to the field as Commanding General of I Amphibious

Corps and led the Corps in November-December 1943 in clearing **Bougainville** with the help of Allen Turnage's 3rd Marine Division, for the arrival of the Army 37th Division. He was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal. He became Commanding General

of III Amphibious Corps in April 1944, accomplishing the invasion and recapture of **Guam** in July-August 1944, and the assault and capture of **Palau** Islands in September 1944. Geiger received 2 gold stars for the victories in **Guam** and **Palau**. Geiger led the III Amphibious Corps into action for the 4th time as part of the 10th Army in the capture of **Okinawa** in 1945. Geiger was the best combat Marine General in WWII Pacific, spoke direct to the point with an utmost dislike for small talk. He had a first-rate intellect that he quickly grasped issues and flaws in arguments. Aside from a law degree, Geiger had years of aviation experience. He was hard-driving, aggressive, confident, intimidating, and unforgiving of errors yet his crew looked up to him. A newly arrived pilot reported that Japanese naval guns rendered Henderson Field inoperative. Geiger walked down to the airstrip to commandeer a dive bomber, took off, dodging shells, flew north, bombed a Japanese battery and returned without a scratch. This most proficient and successful Marine Corps Commander was neither infantryman nor artilleryman but an airman. In 1945, he became Commanding General, Pacific Fleet Marine Force. Geiger was promoted to 4-stars posthumously by the 1947 80th Congress.



**Lt. Gen. Pedro A. del Valle** served in WWI and WWII. He graduated from the Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland in 1915. In 1931, del Valle was with the "Landing Operations Text Board" in Quantico, the first step the Marines took to develop a doctrine for amphibious assault. In

1932, his essay titled "*Ship-to-Shore in Amphibious Operations*," stressed the importance of a coordinated amphibious assault, and execution of an opposed landing. In March 1941, del Valle became Commander of 11th Marine Artillery Regiment and participated in the **Battle of Guadalcanal** providing artillery support for the 1st Marine Division. In the **Battle of Tenaru** in **Guadalcanal** in August 1942, del Valle's artillery units killed all assaulting Japanese soldiers even before they reached the Marines. It stunned the Japanese commander, Col. Ichiki Kiyonao, and drove him to commit seppuku. In October 1942, he became Brig. Gen. and head of 11th Marine Regiment. He fought in the **Battle of Guam** in 1944. As Commanding General of 3rd Corps Artillery, III Amphibious Corps, he was awarded a Gold Star. The men under his command did such a good job with their heavy artillery that not one could be singled out for commendation. Del Valle gave each man a letter of commendation that went on record. In October 1944, del Valle became Commander of 1st Marine Division. In May 1945, del Valle fought in the **Battle of Okinawa**. Del Valle ordered Company A, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines to capture the Shuri Castle, a medieval fortress of the Ryukyuan kings. This was a moral blow to the Japanese. He was awarded a Distinguished Service Medal for leadership. Lt. Gen. Pedro del Valle became Inspector General and Director of Personnel until he retired in January 1948.



**Maj. Gen. Graves "Robert" Erskine** served in WWI and WWII. He graduated from Louisiana State University. Erskine served as Chief of Staff, Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet. In September 1942, he joined the Amphibious Corps, Pacific Fleet, in San Diego, California as Chief of Staff and

performed duty in Alaska in July-August 1943 during the planning and training phase of the assault on **Attu** and **Kiska** in the **Aleutian Islands**. Maj. Gen. Erskine then became Chief of Staff of V Amphibious Corps for the Pacific. He was promoted to Brig. Gen. in November 1943, and became Deputy Commanding General, V

Amphibious Corps. For exceptionally meritorious service during the invasion of the **Gilbert Islands** in 1943, and the assault and capture of **Kwajalein, Saipan, and Tinian** in 1944, Erskine received two awards of the Legion of Merit, both with combat valor. He performed duties for the "Marianas Campaign" as Chief of Staff of East Marine Force, Pacific. He was Commander of 3rd Marine Division in the **Battle of Iwo Jima** in February 1945 where his unit was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation for extraordinary heroism, and he was awarded the Navy Distinguished Service Medal. In July 1947, Erskine became Commander of 1st Marine Division, as well as Commanding General of Camp Pendleton. In May 1949, he became Deputy Commander, Pacific Fleet Marine Force. In July 1951, as Lt. Gen., Erskine became Commanding General, Atlantic Fleet Marine Force. Upon retirement, Erskine was advanced to 4-star rank in July 1953, with special commendation for heroism in combat. Holland Smith saw Erskine as a brilliant officer, and valued his efficiency. Erskine held a career at the Pentagon from 1953-1961 as Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, specializing in special intelligence operations.



**Maj. Gen. Lemuel "Lem" C. Shepherd, Jr.** served in WWI, WWII, and the Korean War. He graduated from the Virginia Military Institute in 1896.. Commandant Holcomb gave the 9th Marine Division to Shepherd which he took to Guadalcanal as part of the 3rd Marine Division.

Shepherd took command of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, formed from experienced units - 4th Marines and 22nd Marines – that had fought on **Guadalcanal** in 1942-43; **Eniwetok** and **Guam** and other amphibious operations in 1944. The brigade had good men, but their loyalty remained with their original regiments. Shepherd worked double time, persuading them to cooperate and give their allegiance to the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade. He trained the brigade well, emphasizing tank-infantry tactics to overcome the Japanese machine gun emplacements. In the summer of 1944, his brigade was ready. To bring the brigade to division level, Vandegrift built the 15th Artillery Regiment for the 29th Regiment, and combined them forming the 6th Marine Division. In April 1945, Shepherd became Commander of 6th Marine Division called the "Striking Sixth," on **Okinawa**. It entered **Naha** on the night of 23-May-1945, sustaining 1,622 killed and 6,689 wounded. **Okinawan** deaths ran as high as 150,000. Shepherd was intelligent, competitive, and ambitious, but also had a fatalistic religious streak, stating that only God could help a Marine. Lt. Gen. Simon Buckner, Jr. of the 10th Army who rejected an amphibious assault landing behind Shuri by the 2nd Marine Division, was questioned after the war as it may have led to the high death rate in Okinawa. Shepherd became the 20th Commandant of the Marine Corps. He was the first Commandant to become a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which gave parity to USMC. He retired in January 1956.



**Lt. Gen. Keller E. Rockey** fought in WWI and WWII. He graduated from Gettysburg College in 1913. When Japan attacked Pearl Harbor in December 1941, Rockey was Chief of Staff for the 2nd Marine Division. He was then appointed as Head of the Plans and Policies Division, and later as Assistant Commandant. Keller Rockey became a highly decorated Marine General as the Commander of 5th Marine Division in the **Battle of Iwo Jima** in 1945, and Commanding General of 3rd Amphibious Corps during the occupation of **North China** following the Pacific War. Despite being the only rookie among veteran Marine

Division Commanders, Rockey's 5th Marine Division captured more territory, with less personnel evacuated for illness or combat fatigue, and faced the enemy longer than the other Marine divisions. His subordinates appreciated his honesty and fairness. Commanders noted Rockey supported his men in their efforts, protected them from undue pressure from higher-ups, and did not scapegoat. But his weakness was being insufficiently direct and forceful. In 1946, he became Commanding General, Department of the Pacific; and the Atlantic Fleet Force in 1947. For outstanding services with the 3rd Amphibious Corps, Rockey was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal (Army), and for exceptionally meritorious service with the 5th Marine Division, he was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal (Navy).



**Maj. Gen. William H. Rupertus** served in WWI and WWII. His excellent marksmanship led to his recruitment by in November 1913, and was appointed 2nd Lt. in the Marine Corps. In the summer of 1915, 2nd Lt. Rupertus was a member of the Marine Corps Rifle Team. The Inspector

of Target Practice was Captain Thomas Holcomb, who would later become his Commandant. Rupertus won a Distinguished Marksman's badge in mid-1915. He attended Marine Corps Officers School, graduating first in his class of 1915. Rupertus was a staunch advocate of expert marksmanship and penned the *Rifleman's Creed* as doctrine for the Marines right after the Pearl Harbor attack. He graduated with distinction from the Command and General Staff College in 1926. In 1937, Rupertus was the Battalion Commander of 4th Marines Regiment when Japan attacked Shanghai in the 2nd Sino-Japanese War. In WWII, he was Assistant Division Commander under his friend, Vandegrift, who commanded the 1st Marine Division. He commanded the Landing Task Force Organization which attacked successfully the islands of **Tulagi, Gavutu, and Tanambogo** in **Guadalcanal**. Rupertus assumed command of the 1st Marine Division, upon detachment of Vandegrift in 1943, for which he participated in **Cape Gloucester** in 1943 and **Peleliu** campaigns in 1944, but did not perform as well in **Peleliu** because he lacked tactical competency. Rupertus was ferociously loyal to the Marine Corps, short-tempered, and convinced of the certitude of USMC ideas. These very same flaws, however, were what the Marine Corps valued to defend the Marine's stance against the Army. In November 1944, he became Commandant of the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico, Virginia. Capt. Patrick H. Rupertus, USMC is his son.



**Gen. Clifton "Lucky" B. Cates** served in WWI, WWII, and the Korean War. He graduated from the Missouri Military Academy in 1910, and held a Doctor of Law from the University of Tennessee College of Law in 1916. In August 1937, Cates returned to Shanghai as Battalion Commander

with the 6th Marine Regiment, later transferring to 4th Marine Regiment. He was awarded the Navy Cross. While attending the U.S. Army War College in April 1940, he was promoted to Colonel and later reported as the Director of The Basic School at Philadelphia Navy Yard, Pennsylvania. In May 1942, he became Commander of 1st Marine Division, leading the troops at **Guadalcanal**. In September, he was promoted to Brigadier General. He then became Commandant of the Marine Corps School at Quantico, Virginia. In February 1944, he was promoted to Major General. That summer, he became Commander of 4th Marine Division, participating in the **Battles of the Mariana and Tinian Islands**. In February-March 1945, he led the 4th Marine

Division in the **Battle of Iwo Jima**. In December 1945, Cates briefly served as President of the Marine Corps Equipment Board at Quantico, Virginia, then was assigned as Commanding General, Marine Barracks, Quantico. In January 1948, he was promoted to General and became the 19th Commandant of the Marine Corps leading the Marines during the **Korean War** together with Gen. Shepherd. In 1952, he became Commandant, Marine Corps Schools, Quantico. Cates was promoted to General upon his retirement in June 1954.



**Maj. Gen. John Marston VI** served in WWI and WWII. He graduated from the University of Pennsylvania, as his great grandfather RADM John Marston III had. In September 1941, Army reinforcements arrived, and its Commander, Charles Hartwell Bonesteel, Jr., was senior to Marston. Despite the objections of Marine Commandant Thomas Holcomb, Marston's unit was detached for service with the Army by order of the President, the only time in WWII that a Marine Corps unit was detached from the Navy to the Army. On March 8, Marston relocated his command post from shore to the USS *McCawley*, restoring the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade to Navy jurisdiction. The unit reached New York on March 25, where it was immediately disbanded. Its component units were transferred to the 2nd Marine Division, and Marston was promoted to Maj. Gen. in March-1942. In April 1942, Marston was appointed Commander of 2nd Marine Division, which arrived in **Samoa** in September 1942. In March 1943, the 2nd Marine Division participated in **Guadalcanal**, but Marston was ordered to be in New Zealand because the "Guadalcanal Campaign" was to be an Army operation. Since Marston outranked the Commander of Army XIV Corps, Marston had to relinquish his command to his Assistant Division Commander, Brig. Gen. Alphonse DeCarre. Marston offered to waive his seniority but Admiral Halsey refused. The joint Army and Marine operation did not gel well and the officers criticized DeCarre for ineptitude. They did not fight as an integrated force. In April 1943, Marston became Commander of Marine Activities in San Diego at Camp Elliott. In August 1943, he became Commanding General, Department of the Pacific. Marston served as Commanding General of Camp Lejeune, until he retired in 1946. His son, Lt. Col. John Marston VII, 6th Marine Division, received a Silver Star.



**Lt. Gen. Thomas "Terrible Tommy" Watson** served in WWI and WWII. He graduated from the Army War College in 1938. He was commissioned a 2nd Lt. of the Marine Corps in 1916. During 1930-34, he was Naval Attaché to the Dominican Republic. Watson joined the 3rd Marine Brigade as Chief of Staff of Gen. Barrett, and sailed for **Samoa** in April 1942, where he took command of the brigade in August 1942. In November 1943, he became Commanding General of Tactical Group 1, which included the 22nd Marine Regiment, Army 27th Division, V amphibious Group, and led this joint organization in the assault and capture of **Eniwetok Atoll** in the Marshall Islands on February 1944. Watson was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal. He then became Commander of 2nd Marine Division, replacing Julian Smith, in April 1944, and led in active operations against enemy forces in the **Battles of Saipan** and **Tinian** in the Marianas. His aggressiveness, competence, imagination, knowledge, and loyalty were seen by Vandegrift. He was awarded a Gold Star. But "Terrible Tommy" had a stormy personality, having no tolerance

for stupidity, laziness, incompetence, or failure in leadership. His temper would turn fiery and furious. During April 1-13, 1945, he led the division as part of Task Group 51.2 in diversionary activities off the coast of **Okinawa** and as floating reserve for the 10th Army. From August 1945 to June 1946, he became Director of Personnel. He assumed Command of 2nd Marine Division in Camp Lejeune. His last command from 1948-1950 was as Commanding General, Pacific Fleet Marine Force.



**Gen. Holland "Howlin' Mad" Smith** graduated with a BS degree from Auburn University in 1901; and a Bachelor of Laws from University of Alabama in 1903. He became Commanding General of V Amphibious Corps in **Saipan**, but was later moved out of the Pacific. Although an expert logistician, organizer, and trainer, Gen. H.M. Smith oversaw but did not command the major WWII battles that he managed, except **Kwajalein**. Nevertheless, Erskine appreciated Holland Smith's independence and perceptiveness. In June 1941, he helped create the Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet, which provided initial training for the 1st Marines and the 9th Army Division on amphibious warfare. In October 1941, he was promoted to Maj. Gen. and commanded the Amphibious Corps, Pacific Fleet. In August 1942, commanded the Amphibious Corps, Pacific Fleet, and completed the amphibious indoctrination of 2nd Marine and 3rd Marine Divisions, and the 7th Army Division involved in the **Aleutians Islands** operation. The Amphibious Corps was designated V Amphibious Corps a year later and relocated to **Pearl Harbor**. Holland Smith helped plan the invasion of **Tarawa** in November 1943. In February 1944, he was promoted to Lt. Gen. and participated in the invasion of **Kwajalein**. For the V Amphibious Corps, Holland Smith prepared for the invasion of **Saipan** in June 1944, **Guam** in July 1944, and **Tinian** in August 1944. Holland Smith was designated Commanding General, Pacific Fleet Marine Force, and later commanded Task Force 56 to plan the invasion of **Iwo Jima** in February 1945. In July, he led the Marine Training and Replacement Command at Camp Pendleton. He was promoted to General and retired in May 1946. The USMC Base Camp H.M. Smith, HQ of Marine Corps Pacific on Oahu, Hawaii is named in his honor.



**Gen. Harry "Dutchman" Schmidt** served in WWI and WWII. He graduated from the Command and General Staff School in 1932. In January 1942, he became Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps. In 1944, a joint Marine and Army troop launched an amphibious assault on **Kwajalein** where the Japan stationed its outermost defensive perimeter. The U.S. forces for the landings comprised RADM Turner's 5th Fleet Amphibious Force, and Gen. Holland Smith's V Amphibious Corps, comprising the 4th Marine Division commanded by Maj. Gen. Harry Schmidt, Army's 7th Infantry Division, 22nd Marines, Army's 106th and 111th Infantry regiments. The 4th Marine Division and 7th Infantry Division were assigned to do landings at Roi-Namur, while 2nd Battalion, 106th Inf was assigned to the capture of Majuro Atoll. The rest of the 106th Inf and 22nd Marine Regiment were on reserve for the assault on Eniwetok. The 4th Marine Division took **Roi-Namur** in March 1944 in half the time the Army took **Majuro Atoll**. This was the first Marine Corps unit to formally employ fire team tactics in combat. Schmidt led the 4th Marine Division in the **Battle of Saipan**. In February 1945, 70,000 Marine Corps landed on **Iwo Jima**. The island was laden

with pillboxes, gun emplacements, tunnels, and machine-gun nests, ready to annihilate the approaching Marines. **The Battle of Iwo Jima** encompassed everything the Marine Corps represents: courage, sacrifice, persistence, camaraderie, discipline, and honor. The Marine Commander who led and won the **Battle of Iwo Jima** is Gen. Harry Schmidt, Commanding General, Pacific Fleet Marine Force. In February 1945, a platoon-sized patrol began climbing Suribachi wary of snipers. Marines of 5th Marine Division planted a much larger American flag than the previous team did. The Japanese fired on the men at the summit. Schmidt had a steady hand, determination, and fortitude that guided his Marines to overcome their enemy. Schmidt became Commanding General of V Amphibious Corps in July 1944.



**Maj. Gen. Clayton "Barney" Vogel** served in WWI and WWII. He graduated from Rutgers University in 1904, and took Law at Georgetown University. In 1941, Vogel led the 2nd Marine Division. He became Commanding General, Pacific Amphibious Force, and led the I Amphibious Corps. He was promoted to Maj. Gen. to lead the preparation of Marines for amphibious operations. The unit was designated I Marine Amphibious Corps (1MAC). In May 1942, Vogel became Commander of 2nd Joint Training Force, comprising 2nd Marine Division and 3rd Army Division. In February 1942, Vogel tested the Navajo Code Talkers by writing combat messages. The Navajo transmitted the messages almost verbatim. In March 1942, Vogel wrote to Commandant Thomas Holcomb recommending the Navajo Code Talkers because Nazi Germans had not been able to infiltrate the Navajo tribe. In 1943, Admiral Halsey ordered Vogel to do a "New Georgia Campaign" study. Vogel's calculation of ground forces necessary to capture **New Georgia**, with landing forces from the South Pacific Army, were on the high side. Vogel did not meet the expectations of Admiral Halsey, who considered Vogel too lenient as a planner, and ordered Commandant Holcomb to replace Vogel. Subsequently, Vogel's calculations were proven correct. Capturing **New Georgia** took more time, and needed more resources than the Army and Admiral Halsey had estimated. Vogel's fear of flying had him doing inspection tours by ship, which caused delays. He lost time to train 1MAC for amphibious operations. His inability to manage 1MAC well required Holcomb to relieve him. In August 1943, he became Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, San Diego, Camp Elliott. In May 1944, Vogel became Commanding General at the Marine Corps Recruit Depot, Parris Island, until his retirement in February 1946.




**Gen. Charles D. Barrett** served in WWI and WWII. He studied at Ecole de Guerre in Paris. In May 1911, he was at the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland, to command the Marine Detachment aboard USS *Indiana*. During 1929-33, he taught at Marine Corps schools and co-wrote "*The Tentative Manual for Landing Operations*," marking him as a pioneer in amphibious operations. He was Commander of 3rd Marine Brigade, and embarked for **Samoa** where his brigade morphed into a battle unit. In 1940, he was Director of Plans and Policies Division at HQMC. In November 1941-March 1942, he was Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps. In September 1942, he was promoted to Maj. Gen. as Commander of the 3rd Marine Division, and embarked for **Auckland** in July 1943. By August 1943, his division was stationed on **Guadalcanal**, training intensively for the invasion of **Bougainville**. In September 1943,

Barrett relinquished the 3rd Marine Division to Harry Schmidt because Commandant Holcomb decided that Barrett would replace Vandegrift as Commander of 1MAC. A fellow Marine said Barrett was very imaginative, ingenious, and forward-thinking. Holcomb lauded Barrett's brilliance, sincerity, attentiveness, friendliness, work ethic, and tact. He would have been a good combat general for intricate knowledge of amphibious warfare, if not for his lack of an iron soul. Vandegrift handed 1MAC to Barrett but he continued to work on **Bougainville** until his death 3 weeks later. Records indicate cerebral hemorrhage as cause of death but there is evidence of suicide a day after he was fired as 1MAC Commanding General by Admiral Halsey. Camp Barrett in Quantico, Virginia is named after Gen. Charles Barrett.

**CONCLUSION.** In November 1941, there were 65,000 Marines. The Marine Corps engaged in perilous battle engagements. They consequently suffered relatively high casualties. By the Pacific War's end in September 1945, there were over 23,000 Marines killed; and over 67,000 wounded. The Marines played a major role in WWII particularly against Japan. Marines were in the Philippines, Guadalcanal, Bougainville, Cape Gloucester, Tarawa, Roi-Namur, Eniwetok, Saipan, Tinian, Guam, Peleliu, Iwo Jima, Okinawa, and others. As Marines, they did not balk at their missions as they have a top-down "can-do" attitude. But the Marine Corps did not have it easy. They had to prove their worth to the military branches as a capable unit to undertake very risky amphibious warfare operations, which became the Marine Corps raison d'être. Weaponry, doctrine, tactics, skills, good combat commanders, all together gave the Marine Corps' the ability to storm hostile beaches. Without good leadership, the Marines would not have attained an exceptional battle record in WWII Pacific.

**RECOMMENDATION. Commanding the Pacific – Marine Corps Generals of WWII** authored by **Stephen R. Taaffe** and published by **USNI**, highlights the manifested glory of the U.S. Marine Corps in WWII Pacific. However, the Marine Combat Generals who led



the riskiest attack missions remain to this day relatively unknown. That must change. This book unequivocally presents each of these 16 Marine Generals' characteristics, education, strengths, and weaknesses that either helped or obstructed their careers. The Marine Corps may have instilled the same sense of duty, ferocious commitment to the Corps, loyalty, and self-reliance, but their personalities were far from uniform. The Marine Corps' greatest contributions to success in WWII were their amphibious operations that carried Allied Troops over every single beachhead in the Pacific war. Lt. Gen. John Lejeune said, "Leadership is the sum of the qualities of intellect, human understanding, and moral character that enables a person to inspire and control a group of people successfully." This book is recommended reading for those who would like to join the Marine Corps, and learn combat leadership skills to be a successful fighter in battle. The ideal Marine Combat General must be in perfect health and mind, and excellent in logistical planning and executing orders, but with an iron soul. In my opinion, the Marine Corps was the perfect arm to match the ferociousness of the Japanese in WWII. Marines are truly a different breed. Semper Fi. 🚩



# SEABEES AND ENGINEER RETIREES GENERAL SERVICES COOPERATIVE

SURVEYING • PLANNING • DESIGN • ESTIMATES  
CONSTRUCTION • REPAIR • AIRCONDITIONING

**IN PARTNERSHIP WITH:**



**ARISTOS CONSTRUCTION**

PCAB License No.: 45198  
Classification: General Engineering

RADM MARGARITO V SANCHEZ JR AFP (RET)  
President

**Our Vision:**

To be a successful cooperative engaged in Construction Engineering and Manpower provider in the Construction Industry, that provides Livelihood Assistance and additional Financial Resources for Seabees Retirees, their dependents and other members of SERGS Cooperative.

**Our Mission:**

To undertake Quality Construction Engineering Projects, or provide Skilled Labor and Construction Management and other Engineering Services, in order to provide Livelihood Assistance and additional Financial Resources to Retired Seabees and other members of SERGS Cooperative.

**Objective:**

To engage in General Services particularly in Construction Engineering, Repair and Maintenance of Facilities and Buildings.

RADM MARGARITO V SANCHEZ JR AFP (RET)  
Chairperson, SERGS Cooperative

**For Inquiries and other concerns:**

**Address:** 2nd Flr. P&J Bldg., M. Roxas cor., Bayani Rd. AFPOVAI, Western Bicutan, Taguig City

**Tel No.:** 961-9392

**E-Mail:** sergskooperative@yahoo.com

**Our Clients:**



and many more...



# Maritime Academy of Asia and the Pacific - Kamaya Point

Associated Marine Officers' and Seamen's Union of the Philippines-PTGWO-ITF

Kamaya Point, Brgy. Alas-asin, Mariveles, Bataan, Philippines  
 Tel. No.: (02) 784-9100 Fax No.: (02) 741-1006  
 URL: www.msaap.edu.ph E-mail: info@msaap.edu.ph

Mobile No.: (0917) 533-8263

AMOSUP - PTGWO - ITF



## Welcome Aboard!



### Courses Offered:

- BSMT - Bachelor of Science in Marine Transportation
- BSMarE - Bachelor of Science in Marine Engineering
- BSMTE - Bachelor of Science in Marine Transportation and Engineering

- Courses Offered:**
- Master of Science in Marine Transportation (Marine Superintendent)
  - Master of Science in Marine Engineering (Technical Superintendent)

### MAAAP Profile

#### Testing Assessment Center of TESDA

Geographic destiny has given the Filipino the innate talent to be an excellent seafarer. To enhance this natural skill, the Maritime Academy of Asia and the Pacific (MAAP) was established on January 14, 1998. The Academy stands on a 103-hectare property in Kamaya Point, Mariveles, Bataan.

The Associated Marine Officers' and Seamen's Union of the Philippines (AMOSUP) founded by the late Capt. Gregorio S Oca, capitalized and developed the Academy. The new AMOSUP President, Dr. Conrado F. Oca, heads the Academy's board of governors. The board is comprised of representatives from the private sector, the International Transport Workers Federation, the Filipino Association of Maritime Employers, the International Transport Workers Federation, the All Japan Seamen's Union, the International Mariners Management Association of Japan, the Norwegian Seafarers' Union, the International Maritime Employers' Committee, the Danish Shipowners' Association, the Norwegian Shipowners' Association, and the Japanese Shipowners' Association.

MAAP conducts shipboard training aboard T/S Kapitán Felix Oca, a 5020 DWT dedicated training ship capable of accommodating 180 midshipmen and 9 instructors in 30 air-conditioned cabins and six berths.

MAAP students are all scholars who are entitled to free tuition, board and lodging. They receive a comprehensive, up-to-date and well-rounded education that fully complies with the requirements of STCW 95 and the Commission on Higher Education (CHED). To ensure the highest standards of quality, MAAP adheres to a Quality Standards System that has been certified to comply with ISO 9001 version 2008, the Det Norske Veritas (DNV) Rules for Maritime Academies, and the Productivity and Standard Board (PSB) of Singapore.

The Academy offers three main programs: the Bachelor of Science in Marine Transportation (BSMT), Bachelor of Science in Marine Engineering (BSMarE) and the Bachelor of Science in Marine Transportation and Engineering (BSMTE). The curricula for the three courses were designed with the help of the United States Merchant Marine Academy at Kings Point, New York. Courses are four-year courses with sea phases scheduled in the third year. The BSMT curriculum requires a total of 192 units: 152 at MAAP, 40 practicum/shipboard units on board T/S Kapitán Felix Oca and/or a shipping company sponsorship. The BSMarE curriculum requires a total of 193 units: 153 at MAAP, 40 practicum/shipboard units on board T/S Kapitán Felix Oca and/or a shipping company sponsorship.



AMOSUP Seamen's Training Center



Full Mission Bridge Simulator



Full Mission Engine Simulator



Full Mission Bridge Simulator on Motion Platform



Japanese Compact Ship Handling Simulator

### Our Curricula

# ONE STANDARD EVERYWHERE, EVERY TIME:




## EXCELLENCE UNCONTAINED.

Established in 1988 in Manila, Philippines, International Container Terminal Services, Inc. (ICTSI) develops, manages and operates gateway ports in the Asia Pacific, Americas, Europe, Middle East and Africa.

Starting with the privatization of the Manila International Container Terminal, ICTSI's current diverse portfolio includes capacity expansion projects and greenfield investments in developed and emerging markets.

ICTSI is an acclaimed private sector partner of governments requiring high-performing, profitable ports.

More important is ICTSI's distinct neutrality. As an independent business with no shipping, logistics, or consignee-related interests, ICTSI offers the same level of service excellence to every port community stakeholder.



EXCELLENCE UNCONTAINED

#### HEAD OFFICE

ICTSI Administration Bldg., Manila International Container Terminal  
MCT South Access Road, Port of Manila, Manila 1012, Philippines  
+632 245 4101 +632 245 2245 info@ictsi.com  
www.ictsi.com