



MARITIME REVIEW

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THE CONTROVERSY OF SANDY CAY



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- » A Tribute to a Filipino Veteran
- » PH-US Marine Exercise 2022
- » Maritime League supports Bohol Relief Assistance
- » Relief and Recovery Operations by BFAR-8

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
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Source: Edcel John A. Ibarra.

MARITIME EVENTS CALENDAR

MARCH 2022

- 2 MARITIME ELECTRIFICATION WORKSHOP - TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION CENTRE, UNIVERSITY OF STRATHCLYDE, GLASGOW, UNITED KINGDOM
- 8 - 9 SMI ANNUAL CONFERENCE 2022
SAGE GATESHEAD, NEWCASTLE, UNITED KINGDOM
- 15 - 17 OCEANOLOGY INTERNATIONAL 2022 - EXCEL LONDON ROYAL VICTORIA DOCK, LONDON, UNITED KINGDOM
- 16 MARINE AUTONOMY NETWORKING EVENT - EXCEL LONDON, WESTERN GATEWAY, ROYAL VICTORIA DOCK, LONDON, UNITED KINGDOM
- 16 - 18 ASIA PACIFIC MARITIME 2022
MARINA BAY SANDS, SINGAPORE, SINGAPORE
- 21 - 23 DOHA INTERNATIONAL MARITIME DEFENCE EXHIBITION AND CONFERENCE (DIMDEX 2022) DOHA EXHIBITION AND CONVENTION CENTER (DECC), DOHA, QATAR
- 24 - 25 16TH LNG SUPPLIES FOR ASIAN MARKETS 2022 FAIRMONT HOTEL, SINGAPORE, SINGAPORE
- 24 - 26 INTERNATIONAL MARITIME EXPO VIETNAM (INMEX VIETNAM 2022) SAIGON EXHIBITION AND CONVENTION CENTRE, HO CHI MINH, VIETNAM
- 29 MARITIME FORUM #171 - MARITIME ACADEMY OF ASIA AND THE PACIFIC (MAAP) / AMOSUP, INTRAMUROS, MANILA**
- 30 SMART MARITIME NETWORK ATHENS CONFERENCE BLE PAVILION, POSEIDONOS, ATHENS, GREECE

APRIL 2022

- 4 - 7 NOR-SHIPING 2022 NOVA SPEKTRUM, LILLESTROM, NORWAY
- 5 - 7 WINDEUROPE 2022 - BILBAO EXHIBITION CENTRE, BARAKALDO, BIZKAIA, SPAIN
- 20 - 22 SEA JAPAN 2022 - TOKYO BIG SIGHT EXHIBITION CENTRE, KOTO CITY, TOKYO, JAPAN
- 25 - 28 SEATRADER CRUISE GLOBAL - MIAMI BEACH CONVENTION CENTRE, MIAMI, FLORIDA, USA
- 25 - 28 IPF - INTERNATIONAL OFFSHORE WIND PARTNERING FORUM ATLANTIC CITY CONVENTION CENTRE, CONVENTION, BLVD, ATLANTIC CITY, NEW JERSEY, USA
- 26 MARITIME FORUM #172 DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE - BUREAU OF FISHERIES AND AQUATIC RESOURCES (DA-BFAR)**
- 26 - 28 DANISH MARITIME FAIR - TIVOLI HOTEL & CONGRESS CENTRE ARNI MAGNUSSONS GADE 2 COPENHAGEN, DENMARK
- 26 - 28 7TH WORLD MARITIME TECHNOLOGY CONFERENCE TIVOLI HOTEL & CONGRESS CENTRE ARNI MAGNUSSONS GADE 2 COPENHAGEN, DENMARK
- 26 - 27 DEEP SEA MINING SUMMIT 2022
HALLAM CONFERENCE CENTRE, LONDON, UNITED KINGDOM
- 27 - 29 SHIP ENERGY SUMMIT 2022
HOTEL BALNEARIO LAS AREANAS, VALENCIA, SPAIN

MAY 2022

- 2 - 5 OFFSHORE TECHNOLOGY CONFERENCE 2022 (OTC 2022)
NRG PARK HOUSTON, TEXAS, USA
- 3 - 5 GLOBAL LNG BUNKERING SUMMIT 2022
NOVOTEL AMSTERDAM CITY, AMSTERDAM, THE NETHERLANDS
- 11 - 13 TORSIONAL VIBRATION SYMPOSIUM 2022
HALLWANGER LANDESSTRASSE, SALZBURG, AUSTRIA
- 11 - 12 COASTLINK 2022
HAVENHUIS ANTWERPEN, ZAHA HADIDPLEIN, ANTWERP, BELGIUM
- 11 - 13 SHIPBUILD INDIA EXPO SUMMIT
BOMBAY EXHIBITION CENTER MUMBAI, INDIA
- 11 - 13 MARITIME TRANSPORT AND SHIPPING INDIA EXPO 2022
BOMBAY EXHIBITION CENTER, MUMBAI, INDIA
- 16 - 18 WORLD PORT CONFERENCE - VANCOUVER CONVENTION CENTRE, VANCOUVER, BRITISH COLUMBIA, CANADA
- 17 - 19 MARITIME INDUSTRY TRADE SHOW - EVENEMENTENHAL GORINCHEM, FRANKLINWEG 2, GORINCHEM, THE NETHERLANDS
- 17 - 19 BREAKBULK EUROPE - ROTTERDAM AHOY, AHOYWEG, ROTTERDAM, THE NETHERLANDS
- 17 - 19 EUROPORT ROMANIA - ROTTERDAM AHOY, AHOYWEG, ROTTERDAM, THE NETHERLANDS

- 19 - 20 FERRY SHIPPING SUMMIT - CASINO COSMOPOL MALMO, SLOTTSGATAN, MALMO, SWEDEN
- 19 - 22 EUROPEAN MARITIME DAY 2022 - PALA DE ANDRE, VLE EUROPA, RAVENNA, ITALY
- 23 - 25 INLAND MARINE EXPO (IMX 2022) - AMERICAS CENTER, ST LOUIS, MISSOURI, USA
- 24 - 26 NAVALIA INTERNATIONAL SHIPBUILDING EXHIBITION INSTITUTO FEIRAL - DE VIGO, VIGO, SPAIN
- 30 - 2 HANNOVER MESSE - HANNOVER FAIRGROUND, HANNOVER GERMANY
- 31 MARITIME FORUM #173 - PHILIPPINE NAVY (PN) HEADQUARTERS, PHILIPPINE NAVY, MANILA**

JUNE 2022

- 1 - 2 NAVIGATE 2022 - TURKU FAIR CENTER, TURKU, FINLAND
- 5 - 10 CONFERENCE ON OCEAN, OFFSHORE AND ARCTIC ENGINEERING (OMAE 2022) HAMBURG EXHIBITION HALL AND CONGRESS, HAMBURG, GERMANY
- 6 - 10 POSIDONIA 2022 - ATHENS METROPOLITAN EXPO CENTER, ATHENS INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, SPATA, GREECE
- 7 - 8 BALTIC LNG & GAS FORUM - KLAIPEDA, LITHUANIA
- 8 - 10 GREENTECH 2022 - MONTREAL, CANADA
- 14 - 16 TOC EUROPE - ROTTERDAM AHOY, AHOYWEG, ROTTERDAM, THE NETHERLANDS
- 15 - 17 SEANERGY 2022 - EXPONANTES LE PARC, NANTES, FRANCE
- 20 - 22 WINDFORECE 2022 - BREMERHAVEN, GERMANY
- 20 - 22 MARINE MONEY WEEK - THE PIERRE HOTEL, NEW YORK, USA
- 21 - 22 GLOBAL OFFSHORE WIND 2022
MANCHESTER CENTRAL, MANCHESTER, UNITED KINGDOM
- 21 - 22 MARISSA SYMPOSIUM 2022 - BREMERHAVEN, GERMANY
- 21 - 23 ELECTRIC & HYBRID MARINE WORLD EXPO - RAI AMSTERDAM CONVENTION CENTRE, AMSTERDAM, THE NETHERLANDS
- 21 PHILIPPINES MARINE (PHILMARINE 2022) - SMX CONVENTION CENTER, SM MALL OF ASIA COMPLEX, PASAY CITY, PHILIPPINES
- 21 - 23 SHIPBUILD PHILIPPINES 2022 - SMX CONVENTION CENTER, SM MALL OF ASIA COMPLEX, PASAY CITY, PHILIPPINES
- 21 - 23 OFFSHORE PHILIPPINES 2022 SMX CONVENTION CENTER, SM MALL OF ASIA COMPLEX, PASAY CITY, PHILIPPINES
- 23 ANNUAL GENERAL MEMBERSHIP MEETING**
- 23 MARITIME FORUM #174 - MARITIME INDUSTRY AUTHORITY (MARINA) / SOUTH HARBOR, MANILA**
- 28 - 30 WORLD WIND ENERGY CONFERENCE (WWEC 2022)
RIMINI CONFERENCE CENTER, RIMINI, ITALY
- 28 - 30 EUROMARITIME 2022 - PARC CHANOT MARSEILLE, MARSEILLE, FRANCE
- 27 - 1 JULMARINETEC CHINA
NATIONAL CONVENTION & EXHIBITION CENTRE, SHANGHAI, CHINA

JULY 2022

- 6 - 8 INTERNATIONAL OFFSHORE ENGINEERING TECHNOLOGY & EQUIPMENT EXHIBITION - NEW CHINA INTERNATIONAL EXHIBITION CENTER, BEIJING, CHINA
- 6 - 8 INTERNATIONAL MARITIME DEFENCE EXHIBITION & CONFERENCE KEPINSKI HOTEL, GOLD COAST CITY, ACCRA, GHANA
- 12 - 14 INTERMODAL ASIA - SHANGHAI WORLD EXPO EXHIBITION & CONVENTION CENTER, SHANGHAI, CHINA
- 26 MARITIME FORUM #175 - PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY (PPA) SOUTH HARBOR, MANILA**

AUGUST 2022

- 16 - 18 MARINETEC SOUTH AMERICA
CENTRO DE CONVENCOES SULAMERICA, RIO DE JANEIRO, BRAZIL
- 17 - 18 LOGISTIC SUMMIT & EXPO 2022
CENTRO CITIBANAMEX, MEXICO CITY, MEXICO
- 29 - 1SEP OFFSHORE NORTHERN SEAS (ONS 2022) STAVANGER, NORWAY
- 30 MARITIME FORUM #176 - DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES - NATIONAL MAPPING AND RESOURCE INFORMATION AUTHORITY (DENR-NAMRIA) / QUEZON CITY**
- 31 - 4SEP HISWA - MASTERDAM IN WATER BOAT SHOW (BATAVIA PORT LELYSTAD, FLEVOLAND, THE NETHERLANDS)



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A TRIBUTE TO A FILIPINO VETERAN

by VAdm Emilio C Marayag Jr AFP(Ret)

In January 2022, one of the few remaining WWII veterans, Major Maximo P Young, passed away due to heart ailment. He was six months away from his centennial birthday. The Armed Forces of the Philippines rendered full military honors during his internment ceremony.

Major Young was an extraordinary veteran having served in 3 international conflicts: WWII, Korean War, and Vietnam War. He started his patriotic exploits as an able seaman of SS Divina and later MV Legazpi when the war begun. The government tasked MV Legazpi to transport military cargo in the Visayas but was sunk by the Japanese in the Mindoro waters. Major Young survived by swimming ashore. He then joined the guerillas under then Captain Ernesto Mata in Negros Island.

After the war, he took up a battle tank maintenance course in the United States that qualified him to be with the Philippine Expeditionary Force to Korea (PEFTOK) under the 10th Battalion Combat Team. Upon return, he got an appointment to the army officers corps as 2ND Lieutenant. When the Philippines sent a Civic Action Group (PHILCAG) to Vietnam, Major Young served in an operational planning cell in another capacity but not part of the contingent.

As President of AGFO, the family through Major Young's son, Lt. Colonel Wilson Young, requested me to say a few words during the necrological service. Part of the tribute is quoted hereunder.

"Major Maximo Young's special journey portrayed his tenacity, bravery and heroism that demonstrated the exceptional traits of a true warrior and a productive citizen of the republic. The Association of General and Flag Officers, Inc., AGFO for short, joins the nation and its veterans in paying tribute to a great man."

"AGFO is conceived to "defend the preservation of the Republic so that justice, liberty and democracy shall always prevail." It also aims "to advance the welfare and interest of Filipino veterans of all wars" by recognizing their constant resolve to sacrifice for the protection of the state and by acknowledging their willingness and determination to lay down one's life for the motherland.

"Upon learning of Major Young's demise, several generals who have known him and his service reputation expressed their sympathies and condolences. One is a retired air force major general who used to play badminton with him some years back and once asked Major Young the secret or secrets of his longevity. The Major's response: do physical exercise, solve crossword puzzle and play mahjong. Another is a retired army brigadier general who spent 2 years with PHILCAG in Vietnam and who heard about Major Young's battlefield experiences in WWII and the Korean war but was unaware that Major Young also served in Vietnam not in the combat zone but in a strategic planning cell

that helped shape the allies' conduct of the war."

"Today, I share the grief and emptiness of Major Young's family, colleagues and friends for losing an outstanding war veteran who served his nation so well that the present youth of the land could draw inspiration from and possibly emulate his deeds. Many articles written about Major Young described his gallantry in combat where he convincingly demonstrated the enduring principle in leading troops: accomplishment of the mission and taking care of the welfare of the men. But beyond his heroic acts, Major Young effectively articulated his practical definition of patriotism."

"His definition was very simple –love of country and love of family. Patriotism sustained his life and vigor for more than 70 years, a long journey for a patriot. Major Young's patriotism is larger than his nationalism, international in outlook, tolerant, broad-minded, and bereft of hatred against foreign enemies. Patriots know what the flag, the nation's history, culture and traditions, democratic values, and the family as the basic unit of the society truly mean. Patriots recognize that nobody is perfect and that scarcity of resources is never a hindrance to a noble cause as being patriotic."

"Major Young participated in 3 international wars where the preservation of basic freedoms and national pride and identity were at stake. From the shark infested waters of Mindoro to the chilly battlefields in Korea and the bloody clash of ideology in Vietnam, Major Young's determination to prevail was preeminent. His advocacy to "care for the living veterans and perpetuate the legacy" of Filipino soldiers is very touching. We must carry on."

"Major Young's advocacy is not only about caring for the veterans but also for the Filipino youth. His challenge to them comes in a form of a question: How can you display your patriotism for our beloved country? A question that needs re-echoing."

With the recent aggression of Russia in Eastern Europe, where an inferior nation is no match to its military might, the defenders have to suffer the dreadful consequences of fighting a superior enemy. The destruction of Ukrainian infrastructure, defense capabilities, production centers and communities as the Russian offensive continues is a grim reminder of the horrors of war.

Based on media reports the Ukrainian national leadership appears to have ignited the patriotism of the Ukrainians and currently maintains control of the soldiers and volunteers. While over a million men, women and children have crossed the borders to seek safe refuge most of the population remained to defend their homes and way of life.

Whatever the outcome of this bloody conflict, patriots will long be remembered because many of us salute our own like Major Young and recollect his challenges not only for the youth but also for the incumbent and future leaders of this nation. 🚢



Major Maximo Purisima Young
(1902-2022) PA(Ret).
Photo Credit: Laang Kawal Pilipinas.

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THE CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING SANDY CAY: EXAMINING THE PUBLIC EVIDENCE

by Edcel John A. Ibarra



Figure 1. Thitu Reefs and the features within it. Images from Google Earth, with pins and labels by the author. Geographical coordinates of the sandbars and reefs from Kalayaan, Palawan, Municipal Ordinance No. 50-2020 (14-Aug-2020). Note that Google Earth wrongly labels Pag-asa Cay 3 as Sandy Cay.

In August 2017, Chinese coast guard and navy ships were seen close by Sandy Cay, a sandbar neighboring Philippine-occupied Thitu (Pag-asa) Island in the South China Sea (SCS). Then Senior Associate Justice of the Philippine Supreme Court, Antonio Carpio, warned that Sandy Cay was “being seized (to put it mildly), or being invaded (to put it frankly) by China.” President Rodrigo Duterte and then Secretary of Foreign Affairs Alan Peter Cayetano denied the allegation.

Four years later, Mr. Carpio, who is now retired, continues to claim that the Philippines has lost Sandy Cay to China. Philippine government officials also continue to reject Mr. Carpio’s claim.

The controversy persists to this day partly because neither side has presented conclusive evidence to the public. For its part, the Philippine government cannot simply disclose, for reasons of national security, intelligence on the situation on the ground or details of diplomatic discussions with other countries.

The controversy must be settled not only to set the record straight but also to determine whether the Philippine government should take further steps to defend Sandy Cay. Unfortunately, verifying either side’s claim would prove difficult. The place is remote, and publicly available information about the situation is scarce and sometimes conflicting. For instance, both sides, as well as independent sources, disagree even on basic facts about Sandy Cay’s geography, including its exact location in the SCS.

Still, publicly available sources —satellite imagery, government press releases, news reports, and expert analyses—can shed light on the situation in Sandy Cay if they are checked against each other. Relying on public evidence, this author finds that as of September 2021, the Philippines has not yet lost Sandy Cay to China. Before examining the evidence, though, this paper first clarifies where Sandy Cay is, and then explains why the Philippines should defend it.

Where Is Sandy Cay?

To begin with, basic facts about Sandy Cay’s geography must be clarified. There are three points of confusion.

First, some have doubted whether a sandbar named Sandy Cay exists at all and, if so, whether it is a high-tide feature—a formation that is above water at high tide, as opposed to a low-tide elevation, which is above water only at low tide, or a completely submerged feature.

In the *South China Sea Arbitration*, the Philippines argued that Sandy Cay no longer existed, but the tribunal disagreed. Sandbars, also known as sandbanks, sand cays, or sand keys, can be “dynamic”: they can “appear and disappear under the combined effects of astronomic tides, monsoon winds and storms” and can change their location upon reappearance. “The absence of a sand cay at a particular point in time is thus not conclusive evidence of the absence of a high-tide feature,” the tribunal concluded. Sandy Cay, moreover, may no longer be dynamic and may have become permanent because of the debris from dredging in Chinese-occupied Subi (Zamora) Reef, about 10 nautical miles (19 km) southwest.

Second, some have mistaken Sandy Cay’s general location in the South China Sea. They have confused the sandbar with other features. Presidential Spokesperson Harry Roque has mistaken Sandy Cay for Vietnamese-occupied Sand Cay (Bailan Island), which lies about 40 nautical miles (74 km) southeast of Sandy Cay. National Security Adviser Hermogenes Esperon Jr. has also confused Sandy Cay with a sandy cay or a sand cay—generic terms for a sandbar.

Sandy Cay is part of Thitu Reefs in the northwestern sector of the Spratly Islands. Thitu Reefs consist of two atolls. The eastern atoll comprises two reefs that are completely submerged. The western atoll comprises Thitu Island and several sandbars, one

of which is Sandy Cay. Thitu Island and Sandy Cay are high-tide features. The other sandbars are either completely submerged features or low-tide elevations. Some may have also become high-tide features in recent years, but available evidence is not yet conclusive.

Finally, some have mistaken Sandy Cay's specific location within Thitu Reefs' western atoll. Sandy Cay has been depicted as the sandbar closest to Thitu Island, to the northwest, or the one farthest, to the west-southwest. It has also been described as a set of four separate sandbars or a collection of three "coalescing" sandbars.

But the earliest known reference to Sandy Cay—HMS *Rifleman's* fair chart from a hydrographic survey of Thitu Reefs in 1867 points to the sandbar lying about 4 nautical miles (7 km) directly west of Thitu Island. Filipino fishers and the Philippine government have also called that sandbar Sandy Cay. Precisely put, Sandy Cay lies at approximately 11°3'36" north latitude and 114°13'8" east longitude. Figure 1 shows its location within Thitu Reefs.

Sandy Cay is known by different names:

- In the Philippines, Sandy Cay is known as Pag-asa Cay 2. The name was given in August 2020, when the municipality of Kalayaan—the local government unit headquartered on Thitu Island that administers the Philippines' Kalayaan Island Group claim in the Spratly Islands—renamed Thitu Reefs and the sandbars and reefs in the atolls. The national government adopted the new names on official nautical charts in September 2020. Thitu Reefs is now known as Pag-asa Islands (not to be confused with Pag-asa Island, the Filipino name for Thitu Island).
- In China, Sandy Cay is known as Tiexianzhong Reef (Tiexianzhong Jiao 铁线中礁). Some sources also use the name Tiexian Reef (Tiexian Jiao 铁线礁), but strictly speaking, the name refers collectively to three sandbars in Thitu Reefs' western atoll.
- In Vietnam, Sandy Cay is known as Hoai An Rock (Đá Hoài Ân).

Why Should the Philippines Defend Sandy Cay?

Sandy Cay is a sandbar that lies directly west of Thitu Island and stays above water at high tide. It is tiny, measuring no more than 240 m², according to Google Earth satellite imagery captured in April 2019.

The sandbar's tiny size makes it seem insignificant. Indeed, while responding to claims that China had seized Sandy Cay in August 2017, President Duterte asked, "Why should I defend a sandbar and kill the Filipinos because of a sandbar?" He also asked of China, "Why would they risk invading a sandbar and get into a quarrel with us?" But although Sandy Cay is tiny, from a legal perspective, its value is tremendous.

The 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea classifies a high-tide feature as either an "island" or a "rock." An island can generate a territorial sea of up to 12 nautical miles (22 km), an exclusive economic zone of up to 200 nautical miles (370 km), and a continental shelf of up to 350 nautical miles (648 km) from the coast. A rock can generate only a territorial sea. Sandy Cay qualifies only as a rock because it is too small to "sustain human habitation or economic life of [its] own"—the main condition for a feature to qualify as an island.

Yet Sandy Cay's status as a rock is significant for two reasons. First, the tribunal in the *South China Sea Arbitration* found that no feature in the Spratly Islands is large enough to qualify as an island. The status of a rock, then, is the best status the feature

could qualify for. Second, states may appropriate or assert sovereignty over a high-tide feature (i.e., an island or a rock) but not a low-tide elevation or a completely submerged feature. Sandy Cay is one of the few features in the Spratly Islands that are capable of appropriation.

Indeed, several states claim Sandy Cay. China and Taiwan assert sovereignty over Sandy Cay as part of their claims to all land features within their dashed-line demarcations in the South China Sea. The Philippines asserts the same as part of its claim to the Kalayaan Island Group in the Spratly Islands. Vietnam also asserts sovereignty over Sandy Cay as part of its claims to the entire Spratly Islands. These states are all legitimate claimants of Sandy Cay because the tribunal in the *South China Sea Arbitration* did not—and could not—rule on questions of sovereignty over high-tide features in the South China Sea.

Sandy Cay itself, however, is less important than the territorial sea it can generate, which would engulf Chinese-occupied Subi Reef and overlap with the territorial sea of Philippine-occupied Thitu Island.

Subi Reef is a low-tide elevation in its natural state even though China has transformed it into an artificial island. It is thus incapable of appropriation and cannot generate any maritime zone. Sandy Cay, by contrast, is a rock capable of appropriation and can generate a 12-nautical mile territorial sea. Because Subi Reef lies only about 10 nautical miles from Sandy Cay, Sandy Cay's territorial sea would engulf Subi Reef.

If Sandy Cay did not exist or there were no high-tide features in Thitu Reefs' western atoll, demonstrating sovereignty over Thitu Island would suffice to gain a claim to Subi Reef. The tribunal in the *South China Sea Arbitration* explained: "Subi Reef would fall within the territorial sea of Thitu [Island] as extended by basepoints on the low-tide elevations of the reefs [sandbars] to the west of the island."

But Sandy Cay does exist.

The Philippines, then, must demonstrate sovereignty over Sandy Cay to claim Subi Reef and extinguish any legal ground for China's occupation and construction of an artificial island on the feature. Conversely, China must demonstrate sovereignty over Sandy Cay to bolster its claim to Subi Reef.

Additionally, the Philippines must demonstrate sovereignty over Sandy Cay to ensure that Thitu Island's territorial sea would not shrink. If another state were sovereign over Sandy Cay, the territorial seas of Thitu Island and Sandy Cay would overlap because the features lie only about 4 nautical miles from each other. If the overlapping territorial seas were delimited along the median line, the area of Thitu Island's territorial sea would shrink by about 40 percent.

Has the Philippines Lost Sandy Cay to China?

Sandy Cay is a valuable sandbar, which the Philippines cannot afford to lose. It was alarming when reports surfaced in August 2017 that Chinese ships had appeared close by and seemed poised to seize the feature. But Chinese Ambassador to the Philippines Zhao Jianhua assured President Duterte at that time that China was "not building anything" on the sandbar.

The incident was apparently resolved quickly. The following month, in September 2017, Ambassador Zhao declared, without elaborating, that the incident had been "successfully addressed through diplomatic channels."

Then in November 2017, Philippine Secretary of National

Defense Delfin Lorenzana revealed that the Philippines had in fact attempted to build fishers' shelters on Sandy Cay earlier that year. China protested the attempt, and the Philippines withdrew its soldiers from the sandbar. No structure was built, but the attempt might have triggered China to launch patrols to Sandy Cay, leading to the sighting of Chinese ships near the sandbar in August 2017.

In April 2019, Philippine Ambassador to China Jose Santiago Sta. Romana also revealed that the Philippines and China had previously reached a "provisional agreement" to keep Sandy Cay unoccupied. This may have been the agreement reached by the two countries in September 2017.

Although the August 2017 incident has been declared "successfully addressed," conflicting evidence has since surfaced. The controversy essentially covers three points: (1) whether the Philippines missed an opportunity to occupy Sandy Cay; (2) whether Chinese ships are loitering around the sandbar; and (3) whether Chinese ships have harassed Philippine vessels in the area. Overall, public evidence suggests that the Philippines has not yet lost Sandy Cay to China.

Did the Philippines Miss an Opportunity to Occupy Sandy Cay?

Those who say that the Philippines has lost Sandy Cay highlight a missed opportunity to assert sovereignty over the sandbar in 2017 when the Philippines backtracked from building fishers' shelters after receiving a protest from China. There is no dispute that China has not physically occupied Sandy Cay. Indeed, there is no evidence of Chinese-built structures or stationed Chinese soldiers or agents on the sandbar. In August 2017, the US Department of Defense claimed that China had planted a flag on Sandy Cay, but it might have misunderstood reports from Philippine news media, which cited a sandbar near Loaita (Kota) Island, where China had allegedly planted a flag.

The Philippines, however, was likely correct to backtrack from the plan. The Chinese protest reportedly cited the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC). Paragraph 5 states that ASEAN countries and China should "exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability including, among others, refraining from [the] action of inhabiting on the presently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays, and other features." Although the DOC is not legally binding, the Philippines must not disregard it because doing so will reduce the country's diplomatic leverage in championing compliance with the South China Sea Arbitration award.

Two ironies in the Chinese protest, however, must be noted. First, in 1994, China used the same pretense of building fishers' shelters to occupy Mischief (Panganiban) Reef—a low-tide elevation that is legally part of the Philippine exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Second, when China began transforming its occupied features in the Spratly Islands into artificial islands in 2013, it had arguably disregarded the same provision of the DOC. China did not occupy any uninhabited feature, but it constructed artificial islands that now host the largest de facto military bases in the area. These artificial islands have undoubtedly "complicate[d] or escalate[d] [the] disputes and affect[ed] peace and stability."

Are Chinese Ships Loitering around Sandy Cay?

Those who say that the Philippines has lost Sandy Cay imply that although the Philippines has honored the Chinese protest against the attempt to build fishers' shelters on the Sandy Cay,

China has rarely honored Philippine protests against the presence of Chinese ships around the sandbar. National Security Adviser Esperon, however, has mentioned that although China has not completely withdrawn from Sandy Cay, it has occasionally reduced the number of Chinese ships in the area in response to protests.

States normally do not publicize every diplomatic protest they make, so it would prove difficult to confirm whether a decrease in the number of Chinese ships around Sandy Cay correlates with the filling of a Philippine protest. Nonetheless, the number of Chinese ships in the area does fluctuate. Still, it is rarely zero. Indeed, both sides acknowledge that although China has not occupied the sandbar itself, it has maintained a presence in the surrounding waters.

Media reports, government releases, and satellite imagery demonstrate that Chinese ships have loitered in Thitu Reefs, including around Sandy Cay, since August 2017. These ships appear to be large fishing boats, but they are often Chinese maritime militia vessels in disguise, and are sometimes accompanied by Chinese coast guard and naval ships in a layered formation. Navy helicopters have also reportedly flown over the sandbar.

Initially, Chinese ships seemed to visit Thitu Reefs only occasionally and in small numbers. But starting in December 2018, the deployments became more frequent and larger in size, sometimes reaching numbers of nearly 100 a day. This apparent "swarming" of Chinese ships into Thitu Reefs prompted the Philippines to publicly denounce China in April 2019—a break from a usual quiet diplomacy on SCS matters.

Despite objections from the Philippines, China has refused to completely withdraw its ships from Thitu Reefs. Reports and satellite imagery throughout 2020 show that Chinese ships have mostly stayed in the area. This year, the Philippine government publicly acknowledged the ongoing challenge posed by these Chinese ships. In a protest against China in May 2021, the Philippines deplored the "incessant deployment, prolonged presence, and illegal activities of Chinese maritime assets and fishing vessels in the vicinity of the Pag-asa Islands Thitu Reefs." Satellite imagery in August 2021 shows 18 ships stationed in Thitu Reefs.

Analysts have claimed that the loitering of Chinese ships in Thitu Reefs is connected to the Philippines' infrastructure upgrades on Thitu Island. Chinese ships, then, may not completely withdraw from the area while upgrades are underway. Construction began in mid-2018. A sheltered port and a beaching ramp were completed last year, while repairs to the island's runway are set to start this year.

In March this year, however, the Philippines began to push back against the presence of Chinese ships, not only in Thitu Reefs but also within the Philippine EEZ in the South China Sea. The pushback followed the discovery of around 220 Chinese ships anchored in Whitsun (Julian Felipe) Reef that month. In response, the Philippines increased its patrols in the South China Sea, including in Thitu Reefs.

Have China's Ships Harassed Our Vessels near Sandy Cay?

Those who say that the Philippines has lost Sandy Cay to China point out that Chinese ships have blocked Philippine government vessels and fishing boats from going near the sandbar. Philippine government officials deny such harassment, but acknowledge that Chinese ships have been monitoring the activities of Filipino fishers from Thitu Island.

Public evidence is mixed regarding whether Chinese ships have harassed Philippine vessels.

In August 2017, former member of the House of Representatives Gary Alejano claimed, citing sources from the Philippine military, that Chinese ships had prevented a vessel of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources from going near one of the sandbars west of Thitu Island. He also alleged in February 2018 that Chinese ships had closed in on a Philippine Navy vessel in the area. In March 2019, Kalayaan Mayor Roberto del Mundo acknowledged that Chinese ships would approach Philippine fishing boats trying to go near any of the sandbars.

In May 2019, however, a survey ship of the National Mapping and Resource Information Authority went to the sandbars and successfully collected hydrographic data without being blocked by any Chinese ship. Moreover, in June 2020, local fishers told journalists visiting Thitu Island that “things ha[d] become better” and that Chinese ships would no longer block their paths to the sandbars. The visiting journalists also went ashore a sandbar without any problem, although a China Coast Guard vessel later appeared close by.

But in January 2021, it seemed that things had again gone worse. A video taken by a local fisher from Thitu Island at that time shows several Chinese ships getting in his way during an attempt to go to one of the sandbars. The fisher retreated and returned to Thitu Island.

In March 2021, however, the Philippine government increased its patrols in the SCS. Since then, Philippine military and law enforcement vessels have toured Thitu Reefs more frequently, and thus far, no report has emerged of Chinese ships interfering in a patrol. In contrast, during a patrol around Scarborough Shoal (Bajo de Masinloc) in April 2021, Philippine Coast Guard vessels were dangerously approached by China Coast Guard ships. The Philippines later protested the incident.

Overall, the mixed evidence does not show a persistent pattern of obstruction of Philippine vessels by Chinese ships, unlike in Scarborough Shoal. But it also shows that harassment has occurred previously and may occur again sporadically.

Obstruction by Chinese ships seem to be more apparent with Philippine fishing boats. Yet, Philippine government officials have denied that such obstruction amounts to harassment. But according to Mayor Del Mundo, Filipino fishers would withdraw their boats when encountering Chinese ships to avoid confrontation. Thus, there may be no harassment because Philippine fishing boats would retreat before getting near enough to be actually harassed by Chinese ships.

In other words, the case does not seem to be that Filipinos cannot fish near Sandy Cay, but that they would rather not do so out of fear for their personal security. Filipino fishers have reason to be fearful: Chinese ships not only dwarf Philippine fishing boats, but they have also previously sunk Philippine and Vietnamese fishing boats in the South China Sea.

Worse, the government has given conflicting guidance to Filipino fishers in Thitu Island. In March 2019, the Department of National Defense said that the military has been encouraging Filipino fishers to fish around Sandy Cay. The department added that Filipino fishers “ha[d] not been fishing in the vicinity of the sandbar, even before the Chinese fishing vessels were sighted in the area.” But in June 2020, fishers in Thitu Island told journalists that the military had discouraged them from fishing in the area. In defense, Secretary Lorenzana said that the fishers could fish in other areas. Mayor Del Mundo also discouraged his constituents

from fishing around Sandy Cay in January 2021.

In May 2021, the National Task Force for the West Philippine Sea, the agency charged with coordinating Philippine policy on South China Sea matters, encouraged Filipino fishers to fish again around Sandy Cay.

Fortunately, the Philippine government recently increased patrols around Sandy Cay, though Filipino fishers may take time before they could regain the courage to fish again in the area.

Conclusion

The Philippine government disputes the claim that China has seized Sandy Cay, but the controversy relates only to what constitutes “seizure.” Everyone agrees that no physical occupation of the sandbar has occurred. But everyone also agrees that Chinese ships —fishing, maritime militia, coast guard, and navy— have loitered in the surrounding waters since August 2017.

The Philippine government also disputes the claim that Chinese ships have harassed Philippine law enforcement and fishing vessels going to Sandy Cay, but the controversy relates only to what constitutes “harassment.” There is no dispute that Chinese ships monitor the activities of Philippine vessels near Sandy Cay. But there is also no dispute that the Philippines has increased its patrols around Sandy Cay since March 2021.

Amid these points of controversy, the public evidence suggests that the Philippines has not yet lost Sandy Cay to China. Filipino fishers could still fish near Sandy Cay without being regularly blocked by Chinese ships. Similarly, Philippine military and law enforcement agencies could still patrol the surrounding waters without being regularly chased by Chinese ships. China, however, is clearly watchful of developments in the area.

The Philippine government must strive to preserve the status quo and, where possible, revert to the situation prior to 2017 or at least improve the current situation. Sandy Cay must remain unoccupied, and Chinese ships must not prevent Philippine fishing boats and government vessels going near it.

At the very least, the Philippine government must maintain the momentum of the increased patrols around Sandy Cay. The patrols should have three goals. First, they should restore Filipino fishers’ courage to fish around Sandy Cay. Second, they should signal to China that the Philippines, too, is watchful of developments in the area. Finally, they should deter fishers — Filipino, Chinese, Taiwanese, or Vietnamese— from engaging in unsustainable fishing around Sandy Cay, where the marine environment has already been deteriorating.

The situation in Sandy Cay has indeed deteriorated since August 2017, but there is still room for improvement. Sandy Cay, after all, is not yet lost. 🚢

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ENGAGING THE ENEMY AT THE LITTORALS: A HISTORY OF COASTAL DEFENSE IN THE PHILIPPINES FROM THE PRE-SPANISH PERIOD TO THE SECOND WORLD WAR (PART 2)

by CDR Mark R Condono

FORT DRUM at El Fraile Island in Cavite.

Photo from <https://www.amusingplanet.com/2014/01/fort-drum-concrete-battleship-on-el.html> accessed 02-August-2020.

The American Era: Coastal Defense Fortifications Take Shape

The importance of Corregidor Island in the military complex dates back as far as the beginning of the Spanish Colonial period during the 1500's, as Spanish Galleons used to anchor at the Island or on other nearby islands. Apart from being a naval anchorage, it was an outpost to alert Manila and adjacent Spanish positions of incoming threats from the sea.

As years progressed, Corregidor was an anchorage for Limahong's pirates, the Royal Navy during the British Invasion of Manila, Dutch Pirates, and the naval actions during the Spanish-American War were the Spanish Garrison at El Fraile Island fired at the ships of Admiral George Dewey, though unfortunately out of range.

When the Philippines became an American Colony, Fortifications on the Island were begun, gun emplacements, and the latest calibre of that era were in place until after WWI.

Apart from the amenities and storage buildings for the families of the garrison and ammunition to withstand a six-month siege and seaborne attack, further fortifications and guns were added as the winds of war were embracing the Pacific. The 20TH century would also see the demise of fortifications with the advent of the airplanes rendering the guns vulnerable to aerial attacks.

However, looking into the Coastal and Beach Defense perspective, Fortress Corregidor along with a substantial air and naval support could have turned the tide or further delayed the Japanese advance at that time.

Coastal Defenses of Manila Bay and Corregidor

On 11-April-1902, Caballo, Carabao, Corregidor, El Fraile and Grande Islands were declared Military Reservations. In 1905, construction of the Fortifications had begun.

The primary objective of constructing the fortifications at Manila Bay was to provide protection to the U.S. Navy Asiatic Fleet Headquarters in Subic Bay, the City of Manila, and the ports and harbors of Manila and its adjacent provinces.

Fort Mills in Corregidor, Fort Hughes in Caballo Island, Fort Frank in Carabao Island, Fort Drum in El Fraile, and Fort Wint in Grande Island, Subic Bay, became part of the Philippine Coast

Artillery Command under MGEN George F Moore, US Army.

- **FORT MILLS / Corregidor:**
 - * Hearn/1/12"/BCLR/1921
 - * Smith/1/12"/BCLR/1921
 - * Way/4/12"/M/1910/
 - * Geary/8/12"/M/1910
 - * Cheney/2/12"/DC/1910
 - * Wheeler/2/12"/DC/1910
 - * Crockett/2/12"/DC/1910
 - * Grubbs/2/10"/DC/1911
 - * RJ 43/1/ 8"/BC/1942
 - * Morrison/2/ 6"/DC/1910
 - * Ramsey/3/ 6"/DC/1911
 - * James/4/ 3"/P/1910
 - * Keyes/2/ 3"/P/1913
 - * Cushing/2/ 3"/P/1919
 - * Hanna/2/ 3"/P/1919
 - * Martin/2/155 mm/PM
 - * Hamilton (South)/3/155 mm
 - * Kysor (North)/2/155 mm
 - * Rock Point/2/155 mm
- **FORT DRUM / El Fraile Island:**
 - * Wilson/2/14"/TM/1918
 - * Marshall/2/14"/TM/1918
 - * Roberts/2/ 6"/CM/1918
 - * McCrea/2/ 6"/CM/1918
 - * New Hoyle/1/ 3"
- **FORT HUGHES / Caballo Island:**
 - * Woodruff/1/14"/DC/1914
 - * Gillespie/1/14"/DC/1914
 - * Craighill/4/12"/M/1919
 - * Leach/2/ 6"/DC/1914
 - * Fuger/2/ 3"/P/1914
 - * Willaims/2/155 mm
 - * Hooker/1/155 mm
 - * Sunset/4/155 mm
 - * Stockade/2/155 mm
 - * Monja/2/155 mm
 - * Concepcion/3/155 mm
- **FORT WINT /Grande Island, Subic Bay:**
 - * Warwick/2/10"/DC/1910
 - * Woodruff/2/ 6"/DC/1910

- * Hall/2/ 6"/DC/1910
- * Flake/4/ 3"/P/1910
- * Jewell/4/ 3"/P/1910
- * unnamed/4/155 mm//Olongapo

• **FORT FRANK / Carabao Island, Cavite:**

- * Greer/1/14"/DC/1913
- * Crofton/1/14"/DC/1913
- * Koehler/8/12"/M/1913
- * Hoyle/2/ 3"/P/1913
- * Frank/4/155 mm

These were the gun details in the aforementioned Forts (Coast Defense Study Group; used with permission, 04-July-2021).

Coastal Defense Actions in the Philippines during WW II:

Japanese Landing at Lingayen (22-December-1941) and Filipinos in Coastal Defense at Corregidor (May 1942)

As war finally engulfed the Philippines on 08-December-1941, a series of setbacks in the conflict were encountered by the Filipino and American Forces early on, thus War Plan Orange-3 was put into effect on 24-December-1941 with the arrival and landing of the Japanese 14TH Army off the Coast of La Union and Pangasinan.

War Plan Orange-3 was a fall back plan for the United States Army Forces in the Far East (USAFPE) with the advent of failing to stop and neutralize the Japanese Invasion Force off the country's coast and proceed to Bataan to hold the line.

Nevertheless, Filipino units engaged the Japanese Forces despite overwhelming odds and disparity in weaponry. Worth noting is a Filipino Beach Defense Unit that used its 0.50 calibre machine guns on the incoming Japanese troops.

The counter fire actions made by the Philippine Scouts 91ST and 92ND Coast Artillery Regiment and that of the Philippine Army's 1ST and 2ND Coast Artillery were to counter battery fire from the Japanese guns in Mariveles, Bataan.

The exploits of the Filipino officer and Crew of Battery B assigned at Battery James in Fort Mills, Corregidor are worthy of emulation, that such men fought and were on our side.

Unknown and Known Filipinos assigned to Coastal and Beach Defense during Japanese Invasion in December 1941

On the night of 21-December-1941, three Japanese Naval Convoys landed off Lingayen Gulf carrying the bulk of the Imperial Japanese Army of General Masaharu Homma.

The convoy was composed of three divisions from Formosa along with a Tank and Artillery Regiment.



86TH Field Artillery 155mm. The actual photograph of one of the 155mm positioned in Dagupan under the 86TH Field Artillery. Photo courtesy of Mr. Tony Feredo of the Coast Defense Study Group (CDSG) who provided the image to the author on July 2020.

As the landings progressed on 22-December-1941, a unit of the Philippine Scouts, the 86th Field Artillery which had a Battery of two 155mm guns engaged the southern portion of the Japanese Invasion Force, though unfortunately no damage or hit was inflicted on the Japanese forces.

Despite the overwhelming force of the Japanese who envisioned a 50-day Campaign for the Philippines would encounter setbacks on their timetable. On one particular landing area in Luzon, Japanese troops were met by a barrage of 50 calibre machine gunfire from Filipino Troops.

With the sheer speed of the enemy advances, the War Plan Orange-3 was put in effect ordering all USAFFE Forces in Luzon to fall back to the Province of Bataan.

Early on the defense plan, if the Combined Filipino-American Force were unsuccessful in halting the Japanese Landing at the Coast, delaying actions would be made until all USAFFE Forces were in Bataan to take a stand and await help coming from the mainland United States.



21ST Field Artillery. Actual photograph of the Officers and Crew of the 21st Field Artillery, Philippine Army on the Lingayen Beachhead. Photo courtesy of Mr Tony Feredo of the Coast Defense Study Group (CDSG) who provided the image to the author on July 2020.

The 21ST Field Artillery, a unit of the 21ST Infantry Division of the Philippine Army under the USAFFE, was mobilized on 18-November-1941, and was in action from December 1941 to 09-April-1942. The Division's area of responsibility covers La Union, Nueva Ecija, Tarlac and Pangasinan.

Filipino Defenders at Fort Mills

During the Siege of Corregidor or Fort Mills from December 1941 to May 1942, the One Gun Battery was commanded by Filipino 1LT AMADEO S GARCIA of the Philippine Army. Along with 42 of his men, they all bore the brunt of the Japanese onslaught but prevailed to continue firing the 4-3 inch calibre guns of Battery James.

1LT Amadeo S Garcia, Philippine Army of B Company, 1st Coast Artillery, was attached to the 91st Coast Artillery of the Philippine Scouts, one of the primary units involved in the Beach Defense of Corregidor.

The 3-inch guns had already suffered enough damage but continued to perform its mission as a counter battery to Japanese artillery fire coming from Bataan.

On 18-December-2009, the Philippine Coast Guard and the Corregidor Foundation Inc. built a historical marker in honor of 1LT AMADEO S Garcia and his men.

As backgrounder, Battery James was named after US Army LT John James of the 8th Infantry who was killed in an ambush along with his men while assigned in the Province of Leyte in 1906.

Units in the Beach and Coastal Defenses of Manila Bay:



91ST Coast Artillery Regiment Coat of Arms, 1928. Photo credit: U.S. Army.

- The 91ST Coast Artillery Regiment was formed on 30-November-1930 for harbor defense with 8 Batteries that were assigned to Fort Mills, Fort Frank, and Fort Hughes. They had both Filipino and American Officers who were Graduates of the US Naval Academy in Annapolis and the US Military Academy in West Point. The Batteries were either led by an American or Filipino Officer with a Filipino Senior NCO.



92ND Coast Artillery Regiment Coat of Arms, 1927. Photo credit: U.S. Army.

- The 92ND Coast Artillery Regiment was formed on 01-July-1924 for harbor defense with 7 Batteries that were assigned mostly to Fort Mills and Fort Frank. The Regiment had American Officers and Filipino Non-Commissioned Officers and Enlisted Personnel. The 92ND had a primary weapon employed, the 155mm M1918 GPF, which was similar to the French M1917 in towed version.



1ST and 2ND Coast Artillery Regiment, Philippine Scouts. Photo credit: U.S. Army.

• 1st and 2nd Coast Artillery, Philippine Army

The Two Filipino Coast Artillery Units for harbor defense had a combined force of 600 Philippine Army personnel then in training, although operational control was with the Philippine Scouts Coast Artillery Regiment.

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Adjunct Beach and Coastal Defense Elements of Corregidor

72 Anti-Aircraft Units were assigned to 13 of 23 Batteries, as well as the remaining Naval Forces of the United States Navy, the Philippine Offshore Patrol (OSP), the 4TH Marine Regiment, and 35 Electronic Controlled Sea Mine Groups. 

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MARITIME LEAGUE TRUSTEE IS NAVY RESERVIST OF THE YEAR

It was not so long ago when a fine young man had joined the Maritime League, and that man eventually became one of the League’s Trustees. He is LTJG Christian R Chua PN (Res), a junior officer by rank, but to his colleagues, he is a true soldier, gentleman, leader and a fine officer who can be trusted. We would call that trait “maasahan” meaning, trustworthy.


In September 2021, LTJG Christian R Chua was awarded a Certificate of Recognition from O/J9, AFP as one of the top performing Navy Reservists.



He has the passion to serve with all sincerity and the heart for soldiery, the combination of which formed him early on to be ready for sacrifice, and to serve people in need of help.

From the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, he did not stay home and rather joined the Reserve Force in relief operations of donated goods, hauling goods from the piers of Manila, then proceeding to Tanging Yaman Foundation at Ateneo de Manila QC for repacking. He later joined the Reserve Task Unit (RTU) comprising battalions from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and AFPResCom under the Joint Task force-NCR to provide security detail in areas in Metro-Manila. From Duty Officer, he rose to Administrative Officer at RTU.

Despite the deadly threat of an unknown enemy, he served with zeal and dedication that earned him the Bronze Cross Medal that was conferred for the risk of life in non-combatant operations. He also has the love of history that lead him to join the RTU Historian Team, in telling the story of the unit and the men and women behind RTU.



In December 2021, LTJG Christian R Chua was awarded the Navy Reservist of the Year.




In the field of education, having a tireless and fervent heart enabled him to pursue Electrical Engineering and an MBA both at the Adamson University, Manila; Naval Command and Staff Course-Class 86, Civil Military Operation Course, several other Philippine Navy training courses including Shipboard Familiarization Training, Information Collection Training, Basic Reservist Administrative Course, EORA Training, and others. ⚓



PH-US MARINE EXERCISE 2022

by Philippine Marine Corps

The Marine Exercise 2022 Philippines (MAREX 22 PH) between the Philippine Marine Corps and the United States Marine Corps (USMC) officially concluded with a virtual closing ceremony graced by the Philippine Navy Flag Officer In Command Vice Admiral Adeluis Bordado as the Guest of Honor and Speaker on 2-February-2022.

The annual bilateral exercise was conducted from January 28-31, 2022. The exercise includes jungle operations subject matter expert exchange, insertion techniques, beachmaster management, combined amphibious planning, drills, execution using the USMC's landing craft air cushion, and ship visit in the Western Command area of responsibility in Palawan. 



Story and Photo Source: *Philippine Marine Corps*



PH-US MILITARY COOPERATION

“MAREX 22 PH is one of the most productive combined exercises of the Philippines because it contributes to the Philippine Marine Corps’ goal of becoming a highly capable amphibious force in readiness for archipelagic defense.”

-VADM ADELUIS S BORDADO PN
Flag Officer in Command
Philippine Navy


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COMMEMORATION OF COURAGE, GALLANTRY, AND VALOR OF FIL-AM TROOPS IN THE BATTLE OF BATAAN

by CAPT Tomas D Baino PN (Ret)



*Japanese Landings on Bataan on 23 January – 1 February, 1942.
Photo credit: Center of Military History, US Army.*

INTRODUCTION

From 7 January to 9-April-1942, the Battle of Bataan was fought by the Fil-Am troops of the United States Armed Forces in the Far East (USAFFE). Said battle displayed the courage and gallantry of the Filipino from all walks of life to preserve the democratic way of life and freedom of free loving people of the world at the most intense phase of the 14th Japanese Imperial Army and Navy invasion in the Philippine Archipelago following the bombing of the US Navy base on 7-December-1941 at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.

WAR PLAN ORANGE-3 (WPO-3)

When Gen. Douglas MacArthur returned to active duty, the latest revision plans for the defense of the Philippine Islands had been completed in April 1941 and was called WPO-3, based on the joint Army-Navy WPO of 1938 that involved hostilities between the United States and Japan. Under WPO-3, the Philippine garrison was to hold the entrance to Manila Bay and deny usage to Japanese naval forces, while ground forces were to prevent enemy landings. If the enemy prevailed, they were to withdraw to Bataan, the key to the control of Manila Bay. It was to be defended to the "last extremity." In addition to the regular U.S. Army troops, the defenders could rely on the Philippine Army, organized and trained by Gen. MacArthur.

FIGHTING RETREAT

Gen. MacArthur intended to move his men with their equipment and supplies in good order to defensive positions. He charged the North Luzon Force led by Maj. Gen. Jonathan M Wainwright IV to hold back the main Japanese assault and keep the road to Bataan open for Maj. Gen. George Park's South Luzon Force, which proceeded quickly and in remarkably good order, given the chaotic situation. To achieve this, Gen. Wainwright deployed his forces in a series of five defensive lines outlined in WPO-3:

- D1: Aguilar to San Carlos to Urdaneta City
- D2: Agno River (5th largest river in the Philippines)
- D3: Santa Ignacia to Gerona to Guimba to San Jose
- D4: Tarlac to Cabanatuan City
- D5: Bamban to Sibul Natural Springs in Bataan

LAYAC BATAAN LINE

The main force of Gen. Masaharu Homma's 14th Area Army landed at Lingayen Gulf on December 22 in the morning. The defenders failed to hold the beaches. By day's end, the Japanese had secured most of their objectives and were in position to emerge onto the central plain. Facing Homma's troops were four Filipino divisions: the 21st, 71st, 11th, and 91st, as well as a battalion of Philippine Scouts backed by a few tanks. Along Route 3—a cobblestone road that led directly to Manila—the Japanese soon made contact with the Filipino 71st Division. American artillery action stalled the Japanese attack. However, Japanese planes and tanks routed the Filipino infantry, leaving the artillery uncovered. A second Japanese division landed at Lamon Bay, south of Manila on December 23, and advanced north.

It was evident to Gen. Wainwright he could no longer hold back the Japanese advance. On the late afternoon of the 23rd, Wainwright called MacArthur's headquarters in Manila to report that any further defense of the Lingayen beaches was "impracticable." He requested and was given permission to withdraw behind the Agno River. MacArthur weighed two choices: either make a firm stand on the line of the Agno River and give Wainwright his best unit, the Philippine Division, for a counterattack; or withdraw all the way to Bataan in planned stages. He decided on the latter, thus abandoning his own plan for defense and reverting to the old ORANGE plan. Having made his decision to withdraw to Bataan, MacArthur notified all force commanders on the night of December 23 stating "WPO-3 is in effect."

PORAC-GUAGUA LINE

From January 1 to 5, 1942, as the entire USAFFE converged from south and north, delaying actions were fought to allow the struggling withdrawal to Bataan. The fiercest fighting occurred at the hastily emplaced Porac–Guagua Line, where the 11th and 21st divisions, led by U.S. Brig. Gen. William E. Brougner and Philippine Brig. Gen. Mateo Capinpin, respectively, with Col. Clinton A. Pierce's 26th Cavalry Regiment in reserve, held the line, mostly on open and unprepared ground, against massive aerial and

artillery bombardment, strong tank assaults, and infantry banzai attacks by the Takahashi and Tanaka detachments. But both sides suffered heavy casualties.

Overlooked in this report is the 23rd Infantry Regiment of the Philippine Army led by Col. Wallace A Mead. The 23rd Inf Regiment established the defensive line at Porac-Pampanga on or around 2-January-1942. Col. Mead was later awarded the Silver Star for his courageous actions. The 23rd Inf Regiment's defense allowed Capinpin's forces to withdraw and establish new defensive positions. It was Brig. Gen. Capinpin's recount of the fighting on that day that was offered as support for Col. Mead's citation.

ABUCAY-MAUBAN LINE

WPO-3 called for two defensive lines across Bataan. The first extended across the peninsula from Mauban in the west to Mabatang, Abucay in the east. Gen. Wainwright, commanding the new I Philippine Corps of 22,500 troops, held the western sector. I Corps included the Philippine Army's 1st Regular, 31st, 91st Divisions, 26th Cavalry (Philippine Scouts) and a battery of field artillery and self-propelled guns. Gen. Parker and the new II Philippine Corps that included the Philippine Army's 11th, 21st, 41st, 51st divisions and 57th Infantry (PS) numbering 25,000 men, defended the eastern sector. All the divisions, already under strength at the onset of war, suffered serious combat losses, due to desertions. The U.S. Army's Philippine Division, made up of the 31st Infantry, 45th Infantry (PS), and supporting units became the "Bataan Defense Force Reserve." Mount Natib, a 4,222-foot-high mountain that split the peninsula, served as the boundary line between the two corps. The commanders anchored their lines on the mountain, but because they assumed the rugged terrain was impassable, they did not extend their forces up its slopes. The two corps were not in direct contact with each other, leaving a serious gap in the defense line. With the fighting withdrawal completed, the Abucay-Mauban Line, USAFFE's main battle position was now in place.

2nd LT ALEXANDER R. NININGER

Nininger was killed in action near Abucay, Bataan on 12-January-1942. He was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for leading an assault on Japanese positions. He was the first American army soldier to be honored in World War II.



Cadet Alexander Nininger, West Point Class 1941

BATTLE OF TRAIL TWO

Within four days, the Orion-Bagac Line was formed. But the defenders had yet to complete their withdrawal to the reserve battle position when the Japanese struck again, through a gap held by I Corps. Thus Gen. Bluemel hastily organized a defense along Trail Two, consisting of 32nd Infantry, 41st Infantry and 51st Division reinforcements to stop a major offensive and plug the gap.

BATTLE OF THE POCKETS

The remaining Japanese troops managed to get through, however, and held out at some rear sectors of the Orion-Bagac Line at the Tuol River Valley behind the 11th Division, and in the Gogo-Cotar River behind the 1st Regular Division. From January 23 to February 17, coordinated action by the defenders to eliminate these salients of resistance became known as the "Battle of the Pockets."

Fierce fighting ensued. Captain Alfredo M. Santos of the 1st Regular Division outmaneuvered the enemy during their attempt to pocket the area. In both attempts, his unit successfully broke through the Gogo-Cotar and Tuol pockets, thus earning for himself the moniker "Hero of the Pockets." For his successes, he was promoted to major in the field. Major Alfredo Santos was then given the hazardous mission of closing the gaps and annihilating the enemy troops that had infiltrated the lines, as the gap posed a serious threat to the positions and the total security of the division. He led a counterattack against the strong and numerically superior Japanese forces positioned between the MLR and the Regimental Reserve Line (RRL).

The fighting began at dawn on 29-January-1942, and the Americans restored the defensive sector assigned to the 1st Regular Division. On 3-February-1942, 1st Lieutenant Willibald C. Bianchi of the 45th Infantry, Philippine scouts, led a reinforced platoon forward against two enemy machine-gun nests. He silenced them with grenades, and despite two machine gun wounds to the chest, he manned an anti-aircraft machine gun until he was knocked off the tank by a third severe wound. He was awarded the Medal of Honor. Of the 2,000 Japanese soldiers, 377 escaped.

BATTLE OF THE POINTS

The naval infantry consisted of 150 ground crewmen from Patrol Wing 10, 80 sailors from the Cavite Naval Ammunition Depot, and 130 sailors from USS Canopus (AS-9), 120 sailors from the base facilities at Cavite, Olongapo, and Mariveles, and 120 Marines from an anti-aircraft battery. Sailors used the Canopus machine shop to fabricate makeshift mountings for machine guns salvaged from Patrol Wing 10's damaged aircraft. The Marines were distributed through the ranks, and the sailors were told to "watch them and do as they do." The sailors attempted to make their white uniforms more suitable for combat by dyeing them with coffee grounds. The result was closer to yellow than khaki. The diary of a dead Japanese officer described them as a suicide squad dressed in brightly colored uniforms and talking loudly to draw fire and reveal enemy positions.

Japanese commanders, in an attempt to hold onto their lodgements, reinforced the beachheads piecemeal, but could not break out. Battles were fought ferociously against a company-sized group at the Lapay-Longoskawayan Points from January 23 to 29, at the Quinawan-Aglaloma Points from January 22 to February 8, and at the Silalim-Anyasan Points from January 27 to February 13. Out of the 2,000 Japanese troops, only 43 wounded returned to their lines. These battles were called the "Battle of the Points."

FALL OF BATAAN

On the night of March 12, Gen. MacArthur, his family, and several USAFFE staff officers left Corregidor for Mindanao aboard four PT boats commanded by Lieutenant Commander John D. Bulkeley. For this, and a number of other feats over the course of four months and eight days, Bulkeley was awarded the Medal of Honor, the Navy Cross, the Distinguished Service Cross and other citations.

MacArthur was eventually flown to Australia where he broadcasted to the Filipino people his famous "I Shall Return" promise. MacArthur's departure marked the end of the USAFFE, and by March 22, the defending army was renamed the United

States Forces in the Philippines (USFIP). Lt. Gen. Jonathan Wainwright IV was placed in command.

After the failure of their first attack against Bataan at the Battle of Trail Two, Battle of the Pockets, and Battle of the Points, the Japanese general headquarters sent strong artillery forces to the Philippines in order to smash the American fortifications. They had 190 artillery pieces, which included bigger guns like 150 mm cannons and the rare Type 45 240 mm howitzer. The 1st Artillery headquarters, under Maj. Gen. Kineo Kitajima, who was a known authority on IJA artillery, moved to the Philippines along with the main forces to command and control these artillery units. Also, the Japanese high command reinforced Gen. Homma's 14th Imperial Army, and toward the end of March, the Japanese forces prepared for the final assault.

On 3-April-1942 the entire Orion-Bagac Line was subjected to incessant bombings by 100 aircrafts and bombardment by 300 artillery weapons from 9:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m., which turned the Mount Samat stronghold into an inferno. Over the course of the next three days (Good Friday to Easter Sunday), the Japanese 65th Brigade and 4th Division spearheaded the main attack at the left flank of II Corps. Everywhere along the line, the American and Filipino defenders were driven back by Japanese tanks and infantry.

Based on his two prior attempts, Gen. Homma had estimated that the final offensive would require a week to breach the Orion-Bagac Line, and a month to liquidate two final defense lines he believed had been prepared on Bataan. When the opening attack required just three days, he pushed his forces on April 6 to meet expected counterattacks head-on. The Japanese launched a drive into the center, penetrated into flanks held by the 22nd and 23rd Regiments of the 21st Division, captured Mount Samat and outflanked all of II Corps. Counterattacks by the U.S. Army and Philippine Scout regulars held in reserve were futile; only the 57th Infantry gained any ground, but soon lost.

Along the battle front, units of I Corps and the devastated remnants of II Corps, crumbled and moved to the rear. The commanders on Bataan lost all contact with their units, except by runners. In the last two days of defending Bataan, the entire Allied defense progressively disintegrated and collapsed, clogging all roads with refugees and fleeing troops (some were evacuated by YAG-4 from the Mariveles Naval Base, Bataan). By April 8, the senior U.S. Commander of Bataan, Maj. Gen. Edward P. King, saw the futility of further resistance, and set forth proposals for capitulation.

The next morning, on 9-April-1942, Maj. Gen. King met with Maj. Gen. Kameichiro Nagano and, after several hours of negotiations, the remaining weary, starving, and emaciated American and Filipino defenders on the battle-swept Bataan Peninsula finally surrendered.



Maj. Gen. Edward King discusses terms of surrender with Japanese officers at Balanga Elementary School.

Radio broadcast – Voice of Freedom – Malinta Tunnel – Corregidor – 9-April-1942: Bataan has fallen!

“The Philippine-American troops on this war-ravaged and bloodstained peninsula have laid down their arms. With heads bloody but unbowed, they have yielded to the superior force and numbers of the enemy.

The world will long remember the epic struggle that Filipino and American soldiers put up in the jungle fastness and along the rugged coast of Bataan. They have stood up uncomplaining under the constant and grueling fire of the enemy for more than three months. Besieged on land and blockaded by sea, cut off from all sources of help in the Philippines and in America, the intrepid fighters have done all that human endurance could bear.

For what sustained them through all these months of incessant battle was a force that was more than merely physical. It was the force of an unconquerable faith—something in the heart and soul that physical hardship and adversity could not destroy. It was the thought of native land and all that it holds most dear, the thought of freedom and dignity and pride in these most priceless of all our human prerogatives.

The adversary, in the pride of his power and triumph, will credit our troops with nothing less than the courage and fortitude that their own troops had shown in battle. Our men fought a brave and bitterly contested struggle. All the world will testify to the most superhuman endurance with which they stood up until the last hour, amidst overwhelming odds.

But the decision had to come. Men fighting under the banner of unshakable faith are made of something more than flesh, but they are not made of impervious steel. The flesh must yield at last, endurance melts away, and the end of the battle must come. Bataan had fallen, but the spirit that made it stand, a beacon to all the liberty-loving people of the world, cannot fall.”



Maj. Gen. Edward A. King, Commander, I Corps. University of Georgia Class of 1902.



Jonathan M. Wainwright, West Point Class of 1906, Commander, United States Forces in the Philippines.



Maj. Gen. George M. Parker, Commander, II Corps, Shattock School, IOWA Class of 1909.



Brig. Gen. Mateo M. Capinpin, Commander, 21st Infantry Division. Rose from the rank of Corporal



Gen. Alfredo Santos, then Captain, Company Commander of the 1st Infantry Regular Division under Brig. Gen. Vicente Lim. BSCE MIT 193.



Gen. Douglas Mac Arthur, West Point Class of 1903, Commander-In-Chief of all US Forces and Filipino Forces in the Philippines.



Cadet Vicente Lim, West Point Class 1914; Brigadier General Vicente Lim, Commander, 41st Infantry Division.

CONCLUSION AND AFTERMATH OF THE BATTLE

Commanders and Leaders	
Douglas MacArthur	Masaharu Homma
Jonathan Wainwright IV	Susumu Morioka
George M. Parker	Kineo Kitajima
Edward P. King	Kameichiro Nagano
Vicente Lim	
Mateo Capinpin	
Strength	
120,000 U.S. and Filipino troops	75,000 Japanese troops
Casualties and Losses	
106,000	8,406–22,250
10,000 killed,	3,107 killed,
20,000 wounded,	230 missing,
76,000 captured	5,069 wounded

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1. Photo credit and narratives: Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
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BATAAN TODAY

Dambana ng Kagitingan at the Peak of Mt. Samat



The Bunker, Balanga City Capitol Building



President Rodrigo Duterte unveils the marker of the Bataan Government Center and Business Hub, "The Bunker," during its inauguration in Balanga City, Bataan on 12-September- 2019.



The bunker is a military field fortification design to protect gun emplacement from bombs, gunfire and artillery fire. It was constructed and built by combat engineers in the line of resistance.

Today, a bunker building constructed and inaugurated last 12-September-2019 was built under the administration of provincial governors Abet Garcia of Bataan. The provincial capitol building was designed and supervised by Architect Henry B. Mayuga, the son of Col. Leonardo A. Mayuga, a war veteran of Bataan.

Said bunker building in Balanga City symbolizes the three major battles fought and won by Fil-Am troops in the Battle of Trail Two, Battle of the Pockets, and the Battle of the Points. These victorious battles delayed the advance of the 14th Imperial Japanese Army by three months which consequently provided enough time for Gen. Douglas McArthur to regroup the allied forces in Australia.

About the Researcher



CAPT TOMAS D BAINO PN (Ret), a Civil Engineer hails from Samal, Bataan and is a member of the Editorial Board of the Maritime Review, the journal of The Maritime League.

His early Civil Engineering career was initially spent at the Provincial Engineering Office of Bataan in 1970 before joining the Philippine Navy. He was with the Naval Construction Battalion known as the PN SEABEES involved in the early reclamation of the Cultural Center in 1973 and the construction of Airfield in PAGASA Island, Spratly, West Philippine Sea sometime in 1974.

He was sent by the Philippine Navy to study Combat Engineering in the Engineer Officer Advance Course at the United States Army Engineer School at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, USA in 1991. 🚢



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MARITIME LEAGUE VP IS NEW AGFO PRESIDENT

RAdm Margarito V Sanchez Jr




Maritime League Vice President VAdm Emilio C Marayag Jr. was elected President and Board Chairman of the Association of General and Flag Officers, Inc. (AGFO) for the year 2022. He was the former Vice President, Corporate Secretary and Chairman of the Membership and Ethics Committee. He joined the 15-man Board in 2019 and was recently re-elected as a Director for another 3-year term.

Established in 1965, AGFO is a non-profit organization that aims to uphold and support the Philippine Constitution, preserve and protect democracy, promote veterans' welfare, help sustain the morale, discipline and esprit de corps of the AFP and other uniformed services, and maintain highest ethical standards and proper decorum among its members. The 900-man organization consists of active and retired star-ranked officers from the military and other uniformed services –PNP, PCG, BJMP and BFP.

The new AGFO President announced that the Board and his management team will work for the publication of the fourth edition of the members' Registry Book, the resumption of the quarterly newsletters and fellowship forum, the recruitment of new members, and the expansion of advocacy efforts. Many annual activities in 2020 and 2021 were either suspended or scrapped due to the pandemic but AGFO embarked on the

vaccination of members and dependents through coordination with and cooperation of the Department of National Defense, the Philippine Veterans Affairs Office, and the Veterans Memorial Medical Center (VMMC). AGFO members donated an ambulance to VMMC during the early stages of the pandemic to assist in the transport of patients.

Vice Admiral Marayag brings into AGFO his leadership and management experiences in other organizations including the Maritime League and its journal, the Maritime Review.

Under the helm of VAdm Emilio C Marayag AFP(Ret) as President, the AGFO Officers for 2022 is composed of: PMGen German B Doria PN(Ret), Vice President; BGen Alejandro Camagay AFP(Ret), Corporate Treasurer; BGen Andrew Regacho AFP(Ret), Corporate Auditor; BGen Robert T Romero AFP(Ret), Corporate Secretary; MGen Alphonsus P Crucero AFP(Ret), Executive Director; LTGen Edilberto P Adan AFP(Ret), Director; BGen Restituto L Aguilar AFP(Ret), Director; PGen Jose C Bandong Jr. PNP(Ret), Director; PGen Crisogono Francisco PNP(Ret), Director; MGen Jose C Lopus AFP(Ret), Director; LTGen Oscar H Rabena AFP(Ret), Director; and Commo Amado A Sanglay AFP(Ret), Director. 

IMO GOODWILL MARITIME AMBASSADORS OF THE PHILIPPINES

In February 2015, the Secretary-General established the IMO Goodwill Maritime Ambassador (IMO-GMA) Scheme. **It aims to reach new target audiences and inspire a new generation of maritime experts and seafarers.**

The multi-faceted maritime world offers a series of rich and fulfilling career opportunities for young people, both at sea and ashore. Seafaring can provide young generations not only with an opportunity to provide for their families but also with unique opportunities to navigate the seas of the globe and encounter the wonders of the world. Other avenues such as marine engineering, naval architecture and maritime law provide the chance for an exciting and dynamic life in a truly vital professional sphere.

But young people need to be engaged and enthused if they are to see and understand these opportunities. With this in mind, IMO has launched the IMO Maritime Ambassadors scheme.

An IMO Goodwill Maritime Ambassador is a spokesperson or advocate for the maritime and seafaring professions.

IMO Member Governments and international organizations in consultative status or which have concluded an agreement of cooperation with IMO are invited to participate in the scheme by selecting and identifying "IMO Goodwill Maritime Ambassadors" to promote the maritime and seafaring professions and raise awareness of the positive benefits of choosing a career at sea or other maritime profession.

IMO Goodwill Maritime Ambassadors are encouraged to share their passion about the maritime world with others, particularly young people who are starting out on their further education, apprenticeships and career pathways; and to reach new target audiences **to educate and inform on the importance of shipping and the role of IMO, and inspire a new generation of seafarers** and other maritime professionals.

By reaching out, IMO Goodwill Maritime Ambassadors can engage, inspire and call upon young people to consider careers at sea or in the maritime industries. The goal is to reach new target audiences and inspire a new generation of maritime experts and seafarers.

Member States, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in consultative status with IMO may nominate an IMO Goodwill Maritime Ambassador for appointment by the Secretary-General.

Persons nominated should be distinguished persons in the maritime community, with the knowledge, expertise, resources and desire to meet the objectives of the IMO Goodwill Maritime Ambassador Scheme.

The Maritime League would like to congratulate the four new IMO Goodwill Maritime Ambassadors of the Philippines. Of these Ambassadors, **VAdm Eduardo Ma R Santos** is Chairman and President of the Maritime League.

Four IMO GOODWILL AMBASSADORS OF THE PHILIPPINES have been nominated, and have been appointed by the IMO Secretary General:



- Ambassador Carlos Salinas, Founder and Chairman Emeritus, The PTC Group of Companies, nominated by Philippines



- Ms. Josephine J. Francisco, President, NYK-FIL Ship Management, nominated by Philippines



- Vice Admiral Eduardo Ma R Santos, MAAP President and AMOSUP Executive VP, nominated by Philippines



- Mr. Yrhen Bernard Sabanal Balinis, Seafarer, nominated by Philippines.

The Philippines has been a cooperative member of the IMO since 1964, and has been an active member of the IMO Council, the executive organ of the IMO, since 1997. The country was successfully re-elected to the IMO Council under Category C in December 2021. The importance of IMO Membership are: (a) **Privilege to contribute to policy formulation and decision making process** of the IMO (i.e. drafting of IMO Instruments, rules, regulations, and resolutions that aim to promote safety and security on ships, seafarers, marine environment, etc.); and (b) **Continuously granted voting rights** to IMO Council; (c) **Venue to promote** our seafarers, our Registry, shipbuilding and ship-repair and other maritime industry in the global maritime world paving way to more opportunities for Filipinos and the industry; (d) **Participation in the advancement of safer ships**, welfare of the seafarers and protection of the marine environment. Nominating entities are responsible, within their own national laws and rules, for ensuring nominees are of the highest moral character and integrity. IMO Goodwill Maritime Ambassadors will be appointed for an initial term of two years. Term renewal will be at the discretion of the IMO Secretary-General, based on performance of the IMO Goodwill Maritime Ambassador in meeting the objectives of the Scheme. IMO Goodwill Maritime Ambassadors shall serve for a maximum of six years. Activities consistent with the objectives may include (but are not limited to): (a) visit local youth groups or other local community groups to deliver a presentation highlighting the importance of the maritime industry; (b) have a stand or give a talk at a local careers forum, community fair or other local event; (c) visit local schools and further education colleges; and (d) engage with local radio, television or newspapers; offer a "day-in-the-life" view of the Goodwill Maritime Ambassador's profession; (e) visit local youth groups or other local community groups to deliver a presentation highlighting the importance of the maritime industry; (f) have a stand or give a talk at a local careers forum, community fair or other local event; (g) visit local schools and further education colleges; (h) engage with local radio, television or newspapers; offer a "day-in-the-life" view of the Goodwill Maritime Ambassador's profession. ▲

Source: Presentation by DOTr and MARINA

BOOK REVIEW: BATTLESHIP COMMANDER

THE LIFE OF VICE ADMIRAL WILLIS A. LEE JR.

by Vicky Viray Mendoza

Early Days of Mischief. It was during the years 1888-1904 in Owenton, Kentucky that **Willis Augustus Lee Jr.** was nicknamed "Mose." His father, Judge Lee Sr, was the circuit judge who tried civil and criminal cases. His mom, Susan, died of a heart attack in 1913. His elder brother, Clarence also died at an early age. His father had a "Live and Let Live" attitude toward gambling and bootlegging in Owenton. It also manifested in the loose rein on his children—Lucy, Roberta, Alice, and Mose—and helps explain why Mose was allowed to play pranks. Mose was mischievous, and when he pulled a prank, it involved some cleverness. Judge Lee Sr. had an excellent shot, and passed along this skill to Mose who became an excellent shooter, and anything he aimed at, he hit. Mose's interest in guns remained with him all his life.

Mose and his friend, Roy Holbrook, decided to make a bomb one day. They took gunpowder out of shotgun shells and put it under a tin can. They then ran a trail of powder from the can as a fuse, and lit the other end of it. When nothing happened, Mose went to investigate but when he got close, the bomb exploded on his face. His physician saved his eyesight and no scar remained on his face. But his eyesight was damaged and he had to wear thick glasses for the rest of his life.

He applied at the Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland. Judge Lee Sr.'s political connections got Mose the appointment to Annapolis through Congressman South Trimble. At age 16, without having finished high school, he entered the Naval Academy. Many doubted he would last in a rigidly disciplined academy. The strict rules were tough but Lee stuck it out.



U.S. Naval Academy (USNA) Years. From the 4th of July 1904 to June 1908, Lee attended USNA. On the day Lee entered the campus on Independence Day, his civilian life ended. During 3 1/2 of his 4 years at the Naval Academy, Lee roomed with Midshipman Edmund R Norton, who marveled at Lee's ability to get by with little studying. Norton studied hard and stood 2ND in the 201-man Class of 1908. Although Lee had a great mind, only two things mattered to him: rifle shooting and freehand drawing. Midshipman John Earle was amazed at Lee's intense concentration. Lee would read a lesson assignment once and retain everything. Earle wrote, *"He never seemed to be in the least burdened by our studies, as were so many of us. On walking into Lee's room, one seldom found him at his books. He was particularly good at math, the hardest subject, and spent hours trying to show his classmates how simple math really was."* Lee was nicknamed *"Wah Lee,"* Chink, and Ching, as almost everyone is named. That nickname sticks with you forever.

Willis Lee's and Walter Heiberg's marksmanship skills immediately showed in the shooting galleries in Annapolis and became the long subject of conversations in the Wardrooms of the fleets. At end-June 1907, USNA awarded the gold medal for general excellence in target practice to Willis Lee. Lee and Heiberg (bronze medalist) began summer training and were assigned to the USS *Nevada*. While Nevada was in New London, Connecticut, Lee received orders to report to the USNA Rifle Team in Annapolis. He was detached from *Nevada* on 12-July-1908 to join a marksmanship competition. What Lee accomplished in one day was overwhelming. He won Individual national championships in both rifle and pistol, the only American to win both categories the same year. In the Individual rifle category, Lee performed rapid fire at 200 and 300 yards, and slow fire at 600 and 1,000 yards. Lee won over his competitor, 318 vs 316. With the pistol, Lee shot slow fire, timed fire, and rapid fire at ranges between 15-75 yards. He beat his competitor by 1 point. Classmate Thomas C. Kinkaid spoke with Lee after the triumphs at Camp Perry. Lee finished the rifle match early, so he joined the pistol matches *"just to kill time."*

Midshipman Lee was excellent at marksmanship, but he could not see the target clearly. What he saw was an image the size of a postage stamp. William "Poco" Smith observed that Lee aimed at the postage stamp and hit the bull's eye. John Earle, an USNA Rifle Team member, said Lee never looked flustered. He shot birds just as fast as he could pull the trigger.

One of Lee's lifelong traits was his sense of modesty. During Lee's first-class year, weekly inspections were standard. Midshipmen wore full-dress uniforms with medals. Lee did not comply. He told Lee if he did not show up with medals next week, he would be put on report. Lee showed up at formation, his chest covered with medals that it was hard to see his jacket.

Lee habitually failed the regular eye exams. In May 1908, Lee's poor eyesight was finally found out at USNA. The Bureau

of Medicine and Surgery reported a physical examination of Midshipman Lee revealed he had defective vision, a potentially disqualifying condition. His right eye tested 11/20 and his left eye at 10/20. But the Navy Surgeon General recommended he "be allowed to graduate with his class, subject to re-examination in 2 years" to establish physical fitness for service. The Secretary of the Navy concurred. Lee graduated on 5-June-1908. Of 201 graduates, Lee was 106TH yet was among the 4 youngest. The level of attrition was considerable. In the USNA Class of 1908, 82 students (41%) did not make it to graduation.

Junior Officer, 1908-1918. Pre-1910 USNA graduates were required to serve for 2 years as "Passed Midshipmen." But starting 1910, the year Lee would finish serving his 2 years, midshipmen become Ensigns upon graduation from USNA. Post-USNA, Lee moved to an old sailing ship, the *Severn*. He also practiced with the USNA Rifle Team. Lee spent July & August with the rifle team at Camp Perry, Ohio. On 2-October-1908, Lee reported to battleship *Idaho*. On 1-June-1910, Lee asked to compete for a spot on the U.S. Rifle Team for an international rifle tournament in Bisley, England. The Bureau of Navigation turned him down. British battleship *Dreadnought* entered in 1906, setting a new standard for battleships with a battery of big guns. Whereas, the *Idaho* was built on the cheap.

Congress previously provided each class to have the best armor, armament, and speed. But for the *Idaho* and *Mississippi* in 1905, Congress restricted tonnage, making the ships less capable than predecessors. Naval historian Malcolm Muir wrote "*the sister ships proved a perfect example of false economy in defense spending. They were of such limited endurance and so slow that they hampered the performance of the whole fleet.*"

In November 1908, Passed Midshipman Lee was assigned to engineering duty. By May 1909, his *Idaho* tenure ended, and he returned to USNA Rifle Team and *Severn*. The New England Military Rifle competition was held at Wakefield, Massachusetts In July 1909. Andrew Denney won the revolver reentry match at 25 yards; Lee won the timed-fire revolver match at 50 yards.

Lee spent a brief period on board *Independence*, a former warship. Later, Lee joined the cruiser *New Orleans* which was being refitted at Mare Island for China service. She was a protected cruiser, with armor above her machinery space.

The USNA Rifle Team received overtures from an agent seeking recruits to overthrow China's Manchu government. Inducements included amounts big enough to resign from the Navy. The offer included the right to chop off as many Chinese heads as they desired, which was totally unappealing to Lee.

Lee and Denney were part of the cruiser's crew when *New Orleans* was recommissioned on 15-November. By 25-April-1910, the ship ventured from California to the Pacific and arrived at Yokohama, Japan. She then patrolled the far eastern waters. It was Lee's first in-person exposure to China. Lee and Denney then got their article published on the first 1910 issue of the U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*. The topic was revolver shooting, a 6-page primer with hand-drawn diagrams. One tip was "Acquire accuracy before you try for speed." Lee signed with a Chinese character. It was their first and last article.

On 6-June-1910, Lee was commissioned as an Ensign. Lee and Denney embarked on the *New Orleans* for Hankow, China, near current-day Wuhan, where they joined the next ship, *Helena*, on 26-May-1910. *Helena* was 251 ft with a shallow 9 ft draft to navigate China's rivers. Her main armament were four 4-inch guns.

The purpose of the collection of ships in the area was to protect U.S. interest in the Far East. The locus was known as the "China Station," although the ships operated often in the Philippines. In 1911, Lee contracted cholera and was hospitalized ashore, but recovered in a short time.

Marine 2LT Adolph Miller, who joined *Helena* in 1911, was a year behind Ensigns Lee and Denney at USNA, but did not graduate. Once Miller became part of the crew, *Helena* ventured in April 1911 from Shanghai to Hankow because of rumors of a revolution between the Manchu government in Shanghai and the rest of China. The revolt broke out in October in Hankow, where the ship was in port. A company of Marines and 2 divisions of sailors went ashore from the *Helena*. Miller was ashore for 5 months as intelligence officer, while Lee commanded a division of sailors. During that time, Miller kept a day-by-day record of the revolution. Miller and Ensign Lee compiled a report for the Office of Naval Intelligence.

In June-December 1913, the *New Hampshire* joined other ships of the Atlantic Fleet in patrolling the Gulf of Mexico. Relations were strained between the U.S. and Mexico. The situation became complicated upon the delivery of weapons to President Victoriano Huerta, who had taken over Mexico a year before the coup. President Woodrow Wilson ordered a landing force ashore Veracruz to seize the weapons from the Customs. By 21-April-1914, landing parties were ashore. Sailors and Marines crawled onto the land with orders to occupy Customs, the railroad terminal, and communications offices. RADM Frank "Friday" Fletcher directed the sailors and Marines to occupy beyond the port area, which was too much for the locals, so they attacked the U.S. forces, devolving into an urban warfare.

CAPT Edwin Anderson of *New Hampshire* disembarked the 2nd Seaman Regiment that marched toward the Mexican Naval Academy. They came under fire from the locals. The U.S. ships offshore bombarded the academy. Ensign Lee became part of this hostile mix. Mexican snipers were now his target. They were hardly visible, poking out a rifle barrel or a pistol. Getting the targets to show themselves required risk. Lee baited them. He sat on a curb in the open with a borrowed rifle across his knees. Navy men use the angle of the sun by day. The Mexican snipers were now silhouetted against a bright sky to shoot him. Big mistake. Lee drew a bead on the snipers at 800 yards, pulled the trigger, and watched each one fall into the street below.

In July, the *New Hampshire* moved to the Norfolk Navy Yard. Ensign Lee renewed his request to be examined by a statutory board for promotion, and he passed. In August 1914, WWI broke out in Europe. On 29-September-1914, Lee was commissioned LT Junior Grade retroactively as of 6-June-1913.

After serving on the *New Hampshire* another year while the U.S. was neutral during the European war in progress, LTJG Lee was detached on 3-December-1915. LTJG Lee reported to the Union Tool Company, a foundry in West Chicago, Illinois where he served as Naval Inspector of Ordnance. It was his first shore assignment, 7 1/2 years after graduation from USNA. His role was as quality control observer. He inspected control appliances for turret motors that were long-lead-time equipment for battleships of the *Tennessee* class. Inspections took him to Minnesota, Michigan, Indiana, and Iowa. Factories in the Midwest were making their contribution to the construction and arming of ships that would operate on oceans far away.

The U.S. being at war beginning 6-April-1917, the Bureau of

Navigation advised Lee on 19-February-1918 of his promotion to Lieutenant retroactive to 29-August-1916. Another letter in 19-April-1918 from the Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels notified Lee of a temporary appointment to LT CDR retroactive to 1-January-1918 – when he was still wearing his LTJG uniform.

World War I and Aftermath, 1917-1920. In July 1917, while Bullseye Lee was still trying to get promoted to Lieutenant, he was transferred to another shore billet. The U.S. had entered WWI 3 months earlier, and still needed ordnance inspectors. But LT CDR Lee preferred to serve on board a warship to support the Allied war effort in Europe. On 7-October-1918, LT CDR Lee requested he be assigned to sea duty in European waters. His request was granted. Lee proceeded to New York, caught a ship to Queenstown, Ireland then to Brest, France where he reported on board destroyer O'Brien on 20-November-1918. However, he arrived too late to take part in WWI combat. The hostilities had ended 9 days earlier. He remained at the naval port office in Rotterdam until 9-June-1919. A dispatch to his Kentucky home directed Lee to join the U.S. Rifle Team in Caldwell, New Jersey in July 1919. But he had something else to attend to. Lee and Miss Mabelle Elspeth Allen, daughter of John and Margaret Allen, were married on 14-July-1919. She was 24 and he was 31. Mabelle met Lee in Chicago for the ceremony. Mabelle went back to Rock Island, Illinois to live with her family since the newlyweds had no time for a honeymoon.

In September 1919, LT CDR Lee returned to shipboard duty for 9 months as Executive Officer of submarine *Bushnell*. It was likely that Lee was assigned to the sub to broaden his naval experience by including some contact with submarines, and to “stash” him somewhere safe before going abroad to the 1920 Olympic Games with the U.S. Rifle Team. With his typical curiosity, Lee learned as much as he could and how submarines worked. He rode the submarine, and experienced going down during dives. Lee's assignment on *Bushnell* ended in June 1920.

WWI prevented holding Olympic Games. For participation in the U.S. Rifle Team at Quantico, 17 men were selected –one civilian and 16 officers and enlisted men of the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps. They were off to Belgium aboard armored cruiser *Frederick* for a competition. Lee participated in 14 events, including 7 in one day. As a member of a 5-man team, he captured most of the Gold medals. LT CDR Lee and CDR Carl T Osburn, U.S. Rifle Team Captain, reported to the Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels on the results of their rifle competition. They received congratulations and a picture with SECNAV Daniels. Lee was now poised for his first battleship command.

Destroyer Skipper, 1920-1928. On 28-September-1920, Lee took over his first command, the destroyer *Fairfax*. On 1-June-1921, LT CDR Lee became the Commanding Officer of USS *William B Preston*, which ended on 29-July-1924 when he was detached at Chefoo, China. It was a tour of duty he surely enjoyed. He boarded the USS *Argonne* on 8-November to serve at the New York Navy Yard in Brooklyn. In September 1926, Lee was promoted to the rank of CDR, 18 years after leaving Annapolis. He passed the promotion examinations with high marks, particularly in international law, strategy, and tactics. Lee became Executive Officer of the target repair ship *Antares*, home ported in Norfolk, Virginia. He reported to the ship on 27-November-1926, then took command of the 4-piper *Lardner* on 7-October-1927 at Norfolk until 16-June-1928. At the end of his tour, LT Dashiell L Madeira witnessed Lee's ship-handling prowess. Lee's destroyer days were over.

Commander, 1928-1936. CDR Willis A. Lee was a student in the senior course of the 1928-29 academic year at the Naval War College, which prepared naval officers for naval war. The preponderance of Navy flag officers who made substantial contributions during WWII were Naval War College graduates.

After the shooting competitions, CDR Lee reported on 22 September for duty at the Navy Department in Washington. It was the 1ST of 3 tours he performed in the Fleet Training Division on the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations. The work of the division was to assess the effectiveness of the performance of ships in their ability to perform wartime missions.

One route to promotion in the Navy between the world wars was being a member of the “Gun Club.” Although CDR Lee did not have a postgraduate degree in ordnance, he had great knowledge in depth. Some dubbed him a “scientist in uniform.” His exceptional ability was in applying theory into reality.

A new skipper, CAPT William J Giles, took command of flagship USS *Pennsylvania*. Lee became Executive Officer and Navigator, but relinquished the latter in a month. As second in command, CDR Lee was responsible for the internal operation of the ship: cleanliness, discipline, and administration. He went about the high-power job in low-key. Lee had applied essentially no sanctions and achieved the desired result easily.

ADM Luke McNamee sent a letter to the Chief of Naval Operations, “*During Lee's current tour of sea duty as navigator and as Executive Officer of the USS Pennsylvania, CDR Lee USN, has been of material assistance to battleship gunnery progress particularly in subjects as anti-aircraft machine gun defense, ballistics, and the photographic analysis of anti-aircraft bursts...*” CDR Lee's assignment on *Pennsylvania* ended on 7-June-1933, and he reported on 29-June-1933 for his 2nd tour of duty in the Navy Department in Washington. He was again assigned to Fleet Training Division to revise the gunnery and tactical instructions.

CDR Lee went to Rockland, Maine to observe trials held by the Board of Inspection and Survey on the USS *Ranger*, the first U.S. aircraft carrier built from the keel up for naval war. Lee was to observe interior control mechanisms and practices for lessons learned to be applied to the coming *Yorktown* class.

In 1936, RADM Manley H Simons wrote, “*I know of no officer in the Navy that I would prefer to have serve with me more than CDR Lee. He possesses zeal, ability, knowledge, and initiative that is far above average. He has displayed exceptional knowledge of both theoretical and practical Ordnance in connection with his present duty.*” On 26-August-1936, Lee was promoted to CAPT retroactive to 1-July-1936. Finally, he would now be at sea, where he had always wanted to be.

Cruiser Service, 1936-1939. CAPT Willis Lee was ready for his major command. For surface officer, the desired commands were battleships, heavy cruisers, and light cruisers –in that order. Having received his 4th stripe, Lee became one of the Navy's most junior captains. In 1936, the Bureau of Navigation slated him for the Omaha-class light cruiser USS *Concord*. Although CAPT Lee's ship was commissioned in 1923, it was already obsolescent in armament. Her anti-aircraft protection was nonexistent. EO CDR Eugene Oates, summoned LTJG Evan “Deacon” Yancey to meet Lee at the railroad station. Yancey was from Owen County and had known Lee since grade school.

On 6-October-1936, CAPT Willis Lee relieved CAPT William T Smith. Morale in the *Concord* under CAPT Lee's command was high. The enlisted men were topnotch since the labor situation

during the Depression enabled the Navy to be choosy. The Navy was comprised of a small, elite professional group of men, and most officers were from the Naval Academy.

On 23-October-1936, Concord was the flagship of RADM Walter N Vernou, simultaneously Commander for the Cruisers Battle force and Cruiser Division 3. RADM Vernou was a stickler for punctilious compliance with Navy regulations and customs. Lee was practically the anti-thesis of Vernou. In professional matters, Lee did care and sought excellence. But he was casual about appearances, and that included his navy uniform. When naval aviator LT William "Andy" Anderson embarked on the cruiser scouting squadron to report to CAPT Lee on the bridge, Lee replied with an informal "Okay" instead of "Very well," the proper naval response. Vernou did not hear him and Lee got away with it. But in the instance of Vernou giving an order to the Concord's helmsman where Lee was conning the ship, he countermanded the order. CAPT Lee turned to RADM Vernou and said, "I'm the commanding officer of this ship. I give orders to the helm. Please leave the bridge."

One day when LTJG Marcus W Williamson, a junior aviator, had the watch in port. Lee called him to the captain's cabin and asked him to bring along bombing data records. When Williamson arrived, he walked in and saw the skipper had a blackboard set up filled with bombing data and sketches of airplane bombing approaches at various altitudes. Math formulas filled the chalkboard. CAPT Lee asked LTJG Williamson whether the approaches he had drawn were feasible. LTJG Yancey stood deck watch on the bridge, and many times heard CAPT Lee express that the U.S. would have to fight Japan, and he scanned every open foot of deck on the Concord to determine whether he could install additional light AA guns.

On 12-June-1937, the crew gathered on the fantail. RADM Vernou presented CAPT Lee with the Light Cruiser Unit Trophy for General Excellence in Athletics. In 1935, the Concord's unheralded team staged an upset to win the Battle Force championship and went on to win the U.S. Fleet competition.

On 22-June-1937, RADM Julius C Townsend relieved Vernou and the flagship shifted to USS Trenton. CAPT Lee took over as acting commander of Cruiser Division 3 for the next few months. LT Harold Krick was Lee's flag lieutenant when Lee was acting division commander. LT CDR William F Jennings reported to the cruiser division staff as flag secretary. Thus began a personal and professional association with Lee that continued for 7 years.

The Concord was a happy ship under CAPT Lee. When Lee left, the new skipper CAPT Earle C "Dutch" Metz was as nervous as Lee was calm and serene. Metz was likeable and a fine officer, but he lacked the control that CAPT Lee displayed on the bridge and throughout the ship by his unruffled, taciturn demeanor. He was an old shoe in sloppy uniform but he got results. CAPT Lee's command of Cruiser Division 3 ended on 7-September-1937 when RADM Harold "Betty" Stark became Commander.

Ensigns Richard Bradley and Fitzhugh Palmer were two new contributions to the Concord from USNA'36. Years later, both expressed gratitude at having been sent first to the cruiser. It was standard practice for newly commissioned academy ensigns to report to the fleet's battleships, carriers, or heavy cruisers that allowed them to get their first experiences as naval officers without a too much pressure or responsibility. With fewer officers in the light cruiser, both of them got their upbringing in the hands of capable officers who were serious about professional

performance and yet pleasant to be with.

Before the end of 1937, LT CDR Charles Wellborn Jr became navigator after having served in the Bureau of Ordnance and as Commanding Officer of destroyer Perry. Wellborn said of Lee: "He could carry in his mind the decimal figures for sines and cosines to any degree you wanted to give. He could multiply these decimals by some other number mentally and come out with the linear measures of sines and cosines." To Wellborn, Lee was a human computer, using his capability beyond the classroom, spending little time in academic pursuits.

CAPT Lee's concern was finding the means for his facility with numbers to be applied in naval operations. Lee used 2 superimposed compass roses that he carried in his pocket. The gadget was known as an "is-was" and was more commonly used by submariners to calculate attack courses. The device enabled Lee to come up with the two legs of the relative motion triangle: the range and bearing from the guide at the Concord's present station and at the new station to which she would proceed. He figured the 3rd leg in his head and then was able to supply the required course and speed. He had memorized the trigonometric functions of all possible angles of a triangle and then did the necessary calculations mentally. He was tolerant of people who didn't have his ability, and they had to do the computations on paper to check his solutions. His estimates were almost always right within a degree or two.

On 30-July-1938, CAPT Willis Lee ended his nearly 22 month tour in command of Concord but he remained onboard as Operations Officer on ADM Stark's staff. CAPT Earle C Metz of USNA'10 became the new skipper of the Concord. Since Stark had white hair and seven staff members, they were soon nicknamed for the movie characters of Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs. The new commanding officer of Concord had a tough act to follow, and a resulting fall in morale was inevitable.

On 30-December-1938 in New York, ADM Stark and his staff shifted to Honolulu, one of Brooklyn's sisters. The commissioning skipper was CAPT Oscar Smith who was sworn in with Lee at USNA in 1904. LT CDR Frederick Entwistle, Honolulu's gunnery officer noted CAPT Lee's interest in the new 6-inch guns. LT CDR Entwistle recalled Lee as quiet and unassuming but not an introvert, and devoid of pomposity.

Staff Gunnery Officer Wellborn scheduled the various ships for target practice and sent in administrative reports on the results. The international political situation had dictated the operation be geared more to potential wartime requirements.

On 24-May-1939, CAPT Lee left cruiser Honolulu to report to the Navy Department in Washington to prepare the U.S. Navy for the war that he and many others expected to come.

The Washington Years: Preparing for Battle, 1939-1942. War clouds were swirling throughout Europe when ADM Harold R Stark became the Chief of Naval Operations on 1-August-1939. Stark wrote that CAPT Lee's men were devoted to Lee. Those words may just have been Lee's highest accolade of all.

One weakness of the Mark 14 sight was that its predicted lead angles relied on a manual range estimate by an operator. In fast combat situations, operators could neglect to change the range setting as planes approached, throwing off their aim. Radar could not only "see" but could also update the range automatically, making the entire system always accurate. The Navy purchased 85,000 Mark 14 gunsights to control the multitude of light AA guns in the fleet.

One of the best-kept secrets of the prewar months was the development of shipboard radar. CAPT Lee saw the radar's potential. He recognized the value of getting it installed aboard as many ships to perform the functions of searching for targets and controlling gunfire against those targets.

On 13-May-1941, CAPT Lee chaired a conference in his office to discuss installation of radar antennas and sets on board various ships of the fleet, beginning with battleships, heavy cruisers, and light cruisers. CAPT Lee recommended to the Bureau of Navigation to establish a class at the Naval Research Laboratory in Washington to train men to operate various types of radar. The candidates for training were to include radiomen, fire controlmen, and electrician's mates.

At 0200 on a September morning in 1941, CDR Nealy A Chapin, Fleet Training Duty Officer, gave a pleased Mabelle Lee the news that her husband had been selected for Rear Admiral. It wasn't that much of a surprise as CAPT Lee had been serving in an admiral's billet in the months since ADM Herbert Leary left, and the CNO had utmost confidence in him.

On 7-December-1941, the Japanese struck Pearl Harbor and the nation was at war. CAPT Lee put Jimmy Holloway as Head of Fleet Training's gunnery section in charge of allocating .50-caliber ammunition, which was in short supply. The half-million rounds on hand weren't enough for more than a few days of fighting. One reason for the scarcity was that the U.S. had been providing the bullets to the British through the Lend-Lease program, which was America's means of keeping the British afloat during the period before the U.S. got into the war itself.

ADM Ernest J King who had been serving as Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, moved to Washington to be Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet. On 30-December-1941, CAPT Lee reported to ADM King's staff for temporary additional duty as Assistant Chief of Staff for Readiness. The division's function was to make the fleet ready for combat. On 8-January-1942, ADM Stark administered the oath of office as CAPT Lee was promoted to the temporary rank of Rear Admiral, retroactive to 4-November-1941. RADM Lee could now provide the fleet more weapons.

As Head of Readiness Division, RADM Lee was responsible for seeing that weapons and ammunition were procured and delivered to the ships to meet all operational requirements.

RADM Lee and LT CDR Percival "Pete" McDowell of USNA'23 concocted a letter to BuOrd and BuShips, saying they wanted at least one radar installed on every combatant ship. Per RADM Lee, "If you can't produce them in the U.S., buy British."

Getting weapons onto ships was a prime consideration. A letter drafted by LT CDR McDowell went up the chain of command, got the requisite approval from the Secretary of the Navy, and was implemented. Thereafter, whenever a combatant went into a shipyard, light anti-aircraft guns were added everywhere there was room. For some of the ships, topside equipment was removed to make way for the AA guns.

The biggest and most impressive of the new gunnery ships were 35,000-ton fast battleships of the *North Carolina* and *South Dakota* classes. A war was on, and RADM Lee wanted to go to sea, ADM King approved RADM Lee for command of a battleship division. Lee was officially detached from Washington duty on 10-August-1942. RADM Willis Augustus Lee Jr., 54 years old, was on his way to rejoin the fleet he loved so well.

Battleship Division Commander, August-October 1942. The recently promoted RADM Willis Lee would be heading to the South

Pacific in August 1942. The tentacles of the Japanese octopus had expanded farther and farther to ensnare new conquests. But then, codebreakers working in a basement room in the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard divined Japanese intentions from intercepted radio messages. That intel work put U.S. warships into position for the Battle of the Coral Sea in May. The victory of the Battle of Midway was also due to good intel work. The intel also revealed that Japan's intention in Guadalcanal was to build an airstrip that would provide them a wide radius for air attacks. Japanese began laying out the air strip on July 6.

On August 7, the Navy sent the 1ST Marine Division assault team ashore Guadalcanal. The Marines captured the airstrip and renamed it Henderson Field. On 8-9 August, a Japanese cruiser commanded by VADM Gunichi Mikawa sank 4 heavy cruisers: *Astoria*, *Vicennes*, *Quincy*, and the Australian *Canberra*. The U.S. guns inflicted hits on the enemy heavy cruisers: *Chokai*, *Aoba*, and *Kinugasa*. U.S. submarine S-44 torpedoed and sank heavy cruiser *Kako* on August 10. On August 19, a Japanese convoy of 9 destroyers delivered a thousand army troops to the island. The commander of the infantry regiment was COL Kiyonao Ichiki, whose mission was to recapture Henderson Field. The Marines killed COL Ichiki and hundreds of his men, but even more troops were poured into Guadalcanal. RADM Willis Lee was now headed to Guadalcanal, designated to take the first division of the new 27-knot fast battleships to the Pacific. RADM Lee had risen to Commander, Battleship Division 6.

President Roosevelt directed SECNAV Frank Knox to put together a group of 9 senior admirals, whose task was to pick the 40 most competent of the Navy's 120 active-duty flag officers. Surprisingly, neither Nimitz nor Spruance made the cut. RADM Lee received 5 votes. Historian Richard Frank lauded RADM Lee as the star of the surface officers as clearly one of the finest officers of that generation. SECNAV Knox turned over the results of the votes to President Roosevelt on March 9.

The *South Dakota* served as RADM Lee's flagship. She was the lead ship in a new class of fast battleships, shorter and better armored than the *North Carolina* and *Washington*. She carried a main battery of 9 16-inch/45-caliber guns. Her secondary battery has only 16 rather than 20 5-inch/38-caliber dual-purpose guns for use against both air and surface targets.

For his flag lieutenant, RADM Lee wanted someone who could aid him in the substance of tactical challenges ahead, not one who would take care of his personal chores. Thus the intervention by CDR Bill Jennings who had gone to the Bureau of Naval Personnel to find an officer with postgraduate education in ordnance and fire control. LT Ray Thompson fit those specifications and was immediately available. Ensign Paul Backus remembered LT Thompson as a hot shot in the weapons field. He finished 5TH of 432 in the USNA Class of 1933.

RADM Lee also sought out LT Chad Knowlton as the ship's Electronic Maintenance Officer. He did the repairs on all of the ship's radars and Lee sought him out for information on their capabilities. Lee wanted to pass on his knowledge of the intersection of radar and gunnery by pooling what he knew with inputs from others. LT CDR Richard D Zern became the Flag Secretary and proved to be a wise choice. Signalman Henry C Price as watch supervisor, hand-delivered messages to RADM Lee. LT Albert T. Church was Radar Officer and acting Communications Officer. Ensign Robert Gooding served as the Radar Material Officer. In the 1970s, he became VADM Gooding and served as

Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command. Two years later, Gunnery Officer LT Lloyd M. Mustin joined RADM Lee's staff. The *Washington* remained Lee's favorite flagship.

On October 8, Japanese seaplane *Nisshin* and destroyers headed toward Guadalcanal. They were attacked by SBD dive-bombers and TBF Avengers of the Cactus Air Force. The Navy sent in ships to stave off *Nisshin's* return. These were RADM Normal Scott's Task Group 64.2, RADM George Murray's Task Force 17, and RADM Willis Lee's Task Group 17.8. In addition to Lee's flagship *Washington*, was a light cruiser and 2 destroyers. That day, RADM Kelly Turner set out from Noumea in 7 ships to deliver an Army Infantry Regiment and ground detachment of the 1st Marine Air Wing. On October 11, seaplanes *Nisshin* and *Chitose*, set out with cruisers and destroyers to bombard Guadalcanal's Lunga Airfield after midnight. ADM Ghormley dispatched the 3 Task Forces and directed RADM Lee's group to protect RADM Kelly Turner's convoy. This was a rare and successful surface action. This victorious night action on October 11-12 was called the Battle of Cape Esperance.

On October 18, ADM Nimitz tasked ADM Halsey to take Command of the South Pacific Area and South Pacific Forces. The morale of the South Pacific Theatre shot skyward. But there was at least one skeptic. ADM Halsey visited the *Washington* and RADM Lee pointed out the SB radar screen to ADM Halsey. All ADM Halsey said was "I've heard of that." RADM Lee had no expression on his face but LT Al Church wrote years later, "*I'm not trying to detract from the great leader Halsey was, but this was just an incident where my confidence was so fully in Lee and somewhat shaken in ADM Halsey.*" It showed how really exceptional Lee was in grasping and mastering new technology.

Task Force 64 was now under RADM Lee's command, deployed to the waters of Guadalcanal known as "torpedo junction" for the submarine peril. With *Washington* at dusk on October 17 were cruisers *San Francisco*, *Helena*, and *Chester*. They were directed to patrol off Guadalcanal's southern coast as ADM Yamamoto's plan was to capture Henderson Field.

On 20-October-1942, the 3 cruisers along with 6 destroyers split off to bombard Japanese positions near Cape Esperance. That night, a Japanese submarine *I-176* hit *Chester* with a torpedo ramming into her number 1 engine room after tearing a large hole in the skin of the ship. The attack killed 11 crewmen and injured 12. It damaged the ship to the extent that she needed significant repair work, and headed stateside for repairs.

Chester's Signal Officer, Ensign Guillaem Aertsen III was transferred to Lee's staff as Aide and Flag Lieutenant. Aertsen was a Harvard graduate commissioned as junior officer by the V-7 program. But his skills and experiences on board *Chester* were useful. Aertsen and Lee meshed so well that he remained with Lee throughout the war. He was like a son to RADM Lee.

RADM Lee's *Washington* was 130 miles south of Guadalcanal. Lee's Task Force 64 composed of battleships, cruisers, and destroyers positioned itself between the islands of Rennell and San Cristobal, out of range of Japanese carrier planes, but also not in position to support the carrier task forces. The *Hornet* sank on October 27, hit by Japanese destroyers and deadly torpedo attacks. The lesson this provides is the need for anti-aircraft protection for the carriers and its surface ships. That pairing became the template for U.S. carrier operations throughout the remainder of the Pacific War.

Night Action off Savo Island, November 1942. LT CDR Layton recalled that ADM Nimitz had a high regard for RADM Lee as a

war-fighter, which explains why Lee remained in the war zone for nearly 3 years without relief so he could command the battle line when appropriate. Nimitz said: "Now we'll see a real fighter show those Japs how we can fight." Layton said it was obvious that Nimitz felt far more confidence that Lee would "do the job" on the Japs than he had of the others.

RADM Lee's *Washington* did not have a radar on the bridge, just one in the CIC room. It would mean having to walk back and forth the bridge and CIC so he stood and watched the battle from outside the ship instead. Projectiles from the *Kirishima* flew over but did not hit his ship, but at least one of the *Washington's* 16-inch salvos struck *Kirishima*. The *South Dakota* was hit critically by *Kirishima*, *Atago* and *Takao*. At 02:32, the *Washington* unleashed her 5-inch guns fatally on the already-wounded destroyer *Ayanami*. The *Uranami* polished her with a torpedo and sunk *Ayanami*. At 2338, VADM Lee directed his two remaining destroyers to leave the formation since they were no longer capable of offensive action. The *Washington's* fire control radars tracked a large target which proved to be the Japanese flagship *Kirishima*. But VADM Lee held off firing for a while until the smoke cleared because it might be the *South Dakota*. At midnight, the *Washington* opened up on *Kirishima* with her main battery at the range of 8400 yards, a close encounter of naval behemoths firing. *Washington* unleashed 75 radar-controlled 16-inch rounds at *Kirishima*. Of the 75, 20 struck home. Rounds from the 5-inch guns made 18 hits. Within 7 minutes, *Kirishima* was out of the fight. *Kirishima's* rudder was jammed, some of the hits were below the ship's waterline, acting like a torpedo which let water into her hull. She was uncontrollable and fires raged topside. The damage inflicted on *Kirishima* was so extensive that she sank at around 0320, 11 miles west of Savo Island. The *Washington* was now fighting alone. From that point onward, *Washington* effectively constituted the entirety of the U.S. Fighting force. Neither the destroyers nor the *South Dakota* were capable of combatting the enemy. *Washington* sailed south to protect *South Dakota*. As *Washington* was steaming away, VADM Lee was imperturbable. Yet he had just fought the biggest battle of his life. He explained to the surviving crew that their margin of superiority was due almost entirely to their possession of radar. The Japanese did not have any radar. That night, Task Force 64 had prevented the bombardment of Henderson Field and the landing of enemy troops and supplies on Guadalcanal.

Watchful Waiting, December 1942-October 1943. For years, RADM Lee focused his efforts on improving anti-aircraft gunnery. Lee was interested in the variable-time (VT) fuze, a part of a projectile for a 5-inch/38-caliber shipboard gun. The fuze would send out a radio signal, sense the nearness of an enemy aircraft, and receive a response that would explode the warhead. It only had to come near an aircraft to detonate. His interest resulted in a large increase in orders for the VT fuze and its general issue to combatant ships in the Pacific. LTJG Van Allen explained that RADM Lee's influence was responsible for the highly successful use of the radio-proximity fuze in anti-aircraft defense of the Pacific Fleet. Years later, by then a renowned scientist, Van Allen recalled that Lee immediately focused on the importance of the VT fuze that eliminates "range error" of the old mechanical-time fuze, making it 5-10 times more effective.

Central Pacific Campaign, Autumn 1943-Summer 1944. After Guatemala, RADM Lee's battleships got back into combat in the autumn of 1943 while supporting the invasion of the Gilbert Islands. This was the start of the island-hopping campaign that

would eventually lead to Japan. The battleships were to be valued not so much for their big guns, but for their smaller ones. They would provide anti-aircraft protection while operating as part of carrier task groups. This validated Lee's push in the pre-war period to get as many anti-aircraft guns to sea battleships.

RADM Lee got a rare opportunity to exercise tactical command on 8-December 1943. The operation was an air-sea attack on the island of Nauru, northeast of the Solomons. It was well defended by the Japanese that U.S. forces bypassed than invaded. It did, however, provide an opportunity for all 6 fast battleships to participate as a unit and test their abilities at *shore bombardment*. The ships were *North Carolina*, *Washington*, *South Dakota*, *Indiana*, *Massachusetts*, and *Alabama*. At 0700, at RADM Lee's signal transmitted by flags, all ships unleashed 9-gun salvos toward the coast. 54 16-inch projectiles were in the air simultaneously. The opening range was 30,000 yards. The ships moved closer during 40 minutes of firing, bringing the destroyers firing position. The U.S. ships had fired 810 16-inch projectiles and 3,400 5-inchers. The carriers *Bunker Hill* and *Monterey* strafed and bombed the island too.

On 30-January-1944, a day before the invasion of Kwajalein Atoll, RADM Lee commanded Task Unit 58.13 during a bombardment of the southern atoll. His command comprised of the *Washington*, *Massachusetts*, and *Indiana*, which were accompanied by a division of destroyers. The battleships launched Kingfisher floatplanes though Lee's report said these aircrafts did not have sufficient endurance to observe the entire operation. Lee recommended carrier planes be used in future missions. The battleships fired 1029 rounds of 16-inch projectiles and 8,215 rounds of 5-inch projectiles. Lee's assessment: "The bombardment appeared to be most effective and undoubtedly inflicted heavy damage on enemy personnel and installations." As in the Gilberts, RADM Lee was designated to command the battle line if enemy ships contest the invasion.

Of all the actions that RADM Lee took during WWII, his decision not to engage the Japanese surface fleet in the Marianas remains the most controversial and the one for which he has been criticized. When the time came to take on the Japanese heavies, Lee expected that he could do so in a situation that provided him a battle line with a clear tactical advantage, an element missing off Saipan. It would be amiss again in Leyte.

Battle of Leyte Gulf, Summer-Autumn 1944. RADM Lee, on board the *Washington*, was designated commander of Task Group 34 and had tactical command. Among Lee's duties was serving as the assistant commander of the 3RD Fleet, able to step in and direct the fleet when needed. However, when ADM Halsey and his men could have greatly benefited, they did not listen to Lee. It was a huge blunder on the part of ADM Halsey and staff to ignore Lee's warning that VADM Takeo Kurita's ships were on their way to San Bernardino Strait. Halsey blundered twice, the first was in sending all the battleships north when the enemy was south; the second was in turning back and sending all his ships south when the enemy had headed north. Had even just 2 of Lee's ships pursued VADM Kurita's ships, the likelihood would be that Lee would have sunk *Ise* and *Hyuga*. Kinkaid asked Halsey plainly "Where is Lee? Send Lee." Nimitz directed his war plans officer RADM Forrest Sherman to ask Halsey, "Where is Task force 34?" ADM Ernest King was angry that Halsey had not let Lee's ships guard San Bernardino Strait. A few years later RADM Kinkaid said, "The net result of all this is that 6 strongest battleships in the

world, except *Yamato* and *Musashi*, steamed 300 miles north and 300 miles south during 'the greatest naval battle of WWII' and the largest engagement ever fought on the high seas -and did not fire a single shot. I can well imagine the feelings of my Naval Academy classmate, Lee."

On 21-November-1944, RADM Lee disembarked his favorite flagship, *Washington*, at the lagoon of Ulithi Atoll. He first embarked on the ship in September 1942 after the *South Dakota* scraped a gash in her hull at Tongatabu. RADM Lee had been on board *Washington* for the Guadalcanal campaign, Gilbert Islands, Marshall Islands, the collision with the *Indiana*, Marianas, and the frustration at Leyte Gulf. Lee and his Battleships Pacific Fleet staff transferred back to *South Dakota*.

Closing in on Japan, November 1944 - June 1945. The operation to capture Kerama Retto in the Ryukyus was to acquire a support base and anchorage for U.S. Navy ships. In preparation, ADM Spruance designated RADM Lee as Commander of Task Force 59. It was classified as a heavy striking force as it went out from Ulithi for 2 days of maneuvers, prior to the invasion of the Philippines. The difference was the enemy was considerably diminished in size and power by 1945. But *Yamato* survived the Battle of Leyte Gulf, and was a threat.

Scholar Malcolm Muir wrote that only one fast carrier was lost to air attack while under fast battleship protection: the *Princeton* at Leyte Gulf. Some ships were not conceived for air attacks when they were designed. The Japanese may have had to turn to kamikazes when their pilots met such effective anti-aircraft fire from U.S. ships escorting carriers making it hard to carry out their air raid missions.

Task Group 59.7, commanded by VADM Lee, comprised 8 fast battleships, Spruance's flagship *Indianapolis*, destroyers, and destroyer minesweepers. Air attacks and bombardments of southern Okinawa was a diversion to deceive the enemy on where the real landings would happen. VADM Lee's 4 divisions of battleships opened up at 0930 on 24-March-1945 at a range of 22,000 yards, and proceeded to bombard the southern coast. The 8 battleships released 1,375 16-inch projectiles. *Missouri* and *Wisconsin* fired their main battery guns for the first time. Floatplanes were over the island as spotters. The carriers maintained aerial assaults and continued support as the soldiers and Marines went ashore on the western side of the island.

Ever since Lee's victory at Guadalcanal in November 1942, VADM Lee had remained at sea much of the time to command the battle line in surface engagements. The remaining target was the 72,000-ton *Yamato*, which was sunk on April 7 together with 9 other warships by U.S. carrier aircrafts before the kamikazes reached Okinawa to perform a suicide attack.

From April 1 to June 22, 1945 the U.S. Army divisions and Marines attacked the Shuri Castle line. U.S. battleships, cruisers, and destroyers approached under cover of darkness to support the offensive. VADM Lee's Task Group 58.7 comprising *South Dakota*, *North Carolina*, and *Washington* also arrived in darkness. *North Carolina* commenced shelling at 0647. *South Dakota* followed at 0853 with her 16-inch guns, and 5-inchers at 11:16. *South Dakota's* Kingfisher planes were overhead to direct firing at preplanned targets. Carrier planes joined in the onslaught. *South Dakota* launched 227 16-inch projectiles and 114 rounds of 5-inchers. Carriers launched 1,000 aircrafts a day to strike at LT GEN Mitsuru Ushijima's HQ on Okinawa. But the kamikazes got worse. 36 U.S. ships sunk and 5,000 sailors died.

ADM Nimitz, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas moved his HQ from Pearl Harbor to Guam to put him closer to the scene of combat. This gave him opportunity for face-to-face conversations with VADM Lee on operational issues. Lee and Mustin were impressed by Nimitz' acceptance of observations made by those who had experienced actual combat. Nimitz wanted to learn more about kamikaze attacks. The intellectual Nimitz finished 7TH of 114 in USNA Class of 1905.

VADM Lee discussed with ADM Nimitz that a combat information center (CIC) on board any ship should include the gunnery department. CIC provided information necessary for the effective use of the ship's armaments and should have a direct link in the organizational structure. The Navy Department experimented augmenting an operations department, merging gunnery and radar CIC systems in a few ships. Post-war, the change was made permanent in U.S. Navy ships.

VADM Lee's WWII combat service was over, having started in the summer of 1942. The kamikaze was the primary threat in invading Japan's home islands. Lee had been selected to find counter-measures to foil the kamikaze attacks. Lee was considered the best analytical man in the Navy. The conviction by the Navy's leaders that he was the best man to take on Japan's fleet. Thus Lee had not been east of Hawaii since that summer of 1942. On 16-June-1945, Lee turned over Battleship Squadron 2 to RADM John F Shafroth, a Division Commander under him, and also from USNA Class of 1908.

War's End, June-August 1945. On 18-June-1945, a PT boat came alongside the dark gray hull of *South Dakota*, and RADM Lee took leave of a battleship for the last time in his life. He took along with him a few of his staff. The boat headed for Samar Island, where a Navy plane would fly them to the U.S. East Coast.

On 2-July-1945, VADM Lee was designated as Commander of Task Force 69, re-designated as Composite Task Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet. VADM Lee's initial flagship for Task Force 69 was the radar picket destroyer *Dennis J Buckley*. Its role was to provide advance warning of incoming enemy air raids. On August 11, she was replaced with the *Wyoming* as Lee's flagship.

VADM Lee's group gave COMMO Arleigh Burke the go-ahead to send the color-burst projectiles to the fleet. It was an innovation adopted as anti-aircraft projectiles that produced different-colored bursts when they exploded. Previously, all flak bursts were black, so if more than one ship was firing at a plane, there was no way to distinguish the bursts. In surface gunnery against ships, different colors of dyes were used in projectiles.

Following the dropping of 2 atomic bombs on Nagasaki and Hiroshima, Japan surrendered. VADM Lee had not gotten back to his battleships. WWI and WWII finished without him. The naval career he so single-mindedly dedicated his life to suddenly seemed to have no future. Lee was unprepared and depressed. His task force had not found a solution to the kamikaze menace. And now it no longer mattered. For what good use would a battleship commander be now that the war is over? Lee's deep-set grief in not being able to correct the blunders of ADM Halsey in the Battle of Leyte Gulf greatly contributed to his early death, a high price to pay to be part of the greatest battle at sea.

VADM Lee boarded a boat to his office on Great Diamond Island. Moments later, Lee began choking. He slumped over on his seat in the cockpit, and the boat crew rushed in to help. Lee tried to speak but could not. The boat headed for the nearest ships of Lee's task force destroyers. Within 20 seconds, doctors

from the *Goodrich* and *Henry Tucker* boarded the boat but found Lee already dead of coronary thrombosis. It had only been 7-8 minutes since the boat had left the landing dock. The man who spent many years in command of big ships died in a small boat. The best Battleship Commander died not in battle but in peace.



RECOMMENDATION:

The book "**Battleship Commander –The Life of Vice Admiral Willis A Lee Jr.**" by Paul Stillwell and published by USNI is such a joy to read. The author clearly presents how VADM Lee's marksmanship, advanced mathematical skills, cleverness, and wit in his childhood years later benefitted the U.S. Navy in wartime Pacific. This book would be a perfect reference for future navy commanders as it reveals how Lee could generate a cohesive and happy crew. Lee was very much appreciated by ADM Nimitz for his brilliant mind, and his ability to transfer theory into practice, but most of all for his humility and non-pompous nature.

VADM Lee sought ideas to find the nexus between radar and gunnery systems, and to optimize the placement of weaponry in all ships. His quest created an operations department, merging gunnery and radar communications systems in every ship, as recommended by VADM Lee. He ensured that all crew were well-trained in gunnery by holding drills. The battleship crews became so good with their light and heavy guns that the Japanese had to resort to Kamikaze pilots because of the difficulties they faced. In addition, having carrier planes became a template for all U.S. carriers after the war, as recommended by VADM Lee. The tactical group that experimented on remedies to fight the Kamikazes became the Operational Test and Evaluation Force in 1959. That command, growing from the seeds planted by VADM Willis Lee in 1945, exists as a vital part of the U.S. Navy. There was a reason why ADM Chester Nimitz singled out VADM Willis Lee. He considered VADM Lee as the best battleship commander among the rest. 🚢

PREPARATION FOR THE PROPOSED NEW NAVAL FORWARD OPERATING BASE FACING THE PACIFIC

by NAVFORSOL



Chairman, Technical Working Group (TWG) Forward Operating Base (FOB) Catanduanes Paid Courtesy Call to LGU of Catanduanes in Connection with Naval Forward Operating Base.

01-March-2022, Bagamanoc, Catanduanes – CAPTAIN SALVADOR G LAVAPIE JR PN(GSC), Chairman, Technical Working Group (TWG) Forward Operating Base (FOB) Catanduanes and Commander, Naval Task Force – 31 (NTF-31), paid a courtesy call to Catanduanes Governor, Hon. Joseph Chua Cua on 01 March 2022.

The courtesy call is in connection with the proposed construction of a Forward Operating Base (FOB) for ground, air, and naval assets including renovation of the dilapidated pier on the said area that shall cater to ships deployed in the eastern

seaboard of the country. The team discussed the proposed location as well as the contribution of the Provincial Government of Catanduanes in the creation of the FOB.

This initiative is in line with AFP’s constitutional mandate of protecting the people, securing the sovereignty of the State, and the integrity of the national territory. Moreover, the activity exhibited Naval Forces Southern Luzon’s commitment and intent to protect and secure the territorial waters of Bicol and Southern Luzon against any foreign adversaries, invaders, or intruders. 🚢



RELIEF AND RECOVERY OPERATIONS BY BFAR-8

by BFAR News



DA-BFAR'S RELIEF AND RECOVERY OPERATIONS REACH MORE ODETTE-STRICKEN FISHERFOLK COMMUNITIES

Thirty (30) fisherfolks from Barangays Asuncion, Combado and Pasay of Maasin City, Southern Leyte whose fishing boats have been totally damaged by Typhoon Odette on December 16, 2021 have been awarded with 15 units of 20-footer fiberglass boats with engines and accessories by the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) on 22-January-2022.

The said fishing boats with an estimate value of Php 45,000-Php 50,000 is part of the first batch of distribution of fisheries livelihood interventions to the people of Maasin as committed by the BFAR through National Director Eduardo B. Gongona. He also pledged that the Bureau will earnestly work to deliver the requested number of fishing boats for the City of Maasin by the end of March 2022.

National Director Gongona highlighted the need to beef-up local fisheries production through provision of such livelihood and shared the weight of enacting ordinances supporting Small-Brother-Big-Brother partnerships to enhance fisheries production and establish fish security and sustainability in the country.

Further, Maasin City Mayor Nacional Mercado reminded the beneficiaries to take appropriate care of the interventions granted and religiously follow fishery laws to properly conserve and manage our fishery resources, particularly the bounties of the waters of Southern Leyte.

The said beneficiaries were identified through the On-the-Ground Assessment conducted by the Provincial Fishery Office (PFO) of Southern Leyte, assisted by the Maasin City Agriculture's Office last December 2021. To date, Php28 million worth of damages and losses to fisheries-related livelihoods and infrastructures have been recorded and 454 fisherfolks from the 18 coastal barangays of Maasin have been evidently affected by the wrath of Typhoon Odette. More than 200 units of fishing boats are targeted to be given to these affected fisherfolks, having two beneficiaries share one boat.

In continuous response to this call of assistance envisioned to enliven the lives of not only the fisherfolk communities of Maasin City but of the Province of Southern Leyte and affected municipalities in Leyte, BFAR 8 is fabricating fiberglass boats and procuring suitable fishing gears and paraphernalia targeted to be promptly delivered within the first quarter of 2022. Necessary proposals are also being lobbied to the National Government for immediate and appropriate funding.

Exemplifying the innate camaraderie of its Regional Offices spearheaded by its Central Office, several fabrication tools for Fiber-Reinforced Plastic Boats, boat engines, wooden boat reconstruction materials and in-kind donations were brought to Tacloban City on December 26, 2021 by the BRP Lapu-Lapu (DA-BFAR MMOV 5001).

Showing the cooperation and benevolence which was once embodied after the onslaught of Typhoon Yolanda in 2013, BFAR Regional Office 8 received these donations for the immediate assistance of fisherfolk communities affected by Typhoon Odette in Eastern Visayas having the province of Southern Leyte and Dawahon Island in Bato, Leyte as priority areas.

Coastal municipalities whose fisherfolk communities have been severely damaged by this ravaging typhoon based on the On-the-Ground Assessment of the Bureau were considered first for immediate delivery of assistance.

To date, a total of Php444M worth of damages to fisheries-related livelihoods and infrastructures, affecting 4,823 fisherfolk in the region have been recorded by the BFAR 8. Several sustainable and adaptive interventions are being lobbied by the Office for appropriate and urgent funding.

The BRP *Lapu-lapu* also transported several relief goods from volunteer media practitioners and the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD-8) to Limasawa, Southern Leyte in a bid to safely deliver the necessities for the island settlers who are in dire need of food and water as transportation of these goods have been difficult since the onslaught of Typhoon Odette.

Further, the **BFAR 8 Donation Drive** is still accepting in-kind and other necessary aids from donors. Generous individuals may visit the nearest BFAR Office in their areas or call 09704508876/09263677328 for further coordination. 🚢

MARITIME LEAGUE SUPPORTS BOHOL RELIEF ASSISTANCE

by Vicky Viray Mendoza

On 16-December-2021, Typhoon Odette left the province of Bohol in a devastated environment: with uprooted trees, flooding, roofs ripped from schools and buildings, and collapsed numerous homes! RADM MARGARITO V SANCHEZ JR AFP(RET), Chairperson of SEABEES and ENGINEER RETIREES GENERAL SERVICES COOPERATIVE (SERGS Coop) organized a relief drive to benefit victims of this typhoon as what they had carried out during the past Bohol earthquake.

The Maritime League (ML) heeded the call for help to the victims of the natural disaster through the efforts of ML Trustee RADM MV Sanchez Jr.

Trustee Sanchez Jr, who hails from Inabanga, Bohol, spearheaded the BOHOL RELIEF ASSISTANCE, a joint Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief mission to benefit the victims of the typhoon. Also, he rounded up the support of PNSLAI, Philippine Military Academy (PMA) Magilas Class of 1976,

Topsolve Manpower Solutions Inc. and donations from his former commanders, colleagues and friends to provide assistance to Bohol's most stricken areas hit by Typhoon Odette.

On 23-January-2022, Trustee Sanchez Jr successfully distributed food packs and used clothing to 600 Inabanga households composed of about 2,400 family members. Cash assistance was also given to families with the most heavily-damaged dwellings in Barangays Luyo and Bugang.

"On behalf of my townfolk in Inabanga, Bohol, we would like to extend our heartfelt gratitude for your generosity and support. May God bless us more!," Trustee Sanchez Jr expressed with gratification.

The Maritime League continues to support missions of compassion and worthwhile endeavors that uplift the spirits of our countrymen in need.



**SEABEES AND ENGINEER RETIREES
GENERAL SERVICES COOPERATIVE
(SERGS COOP)**

BOHOL RELIEF ASSISTANCE



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- SEC HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR.
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- VADM EDUARDO MA SANTOS
- VADM LUISITO FERNANDEZ
- VADM VICTORINO HINGCO
- VADM FERDINAND GOLEZ
- VADM MATEO MAYUGA
- VADM ROGELIO CALUNSAG
- VADM JOSE LUIS ALANO



*The Maritime
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- ROD SAN PEDRO
- ARISTOS CONSTRUCTION
MANAGEMENT TEAM

Below are some of the photos taken during the activities for your appreciation, with RADM MV Sanchez Jr himself overseeing the operation in Bohol.



Distribution of Food Packs! BRGY. OFFICIALS!



Distribution of Food Packs! BRGY. LUYO!



Distribution of Food Packs! BRGY. BUGANG!



Distribution of Financial Aid

Here are a couple of pictures of financial assistance given to those whose homes had collapsed and were heavily damaged by Typhoon Odette, which was a category 5 typhoon.



LGU LILA DEPARTMENT HEADS!



OFFICIAL HAND OVER OF THE SYMBOLIC CHEQUE!



Correspondingly, RADM MV SANCHEZ Jr an honorary member of PMA Magilas Class '76 also formally turned-over the Class'76 financial aid to typhoon victims in LILA, Bohol. This is through the efforts of CARLOS CAGAANAN, an original member of Class'76 and a native son of LILA, Bohol. Shown is Mayor Jed Piollo accepting the class donation in the presence of the LGU Department Heads.

In a related development, Gov Hermogenes E Ebdane Jr of

the Province of Zambales also responded to the call for a relief assistance initiated by RADM Sanchez. On 25-January-2022, the Provincial Government of Zambales donated to LGU-Inabanga, Bohol the amount of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00) as relief assistance to typhoon victims.

On behalf of all Boholanos, RADM MV Sanchez Jr thanked Gov Hermogenes E Ebdane Jr for his benevolence and support to help alleviate the living conditions of the typhoon victims. 🚩

RELIEF AND RECOVERY OPERATIONS BY DA-BFAR

by BFAR Central



PRESS RELEASE

DA-BFAR'S RELIEF AND RECOVERY OPERATIONS REACH MORE ODETTE-STRICKEN FISHERFOLK COMMUNITIES

DA-BFAR's multi-mission vessels have been deployed to fast-track the recovery of Odette-stricken coastal areas. More than Php 6 million worth of relief goods and food packs including frozen fish, rice, sardines, clothes, and hygiene kits have been distributed to affected fisherfolk in Regions IV-B, VI, VII, VIII, X, and CARAGA.



DA-BFAR'S RELIEF AND RECOVERY OPERATIONS REACH MORE ODETTE-STRICKEN FISHERFOLK COMMUNITIES

The Department of Agriculture's Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (DA-BFAR) continues to expand its relief and recovery drive in coastal communities affected by Super Typhoon Odette.

DA-BFAR's multi-mission vessels have been deployed to fast-track the recovery of Odette-stricken coastal areas. More than Php6 million worth of relief goods and food packs including frozen fish, rice, sardines, clothes, and hygiene kits have been distributed to affected fisherfolk in Regions IV-B, VI, VII, VIII, X, and CARAGA.

The Bureau was able to provide Php32.5 million worth of repair materials for damaged wooden and fiberglass-reinforced plastic (FRP) boats including marine plywood, marine engines, copper nails, paints, and others to Regions VII, VIII, and CARAGA.

Aside from the repair materials, 150 units of 20-foot FRP boats were turned over to Region VII, 48 units of 20-foot FRP boats and 150 units of repair materials for damaged boats went to Region VIII, and 150 units of 20-foot FRP Boats and 250 units worth of

construction materials for wooden boats went to the heavily affected region of CARAGA.

Based on the latest Fisheries Damage and Loss Assessment Report, it has been estimated that the fisheries sector in Regions IV-A, MIMAROPA, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X, XI and CARAGA has incurred a total of Php3.97 billion worth of damages and losses due to Typhoon Odette. As a stopgap measure, the DA has allocated Php50 million for BFAR under the Quick Response Fund for the rehabilitation and recovery of damages in the fisheries sector through its Rehabilitation and Recovery Plan.

The Bureau aims to effectively communicate the needs of fisherfolk in times of humanitarian crisis through livelihood programs such as distribution of seaweed propagules, and seaweed farm implements, provision of cages, and repair and provision of boats, distribution of fishing gears/paraphernalia, repair of damaged Community Fish Landing Centers, and rehabilitation of Technology Outreach Stations and hatcheries. 🚢



NAVAL FORCES WEST ASSISTS IN DISTRIBUTION OF GALVANIZED IRON SHEETS TO PALAWAN

by NFW

Navy's operating forces in Palawan distributed hundreds of galvanized iron sheets to aid in rehabilitation of Typhoon Odette-affected areas. The Naval Forces West (NFW) together with Civil Military Operations Unit – West (CMOU-W), Naval Installation and Facilities-West (NIF-W), and Joint Task Force I-CARE, facilitated and assisted Lara's Ark Foundation in the distribution of 580 pieces and 170 pieces of galvanized iron sheets to Sitio Cayasan, Barangay Tagabinet,

Puerto Princesa City; and Barangay Aplaya, Roxas, Palawan, respectively on 1-February-2022.

Said donations aim to boost the morale of the community and make them feel the Spirit of Bayanihan with the support of the Palawan government ongoing, rebuilding their communities having been devastated by Typhoon Odette particularly the coastal communities and far-flung mountainous barangays of Palawan. 🚢

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JOINT LAW ENFORCEMENT



JOINT LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIVES DESTROY PHP 375 MILLION WORTH OF MARIJUANA IN KALINGA

by PCG Northwestern Luzon

As of 05-March-2022, joint law enforcement operatives have destroyed 1,837,200 fully-grown Marijuana plants, 30,000 grams of dried fruiting tops, 6,000 grams of Marijuana seeds, 70,000 grams of powdered Marijuana, and 492,666 grams of dried Marijuana leaves and stalks with a total estimated market value of PHP 375 Million during their 10-Day Air and Land Interoperability Operations Against Illegal Drugs in the province of Kalinga.

The Marijuana produce were discovered at 50 Marijuana Plantation Sites with an estimated land area 16.49 Hectares in the municipality of Tinglayan from 22 February to 03-March-2022.

The said operations were conducted by the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), Philippine National Police (PNP), and the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) in support of President Rodrigo Duterte's campaign against illegal drugs.

It was also covered by the PDEA Cordillera Administrative Region's OPLAN MAALAAB RELOADED and the PNP Police Regional Office (PRO) Kalinga's OPLAN HERODOTUS 2.

According to the PCG District Northwestern Luzon, the Cordillera region, known for its cold climate, fertile land, and mountainous terrain, is used by Marijuana cultivators in planting and growing the said illegal produce.

Joint law enforcement agencies believe that the eradication of Marijuana supply straight from plantation sites is an effective way of cutting the supply and demand of Marijuana in the country. 🚢

Source: PCG District Northwestern Luzon



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IN PARTNERSHIP WITH:



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RADM MARGARITOV SANCHEZ JR AFP (RET)
President

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To engage in General Services particularly in Construction Engineering, Repair and Maintenance of Facilities and Buildings.

RADM MARGARITO V SANCHEZ JR AFP (RET)
Chairperson, SERGS Cooperative

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
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MAAP Profile

Testing Assessment Center of TESDA

Geographic destiny has given the Filipino the innate talent to be an excellent seafarer. To enhance this natural skill, the Maritime Academy of Asia and the Pacific (MAAP) was established on January 14, 1998. The Academy stands on a 103-hectare property in Kamaya Point, Mariveles, Bataan.

The Associated Marine Officers' and Seamen's Union of the Philippines (AMOSUP) founded by the late Capt. Gregorio S Oca, capitalized and developed the Academy. The new AMOSUP President, Dr. Conrado F. Oca, heads the Academy's board of governors. The board is comprised of representatives from the private sector, the International Transport Workers Federation, the Filipino Association of Maritime Employers, the International Mariners Management Association of Japan, the Norwegian Seafarers' Union, the International Maritime Employers' Committee, the Danish Shipowners' Association, the Norwegian Shipowners' Association, and the Japanese Shipowners' Association.

MAAP conducts shipboard training aboard T/S Kapitán Felix Oca, a 5020 DWT dedicated training ship capable of accommodating 180 midshipmen and 9 instructors in 30 air-conditioned cabins and six berths.

MAAP students are all scholars who are entitled to free tuition, board and lodging. They receive a comprehensive, up-to-date and well-rounded education that fully complies with the requirements of STCW 95 and the Commission on Higher Education (CHED). To ensure the highest standards of quality, MAAP adheres to a Quality Standards System that has been certified to comply with ISO 9001 version 2008, the Det Norske Veritas (DNV) Rules for Maritime Academies, and the Productivity and Standard Board (PSB) of Singapore.

The Academy offers three main programs: the Bachelor of Science in Marine Transportation (BSMT), Bachelor of Science in Marine Engineering (BSMarE) and the Bachelor of Science in Marine Transportation and Engineering (BSMTE). The curricula for the three courses were designed with the help of the United States Merchant Marine Academy at Kings Point, New York. Courses are four-year courses with sea phases scheduled in the third year. The BSMT curriculum requires a total of 192 units: 152 at MAAP, 40 practicum/shipboard units on board T/S Kapitán Felix Oca and/or a shipping company sponsorship. The BSMarE curriculum requires a total of 193 units: 153 at MAAP, 40 practicum/shipboard units on board T/S Kapitán Felix Oca and/or a shipping company sponsorship.



AMOSUP Seamen's Training Center



Full Mission Bridge Simulator



Full Mission Engine Simulator



Full Mission Bridge Simulator on Moflon Platform



Japanese Compact Ship Handling Simulator

Our Curricula

ONE STANDARD EVERYWHERE, EVERY TIME:



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Starting with the privatization of the Manila International Container Terminal, ICTSI's current diverse portfolio includes capacity expansion projects and greenfield investments in developed and emerging markets.

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