One of the pillars of the 1995 and the amended AFP Modernization Law is force restructuring and organizational development. The original law focused on external defense given the transfer of the Internal Security Operations (ISO) from the AFP to the newly created Philippine National Police. Through Congressional Joint Resolution No. 28, the ground forces were supposed to be reorganized into 3 infantry divisions and 8 separate infantry brigades. However, the ISO responsibility was reverted back to the AFP and the force restructuring program never took place. More infantry divisions and brigades were activated, as well as joint command headquarters.

The recent frequent intrusions and eventual control of some of the nation’s maritime areas by a neighboring state and the dwindling elements of the local communist movement, including
the death of its top ideologue, are positive indications that defense forces need to be restructured to prevent further diminution of food and mineral resources in our maritime areas.

Napoleon Bonaparte once postulated “the tactics of war should be changed every 10 years to retain its superiority.” Those “tactics,” likely referring to doctrines, normally lead to force restructuring and organizational development. Revisionist states like China and Russia, understand this fully as they find ways to seek additional power or influence over other states. For example, China in 2017 restructured its ground force-centric, infantry-heavy, and low-technology military into a joint-command, networked, and high-technology force. It reduced its manpower by 13%, created the PLA Rocket Force, Strategic Support Force, Logistics Support Force, and harnessed civilian science and technology for integration into military operations. It reorganized its army divisions and regiments into brigades for operational flexibility, and strengthened its maritime forces by putting its Coast Guard (CCG) and People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM, or CMM) under the Military Commission for better command and control. China’s concept of modernization includes testing and application of military theories, reviewing and refining organizational structure, training units, educating military personnel, and improving weaponry. On the other hand, the Russian invasion of Ukraine threatens peace and stability in Europe and the whole world in general. Russia’s failure to decisively defeat Ukraine’s defense forces reflects its rigid, outdated doctrines that makes victory difficult to predict.

In the January 2023 issue of Maritime Review, retired Air Force Major General Melchor Rosales wrote an article on the need to “reshape” AFP’s operational plan to defend our patrimony. He introduced a formula: “EOP = 2I + D + CGZ” as a basis to enhance defense forces’ capability. EOP means Expanded Operational Paradigm; 2I represents the core functions of the AFP: counter Insurgency and counter Invasion; D refers to building up Deterrence capabilities to prevent further maritime encroachment; and CGZ stands for Counter Gray Zone capabilities. The 2Is are the AFP’s principal missions. The D and CGZ are the proposed additional missions.

The above proposal will not totally diminish counter Insurgency, counter Invasion, and counter gray zone efforts on land territories but will give more focus to defend the maritime zones where substantial natural resources are found. It will allocate some naval and air force personnel, defense equipment, tools and platforms to enhance maritime domain awareness to prevent more intrusions and to counter gray zone operations under a joint command set up.

A new joint command will have geographic areas reckoned from the edge of the territorial sea up to the EEZ and ECS. It will concentrate on sovereignty patrols and countering gray zone operations within our maritime borders. In case of encountering unfriendly naval and air forces the proposed joint command will employ available platforms and weapons while waiting for more suitable delivery platforms and lethal munitions. This joint command will formulate counter gray zone operating doctrine to serve as the authority to train, deploy and employ forces assigned to it. With maritime areas beyond territorial sea outside the responsibility of existing unified commands, counter insurgency operations and training and organizing the police forces to assume internal peace and security duties will be hastened. Land- based counter-gray zone concerns can then be fully addressed. Likewise, the training and preparation of our reserve forces for counter invasion will be expedited.

Many security analysts view that gray zone operations cover not only the maritime domain (island building, occupation, maritime militia, blockage) but a lot more like election meddling, economic coercion, cyber espionage, debt dependency, forced technology transfer and others. The gray zone operators employ tools such as proxy forces, information warfare (using the mainstream and social media to sow doubt, dissent, misinformation and build false narratives), corruption of politicians, economic means (cutting energy supply, infrastructure projects without viable economic returns and employing their own workers), and shaping the civil society (Confucius Institutes, Russian Orthodox Church).

China’s gray zone strategy in South China Sea consists of 4 reinforcing actions:

• ignore the 2016 Arbitral Ruling;
• reinforce control of occupied and artificially built islands
• employing its Coast Guard and Maritime Militia;
• use economic leverage to demand compromise; and
•  squat in the occupied features and wear off other
  claimants.

To China, gray zone operations are meant to maintain stability, protect its “rights,” and are considered essential to its security and guarding operations.

To counter gray zone operations these security analysts also point out that upon spotting the gray zone actions, responding boldly will minimize their effects. They suggest several techniques:

• transparency to draw attention to the coercive actions;
• deterrence;
• preparation and preemption to expose the action; and
• integrated actions using the “whole of society” approach including strengthening national identity, with early and
  bold action.

Some members of The Maritime League are consistently voicing out the importance of following the rule of law, the need for transparency in government actions to counter China’s gray zone tactics, and the benefits of having a defense ally and security partners. Sadly, some media commentators and academics appear biased in supporting non-Filipino narratives by highlighting the disadvantages of fulfilling our defense treaty obligations while overlooking the creeping invasion of our maritime zones and setting aside the favorable population support to the rule of law and to our ally.

The force restructuring and organizational development entail consolidation of maritime forces. China has 3 seagoing forces: PLAN, CCG and CMM, under one command and control body, the Military Commission. The country has 2 but with separate command and control. Barely ten years after China consolidated its maritime forces it had established “command” of the South China Sea threatening freedom of navigation therein and continuing its creeping invasion. Among the claimant nations, Indonesia and Vietnam made significant bold responses –burning fishing boats and using naval ships to confront the CCG and CMM– that deter further Chinese presence in their maritime areas.

Up north, the Japanese self-defense and maritime safety assets challenge CCG and CMM ships to assert their position against poaching their borders. Our only defense ally has been asserting the freedom of navigation provision of the UNCLOS and other international laws. Some EU nations have sent their naval contingents to send a strong message that the rule of law must be upheld by the international community.

With growing support from other friendly nations, we must show our unequivocal position that we are also prepared to do our share by restructuring our defense forces. The PCG may have to be transferred to the National Defense Department and further to the AFP in the interest of efficiency, effectiveness, and economy. The U.S. Coast Guard used to be with the Treasury Department, was then moved to the Department of Transportation, and finally to the Department of Homeland Security in 2001. The maxim of Napoleon Bonaparte on “changing tactics in war every 10 years … to retain superiority” may be a thing to ponder, and the sooner the better.