Introduction. The lack of maritime domain awareness and lack of expertise among countries in managing their maritime domain has allowed proliferation of lawlessness and crime on the seas. Organized crime and terrorism have become interconnected and more complex.

A Philippine flag flutters from BRP Sierra Madre, a dilapidated Philippine Navy ship that has run aground since 1999 and became a Philippine military detachment on the disputed Second Thomas Shoal, part of the Spratly Islands, in the South China Sea, 29-March-2014.

Just recently, our Philippine Coast Guard reported to DND a seeming occupation of more than a hundred vessels in Julian Felipe Reef. The AFP made an aerial inspection to confirm, and the Department of Foreign Affairs filled a diplomatic protest. The Navy can just wait on further instructions because they could not afford to have another Scarborough Shoal stand-off where a military vessel had confronted a civilian vessel.

Sovereignty disputes, geopolitical spats, fishing incursions, maritime accidents, standoffs and other challenges that make it difficult for Maritime Law enforcement make it necessary for an all-government approach not just for maritime security but rather  national security.

In 2011, then-president Benigno Aquino III signed Executive Order No 57 establishing the National Coast Watch System (NCWS). The NCWS is the Philippines’ whole-of-government mechanism for a ‘coordinated and coherent approach on maritime issues and maritime security operations.’ The National Coast Watch Center, the operating arm of the NCWS, is composed of ten supporting agencies with the recent inclusion of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency. The number of supporting agencies and partners is expected to grow in the future as threats to Philippine maritime security grow.

The effectiveness of NCWS faces hurdles:

• The convoluted processes for developing and enacting urgent maritime security policies partly because of bureaucratic obstacles; a good example is the NMP.
• Limited command and control authority over concerned government agencies.
• Maritime Law enforcement agencies seem to focus on their own individual mission.
• Lack of appreciation for “whole-of-government” approach.

In order to overcome these hurdles, an amendment to EO no 57 is necessary to give the system a defined command and control authority to direct, order and mobilize member departments and agencies.[1]

We share the same Maritime Space. A recent meeting of PN FOIC and the commandant of the PCG forged an agreement to complement one another in fulfilling their mission. Here are some of the pronouncements:

We are not competitors. We share the same maritime space. The problems in the maritime area are the same problem(s) (we face),” FOIC VADM Giovanni Bacordo PN said during the visit of Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) Commandant, ADM George Ursabia, at the Navy headquarters in Naval Station Jose Andrada along Roxas Boulevard, Manila on Tuesday, 11-November-2020.

ADM Ursabia, meanwhile, said the PCG needs the help of the Navy and maritime agencies, such as the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR), in protecting the country’s waters. “There are a lot of users in the sea but there are also a lot of violators to the sea and our job is to ensure safety, security, and a clean ocean and seas. Hence, we really need the PN (Philippine Navy) and other agencies such as BFAR, (Bureau of) Customs, and others, to help us achieve this. This meeting will be a start and we are looking forward (to) strengthen our partnership,” he said. ADM Ursabia expressed his appreciation for the two maritime organization’s continued “harmonious relationship.”[2]

DND, PCG ready to protect PH waters. Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana said that the country’s security sector would “always be ready” to protect the maritime industry from any threats, as he stressed that the administration’s resolve to promote economic development and protect the natural resources in the Philippine waters.

“The Department of National Defense earnestly supports our maritime industry by ensuring maritime security and by contributing to an environment that is conducive [to] trade and commerce [growth],” SND Lorenzana said, based on the statement read by DND Undersecretary Arnel Duco.

SND Lorenzana also added the DND is “fully supportive” of the Maritime Industry Development Plan (MIDP) 2019 to 2028, which he deemed as the “first-ever comprehensive plan that aims to chart the future of our maritime industry.”

“With MIDP, various government agencies such as the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), the Philippine National Police (PNP), the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR), and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), with the Philippine Navy, address maritime terrorism, piracy, armed robbery at sea, transnational crimes, illegal fishing, and marine environmental degradation,” the Defense Chief said.

While the PCG, through its representative, PCG deputy commandant for operations Vice Admiral Leopoldo Laroya, said the “complex problem” of security risks in the Philippine waters will not cease unless the government can address its “roots and causes.” He noted the illegal gas exploitation and unregulated fishing in the Philippine Rise, the reclamation activities of China in the disputed West Philippine Sea, maritime terrorism, kidnapping, human trafficking, and smuggling of goods in southwest Mindanao. VADM Laroya, nevertheless, ensured that the PCG would exhaust all means to pursue a “safe, clean and secure maritime environment, by means of “sustained vigilance and strict monitoring efforts.”[3]

Latest developments of the NMP. A newly updated resolution on the National Marine Policy (NMP) strengthens the collaboration between the government and private sector for the long-term improvement of the maritime industry.

The resolution, submitted to President Rodrigo Duterte as represented by Executive Secretary Salvador Medialdea during the 2020 National Marine Summit on October 29 and 30, was unanimously drafted, approved, and adopted by industry leaders for the sustainable development of the country’s maritime assets and interests.

Among the many provisions of NMP includes the allocation of public investments for the development of ports and other coastal infrastructures, procurement of maritime safety and security systems to save lives and properties at sea and prevent maritime accidents, establishing a community-based marine and coastal management systems, and formulation of the “Bantay Dagat Bill.”[4]

Brief historical background. The maritime security structure from the American colonial period began in 1901 with the Bureau of Coast Guard and Transportation under the Bureau of Commerce and Police. The Coast Guard (CG) was the maritime law enforcement arm of the colony with an initial fleet of fifteen (15) Chinese and Japanese built steamers. It commenced with a range of sea-going functions which included policing against illegal maritime entrants and providing sealift to the Philippine Constabulary (PC).

The PC was preceded by the Philippine Scouts activated to assist the US military forces in suppressing Filipino resistance against US occupation. With the reluctance of US military forces to address growing problems of law and order, the Philippine Commission decided to establish an insular police force to complement the local police force under the Department of Interior. There were too many problems on insurgency for the police and scouts to worry about the maritime sector.

In 1905, the CG was abolished and its functions absorbed by the Bureau of Navigation. In 1913, it was dissolved with its maritime police functions under the Revenue Cutter Service and its Lighthouse Service split between the Bureau of Customs and the Bureau of Public Works. Eventually these Services were absorbed by Philippine Naval Patrol, the forerunner of the PN.

In 1935, the PN was a support unit of the Philippine Army under the National Defense Act that envisioned to defend the nation by land forces, to include the integration of the PC to the Defense Department from the then Department of Interior. It was only in the 1950s that PN became one of the four major services of the expanded AFP that was engaged in an insurgency war against the HUKs. The navy and air force were but supporting services to the army.

The event that could have shifted our security attention to territorial defense was the manifestation in the 1960s by President Diosdado Macapagal of the Philippine claim to Sabah in the islands of Borneo. He played a role in the successful negotiation with the British for the return of the Turtle Islands, within 10 miles of Sabah, before he became President. Earlier, Las Palmas, which is in the Treaty of Paris and located southeast of Davao, was lost by default to the Indonesians without a whimper. But a catalyst for maritime territorial security, they were not.

It was when President Marcos took over that a scheme to pursue the Sabah claim by means other than diplomacy was exposed by the opposition. Earlier in the SONA before Congress, he called for PCG’s activation. In 1967, PCG was activated by an act of Congress as the lead agency for maritime safety, environmental protection, and maritime law enforcement. The placement of the PCG under the Navy as it was done earlier by the integration of the PC with the AFP, was to gain access to the US military assistance program.

The concept of a maritime police unit emanated during the days of Philippine Constabulary that led to the creation of a seaborne battalion called Constabulary Off-Shore Anti-Crime Battalion (COSAC) on 1-February-1971. The COSAC was tasked to suppress all criminal activities that affects the environment.

Recognizing the need to further strengthen the PCG, Marcos issued PD 601 to separate the Coast Guard from the Navy and to place it under the direct supervision and control of SND in 1974. PD 601 provided for the consolidation of all functions related to safety at sea and the enforcement of all pertinent laws at sea to one agency. But soon enough PCG was back as a unit of the PN.

When Marcos was ousted in 1986, the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (NICA) was created and eventually after 1987 the PC was taken out of the AFP and renamed Philippine National Police (PNP). Then MARINA was created taking out the control of commercial shipping from the PCG together with regulatory and enforcement functions.

Under the Ramos administration, relative internal stability, economic progress, departure of the US forces, and continued Chinese intrusions in the maritime area led to a refocus of attention to territorial defense and the possibility of the modernization of PN that included the PCG. But the 1997 Asian financial crisis rudely interrupted and the twin insurgencies regained momentum. In 1998, the AFP reassumed the lead on Internal Security operations previously assigned to PNP in 1990.

After the establishment of the Philippine National Police through Republic Act 6975, the Maritime Police Command (MARICOM) was created on 16-January-1991, by virtue of NHQ Philippine National Police General Orders No. 58 as one of the National Support Units of the PNP. The original members of the Maritime Command: Philippine Navy, Philippine Constabulary, Integrated National Police, and the Philippine Coast Guard. On 12-September-1996, the National Police Commission (Philippines) issued the Resolution No.96-058, changing the name of the Maritime Police Command (MARICOM) to PNP Maritime Group (MG).

Section 24 of RA 6975 provided the various police function of PNP and the additional functions absorbed from different agencies, in an effort to comply with the constitutional requirement that there shall be one national police force. This section specified the Powers and Functions of the PNP. It also requires that “the PNP shall absorb… the police functions of the Coast Guard.”

Section 86 of the law reiterated this as it provides the Assumption by the PNP of Police Functions. This provision mandates that “the police functions of the Coast Guard shall be taken over by the PNP.” Effectively, these provisions of the law dissolved the police functions of these agencies, Coast Guard included. To date, no law has repealed these provisions.

Specifically, the absorption and take-over of police functions are viewed as a move to comply with the constitutional mandate that there shall only be one police force in the country. Generally, it is understood that the police function of the Coast Guard that was absorbed and taken-over by the PNP, has been vested upon the PNP Maritime Group as it performs these functions to this day.[5]

PNP was originally intended under Republic Act 6975 to wield the “primary responsibility on matters affecting internal security, including the suppression of insurgency.” However, the challenge posed by internal security threats led national authorities through Republic Act 8551 to revert to the DND and AFP the primary responsibility for internal security. In turn, the PNP was tasked “through information gathering and performance of its ordinary police functions, to support the AFP on matters involving suppression of insurgency.”

At present, the contribution of the PNP to internal peace and security has involved participation in and the development of community security mechanisms, and the sharing of intelligence information. It must be emphasized that traditionally, law enforcement entities take the lead in counterinsurgency and internal security function in other countries. The resolution of armed threats to internal peace and security and the subsequent transition of responsibility to civilian authorities is the ideal state envisioned by this Plan. This will allow the AFP and the PNP to develop capabilities consistent with their original mandates. [6]

On 25-February-1998, President Fidel V. Ramos signed into law Republic Act No. 8550, titled, “An Act Providing For the Development, Management and Conservation of the Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, Integrating all laws pertinent thereto and for other purposes,” otherwise known as the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998. This law took effect on 23-March-1998.This mandates the BFAR to protect the Philippine ocean against illegal fishing.[7]

The Philippine Marine Coastal Defense regiment, headed by Col. Romulo Quemado II, was activated last 7-August-2020. The Marines said this unit was designed to protect the country’s shores, ships and amphibious task forces against an invading enemy and to improve support of naval operations.[8]

The National Marine Policy. Recognizing the archipelagic and maritime nature of the country, then President Fidel V Ramos issued in 1994 the National Marine Policy (NMP) to guide various stakeholders in the maritime community, especially those in government, in managing the “blue economy.” The policy contains four key areas: (1) Politics and Jurisdiction, (2) Area Regulation and Enforcement, (3) Area Development and Conservation, and (4) Maritime Security. Although bereft of a legal mandate, NMP is in consonance with the national interests.

The NMP aimed to:

1. Emphasize the archipelagic nature of the Philippines in development;
2. Implement the UNCLOS within the framework of the NMP;
3. Coordinate and consult with the concerned and affected sectors;
4. View coastal areas as a locus of community, ecology, and resources; and
5. Address the following priority issues:
   • Extent of national territory;
   • Protection of the marine ecology;
   • Management of marine economy and technology; and
   • Maritime security.

While maritime security and safety is a concern of the said first three priority objectives, maritime security is curiously the last item in the list. Yet, it is the maritime security aspect that has the biggest priority concern “To promote and enhance maritime security as a component of national security.”

The NMP has a key feature: “The cooperative and coordinated effort of all maritime agencies.”

In 1999, the Cabinet Committee on Marine and Ocean Affairs approved a 13-point priority work program with the updating of the NMP as the first priority, and the information dissemination of the NMP as the 13^th in the list:

1. Updating of the National Marine Policy
2. Determination of Archipelagic Base points/Baselines
3. Delineation/Demarcation of Territorial and Maritime Jurisdictions
4. Delimitation of the Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf
5. Designation of Archipelagic Sea lanes
6. Negotiations with Relevant States for Delineation of Territorial/Maritime Boundaries
7. Negotiations with Relevant States for Joint Development and/or Joint Cooperation Arrangements for Exploration/Exploitation/Conservation of Living or Non-living Resources in Overlapping Territorial or Maritime Jurisdictions
8. Establishment of National Capability for a Monitoring, Control and Surveillance System (MCS)
9. Conclusion of Agreements with other Countries for Cooperation in Marine Scientific Research and the Development and Transfer of Marine Technology
10. Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment
11. Resolution of Piracy and Sea Robbery Problems in Regional Seas and Philippine Ports and Waters
12. Formal Establishment of Tie-ups and Networking Between CABCOM-MOA and Centers of Excellence, NGOs, and Private Sector Entities on Maritime and Ocean Affairs
13. Information Dissemination of the National Marine Policy.

Of the 13 items of the NMP wish plan, only the passage of the Baselines Law in implementation of UNCLOS has been achieved to-date. The designation and control of archipelagic sea lanes would be a crucial initiative for inter-agency cooperation.

The formulation of an integrated ocean policy shall be guided by the principles of integration, precautionary approach, ecosystem-based management, polluter-pays principle, inter- and intra-generational equity, public/private participation, and community-based management. It may include the following components:

1. Determination of the extent of the EEZ and continental shelf against opposite and adjacent states;
2. Adaptation of a fisheries management system;
3. Control of land-based marine pollution;
4. Land-use planning;
5. Control of pollution from ships;
6. Development of the chain of ports and shipping services;
7. Regulation of industrial and agricultural activities;
8. Development of off-shore mineral resources;
9. EEZ surveillance and enforcement;
10. Tourism and recreational uses; and
11. Establishment of ocean installations and structures.

Coordination and integration are central issues of contemporary discourses in ocean management. Coordination is the orderly and harmonized implementation of policies and programs by institutions with the objective of minimizing conflicts among themselves. Integration refers to the process of balancing and prioritization of competing ocean uses. The integration process should consider two aspects of ocean management: (1)            The individual and cumulative effects of coastal and ocean resource uses on the marine environment; and (2)      The negative externalities that coastal and ocean resource users generate toward other users. Addressing these issues would require vertical integration at different levels of governance and horizontal integration encompassing the sector agencies.

Researcher Billana Cicin-Sain further clarifies the concept of policy integration:

1. Not all interactions between different sectors are problematic and therefore requires management;
2. Integrated management should complement sectoral management rather than replacing it;
3. Policy integration should take place at the higher bureaucratic level; and
4. The costs of integration should be carefully considered so as not to outweigh the benefits.[9]

Researchers Ehler, Cicin-Sain, and Belfiore suggest that for a coordinative mechanism to be effective, it has to meet certain requirements. Firstly, the coordinative body must be supported by a legislative authority or authorized by the Chief Executive of the country. Second, it must have sufficient powers to influence the programs and activities of the agencies that have functional roles over the use of ocean space. Third, the role of the coordinative agency in the development planning process must be viewed by the concerned agencies as part of a legitimate process. Fourth, it should have access to technical expertise and decision-making information through venues that will provide exchange of information with coastal managers, resource users, and natural and social scientists. Finally, it must have a built-in mechanism for periodic review and adjustments.[10]

An inter-agency coordination mechanism has to perform the following functions:

1. Provide policy direction and standards for ocean and coastal management.
2. Promote inter-agency and inter-sectoral coordination.
3. Minimize policy conflicts and functional overlaps among agencies.
4. Provide a venue for resolutions of conflicts among stakeholder agencies, sectors, and affected communities.
5. Recommend legislative and policy reforms.
6. Provide regular review, monitoring, and evaluation of accomplishments in the implementation of ocean and coastal management programs.
7. Promote public and private sector participation in policy planning and decision-making.
8. Encourage the marine scientific community to provide multi-disciplinary treatment of scientific information as inputs to decision-making.[11]

NMP IN POLITICS AND JURISDICTION

Gains:

• The Baselines Law of 2009 (RA952) incorporating the areas defined by PD1596 (Kalayaan Island Group) and PD1599 (EEZ) established our national identity as an archipelagic state and defined our maritime boundaries in accordance with UN Convention of the Law of the Sea.
• The recognition of the UN of the country’s extended continental shelf in the Philippine Rise.
• The formation of National Task Force West Philippine Sea to coordinate policy on South China Sea.

Challenges:

• These gains in defining the extent of territory are threatened by the brewing WPS/SCS conflict;
• The continuing Sulu Sultanate claim; and
• The absence of ASEAN Code of Conduct in WPS/SCS, and the impractical local maritime zone limits that consider only physical boundaries rather than economic resource management.

MARITIME AREA REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT

Gains:

The inter-agency and convergence actions in Palawan and the community-based initiatives in other localities to protect selected marine areas contribute a lot in regulating the utilization of marine resources.

In Cebu, the local government organized a system to monitor water quality and set measurement parameters for chemicals to prevent pollution.

The modest gains in this area may increase once the stakeholders address the issues brought about by fragmented implementation; enhance legal and administrative procedures; and hasten the transfer of knowledge, skills and resources. Integration and coordination are central in regulating and enforcing the various issuances as regards to the use of maritime zones and resources.

In regard to area development and conservation, the main priority is the management of the marine economy and technology to balance demands for utilization and conservation. This involves fisheries, seabed resources and ports and shipping.

The concept of Integrated Coastal Zone Management has taken root. DENR, PPA, PCG and MARINA are jointly working on abatement and control of marine pollution while other agencies continue to conduct research and assessment on marine resources to help in poverty alleviation and livelihood development.

Authorities have established marine protected areas (MPAs), mandated seasonal fishing and crafted policies and strategies to mitigate the impact of climate change.

BFAR and marine scientists have started to explore the fishery, aquatic and seabed resources in Philippine/Benham Rise for food, energy and income.

The nautical highway initiated by PPA and MARINA some years back now links the island provinces with the major centers of the economy. MARINA’s development plans led to the country’s elevation to top 5 among the world’s shipbuilding nations in terms of tonnage and in many ways improved coastal and maritime tourism.

Challenges:

• The several challenges faced by this priority area to truly harness the potential of the country’s marine economy are:
• weak development planning and mainly inland looking;
• poverty in coastal communities;
• inadequate port facilities and shipyards; and
• mismanaged MPAs and improper valuation of damaged marine resources like reefs and corals.

MARITIME SECURITY

Gains:

• The recent acquisition of naval, air force and coast guard platforms strengthened the country’s ability to confront low-intensity conflicts in the maritime domain; and
• BFAR also enhanced its capability to enforce fishery laws.

Challenges:

• But these government agencies and transiting merchant ships are constrained by ill-defined sea-lanes, weak mapping of the EEZ and existence of lawless groups that prey on commercial vessels;
• The vastness of the sea areas enables illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing (IUUF) to proliferate. The number of patrol ships for maritime zone is short of the required to prevent, deter and suppress maritime violations; and
• The protection of future marine-based energy sources will need a stronger Navy, Air Force and Coast Guard.

The NMP reviewers also formulated strategies to address the gaps in the four policy areas and added a fifth: climate change and disaster risks. The country’s participation in the Framework Convention on Climate Change is a big step and is aligned with NMP. NDRRMC is a welcome initiative to minimize the disastrous effect of natural and man-made calamities. The enactment of the Human Security Act is another.

Challenges:

Mangrove conversion to aquaculture ponds, storm surges, unsustainable fishing practices, contamination of food and water supplies, and disruption of transportation, communications and power lines.[12]

RECOMMENDATION

The National Coast Watch System was supposedly our solution for institutional fragmentation and absence of inter-agency coordination among our maritime departments and agencies. For the NCWS not to go rudderless, an amendment to EO 57 to establish command and control on its agencies is necessary. Thus, the National Coast Watch Center of the UP Center for Integrative and Development Studies scrutinized the National Marine Policy and the necessary strategic direction has been formulated.

A whole-of-government approach is needed to ensure the objectives of Maritime Security are attained, without which National Security cannot be fully sustained in our archipelago.

What is paramount is that all agencies move in consonance in protecting the national interest.

References:

1. https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2020/08/04/strengthening-the-philippines-approach-to-maritime-security/
2. https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1121423
3. https://www.manilatimes.net/2019/11/06/business/maritime-business/new-policy-binds-government-private-sector-to-boost-maritime-industry/653834/
4. Ibid
5. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philippine_National_Police_Maritime_Group
6. https://www.army.mil.ph/home/images/bayanihan.pdf
7. https://www.bfar.da.gov.ph/about_us.jsp?id=105
8. https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1381290/ph-marines-show-off-coastal-defense-maneuvers-plans
9. https://books.google.com.ph/books/about/Integrated_Coastal_and_Ocean_Management.html?id=HyQsoJqbZMsC&redir_esc=y
10. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/265054118_Guidelines_for_integrating_coastal_management_programs_and_national_climate_action_plans
11. https://www.un.org/depts/los/nippon/unnff_programme_home/fellows_pages/fellows_papers/garcia_0506_philippines.pdf
12. https://maritimereview.ph/national-marine-policy-review-gains-and-gaps/

About the Author:

Karl M Garcia’s interest in Maritime concerns were developed while observing his dad through the years in his capacity as a retired Navy officer who supervised the Navy’s first phase of modernization and once led the Committee on the separation of the PCG from the PN. Karl joined his father later as a consultant to Senators Biazon and Trillanes. Karl holds a BS Computer Science degree from AMA Computer University, and an MBA from DLSU Graduate School of Business.