Early this year on February 11, the President announced the termination of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) in response to the suspension by the U.S. of visas of certain Philippine officials in the Department of Justice and an incumbent senator. The suspension would have taken effect 180 days later. On June 11, in a reversal of position, the government, citing developments in the South China Sea, and a worldwide health crisis, (quarantine rules took effect March 15) the President suspended the termination of the VFA for six months, extendable for another six months.
On July 27, the President in his SONA said that China has actual possession of Philippine islands territories and sea areas in the West Philippine Sea (WPS), a subject of dispute by the two countries. He referred to the islands and islets in the Spratly Group located about 130 miles west of Palawan and the Scarborough Shoal, 120 miles east of Zambales which are parts of Philippine territories and the sea areas within their exclusive economic zones, EEZ.
ASEAN states, the Philippines included and Taiwan have been in dispute with China who has continuously asserted sovereign rights over SCS despite the ruling in 2016 of the Hague Permanent Arbitral Tribunal that China’s so-called nine-dash line has absolutely no legal and historical basis.
On August 5, the President viewing with alarm the increasing tensions between China and U.S. as they issued strong statements over their disputes in the SCS accompanied by major movements of naval and air forces, directed the Philippine Navy not to join a scheduled bilateral exercise with the U.S. Navy in the West Philippine Sea.
These actions of the government have far reaching implications on the external defenses of the Philippines (RP). In particular, the termination of the VFA will make ineffective and inoperative the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) and 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) which has replaced the 1947 Military Bases Agreement (MBA) and terminated by the Senate in 1992.
This over-simplified scenario illustrates the incongruous situation. A house owner (Philippines) wants the fire station (US) within the vicinity. In the event his house catches fire, he wants the firemen (US military) to put out the fire but not to enter his yard or house. (Under the 1951 MDT which is still in effect, US is obligated to defend RP against external attacks).
The RP-US 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty was signed by the governments of the Philippines and U.S. one year after the Korean War (1950-53) broke out. The VFA was entered into in 1998 by RP and US, ratified by the Senate, in 1999, set the rules on the entry and stay of US military and civilian personnel in the country undergoing bilateral exercises with Philippine military on matters of visas, taxes, criminal cases, etc. With the 1947 MBA terminated by the Senate in 1992 and alarmed by China’s aggressive expansions, intrusions and occupations of Philippine territories and sea areas in WPS over which it has sovereignty, the government of President Benigno Aquino Jr. (2010-2016) signed with U.S. the 2014 EDCA which allowed U.S. to place its military forces on six agreed bases or locations, on Philippine territory on ‘rotational basis.’
The government of President Aquino wanted a more visible and concrete manifestation of U.S. resolve and determination to defend the Philippines against external attack. The U.S. government felt that without EDCA it could not effectively perform its obligations to RP under the 1951 MDT. With VFA in place, the 1951 MDT and 2014 EDCA have become more effective and implementable.
The importance of VFA to the external defense and economy of the country was cited by Department of Foreign Affairs Secretary Locsin in his testimony before the Senate in February. He said the VFA ensures the operationability of the 1951 MDT and the 2014 EDCA; enables the continuance of combined exercises by U.S. military forces and our armed forces; provides continuity of U.S. military assistance which for year 2016-2019 amounted to $544 million and for 2020-21 amounted to $200 million; addresses non-traditional threats such as drug and human trafficking, cyber-attacks, terrorism and other internal threats, and provides assistance in air surveillance and during natural calamities. Close relationship with U.S. has economic and trade benefits: economic and development assistance was 38% grant, U.S. is 3rd largest trading partner, 3rd source of tourism, and 5th source of investment.
The permanent termination of the VFA will severely weaken the external defenses of the country. U.S. will not be allowed to conduct exercises with AFP, station on and operate military forces from Philippine territory. Thus the Philippines will not have a very strong and credible deterrence and protection against external attack.
As an archipelago, with a very long coastline, about 37,000 kms. and porous borders, the country is vulnerable to intrusions, invasions and other hostile acts from outside. Its ill-equipped air force and navy cannot possibly do a continuing maritime surveillance of the WPS and the Pacific coastline. It has to depend on the space vehicles of an ally. Photos have shown that Pagasa, an island municipality, the Kalayaan islands, Palawan and islets in the Spratly Group, the Scarborough Shoal west of Zambales, and their sea areas have been continuously intruded into, with Filipino fishermen denied entry and the Philippine navy harassed and intimated by Chinese warships and vessels superior in number and weaponry.
A Philippine territory, Mischief Reef in the Spratlys, was occupied since 1995 by Chinese troops (Note: The 1947 MBA was terminated by Senate in 1992), who have put up a runway, structures and harbors on reclaimed sea areas of military use. In 2012, a Philippine Navy vessel and Chinese militia vessels had a month long stand-off by the seas of Scarborough Shoal where Filipino fishermen were denied entry. In his testimony before the Senate Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana categorically said, “Our Navy cannot prevent intrusion or block the entry of Chinese ships.”
The termination of the VFA and its consequent effects on two other defense treaties will have other very serious implications: It will engender anxiety and fear among the people, foreign investors and nationals, lessen bargaining power for recovery and protection of disputed islands and sea areas in the WPS, embolden insurgents and separatist elements, reduce prestige and credence in the ASEAN. (Revival of the Sabah claim makes this implication highly relevant.)
To strengthen its defenses against external attack and various levels of hostile actions, the Philippines has to increase its defense budget to carry out the P300 billion AFP Modernization Program (AFPMP) or the acquisition of very expensive military assets staggered for a number of years. For the Second Horizon (2018-2022) program the Defense Department (DND) will spend P125 billion on aircraft, naval vessels, weapons and communication systems. Its budget for 2020 is P192.3 billion of which P25 billion is allotted to GHQ as its outlay for the AFPMP. With the onset of a pandemic, DND realigned P19.1 billion of its budget to support the government provide monetary, health, and various assistances. This P19.3 billion fund came from the P9.4billion allotted for the AFPMP and P9.7billion capital outlay.
Thus, the outlay for AFPPM for the year 2020 had a big short fall. The cost of upgrading and strengthening external defense capabilities is highly prohibitive. Take the case of air defense as illustrated by the offer by U.S. to Taiwan of 90 F-16C/D fighter interceptor aircraft with latest electronic and weapon systems spares at a cost of $62billion or an average of $68.8 million each. In pesos, that is P3.44 billion each (P50 to US$1). Hence, for a purchase of 24 aircraft for a PAF squadron will cost P82.6 billion.
Other than aircraft, an air defense system will require surveillance facilities or radar, improved runways and additional hangars. Incidentally, two years ago, U.S. offered F-16s to the Philippine government but no specific number or price was given. RP politely declined the offer and said it would prefer attack helicopters. The Navy acquired from South Korea two frigates (one to arrive February 2021) at a total cost of P16 billion plus P2 billion for weapons and munitions or a total of P18 billion. It plans to buy four more frigates, two corvettes at a total cost of P18 billion and other vessels for maritime defense. It has also plans to build new or improve harbors and shipyards. The Army is evaluating land based offensive and defensive missiles — a complete system may cost in the hundred million dollars. With an yearly outlay of P25 billion as indicated for the Second Horizon (2018-22) of the AFPMP, it would take a decade or more to erect the building blocks of a ‘minimum credible defense’ capability.
The budget for defense is 6% of annual appropriation of the national government and is way below compared to other ASEAN states: Vietnam 8.3 %, Singapore 16.5%, and Myanrmar 13.3%. An increase in defense budget, however, will cut into that for education, health, infrastructure, etc. It would be unwise to increase defense expenditures in a country facing a pandemic that has resulted in a business closures, big and small, massive unemployment, a big decline in remittances from abroad and in government revenues, and an economy facing a recession.
The President, just like leaders of relatively weak ASEAN states, protecting their primordial interests: the survival and safety of the state and the welfare and progress of their people will, understandably, do not want to get involved in the open and acrimonious rivalry of US and China for dominance and control of the SCS. They would rather pursue separately their respective disputes with China and maintain cordial and harmonious relationships with her leaders. The President amid the pandemic, given and offered assistance by China disallowed the Philippine Navy from participating in a bilateral exercise with the US Navy in the WPS scheduled in August.
When elephants quarrel mice and frogs stay away, or they could be hurt or crushed as the earth and roots of the trees shake and move.
Not so few nationalist government officials, private citizens and critics have publicly favored the termination of the VFA which, they say, would make permanent the stay of U.S. military forces in the country, infringe on sovereignty, disregard local laws on criminal cases and diminish national prestige. The national mood on this issue, however, has been reflected by the poll of the Social Weather Station, where 82% agreed that the “country should form alliances with other democratic countries that are ready to defend its territorial rights in the West Philippine Sea.”
One very serious statement critics have repeatedly pointed out is the perceived ambiguity in the 1951 MDT. The clause referred to here states, “Each Party recognizes that an armed attack on either Parties in the Pacific would be dangerous to its own peace and security and would meet the common danger in accordance to its constitutional processes.” They aver that the WPS is not located in the Pacific and unlike the NATO treaty (for US and her allies in Europe) U.S. response in the event of an attack is not an ‘automatic’ or self-effecting. They stressed that Philippine claims over islands and sea areas in the WPS were initiated in the 1970’s or decades after the 1951 MDT was entered into. Hence, U.S. will not go to war with China to defend RP over small islands, reefs, and sea areas in the WPS.
These fears and doubts have been dispelled by U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in his visit to the country in March 2019. He said it is the “US position that SCS is in the Pacific’ and that an “armed attack on Philippine armed forces, public vessels and aircraft will trigger Art IV of the 1951 MDT.” In July this year, Secretary Pompeo in a land mark and bold statement, a significant shift in U.S. foreign policy in the SCS said, “Beijing claims to offshore resources across most of SCS are completely unlawful as its bullying to control them.” (During the term of President Obama 2009-17 U.S. was neutral on the SCS disputes of China and ASEAN states and Taiwan).
Citing the 2016 Hague Arbitral Tribunal ruling that favored the Philippines, he rejected China’s claim based on nine dash line as “unlawful under the UN Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS).” He warned, “US will not allow China to make SCS its maritime empire.” His statement effectively supported ASEAN states and Taiwan in their disputes with China. Another U.S. official, Defense Secretary Mark Esper, said “US will sail, fly and operate wherever international law allows and will defend the right of her partners and allies to do the same.”
The most definitive and unambiguous statement of support to the Philippine was that of U.S. Assistant Secretary on East Asia and Pacific Affairs David Stillwell, who said, “In Scarborough, specifically we have made clear our opposition to any efforts by the Peoples Republic of China (PRA) to block entry of fishermen, and any move by Beijing to physically occupy, conduct reclamation at or militarize Scarborough.” The very significant shift in U.S. foreign policy on the SCS issue was notably preceded and followed by major naval movements by U.S. carrier strike forces with her allies, Japan and Australia, in the sea lanes of SCS, a demonstration of US superior might, firmness and determination.
The underlying basis of the foreign policy announcements by U.S. top officials is the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (ARIA) passed by the US Congress in 2018 that set forth U.S. long term strategy, policy and vision in the Indo-Pacific region (which stretches from India, Australia, the Pacific Ocean and the West Coast). It is funded $1.5 billion annually for five years from 2018-23 to “ensure America’s presence” in the region. Of interest to the Philippines on its territorial disputes in the WPS with China is the statement in the Act, “to encourage the ASEAN to develop a common approach to affirm the 2016 Arbitral Tribunal Ruling” which favored the Philippines. It mentioned a diplomatic strategy, “to strengthen relations with partners”…that encompasses “the peaceful resolution of disputes” backed up by “strong military presence.”
In summary, the permanent termination of the VFA will make the 1951 MDT and 2014 EDCA ineffective and inoperative. The Philippine will not have a credible deterrence and protection from external attacks and continue to be vulnerable to increased intrusions, harassment and intimidation by Chinese ships in the WPS. Considering its limited defense budget, it would take a decade or more for the armed forces to acquire very costly military assets and upgrade to a ‘credible minimum level’ its external defense capabilities. Top U.S. officials issued very significant statements that effectively supported the Philippines’ claim on islands and sea areas in WPS, and that it would honor its obligations under the 1951 MDT.
In conclusion, with VFA in place, explicitly assured protection from external attack and effectively supported by U.S. in its dispute with China, the Philippines can now forthrightly and vigorously assert, hold on and pursue its claim over islands and sea areas in the WPS presently occupied by Chinese troops, warships and other vessels. In line with its independent foreign policy of promoting primordial interests –the survival, safety and welfare of its people– the Philippines should continue to engage in harmonious, cordial and fruitful relations with China and have more dialogues with her on their disputes in the WPS. Likewise it should continue productive discussions with other ASEAN states and Taiwan on their overlapping claims in the Spratly Group of Islands and arrive at a ‘modus vivende.’
A very assertive statement on the issue was made on August 25 by Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana. In response to China’s protest of ‘illegal provocations in the WPS by Philippines sending air and naval patrols in the Spratlys and in the WPS said, “It is they (China) who are doing provocations by illegally occupying some features within our EEZ. Hence they have no right to claim they are enforcing their laws.” He added, “their so-called historical rights over an area enclosed by the nine-dash don’t exist except in their imagination.”
President Rodrigo Duterte in a virtual speech before the UN Assembly on September 22, said, “The Award (Hague Arbitral of 2016) is now part of international law beyond compromise, beyond the reach of passing governments to dilute, diminish or abandon. We firmly reject attempts to undermine it.”
On November 11, Pres. Duterte directed the suspension of the VFA for another six months “to enable the parties to arrive at an enhanced, mutually beneficial, agreeable and more effective and lasting arrangement on how to move forward in our mutual defense.” On November 12, during a virtual ASEAN Summit, he said the 2016 Hague Arbitral Ruling “is part of international law and its significance cannot be diminished nor ignored by any country however big and powerful.”
The Philippine leans on a wall under a roof made of thick steel-reinforced concrete slabs that can stand heavy rains and strong winds. “Naka sandal ka na sa matibay na pader!”
About the author:
Brig Gen Manuel P Oxales AFP (Ret) was with GHQ AFP Staff for Plans and International Relations, and a Wing Commander in Southern Mindanao. A Golden Aviators Awardee, he had several articles on external defense, security and advocacy issues published in magazines for professionals. He wrote three books: Advocacy in Retirement, which was officially designated reference of the National Defense College of the Philippines, Public Safety College and the AFP Educational, Training and Doctrine Command (AFPETDC), and the Offices of Senators Gregorio Honasan and Antonio Trillanes III; Advocacy Through the Year, a reference of the AFPETDC; and Two Stories of the February 1986 Revolution, which was made into a two-hour telemovie in 1987 starred by top movie actors. He has an MBA from U.P. and an MNSA from the National Defense College (Distinguished Graduate). He completed the National Security Management program at the US Industrial College. He was a lecturer at the Graduate School of Business of U.P., Ateneo de Manila University, and NDCP. You may reach him at: maningoxales@yahoo.com.