Notably preceded and followed by major military movements, I wonder what would be the impact on RP’s claim on certan islands and sea areas in the SCS.
Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914), graduate of the US Naval Naval Academy, wrote of the interdependence of military might and seaborne commerce, “whoever controls the sea lanes controls the islands; who controls islands controls the mainlands.” This maritime strategy spurred the further expansion of the British Empire that stretched around the globe over which the ‘sun never sets.’ It also influenced the U.S. to build the Panama Canal in Central America and a strong navy in the Atlantic that would sail the Pacific Ocean, and at the turn of the 19th century reached the shores of Islas de Filipinas, and captured Manila after a mock battle with the Spanish fleet.
Thus, the beginning of America’s colonization of the Philippines, the introduction of her political structures and systems, setting up of military and naval bases, linking or involving the country in U.S. wars, and placing it under its protective umbrella.
This essay and timeline will show the significant foreign policy announcements of the U.S., China, Australia, and ASEAN states to include the Philippines on the disputed islands in the SCS, and major military movements by the U.S. and her allies, and China’s own response.
The sea lanes of SCS extends from the Straits of Malacca between the island of Sumatra of Indonesia and Malaysia, up to the West Philippine Sea towards the straits of Taiwan. Through this waterway passes US$3.5 trillion of the world’s commerce that includes U.S. trade of US$5 billion, 70% of China’s imports and exports and 80% of imports of oil. Beneath the sea lies untapped oil and gas –an estimated 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and a fishing ground that account for the world’s 14% or about 1 million tons supply of fish a year. The volume of oil carried by tankers that pass through this gateway is three times that of the the Suez canal, and five times that of the Panama Canal.
The U.S. has strong allies – Japan, South Korea and Taiwan in Asia, Australia and a defense partner, the Philippines. China has North Korea, an emergent nuclear power.
These military alignments and political geopolitical realities in the SCS explain the open and bitter rivalry of two Super Powers, U.S. and China, for dominance and supremacy.
China has continuously invoked its so-called nine dash line which encompasses almost 90% of the SCS asserting sovereignty over the seas, the islands and islets in the Spratly Group, west of Palawan, the Scarborough Shoal west of Zambales, the Paracels, and other areas claimed by ASEAN states which include the Philippines (with overlapping claims) and Taiwan, despite the ruling of the Hague Tribunal in July 2016 that the nine dash line has no legal or historical basis.
The U.S., invoking Freedom of Navigation in international waters, sails uninterrupted its warships and conducts over flights through the sea lanes of the SCS –a demonstration of military strength.
During President Obama’s term from 2010-16, he pursued a major shift in U.S. foreign policy, ‘the Pivot to Asia’ which, as articulated of by U.S. State Secretary Hillary Clinton, was for the U.S. to move its strategic attention and interest from the Middle East and Europe to Asia –a pointed response to China, a world economic giant and dominant military power in Asia.
In April 2012, the U.S. intervened over a standoff between China maritime vessels and a Philippine Coast Guard vessel and a survey ship sent to protect Filipino fishermen in their traditional fishing grounds at Scarborough Shoal, east of Zambales. As agreed by the parties, the Philippine ship moved away but the Chinese vessel did not and has continously prevented entry of Filipinos. It was then a U.S. policy not to intervene over the territorial disputes on islands in the SCS between China and on the other side, Taiwan and ASEAN states, Indonesia, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, Singapore, Philippines, and instead encouraged them to hold bilateral talks.
In 2013, RP filed a case with the Permanent Court of Arbitration in Hague, Netherlands contesting that China’s so-called nine dash line had no legal and historical basis and that certain islands in the Spratly Group 130 miles west of Palawan and the Scarborough Shoal 120 miles east of Zambales are well within Philippine territory and exclusive economic zone (EEZ). In contrast, the Spratlys are located more than 1500 miles from the southern coast of China while Scarborough is about 500 miles away from China. RP was the lone complainant. China did not participate in the deliberation and declared it would not be bound by the PCA’s decision.
On 12-July-2016, the Hague Tribunal invalidated China’s claims on SCS based on historic rights to resources within the so-called nine-dash line, and declared such claim as unlawful and without basis under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). China responded it was not bound by the decision.
On 18-September-2017, President Donald Trump in his speech before the General Assembly of the United Nations said, “We must protect our nations, their interest and their futures, uphold and respect laws and borders. US rejects threats to sovereignty from the Ukraine to the South China Sea.”
President Trump’s stance towards adversaries is, ‘he speaks loudly and carries a long pole which he thrusts to the ground when needed’ in contrast to President Theodore Roosvelt’s (1901-1910) ‘Speak softly but carry a big stick.’
On 10-June-2019, a Filipino fishing boat was ‘accidentally’ rammed and damaged by a Chinese cargo vessel. A passing Vietnamese ship picked up the fishermen and towed the boat ashore. Despite RP’s diplomatic protest, no compensation has been paid by the owner of the Chinese vessel.
In January 2020, Indonesia filed a diplomatic protest against the presence of Chinese fishing vessels over Natuna islands, sent air and sea patrols, and called for China to abide with Hague Tribunal ruling. Vietnam supported Indonesia and cited the same position.
On 11-February-2020, President R. Duterte directed the termination of the VFA in response to the U.S.’ cancellation of visas of a few government officials.
On 17-February-2020, RP filed a diplomatic protest that its ship, BRP Conrado Yap, while on patrol off the seas in Philippine occupied Rizal Reef Islands in the Spratlys was accosted by a Chinese warship. When told that the ship was within Philippine territory, the Chinese captain replied that “China has immutable sovereignty over the SCS,” and pointed its guns at the Filipino ship. Filipino ships have been treated with less courtesy and respect compared to those of other nations. RP had also protested the passage and presence of hundreds of Chinese warships and other vessels off the seas of the islands in the Spratlys within RP’s territorial limits and EEZ without RP’s consent. These ships have also transited the straits between Tawi-Tawi and Sibuto, RP’s southernmost islands, without notice and approval.
In March, the government declared a national emergency as the pandemic hit the world, and imposed quarantine measures and restrictions on travel loacally and abroad starting on the 15th.
On March 12-22, China’s carrier group composed of five ships conducted exercises in the SCS passing through Basil channel between Taiwan and northern Luzon.
On March 24, Malaysia filed a diplomatic complaint with the U.N. over the presence of at a Chinese survey ship which had been on a month long stand-off with a drill ship contracted by the state-owned Petronas, on sea areas within Malaysia’s EEZ in the Spratlys.
On 4-June, DFA Secretary Locsin, citing developments in the SCS and the pandemic, suspended the termination of the VFA for six months to be extended for another six months.
On 7-June, the ASEAN summit issued a statement amidst a pandemic that China has been advancing its interest in the SCS. It reaffirmed that the “1982 UNCLOS should be the basis for determining maritime entitlements, sovereign rights, jurisdiction and legitimate interests over maritime zones.” So far, It was the ASEAN’s strongest statement to China.
On 28-June, for the first time since 2014, the U.S. Carrier Strike Group led by USS Reagan and USS Nimitz escorted by destroyers, submarines, cruisers, and various ships. sailed the SCS and passed by the territorial limits of Fiery Cross and Mischief (Subi Reef) in the Spratlys, on which the Chinese navy has built a runway on one island and ports and structures with military use. The islets are claimed by the Philippines.
On 5-July, over reports that the Chinese navy would conduct exercises for the period of July 1 to 5 in the vicinity of Paracel islands (claimed by Vietnam), DFA Secretary Locsin issued a stern warning that if such military games spill over Philippine territory, the government would respond diplomatically and whatever measures appropriate. It was so far DFA’s sternest warning to China.
On 12-July, on the fourth anniversary of of the Philippine government’a win before the Arbitral Tribunal at the Hague, DFA Secretary Locsin called on China to respect the award which “authoritatively and conclusively settled the issue of historic rights and maritime entitlements. He said, “The Philippines as a law abiding, peace loving and responsible member of the international community, adheres to the award … without the possibility of compromise or change.” He further stated that the government position is non-negotiable and leaves no room for compromise. Its was so far RP’s strongest policy declaration.
On 13-July, the Embassy of China in Manila promptly rejected RP’s appeal “for China to comply with the Hague ruling” and stated the ruling ‘invalid and illegal’ and that China’s position on the maritime issue is “consistently clear and firm.”
Then DFA Secretary Locsin and the Chinese Ambassador issued a statement that both are “in a consensus in the proper handling of the arbitration case and have laid down ground rules” for bilateral talks.
On 14-July, the U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo (a lawyer who graduated Nr. 1 at the U.S. Military Academy) in a bold and landmark statement declared, “We stand with the international community in the defense of the freedom of the seas and respect for sovereignty, and reject any push to impose ‘might as right’ in the SCS or wider region.” Sec Pompeo told China “to honor the Hague Tribunal’s decision, and stressed “most of the claims of China in the SCS are completely unlawful and the world will not allow China to make SCS its maritime empire.“ The U.S. statement effectively recognized and supported ASEAN states and Taiwan on their sovereign rights over their respective island-territories and EEZ in the vast SCS.
On 15-July, the Chinese Embassy in Washington issued a statement rejecting President Trump’s declarations.
On 16-July, the U.S. Asst Sec for East Asia and Pacific Affairs David Stillwell warned that any attempts by China to reclaim Scarborough Shoal would be a dangerous move. We “oppose any effort to block access to Filipino fishermen and any move by Beijing to physically occupy, conduct reclamation or militarization of Scarborough.” It was the clearest and strongest position by the U.S. on Scarborough Shoal, a departure from her position in 2012 over the stand-off between RP ships and a Chinese coast guard vessels in the islet.
On 17-July, Britain, amid her political differences with China over Hongkong and the border clashes of China with India in the eastern region, announced it would send next year its biggest aircraft carrier, the HM Elizabeth, onboard with U.S. built F-35 fighter jets, accompanied by destroyers and frigates, and deploy them in the SCS for exercises with the U.S. and Australian navies.
On 19-July,China deployed fighter jets on its occupied Woody Island of the Paracels claimed by Vietnam.
On 20-July, Brunei, which had been silent on the issue, declared that “Under UNCLOS, all states have the freedom of navigation and overflight operations in the high seas of the world.” That same day, China’s foreign minister warned the U.S. on meddling in matters that can be resolved bilaterally with ASEAN members.
On 21-July, the U.S. carrier strike forces led by the USS Reagan and USS Nimitz, the Japanese Self Defense Maritime Force, and the Australian Navy conducted combined and joint exercises at the ‘doorstep’ of the SCS. The U.S. sent B-1 bombers in a 32-hour flight from the mainland for exercises in the Pacific. These bombers were relocated from Guam, a U.S. air base. Also, thousands of airborne troops were dropped on Guam for training.
On 22-July, amid military confrontation with China in the eastern region (in Ladakh), India conducted joint naval exercises with the passing of U.S. aircraft carrier strike groups.
On 30-July, a letter from United Nations Malaysia said China’s position has no legal basis and “rejects its claims to historic, or and sovereign rights or jurisdiction over maritime areas of the SCS” bounded by the relevant part of ‘nine-dash line,’ reiterating the Hague Tribunal ruling. It was a hardening stand by Malaysia on the issue.
On 22-July, China’s Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) bombers conducted ‘high intensity exercise’ on simulated targets in the SCS. It also sent frigates at the ‘doorstep’ of the SCS.
ON 31-July, Australia’s High Commissioner told China he “is deeply concerned about China’s action in the SCS as destabilizing and could provoke escalation on an important shipping route, and that China should follow the Hague Arbitral Award, and refrain from unilateral action that will alter the status quo.”
In summary, there has been a very significant shift in US policy in the SCS. From the ‘hands-off position’ in 2012 of the government of President Obama to that of open and unqualified support by President Trump to the ASEAN states and Taiwan in their disputes with China over islands and sea areas in the SCS. The policy declarations by the U.S. were preceded and followed by major military movements in the SCS, the Indian Ocean and Sea of Japan, and at certain periods together with her notable allies, Japan and Australia, exercises which have not been done for the past many years.
What would these major military movements and flexing of muscles lead to? We can only speculate.
The relatively weak ASEAN states, the Philippines included, protecting their primordial national interests, the survival of the state, the safety and promotion of the welfare of the people, would figuratively steer their ships away and stay clear of getting roughed by very strong and tall waves.
RP’s position was spelled out by the President in his SONA last July 27. He said China has possession of islands and seas in SCS, which RP has claimed as its own, acknowledging the government could do little. It was an acceptance of reality; an expression of concern amid a pandemic and assurance of China’s help. Prudence dictates that RP maintains good relations with China and not be embroiled in her confrontation with the U.S. over issues in SCS.
On 5-August, the President disallowed the Philippine Navy from joining the U.S. exercise in the SCS.
RP may take comfort however, with the U.S.’ forceful and explicit landmark statement last 14-July by US Secretary State Pompeo calling for China to honor and abide by the decision of the Hague Tribunal in 2016 –won by RP. It has effectively strengthened the positions of RP, other ASEAN states and Taiwan in their disputes with China in the SCS.
The most definitive and unequivocable statement in support of RP was that of U.S. Assistant for East Asia and Pacific Affairs David Stillwell, “U.S. will oppose any move by Beijing to physically occupy, conduct reclamation and militarization of Scarborough,” located 120 miles west of Zambales, or “block entry of Filipino fishermen.” The U.S. has drawn a big red line.
Colloquially, the saying is, “Iba na ang nakasandal sa pader!” which literally translates to “It’s different when you can lean on a wall”- synonymous to having a big brother to defend you.
About the author:
Brig Gen Manuel P Oxales AFP (Ret) was with GHQ AFP Staff for Plans and International Relations and a Wing Commander in Southern Mindanao. A Golden Aviators Awardee, he had several articles on external defense, security and advocacy issues published in magazines for professionals. He wrote three books: Advocacy in Retirement, which was officially designated reference of the National Defense College of the Philippines, Public Safety College and the AFP Educational, Training and Doctrine Command (AFPETDC), and the Offices of Senators Gregorio Honasan and Antonio Trillanes III; ‘Advocacy Through the Year, a reference of the AFPETDC; and Two Stories of the February 1986 Revolution, which was made into a two-hour telemovie in 1987 starred by top movie actors. He has an MBA from U.P. and an MNSA from the National Defense College (Distinguished Graduate). He completed the National Security Management program at the US Industrial College. He was a lecturer at the Graduate School of Business of U.P., Ateneo de Manila University, and NDCP. You may reach him at: maningoxales@yahoo.com.