INTRODUCTION. The Battle of Jutland to the British or Skagerrak to the Germans set the two largest fleets of World War I, the Grand Fleet of Great Britain and the High Seas Fleet of Imperial Germany, against each other on 31-May to 1-June-1916. It was the largest clash of capital ships in World War I. The battle involved over 100,000 British and German seamen, of which 8,825 fought and died in the 2-day battle. A total of 250 warships, of which 25 warships sunk, fighting a brutal naval engagement. They battled for control of the North Sea for global economic trade. Both navies claimed victory. Although the British suffered more losses, it was not enough to cripple the numerical superiority of the British navy in the North Sea.
BACKGROUND. News of British Vice Admiral Frederick Sturdee’s annihilation of Graf Spee’s German East Asiatic Squadron off Port Stanley in the Falkland Islands had reached the Admiralty days before the Battle of Jutland. This news was, however, wrapped with anxiety as many British people warned that the German Navy would surely settle the score. The probability was quite certain, and as the days passed, nervous victor of the Battle of the Falklands could not avoid hearing the cry for retribution echoing from across the Channel. General Herbert Horatio Kitchener, Secretary of State for War, was convinced this invasion would occur on November 17 or 20 that he stationed 300,000 men to do maneuvers in eastern England’s Weybourne Hope, the bulk of his 25 divisions training for the Western front. He waited, but nothing happened. Admiral John Fisher, the First Sea Lord of the Admiralty, Chief of Naval Staff, founder of the modernized Royal Navy with its revolutionary dreadnought battleships and battlecruisers thought the Germans were coming too. However, when the best lunar and tidal conditions passed a few days later, he shifted the invasion plans to the next days when there would be a waning moon and high tide at dawn around December 8. One could definitely see the difference between army and navy tactics that even on the planning stage, the angle of the sun, the phase of the moon, the height of the tides, calm or rough waters, misty or thick fog, and the darkness before dawn all play a major part in determining the approach of attack. Admiral John Jellicoe was Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Navy and his second in command was Vice Admiral David Beatty. The German Commander-in-Chief was Admiral Reinhard Scheer and his second in command was Vice Admiral Franz von Hipper. One day, Churchill said that Admiral John Jellicoe was the only person capable of losing the war in a single afternoon. Churchill’s choice was rather Jellicoe’s Vice Admiral David Beatty as Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Navy.
CLASH OF THE STEEL CASTLES. The British ships were built for speed and power, thus their battlecruisers were thinly armored, but with guns ranging from 12 to 15-inches. The German ships had smaller 11 to 12-inch guns. Only two German ships had larger 15-inch guns but had thicker armor and better marksmen. The Germans had practiced for night battles; the British had not, not even for target practice. They synchronized light and gunfire, blinding the British navy.
On 31-May-1916, at 1420, light cruiser Galatea hoisted the signal flag for “Enemy in sight, westward. Urgent, 2 cruisers, probably hostile, insight bearing S-SE, 8 miles, am closing.” At 1420, when Admiral John Jellicoe’s Grand Fleet squadrons from Scapa Flow were still 65 miles away to the north, Vice Admiral David Beatty’s advance guard of light cruisers, 5 miles ahead of his heavier ships, and Vice Admiral Franz von Hipper’s scouting ships learned of one another’s proximity. The lines were drawn up for battle. In the next 50 minutes, the British Fleet would suffer severely. And when Beatty’s battlecruisers sailed up to the enemy, the German cruisers, in turn, sustained much damage.
At 1400, Vice Admiral Beatty’s fleet consisted of 4 battleships, 6 battlecruisers, 14 light cruisers, 27 destroyers, and a seaplane carrier. At 1428, light cruisers Galatea and Phaeton fired their 6-inch guns at the German torpedo boats, inaugurating the Battle of Jutland. Battlecruiser Indefatigable was under heavy fire for 15 minutes while bearing explosions at its center and rear. The 18,500-ton steel vessel was the first ship sunk in the battle. At 1432, German light cruiser Elbing fired back and hurried SW to help the destroyers. At 1437, Elbing sent a 5-9 inch shell that hit British light cruiser Galatea. At 1440, all British battlecruisers headed S-SE to be 70 miles nearer Jellicoe to close the gap and trap the enemy.
At 1435, German Vice Admiral Hipper’s flagship, Lützow, broke radio silence to Friedrich der Grosse, reporting smoke clouds of enemy forces in sight. At 1438, a blaring sound “Clear ship for action” was sounded. At 1439, light cruiser Galatea signaled battlecruiser Lion on the enemy having more than just torpedo boats and light cruisers. At 1451, the smoke seemed to hide 7 vessels. At 1452, Beatty swung S-SE to SE. At 1488, Admiral Jellicoe on his flagship Iron Duke learned of Galatea’s earlier sightings. At 1501, Beatty swung SE-E. At 1513, he veered E-NE. Minutes later, New Zealand reported 5 enemy ships. The German ships sighted the enemy at 1515. The Germans had long dreamed of this battle and victory.
German light cruiser Elbing replied the only enemy forces are on the NW horizon. Vice Admiral Hipper’s force turned NW and opened fire at 1518, endangering British battlecruisers New Zealand and Indefatigable. At 1526, Admiral Jellicoe sailed 70 miles NW of Beatty’s battle cruiser fleet.
There was an early blunder on the British side. Admiral Jellicoe was told that Admiral Scheer was still in his base on the Jade River. Admiral Jellicoe assumed from the message that the entire German fleet would not battle, and Admiral Reinhard Scheer would only venture out to cover Vice Admiral Hipper’s return. Since Vice Admiral Beatty, commander of the British Battle Cruiser Squadron, was 70 miles farther out to sea and traveling a more southerly route than Jellicoe, this meant Beatty most likely would engage the enemy first. Thus, Jellicoe proceeded at a leisurely 15 knots toward a rendezvous with Beatty, which was scheduled at 1530 off the coast of Denmark. Both Vice Admirals Beatty’s and Hipper’s ships spotted a Danish tramp steamer, N.J.Fjord. German light cruiser Elbing sent two torpedo boats B109 & B110 to investigate. British light cruisers Galatea and Phaeton broke off from Beatty’s force to get a better look at the lone steamer. Both scouting pairs reported sighting an enemy ship.
At 1535, Vice Admiral Hipper reversed course to SE. At 1536, Beatty gave an order to cut back drastically to starboard to follow Hipper. Beatty wanted Hipper to himself.
At 1539, the German gunnery chiefs received orders to prepare for fire, from the left and to recalculate their ranging as the distance to enemy ships narrowed. At 1542, the battlecruisers were in a tight formation of 500 meters between ships. By 1545, the two forces were just 9.5 miles apart. Hipper decreed a battle turn to S-SE. The turns were done in precise perfection in innumerable pre-war maneuvers.
At 1548, British Flag Captain Ernle Chatfield, relayed the order to Chief Gunnery Officer Gerald Longhurst to open fire as the British ships were clearly visible against the skyline. But German battlecruiser Lützow was first to open fire on British battlecruiser Lion. At 1551, only then were Queen Mary, Tiger, New Zealand, and Indefatigable able to fire in position.
At 1551-52, Hipper opened fire every 7 seconds which was ear-splitting and stupefying to all. At 1552, German battlecruiser Von der Tann fired at battlecruiser Indefatigable for 4 minutes. Indefatigable fired back but missed. At 1555, Beatty radioed his position to Jellicoe and the 13th flotilla that “the opportunity is favorable for attacking.” At 1559, German Gunnery Officer Commander KK Mahrholz fired 8-9 salvos at battlecruiser Indefatigable until she exploded. At 1578, Beatty’s battlecruisers fired back. Battlecruiser Queen Mary hit German battlecruiser Seydlitz. At 1600, battlecruiser Derfflinger hit battlecruiser Princess Royal. Like Lion, she took 2-3 early hits and later 3-4 more. Battlecruiser Tiger was also hit. At 1602, German battlecruiser Von der Tann attacked Indefatigable with 4 gun salvos and 3 shells that pierced the stern and exploded lethally until her demise. At 1605, sensing a disaster, Jellicoe ordered the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron to proceed immediately to provide support to Beatty. From 1600-07, Lützow hit Lion over 6 times. Lion hit Lützow over 4 times. Battlecruiser Indefatigable met her demise taking 1,010 men with her. At 1609, a British shell hit battlecruiser Von der Tann, and another into battlecruiser Moltke at 1616.
The Germans rained down hellish fire on Beatty’s five ships, until salvation arrived at 1610 through Rear Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas’s 5th Squadron of battleships. But Hipper shifted back his attention to close in on Beatty.
At 1615, Jellicoe’s ideal “actual hits” translated into a mediocre 6 scores in 27 minutes, despite firing 800 shells. In contrast, the German fire was 4x more accurate with 25 hits. British ordnance had not improved since Dogger Bank in 1915.
Two battlecruiser shells broke up although ineffectually at 1616, making Hipper declare “Commence Fire!” At 1618, another command was to confuse the British gunners, “Line Ahead!” At 1620, Scheer’s westward course was to envelope Beatty, but quickly changed directions back to north at 1621 after learning that the British Grand Fleet dreadnoughts and Evans-Thomas’ 5th Squadron had joined the action. Earlier, he was eager to present Beatty and Evan-Thomas a rude surprise.
Von der Tann and Moltke were hit 6 more times during 1620-1630; at 1626, Queen Mary was badly hit by Seydlitz. Although the distance was still great and the German line was cloaked in smoke, Evan-Thomas’s 4 ships were able to inflict enough damage on the German vessels to relieve the immediate pressure on Beatty, who smartly altered his course when Evan-Thomas had joined the battle. Hipper did the same. But these fleets, which had drifted out of each other’s sight, would come back and resume firing.
At 1630, Vice Admiral Beatty was almost due South, 7.5 miles SW of German Vice Admiral Hipper’s fleet, who had steered away to the East. Beatty’s battlecruiser fleet’s will to win was strong and “permeated every man under his command,” Navigating Officer William Scott Chalmers, said.
Scheer’s High Seas Fleet was sighted by a British patrol to the south at 1635. Beatty ordered his ships northward, to lure the Germans toward Admiral Jellicoe’s approaching Grand Fleet.
By 1640, in terms of casualties, 2 German vessels and 1 British vessel were lost, and hundreds of casualties on both sides. Of the several torpedoes fired at capital ships, all missed except one, which slammed into Seydlitz, jarring it violently. Tactically, the British fleet had a clear lead in destroyer action.
Lion’s signal at 1645 having sighted enemy battleships bearing SE seemed difficult for Evan-Thomas to believe until German battlecruiser Lützow hit dreadnought Barham at 1646. Beatty’s light-cruiser squadron had been left behind and was just resuming scouting positions in front of larger ships. From this vantage point, they could see the entire German High Seas Fleet. In another 10 – 20 minutes, Beatty’s 8 capital ships would have been outnumbered 21 to 8. Without the light cruisers in the British vanguard, the whole battle would have truly been a disaster for the British. Beatty’s turn had left Evan-Thomas in position to inflict damage on the Germans with his huge 1,900-pound artillery shells. But Evan-Thomas, 7 miles away, could not see Beatty’s message flags, nor did any of the ships signal him by searchlight. He knew of Beatty’s change of course when he passed Lion going in the opposite direction. Beatty had his signalman contact Evan-Thomas. The message flags went up at 1648 and were not taken down until 1654, at which point Evan-Thomas made his turn. The 6-minute period brought his ships 4,000 yards closer to the Germans. Barnham was hit again; while Warspite was hit 3 times; but Valiant was untouched; and Malaya avoided fire. All 4 ships were super-dreadnoughts.
Super-dreadnoughts Barham and Valiant steadied on their new course North at 1656-57. Super-dreadnoughts Warspite and Malaya took 5 more hits as they pivoted. Barham absorbed 4 more hits between 1658-1710. Battlecruiser Lion took 3 hits between 1659-1702. The Germans saw an explosion at 1701, perhaps from the British fleet making a hard veer to port (NW) which may have caused a flash fire. As the battle between Scheer and Hipper against Evans-Thomas intensified, the German ships suffered too. Between 1706-36, Grasser Kurfurst, Markgraf, the leading ships, and Derfflinger and Lützow took hits on the belt armor, making ships crash, and causing ships and conning towers to vibrate. Battlecruisers Moltke and Von der Tann zigzagged to avoid a further hail of shells and lessen the hits and damages.
At 1715, the British Fleet vanished from view in the fog. German Scheer and Hipper then concentrated on Evans-Thomas. In the “Run to the North,” they attacked dreadnoughts Warspite and Malaya with 13 more hits. At 1720, Admiral Scheer signaled Hipper to give chase. Beatty then altered his course N-NE to engage Hipper’s ships again. This forced the German line to bend to the east to prevent Beatty’s ships from gaining the advantage. Smoke from the guns mixed with heavy mists to form a thick fog that hampered Hipper’s vision. It was Hipper’s job to keep the High Seas Fleet aware of changes, but because he was caught up in an intense battle with Beatty and was lost in one of the cloud banks, he did not spot the approaching British Fleet. German Rear Admiral Friedrich Boedicker, 3 miles ahead of him to the east, saw them first, reporting enemy dreadnoughts to the east. These could not be Beatty’s nor Evan-Thomas’ ships —someone else was entering the battle.
At 1733, light cruiser Falmouth, 5 miles ahead of Lion, sighted Rear Admiral Robert Arbuthnot’s ships (Defence, Warrior, Duke of Edinburgh, Black Prince) sailing 7 miles SW of Jellicoe’s Marlborough. It was not until 1750 that Lion saw Black Prince. Beatty veered right at 1756 to reengage with Hipper who saw the approaching battleships.
Hipper changed course NW-NE at 1744 to N-NW at 1747 to N at 1750 to disrupt British ranging. Yet, 4 battleship projectiles smashed into Derfflinger and Seydlitz. When Hipper veered east at 1755, British Admiral Horace Hood emerged, and his Indomitable, Inflexible, and Invincible hit German cruisers Pillau and Wiesbaden lethally, firing from 8,000 yards away. Hipper commanded the torpedo boats to attack at 1758, at which time German Rear Admiral Friedrich Boedicker saw the British Grand Fleet on the horizon, 16,000 yards away. Beatty moved E-NE then E at 1800. Jellicoe sent a message at exactly 1800 asking “what direction is the enemy?” Beatty was irked by the tardy pace of Jellicoe to the meeting point. By 1800, the bulk of Arbuthnot’s ships joined with Beatty’s and Jellicoe’s ships. Jellicoe then turned his 8 capital ships from SE-S at 1802, bringing the Fleet into action.
At 1806, Vice Admiral Beatty sighted the enemy to the south and passed the information on to Jellicoe. Still, Jellicoe did not know their speed, direction, or number. Despite this lack of information, Jellicoe would have no choice but to deploy. If he turned to starboard, he would engage the enemy quickly, being well within gunnery range. He could also come under heavy torpedo and destroyer attacks from the Germans. If he turned to port, he would avoid the torpedo attacks, being 4,000 yards away from the enemy line. This move would cross the German “T” and put the British fleet against the dull-gray sky while the German ships would be backlighted by the sun on the western sky, making the British ships hard to see.
From 1800-1810, Rear Admiral Boedicker radioed Scheer and Hipper that his ship was being fired on by enemy ships. Not until 1814, after Jellicoe’s and Beatty’s ships had been within sight of one another for nearly a quarter of an hour, was the German fleet precisely located —just in time for Jellicoe to deploy his ships to the best advantage. Jellicoe organized the Grand Fleet end-to-end in a line so that their combined broadsides could be brought to bear on the approaching German ships, who could in turn reply only with the forward guns of their leading ships. The British ships formed the horizontal stroke and the German ships formed the vertical stroke of the letter “T” with the British having deployed into line at a right angle to the German ships’ forward progress. This maneuver is called “Crossing the enemy’s T” and is the ideal situation dreamed of by naval tacticians since by “crossing the T” one gains an overwhelming firepower superiority.
At 1819, two 13-5 inch shells from British battlecruiser Lion slammed into Hipper’s flagship battlecruiser Lützow, one exploded at the base of the conning tower, the other penetrated the port roof and exploded against the rear wall of B-turret, both shells breaking up without penetrating armor. Battleship Markgraf hit battlecruiser Princess Royal. By 1820, 850-lb shells began to douse the German battlecruisers. Hood’s flagship Invincible hit German battlecruiser Lützow’s forward torpedo rooms and the A-turret. Although Beatty’s ships took more hits, he had amassed critical tactical points by forcing German Vice Admiral Hipper to turn away SE. At 1820, cruiser Defence disappeared in a cloud of smoke, with all its crew dead. Warrior took 21 hits and crawled while its 800+ survivors off-loaded. Dreadnought Warspite suffered damages and 46 casualties. Battlecruisers Indomitable and Inflexible resumed rapid fire.
Admiral Scheer thought he was sitting in the catbird seat before Jellicoe showed up. Scheer‘s 21 dreadnoughts, with their corresponding complement of torpedo boats and destroyers. Scheer was about to grab his trophy when the whole British Grand Fleet suddenly appeared. Scheer quickly reacted. He saw only one way out —to order a carefully rehearsed fleet maneuver designed for exactly this situation, breaking away rapidly from a stronger fleet. At 1829, the British Fleet stopped firing. The misty veil split like a theatre curtain, and the German’s automaton gun-laying mechanism shifted into gear without a moment of hesitation. At 1830, Admiral Scheer signaled each ship to make a 180-degree turn for the opposite course steering westward. The slow annihilation of light cruiser Wiesbaden and crew perhaps became the tipping point. The British battlecruiser Invincible met her end at 1833. Bad visibility left Jellicoe in doubt about what happened. At 1837, Scheer avoided the stricken battlecruiser Lützow but Hipper could not get himself to abandon his flagship, until Captain Erich Raeder reminded Hipper that the squadron needs him. Hipper got a booster shot, and the old Hipper was back. Captain Viktor Harder asked Commodore Andreas Michelson, leader of light cruiser Rostock, to transport Hipper to torpedo boat G39. Hipper ordered Captain Harder to scuttle Lützow when the damage is too great.
The British lost contact with the Germans at 1845. The British Grand Fleet had maneuvered in such a way that it ended up between the German High Seas Fleet and the German ports, and this was the situation Scheer most dreaded. So at 1855, Scheer ordered another reverse turn, perhaps hoping to pass around the rear of the British fleet. But the result was a worse position than that from which he had just escaped from. His battle line became compressed, and his leading ships found themselves again under intense bombardment from the broadside array of the British ships. Jellicoe had succeeded in crossing the German’s “T” again. Lützow had now received irreparable damage, and many ships were also badly damaged.
At 1855, Scheer sent the German fleet steaming straight at full force to the British fleet. This move surprised the British, but the gamble did not pay off for the Germans. The British could see the German ships clearly, while the late-afternoon sun was blinding the German gunners, who could only make out the flashes of the British guns. Without a good target to shoot at, the Germans were sitting ducks. British dreadnought Hercules fired on German battlecruiser Seydlitz, while dreadnought Colossus and battleship Revenge fired on German battlecruiser Derfflinger; British battleship Neptune and dreadnought St. Vincent fired on Derfflinger and Moltke. Battleship Marlborough, ignoring her own torpedo damage, fired back 14 salvos in 6 minutes, and saw 4 of them hit home. Monarch, Iron Duke, Centurion, Royal Oak, King George V, Temeraire, Superb, and Neptune all scored hits.
The German ships were being slaughtered, finding difficulty to see the enemy ships due to the angle of the glaring sun. The British ravaged the German ships, the Germans only landed 2 shots, both on dreadnought Colossus. At 1915, Scheer ordered his warships to virtually sacrifice themselves in a mass charge against the British navy. 13 more German torpedo boats joined his cause to eliminate the enemy.
At 1917, more British ships opened fire. Royal Oak, Lion, Tiger, Princess Royal, Benbow, Bellerophon, Temperaire, King George V participated. A total of 19 British dreadnoughts at 1920 rose to 21; and at 1922 rose to 23. More joined later. The battle situation for the German navy had fallen apart. The British navy pulled out at 1930, suffering no major losses.
Vice Admiral Beatty mistakenly thought he had seen German ships and reported this to Admiral Jellicoe at 1940, 1945, and 1947. At 1954, dreadnought King George V received the message from dreadnought Iron Duke. Jellicoe received the message at 1959, and shifted SW-W to close the enemy at 2000. But Jellicoe’s ships could not see Beatty’s ships in the fog.
The British Fleet had spotted the silhouettes of 4 German battlecruisers steaming south trying to regain the lead off dreadnought Westfalen. Pre-dreadnought battleships of German Rear Admiral Franz Mauve’s 2nd Squadron were also spotted. At 2018, battlecruiser Princess Royal opened fire; at 2019, Lion fired. They charged at Mauve’s 2nd squadron. At 2021, Jellicoe continued sailing W-SW, and SW at 2028, when battleship Posen opened fire at Vice Admiral Beatty’s ships.
At 2037, battlecruiser Indomitable received a violent jolt, shaking the ship as if it had been hit by a torpedo or a mine. A mysterious force then rocked Inflexible, New Zealand, Tiger, Princess Royal, and Lion, which felt the last of the shock wave. At 2044, destroyer Nestor sunk. Beatty’s command then fired 65 salvos targeting Hartog’s line, making Hipper board Moltke and veer off. German Battlecruisers Derfflinger and Seydlitz were hit. Battlecruiser New Zealand had scored its first 3 hits. Beatty pulled back SW, retreating as he had 4 hours earlier.
At 2045, German battleships resumed their southward course. Scheer sent a message to Commodore Andreas Michelson on Rostock to set a torpedo boat attack against the British navy.
At 2106, Scheer instructed his naval air division with urgent Zeppelin reconnaissance. At 2110, Admiral Scheer ordered his squadrons to sail S-SE and 1 quarter; then at 2146 S-SE and 3 quarters. The course led straight to Horn’s Reef.
At 2155, the admiralty radioed the Rostock plan to Jellicoe. At 2210, the bad weather and expiring twilight were tricky again, and Admiral Scheer did not sail W-SW per Beatty’s report earlier at 2138 to Jellicoe. At 2215, 4 British light cruisers met 5 German light cruisers. In total darkness, it was hard to identify the ships. Commodore W.E. Goodenough’s flagship light cruiser Southampton fired a shot. They returned a barrage of shells. Southampton suffered much damage but returned fire. Her torpedo sunk light cruiser Frauenlob.
The rest of the British ships were reluctant to engage so as not to disclose their night positions. Due to this fear, two of Scheer’s dreadnoughts, Moltke and Seydlitz, were able to pass through the British lines unmolested. Both ships, heavily damaged and ripe for attack, were allowed to limp away.
At 2230, Jellicoe’s ships sailed southward in the dark and collided with Scheer’s ship. Over the next 4 hours up to 0230, there were 7 clashes of the British navy with the German navy, which was well-prepared and adept at night-fighting.
At 2400, the British 4th Flotilla of Destroyer Escorts, together with the 5th Battle Squadron, converged with the German High Seas Fleet 1,000 yards away. Destroyer Tipperary was leading 12 destroyers when she spotted unknown ships on the starboard. Searchlights and a barrage of 5.9-inch and 3.5-inch shells sent Tipperary ablaze. Destroyer Spitfire, which was behind Tipperary, had to maneuver to avoid hitting the burning ship. As she turned, she met the German dreadnought Nassau coming at her from the other direction. Dreadnought Nassau altered her course straight for destroyer Spitfire and their port bows collided and screeched by each other. Nassau fired her 11-inch guns at the smaller ship. Although the projectiles flew over the top of the destroyer, the blast still wrecked the bridge, the foremost funnel, and the mast. Spitfire limped away, useless for battle.
Commander Walter Allen’s 4th destroyer flotilla signaled an unidentified ship and was met by a hailstorm of blinding lights and shells. In less than a minute, Broke was decimated and spun out of control, making Contest ram Sparrowhawk, slicing 30 feet off of her stern. Destroyers Broke and Contest pulled out of the mess, although limping. Destroyer Sparrowhawk floated until the next day, then was scuttled. A torpedo hit German light cruiser Rostock, taking on 930 tons of water, but was able to follow the German ships slowly.
Commander Reginald Hutchinson’s 4th flotilla Destroyer Achates, was followed by other destroyers: Ambuscade, Ardent, Fortune, Porpoise, and Garland. Hutchinson, aiming to merge with the British line, steered a course merging with the German fleet instead. Battleships Westfalen and Rhineland opened fire. It took less than a minute to sink Fortune. Destroyers Achates and Ambuscade thought they were being chased by a German cruiser. It was Black Prince, which had fallen behind because of engine damage. At 0100, battleships Nassau and Thüringen sighted the ship, which did not reply to their signals. Thüringen opened fire on Black Prince from a range of 1,000 yards. All shots were direct hits. German ships Nassau, Ostfriesland, and Frederick der Grosse fired more until Black Prince blew up and sank into the North Sea.
The thick foggy mists were a predicament in the Battle of Jutland. As the German battle cruisers and destroyers steamed forward, the German battleships astern became confused and disorganized in trying to execute their reverse turn. Had Jellicoe ordered the Grand Fleet forward through the screen of charging German battlecruisers at that moment, the fate of the German High Seas Fleet would likely have been sealed. Fearing and overestimating the danger of torpedoes from the approaching destroyers, he ordered his fleet to turn away, and the two lines of battleships steamed apart at a speed of more than 20 knots. They did not meet again, and when darkness fell, Jellicoe could not be sure of the route of the German retreat. By 0300 on 1-June-1916, the Germans had safely eluded their pursuers.
Destroyer Ardent was the final ship of the 4th Flotilla to meet the German line, illuminated by searchlights, and destroyed by a hailstorm of small-caliber shells. None of the British destroyers radioed Jellicoe about the action with the German dreadnoughts. The clash of destroyers versus dreadnoughts was a mismatch that quickly turned into a massacre. Admiral Jellicoe had no idea that Admiral Scheer was successfully cutting across his rearguard and escaping. With minor injuries, the German ships easily broke free.
At 0415, Admiral Jellicoe learned that the High Seas Fleet had gotten away. It was only now that Vice Admiral Beatty got around to tell Admiral Jellicoe of the loss of battle cruisers Queen Mary and Indefatigable. Jellicoe was shocked to hear the news, especially when he learned that they had been lost early in the battle and why battleship commander Beatty failed to keep him informed of such a catastrophe.
STEEL TRAPS. On 31-May to 1-June-1916, Admiral Scheer intended to blast his way to the reefs through whatever enemy forces would try to bar his way or be destroyed trying. He succeeded in entering the swept channel, leaving to historians to explain how the British navy allowed this to happen. One fault lies with incorrect intelligence on the German fleet’s location.
The Battle of Jutland began with a naval encounter off the Danish coast between the battlecruiser forces of German Vice Admiral Hipper and British Vice Admiral Beatty, during which the Germans quickly gained a momentary advantage. This was Admiral Scheer’s plan –to trap British Vice Admiral Beatty before reinforcements could come to his rescue. German Captain Karl von Kameke of dreadnought Helgoland bluntly said, “Our bait, the light cruisers, will draw the stupid fools out to sea with their wireless messages.” Scheer was 50 miles behind and was in time to trap Beatty’s ships. He hoped for a big catch entrapped by 110 German ships. Beatty’s flagship, battlecruiser Lion, was hit hard, lost two of eight 13.5-inch guns, and 99 sailors. Her wireless transmitter got badly damaged, which hindered Beatty’s communications with his fleet and Jellicoe.
Vice Admiral Beatty quickly headed northwards to trap Vice Admiral Hipper, in turn, under Admiral Jellicoe’s large fleet. A collision between Scheer’s gray leftwing destroyer and Jellicoe’s black rightwing rear guard destroyer led to 4 hours of sea fighting in the dark of night. The intense bombardment continued from British ships, and the Germans moved forward, well into the steel trap of the British.
Sensing danger, Admiral Scheer ordered a 180-degree turn of all German ships and steamed out of the impending trap. Still, the German navy believed they had outgunned the enemy, their cruisers were technically superior, their vessels were better equipped and more adept at night fighting, and that they had the element of surprise versus the British navy’s defective shells and light steel armor. But ultimately, the sheer number alone would make it impossible to lose in a war at sea, a British navy expertise honed against the French navy over a century ago.
The question is not whether Jellicoe would have gone back to engage because he was known not to favor night action. Instead, he could have veered S-SE towards Horn’s Reef to block Scheer from escaping at dawn, assuming it would be his escape route. But neither did Jellicoe turn back to engage in battle with the German navy nor did Scheer search for the battleships of Jellicoe. This “missed opportunity” would haunt them for the rest of their life. Jellicoe was accused of forsaking the Royal Navy’s chance for a new Trafalgar, while Scheer accused divine Providence of dealing him a cruel hand. Magnus von Levetzow’s recollection was “the 65-year-old Scheer thought of how Providence had given opportunities for a complete annihilation of the British fleet still robbed him of sleep.”
AFTERMATH. On 1-June-1916, every British naval officer and sailor knew they had hit the German High Seas Fleet hard, forced it to retreat back to Jade River, and prevented it from breaking Great Britain’s blockade of Germany. But this came at a high price. 14 British Battlecruisers and destroyers sunk in the battle: Indefatigable, Queen Mary, Nomad, Nestor, Defence, Invincible, Shark, Ardent, Fortune, Black Prince, Turbulent, Tipperary, Sparrowhawk, and Warrior. The majority of British casualties were from flotillas attached to Beatty, which lost Queen Mary, Indefatigable, and Invincible at the outset, with 3,309 lives lost, over half of the British casualties in the battle.
The first deceptive newspapers from London reported Germany’s victory at sea. Later, the papers got it right. German officers had laughed at the defective British shells even if they knew their enemy had larger caliber ordnance. Admiral Scheer knew that the British navy suffered heavier losses than the German navy did. But British torpedoes had heavily-damaged the German ships: Benhcke, Ostfriesland, Helgoland, Von der Tann, Derfflinger, Moltke, Seydlitz, Konig, Grosser Kurfurst, Markgraf, Frauenlob. The state of the German ships in the aftermath was horrendous, with thousands of casualties. In reality, the German navy was depressed for not having annihilated their enemy. That night, when the hunter became the hunted, the badly damaged battlecruiser Lützow resulted in 115 Germans killed.
However, German Captain Erich Raeder’s memory is that Admiral Scheer knew Great Britain had suffered greatly on May 31st while Germany stood up to a hegemon that did not fight back on June 1st. Germany’s “Navalis Modus Operandi” was to annihilate those of the Royal Navy that responded to the bombardment at Sunderland in April 1916.
Germany’s Admiral Hipper, and Great Britain’s Admirals Beatty and Jellicoe’s ships were just an hour away from each other, and a German L-13 Zeppelin reported this sighting twice to Admiral Scheer, albeit from very cloudy visibility at sea. Admiral Jellicoe turned his ship southward but could not see Admiral Sheer’s flotilla through the thick cloud of smoke emitted by Admiral Scheer’s smokescreen while he escaped upon seeing the incoming massive British fleet. Jellicoe thus turned back. Later, a U-boat reported to Admiral Scheer that several British battleship squadrons were steaming from the North. With no enemy ships in sight, the sobered Admiral Scheer headed home.
An all-out use of U-boats against British economic trade went into effect in February 1917 before the battle, which drew away resources from the German surface fleet now anchored. Radical and rebellious German sailors established a committee to complain about the dismal food rations and promoted the Independent Social Democratic Program. Hunger strikes and cancelation of recreation period made over 600 sailors bolt ship, and sailors from 4 more battleships and battlecruisers joined. By resuming unrestricted submarine warfare, Germany foolishly antagonized a powerful neutral nation, the United States, and brought it into the war and needlessly made a new enemy.
In April 1918, Admiral Scheer set out to annihilate Beatty’s flotillas off Scandinavia. However, German naval intelligence decoded the departure date off by one day –an intelligence failure. Hipper and Scheer also misread their crew’s mood, another intelligence failure resulting in mutinies in Kiel, Wilhelmshaven, and Berlin. The lion-lamb behavior of Scheer, baffling aggressiveness, and attempt just 2 months later to “win” again were mainly influenced by his advisors, the cautious Adolf von Trotha and the impulsive Magnus von Levetzow.
At Jutland, several factors including poor signaling and communications in Beatty’s fleet amidst thick foggy sea conditions meant the British fleet missed many chances to inflict heavier losses on the German fleet. The Royal Navy lost ships due to the ineffective British shells exploding on impact without penetrating armor plates versus the effective German gunnery. As such, the British navy sustained more losses than the German navy in ships and men. The British lost 14 ships: 3 battlecruisers, 3 cruisers, 8 destroyers, and 6,274 casualties. The Germans lost 11 ships: 1 battleship, 1 battlecruiser, 4 light cruisers, 5 destroyers, 1 pre-dreadnought, and 2,551 casualties.
However, the losses inflicted on the British navy did not affect their numerical superiority in the North Sea, where their domination remained unchallengeable during the course of the war. The British used naval dominance to bar German access to the North Sea. Damaged German ships spent months under repair, while many reserve British ships were ready for action.
The 11 German ships sunk in the battle were torpedo boats V27, V29, S35, V48 and V4; light cruisers Frauenlob, Wiesbaden, Elbing, and Rostock; battlecruiser Lützow; and pre-dreadnought Pommern. Henceforth, the German High Seas Fleet chose not to venture out from the safety of its home ports.
The strategic value of the Battle of Jutland was that the British navy contained the German naval threat by deterring their warships from major actions in the North Sea, particularly from bombing the Yorkshire coast. “Although the German Fleet had assaulted its jailer, it was still in jail” was the sentiment in the press. The British navy continued to blockade German ports, resulting in grave shortages of food and materials. Submarine threats against the Atlantic supply lines were overcome.
On 9-November-1918, the Social Democratic Party made Germany a Republic. Two days later, the armistice went into effect. Germany surrendered, with her High Seas Fleet seized by the British and scuttled by the Germans. World War I ended. German Emperor Kaiser Wilhelm II fled to Denmark in exile, ashamed of being a German. He died in 1941 in the Netherlands.
THE ADMIRALS. Jellicoe died in November 1935 in Kensington before his 76th birthday. Beatty, ill with influenza, insisted to be a pallbearer at Jellicoe’s funeral. He died in March 1936 in London at age 65. Scheer passed away in November 1928 in Kiel at age 65, still depressed for not having annihilated the British navy when the chance presented itself. Hipper lived incognito in different places in fear of the German naval crew whom he had starved. He passed away in May 1932 in Weimar at age 68.
RECOMMENDATION: The book Clash Of The Capital Ships authored by Eric Dorn Brose and published by USNI, highlights the Battle of Jutland between the navies of Great Britain and Imperial Germany. The German navy decided to use the U-boats to totally annihilate their enemy. The problem is that an aggressive hunter can become the hunted each time she needs to surface every 2 hours, compromising her location. The more cautious British navy made themselves difficult to locate by constantly shifting direction, using flags more than coded messages. The British continued intercepting and decrypting German coded messages, making full use of the German navy’s movements. This became a significant element of British naval decision-making, despite some decoding errors. Great Britain came away the victor mainly because of its pre-eminence at sea. Nevertheless, both navies suffered horrendous casualties of officers, sailors, and ships in the battle. Ultimately, being held responsible in the vast sea to decide, whether to attack, retreat, or evade, it is still mastery of command –decisiveness and calculated risk-taking– that is paramount. Closely following are the commander’s tactical role, the capabilities of each ship, crewmen skills training, their motivation to fight, and a high esprit d’ corps versus that of the enemy. This book excellently depicts how important these elements are for any naval force, big or small, to succeed in times of war, instability, or peace.
