Deliberate Acquisition of Submarine Warfare Capability of a Navy

INTRODUCTION

This article emphasizes the dangers of operating a submarine short of maturity in a NAVY. They face threats and dangers of deep water that needs to be understood by a NAVY aspiring to fulfill the dreams of acquiring a submarine warfare capability for the defense of their country in territorial seas.

This article is not to discouraged the NAVY, but rather inspire the NAVY to strive more to be proficient in terms of operational, materials, and training readiness in order to achieved maturity and be ready to accept new top line technology in Diesel Electric Submarines with Air Independent Power (AIP).

The modest approach of acquiring a submarine warfare capability must be first within the affordability and sustainability means similar to other countries which are now presently operating new top of the line Diesel Electric Submarines. Korea, Pakistan, Japan, China, and other countries who started first with Midget Submarines, etc., have attained maturity in submarine warfare capability in the most affordable ways by developing gradually their confidence in deep water beneath the waves.

THREAT TO A SUBMARINES

There are several threats to submarines which can be classified as internal and external threats. First, we must consider the human factor as some of the threats can be managed within our means.

Training Readiness – proficiency starts with the basic theory, knowledge in developing skills through practicum and actual real time participation in the operations and maintenance of a submarine in the training laboratory ashore, down to the pier side to extremely shallow waters of coastal areas on a gradual phase by phase basis to develop skills and proficiency. A submarine crew cannot afford to commit mistakes and it’s always disastrous to the entire submarine crew and very expensive equipment once mistakes were committed on a submarine even when a submarine is at the drydock, operating at the surface and most of all in the deep beneath the waves.

Personnel Readiness – is taming our attitude, behavior reflexes, and instinct, working in a very confined space in the deep without seeing the sun for several weeks and must know by heart every system and sub-system, from bolts to nuts with perfect knowledge about how a submarine system efficiently and safely functions as a single system.

Material Readiness – is to make ready and see to it that the submarine is more than 100% ready for operation, resilient to the hydrostatic pressures constantly exerted to the hull surface that committing one mistake tends to crush the hull to collapse to the deep and that would be a disaster. The batteries of a submarine, when faulty, can produce a hydrogen gas  which can make the entire crew suffocate and can also trigger detonation of the ordnance inside the submarine underwater. Gas is the worst enemy of submarines which is the result of poor maintenance and neglect.

Obviously, the external threats are the hostile actions in anti-submarine warfare which we will discuss in separate articles.

SUBMARINE TIME UNDERWATER LIMITATION

Submarine time underwater is always limited and dependent upon the drain time of batteries, fuel, quality of air, morale of the crew under stressful prolonged submarine operation underwater.  A submarine is always running out of time and is very uncertain where everyone will depend on prediction works through ECHO or Acoustic signatures when a submarine navigates or loses a communication contact.  A submarine cannot or could hardly communicate in the deep.

Table 1

Records of Submarine Accidents Year 2000 to 2021

 

COUNTRY YEAR INCIDENT REMARKS
1.   Russian Navy August 2000 Kursk Submarine

Leak on Hydrogen Peroxide in the forward torpedo room triggered explosion of warhead

 

Total loss

2.  United States Navy February 2001 USS Greeneville collided with Ehime-Maru, due to poorly executed SONAR Sweep and ineffective periscope sweep

 

9 crewmen of Ehime-Maru killed
3.  United States Navy March 2002 USS Dolphin experienced severe flooding and fire inside of compartment Submarine  abandoned off San Diego California coast
4.  UK Royal Navy November 2002 HMS Trafalgar run approved close to skye aground Damage £5 Million pounds damage to hull; three (3) crewmen injured
5.  Australian Royal      Navy February 2003 HMAS Dechaineux, a Collins class submarine operating at maximum diving depth, high pressure pipes busted with flooding at Engine room. If the damage on high pressure pipes was not prevented, submarine would have been lost in the deep.
6. PLA Navy China May 2003 Mechanical malfunction in submarine Ming Class Submarine 361 Entire crew of 70 men all killed/lost at sea.

 

7. Russian Navy August 2003 Russian November Class Submarine K-159 sank in Barents Sea. 9 sailors killed
8.  US Navy October 2003 US Navy Los Angeles Class  submarine, the USS Hartford run aground in the Harbor of La Moddalena in the Mediterranean Sea. Worth of damage on Hull: US$9 million
9.  Unknown January 2004 Unidentified submarine got caught in the net of Fishing Trawler Breiz and sank during NATO Exercise Fishing Boat Sank.  Submarine was not identified
10. Royal Canadian

Navy

October 2004 HMCS Chicoutimi suffered fire onboard due to poor insulation of power cables due to sea water electrical arcing. Lt. Chris Saurders died due to suffocation from smoke.
11. US Navy July 2005 USS San Francisco while submerged collided with undersea-terrain. 97 sailors injured
12. Russian Navy August 2005 Priz-Class Deep submerged vessel entangled with fishing net; re-used by Royal Navy. Unable to free itself but rescued by Royal Navy Scorpio ROV

 

13.  US Navy September 2005 USS Philadelphia collided with Turkish Merchant Ship at Persian Gulf, 602 km Northeast of Bahrain. No personnel injuries; superficial damages.
14. Russian Navy September 2006 Victor Class Submarine

Danill Moskovsky, fire due to electrical problem.

Two (2) Crewmen died

 

15. US Navy December 2006 USS Minneapolis washed by heavy waves in Plymouth South, England. Four (4) crewmen washed away onboard, death of Senior Chief Huggins.
16. US Navy January 2007 USS Newport News submerged transmit at straight of Homes Persian Gulf collided with Japanese Tanker. No Casualty
17. Royal Navy March 2007 HMS Tireless explosion caused by air purification equipment at forward section of submarine. Two (2) crewmen died
18. Royal Navy May 2008 HMS Superb hit and collided with underwater rock, North Red Sea 130 km. from Suez. SONAR damaged and was decom-missioned from service.
19. Russian Navy November 2008 Russian K-152 Nepal Class Nuclear Submarine died of asphyxiation from gas leak. 20 Crewmen died
20. Royal Navy February 2009 HMS Vanguard and; HMS Triumphant collision in the Atlantic Ocean. No casualties or damage from being submerged

 

21.  US Navy March 2009 USS Hartford with USS New Orleans collision in the strait of Hormuz. No personnel and material damage
22. Indian Navy February 2010 Faulty Battery Valve leaked oxygen gas that resulted in fire onboard and caused explosion. One crewman killed and two were injured
23. Indian Navy August 2010 Crewmen and maintenance team washed away onboard by heavy seas. No casualty.  Crew were recovered from the sea by helicopter.
24. Royal Navy October 2010 HMS Astute ran aground on bars in the isle of Skye, Scotland. Vessel was emergency towed.  No personnel and materials casualties.
25. Royal Canadian

Navy

June 2011 HMCS Corner Brook ran aground in Nootka Sound of the coast of Vancouver Island. Minor injuries sustained on two crew members.
26. US Navy May 2012 Fire onboard during submarine scheduled maintenance. Submarine was decom-missioned.
27. US Navy October 2012 USS Montpellier with USS San Jacinto collided during exercise at periscope depth at the coast of Florida. No crew injured.  Cause of collision:  human error.
28. Indian Navy August 2013 INS Sundhurakshak kilo-class submarine sank after explosion caused by ordinance exploding onboard. 27 Sailors jumped overboard; 18 dead crewmen recovered during helicopter operations.
29.  Russian Navy September 2013 Oscar K-150 submarine caught fire onboard during welding activity on hull at Zvezda shipyard, Vladivostok. Damage to health of 15 crewmen of submarine

 

30. US Navy January 2013 USS Jacksonville collided with unidentical Merchant vessel at Persian Gulf. Lost one Periscope

 

31. Royal Navy July 2016 HMS Ambush collided with a Merchant Ship at the strait of Gibraltar. Significant damage to conning tower
32.  USA Navy August 2017 VC3 Nautilus suddenly sank. Scuttled
33. Argentine Navy November 2017 ARA San Juan with 44 crewmen missing off the coast of San Jorge Gulf Region. Search declared futile.  Hopes of rescuing alive crew abandoned.
34.  Indonesia Navy February 2021 KRI Nargala of Indonesian Angkatan Laut lost at sea at 2000 meters depth in the strait of Bali.  Explosions onboard during the torpedo firing exercise. Total lost; no survivor recovered.

SHALLOW WATER ATTACK SUBMARINE FOR A START

The Shallow Water Attack Submarine (SWATS) operates in extremely shallow water; can be a part or component of a coastal defense; and can be positioned against the hostile forces probable sea avenues of approach in ambush position intruding into territorial seas. This submarine can engage another submarine or surface hostile vessels. She can stay motionless in a quiet mode waiting for the targets to intrude within the killing radius, and lay anti-ship/anti-submarine mines The SWATS can carry complements of a team of Special Warfare Group as a Commando with limpet mines that can be attached to the bottom hull of hostile target while at anchor. In case of submarine accident, escape from the ill-fated submarine in shallow water (less than 100 meters) is possible through flotation suit with supply of oxygen tank.

AFFORDABILITY AND SUSTAINABILITY WITH SUFFICIENT DEFENSIVE FIREPOWER

A flotilla of SWATS (3 x Midget Submarine) rough order price magnitude including training, base support facilities can be roughly achieved at an initial cost of US$75M (more or less) as compared to the top of the line diesel electric submarine with Independent Power System which roughly costs US$900M to US$1.20B for 3 x units with integrated logistic support for a number of years.

Fig. 1 – Shallow Water Attack Submarine

Specifications:

Length overall 27.28 meters
Height overall 5.59”
Pressure Hull Diameter 2.30”
Pressure Hull Length 19.10”
Displacement 102 tons (surfaced);

110 tons (sub-merged)

 
Operation Depth In excess of 100 m
Test Depth In excess of 100 m
Max. speed (surfaced) 9 KTS (on diesel engine)
Max. speed (submerged) 6 KTS (on batteries)
Endurance Over 1000 NM on diesel engine; Over 40 NM on batteries
Complement 14 (6 operators + 8 commandos)
Armament Torpedo Firing Tubes, Mine Laying Hooks
  • with two MK 5, torpedoes, limpet mines and bottom laid sea mines, MK 5 Torpedo – speed 27-40 knots, effective range 1000-4000 yards homing with acoustic guidance system (active passive);
  • 15-20 days (more or less) depending on the drain time of battery usage.

INVINCIBILITY OF SUBMARINES

The submarine is the most feared adversary of surface naval commanders in areas of conflict. The only way to defect a submarine while underwater through acoustic signatures but once detected, her invincibility is lost and the effective use of the submarine weapons system is denied.  So, instead of a submarine being the hunter, she became now the hunted. Whereas, the shallow water attack submarine (SWATS) in stationary ambush position in shallow water is motionless and very silent with only batteries supplying power to the submarine systems, can conserve power and is very difficult to defect. The SWATS is also a diesel electric submarine with AIP.

RECOMMENDATIONS

A Navy should start first as a beginner in a modest and simple submarine warfare capability, affordability, sustainably defensive mode, and sufficiently supplied application of firepower within financial bounds. It can be deliberately achieved as the Navy approaches maturity.

Whereas a top of the line Diesel Electric Submarine with Air Independent Power is an offensive weapon mainly capable of conducting preemptive strike to hostile forces operating base outside of our territory may not be within the provision in our constitution.  The extra capabilities of Diesel Electric top of the line submarine however can be used also for defensive modes.

About the Researcher:

  1. Retired Navy Captain of the Philippine Navy 2004.
  2. Registered Civil Engineer and Naval Architect with post graduate study in Submarine Design, University College of London, 1998 (under the sponsorship of the UK Ministry of Defense).
  3. Served as Consultant with DOTR/PCG on JICA Ship Acquisition Project for 3 years.
  4. Presently a member of the Editorial Board of the Maritime Review.

REFERENCES:

  1. COSMO S.P.A. Shallow Water Attack Submarine, EDR Magazines.
  2. Sad Records of Submarine Disaster by Christopher Drew, N.Y. Times.com
  3. University College of London Submarine Design Lecture Packaged.
  4. Piranha Class Midget Submarines, Marconi Marine (VSEL) Limited Marketing Services, Barrow-in-Furness, Cumbria.
  5. Prakash Panncerselvan, Pakistan New Midget Submarine Emerging Challenge to India in the Arabian Sea, April 29, 2020.
  6. Cosmos-Class Submarines.

1 Comment on "Deliberate Acquisition of Submarine Warfare Capability of a Navy"

  1. Since we have a penchant for things US. And we do not have any simulator of sorts. We should construct perhaps a mock-up that does not sail.
    Or purchase a decomissioned submarine to maintain and refurbish as a museum to gain maintenace experience without the risk of life…
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Marlin_(SST-2)

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